DisOrientated - A Weblog by Philip Sen - Who Would Win the War?

July 22, 2004

Who Would Win the War? - Analysis

There's been so much talk about it recently, but there's one question remaining: who would win? As a former naval reporter at Jane's, publishers of renowned journals Jane's Defence Weekly and Jane's Fighting Ships, I think I'm qualified to come up with a sketch analysis of this issue.

I will emphasise that having left Jane's two years ago my knowledge is rusty. Moreover, accurate intelligence on current Chinese naval capabilities is rare. But blowing my trumpet I'd still say that my educated assumptions should bear some credibility among China bloggers (though not necessarily on an international political level).

Question 1: Would America Intervene?

There's no doubt about it – if the US doesn't intervene then China will take back Taiwan in a period of days if not hours. The Taiwanese military would be nothing more than a speedbump, and we’ve all seen Chinese drivers flying over speedbumps.

Assurances from the US to the Taiwanese have been ambivalent of late, but ultimately it would be in US interests to at least intervene diplomatically to prevent a war. The economic consequences of any conflict would inevitably be dire. Investors would flee from both Chinas (PRC and Taiwan), Hong Kong would probably also panic and the event would possibly trigger an Asian if not a world crash and recession.

Furthermore, a Taiwan war would also politically destabilise the entire region, especially if China were seen to 'get away with aggression'. Given the momentum received after a Taiwan war it might be tempted to set its sights on the Spratly Islands and other contested territories. Maoist insurgents in various countries would probably be boosted and it could lead to a larger low-level regional conflict.

On the other hand, if there's one thing that will dissuade the US from military intervention it's bodybags. Dead American boys do not win elections, something both George W Bush and John Kerry are both aware of. Hopefully.

Question 2: Naval Power

Taiwan is an island: the war would be an amphibious invasion. According to reputable analysts GlobalSecurity.org, the projected 2005 combat strengths of the oddly-titled People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are as follows:

67 submarines
0 aircraft carriers
1 'aviation ship' (helicopter carrier)
644 other surface combatants, including mine warfare and amphibious vessels

I could only find 2001 figures for the US Navy (USN) but they are:

72 submarines
12 aircraft carriers
207 other surface combatants

Update: It's been pointed out that the figures I originally gave for 'nuclear submarines' were erroneous - I should have remembered that the USN has no non-nuclear powered boats. The figures I gave probably did confuse nuclear-powered with ballistic nuclear missile capable - since I'm unable to access certain websites from China at the moment I can't get an accurate confirmation so think it's best to leave it out.

So it would seem that the PLAN has the numerical advantage. It's also true that the US would only be able to deploy a fraction of its full strength, perhaps a couple of carrier battle groups (CVGs) and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) while the PLAN would have the advantage of being able to call on reinforcements from its own region.

But one of the buzzwords these days is 'force multipliers' and the US has loads of them. A force multiplier is basically advanced technology that makes one of your ships, aircraft or tank worth three, four, five of theirs. And with the kit the USN has you can bet that each of theirs is worth 10 of the PLAN’s.

This isn't a biased patriotic statement (I'm British, so have no reason to favour the US): it’s a statement of cold logic. The Chinese are not known for their technology and it’s another good bet that a high proportion of the 600 odd vessels listed above are obsolete or even unserviceable.

That isn't to say that the PLAN hasn't got some good kit. For example, it's been ordering Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia armed with Moskit/Sunburn anti-ship missiles. Along with the PLAN's submarines these are what the Taiwanese are most afraid of, and they would put up a good fight.

However, naval warfare is all about seeing and not being seen and this is where US systems are still understood to be head and shoulders above others. American radar, especially the SPY-1 variants in the Aegis systems, have far more range and capability than Russian or Chinese. If you don't believe it, look at the amount of nations clamouring to buy Aegis compared to those trying to offload Russian kit.

With these force multipliers in place, the USN can probably blow the PLAN out of the water with ease. The biggest danger is that it'll run out of missiles: even assuming only a 10% hit rate, it probably won't.

Taiwan has four subs and 113 combat ships, hardly worth mentioning.

Question 3: Airpower

Modern war is aerial war. I'm not going to go into another count-up of numerical superiority – suffice it to say that the PLA Air Force has plenty more aircraft than the US.

However, there's one thing the PLA hasn't got and that's an aircraft carrier. Yes, it can launch planes from mainland bases, but it's not going to be able to station them close in to the littoral zone like the USN can. It's either going to have to have aircraft return to base after sorties – which will involve a time delay – or it's going to have to refuel its aircraft in the air. That's a risky business with enemy ships and aircraft around. Moreover, it's not yet possible to re-arm aircraft in flight.

Add to this the USAF's force-multiplying technology and you have a recipe for badly losing air superiority and thus badly losing the war.

Question 4: Would the US get there in time?

All of the above assumes that there’s already combat-ready USN battle groups in the area, probably steaming in from bases in Korea and Japan. It would take longer for them to arrive from Pearl Harbour and other Pacific locations.

If the USN wasn’t quick enough, then it’s possible that the PLA would be able to establish a beachhead on Taiwan. After that, it would be game over. The Taiwanese would put their hands up straight away. America is never going to go in to a ground war against a dug-in and determined Chinese enemy, which would mean enormous casualties on both sides.

It’s also possible that despite all my talk about force multipliers, due to sheer numbers some PLA naval, amphibious and aerial forces may be able to slip past the USN even if it got there in time. In that case they may be able to do some damage in Taiwan, though they might end up cut off from their own forces and supplies.

It all depends on how much warning the US would have and how quick they would be to act.

In terms of intelligence, I think it highly unlikely that the US has much in the way of decent intel on the PRC though it certainly has plenty sources in Taiwan. The most obvious warning of course is going to be a Taiwanese declaration of independence, and it's safe to assume the White House would know about that in advance. Then there could be the problems of congressional and public opposition to sending the navy in, not to mention political dithering.

Conclusions:

My conclusions are simple. If the US decides to intervene and it does it fast enough, the PRC will probably not be able to take Taiwan. But no plan ever survives contact with the enemy: the only predictable thing about war is its unpredictability. There could be some unforeseen factor that would throw this all out of balance.

If the PRC were to pre-emptively attack Taiwan it might beat the USN in the race to the island but it would probably mean the end of the economic boom. Investors would lose their nerve and the UN could possibly impose sanctions.

If Taiwan declared independence, the PRC would have its provocation but the US would have its early warning.

If the US intervened, it would be no Iraq. Though it would most likely win, the numerical advantage of the Chinese is such that at least some US vessels and aircraft are going to get hit. US casualties would probably top a thousand. This may not be politically expedient.

Chinese casualties would be in the tens of thousands.

There's no point entering a war unless you know you can win. It then becomes a question of which will cause less face-loss to the CCP: standing by when Taiwan declares independence or losing to the US. If it does turn into a turkey-shoot then the CCP's grip on power is going to weaken considerably as the people lose patience and respect.

The buck basically stops with Taiwan.

I personally think that for Taiwan to spark conflict over the question of its independence would be an act of monumental stupidity. The economies of both Taiwan and the PRC would probably collapse, thousands could die and no-one would benefit. It would be better to maintain the status quo.

But national leaders do sometimes behave with monumental stupidity, as we've already seen in the recent past. Let's hope reason prevails.

Appendix:

Well worth looking at Global Security's Taiwan links pages.

You can read some of the bloggers' rhetoric and debate here:

http://www.josephbosco.com/2004/07/china-will-go-to-war-if-taiwan.html
http://www.brainysmurf.org/archives/001165.html
http://www.the-eleven.com/~tjlegg/index.php?wl_mode=more&wl_eid=197
http://vodkapundit.com/archives/006167.php
http://pekingduck.org/archives/001500.php
http://angrychineseblogger.blog-city.com/read/735286.htm
http://gweilodiaries.com/archives2/000607.html
http://www.zonaeuropa.com/01738.htm
http://windsofchange.net/archives/005210.php

Posted by Sendover at July 22, 2004 12:17 PM | TrackBack

Comments

Phil,

Excellent piece of reporting and analysis.

To me the most important wild cards are the U.S. and the proportions of its response; and the events that lead to war. If China attacks without a major provocation—without a straight-out declaration of independence by Taiwan—the U.S. would be more likely to intervene on a large scale. In other words, everything the U.S. has other than troops on the ground in direct combat with the PLA, and nuclear weapons.

If the provocation is deliberate and against the expressed warnings of several U.S. administrations, and the PLA moves quickly, I believe the U.S. response would be a major effort at threatening full-scale war while trying very hard to broker a cease-fire.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not forgotten the ferocity with which the PLA fought U.S. troops in Korea; I do not believe the U.S. will ever put troops into major combat with the Chinese again unless there is no other alternative. And without engaging and defeating the PLA and then occupying Chinese territory, there can be no military "victory" over Chinese forces. We then end up with another "stalemate" truce in Taiwan quite similar to the one still present in Korea after much loss of life and economic destruction. This is particularly true if the PLA is able to establish a significant combat presence on the ground in southern Taiwan and the smaller islands.

I lived for a year in Xiamen, Fujian; I have taken a boat ride around Little Jinmen and seen the Taiwanese defenses and troops. I have also had the opportunity to watch the PLA and the PLAN conduct beachhead landing exercises and I can simply say never have I seen such discipline and coordination. I believe the PLA will have troops on the ground in Taiwan quickly. I believe you suggested that would pretty much mean “endgame.” The world would then have another divided piece of territory, another DMZ with daily military incidents; and, of course, the Asian market boom would be a big bust.

There must be a political solution to this problem.

Posted by: Joseph Bosco at July 22, 2004 02:22 PM

I stand corrected on the first comment, perhaps my information was incorrect or misread. I though it odd that there were no SSNs.

Joseph, thanks for your analysis with which I mostly agree. To me, it all depends on how quickly the PLA can get boots on the ground in Taiwan. Amphibious landing ships and paratroops may be able to break through a USN blockade with diversions and very clever strategy. Were this to occur in numbers, the Taiwanese army would be in very big trouble, especially if the shock troops could secure both a beachhead and airfield.

Posted by: Sendover at July 22, 2004 03:55 PM

I think that China would do a lot of damage simply by piling on the troops and the ancient jets until Taiwan ran out of bullets, then it would send in the brand new SU-27s and Mig-29s that it's been buying from Russia to finish the task.

China would also deploy or try to convince the world that it had deployed, submarines in the Pacific in order to keep US aircraft carriers on the deffensive.

Whether or not this tactic would win a war it would certainly would leave a few scares.

We must also note that if Taiwan won, with or without US assistance, the damage to its economy would be crippling, people would not be willing to invest in Taiwan after a war in case there was another war, Taiwan's infrastructure would be decimated in certain key areas and the amount that it would have to spend on deffence and reconstruction would be crippling even with US financial backing.

Taiwan might be better of copitulating than winning, at least with a puppet government its' economy and infrastructure would remain intact. Hong Kong survived the handover to the Chinese. It might be far more restricted than it was before but nobody died and its' economy is still one of the most vibrant in Asia.

Posted by: angry Chinese Blogger at July 22, 2004 06:29 PM

I see a couple of major flaws in this analysis (besides the miscounted nuclear submarines).

First, if the PLA/PLAN forces do manage to get a beachhead on Taiwan, they have to reinforce and resupply. And the US would try its best to keep men and material from crossing the Strait. If you can strangle the forces on the ground, it doesn't take long before they have no option but to surrender. The PRC would have a difficult time denying the air/sea space to US forces, while conversely the US could effective prohibit major resupply efforts by the PLAN and PLAAF. If you can't feed your troops, give them bullets, and send replacements to replace the ones killed or wounded in combat, you are up the Formosa Strait without a paddle.

It is conventional wisdom that one should never get involved in a land war in Asia. Getting involved with a war on a relatively small island, when you can deny enemy use of air and sea to a very large degree is another matter entirely.

Then there is the general fitness and training of opposing forces. In general, communist military forces (and lets not mince words, the PRC despite its growing economic freedom is still a ruthless communist oligarchy) tend to be overly dogmatic and unable to adapt to rapidly changing situations. Their training tends to follow predictable scripts. I have no reason to think that the PLA is any different.

The only previous war we can go on is the Korean conflict, and that is not a useful comparison because the Chinese were able to use railroads, trucks, and boots to move their troops to the Yalu river in protected territory. Even then, they only managed to advance to the approximate pre-war border before the advance was halted. Also, that was when there was less of a technological disparity between forces.

In short, the PRC probably could occupy portions of Taiwan, for a somewhat limited amount of time (a few months, at the most), but without the ability to secure their supply lines the effort would fail. I don't see the Taiwanese rolling over immediately, knowing that they have support of the US.

I think the leadership of the PRC knows this, and has known it for a long time, and will not risk losing face at home and abroad.

Posted by: Bill at July 22, 2004 11:05 PM

It's a fair point about the supply lines, but I'm still fairly convinced that the Taiwanese army wouldn't put up much of a fight especially if they were left on their own for a while.

Once the PLA have dug in and established themselves they would be extremely difficult to remove. They'd be able to obtain supplies through the many sympathisers in Taiwan itself, and they'd be able to loot the Taiwanese army's supplies.

Never forget that is was Mao Zedong who applied Sun Tzu's theories to create the model for modern guerrilla warfare, something the US has shown itself conspicuously unable to manage in Vietnam and Iraq. Guerilla war in the urban jungles of Taiwan would be an incredibly erosive business on any US ground forces engaged, and bodybags don't vote.

As for the dogmatism point, yes, but it's nothing to do with communism. These boys, ill trained and inflexible as they are, are actually truly motivated and believe in a united China. It's nationalism, not Maoism. They'd be hard to beat once they got a foothold.

Posted by: Sendover at July 23, 2004 12:49 AM

There is one more possibility that everyone is overlooking. That the CCP, faced with the possibility of defeat, losing power, and losing what is perceived to be Chinese territory, would use the nuclear trump card. The threat of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield or even, god forbid, a possible strategic nuclear attack would almost for certain forestall or deter a U.S. intervention. The ultimate battle over the Taiwan straights is a contest of wills between China and the United States. Each having to calculate how far the other will go to acheive their ends. If the PRC is willing to engage in a nuclear showdown to reclaim its territory, the U.S. may very well decide that Taiwan is not worth the possible outcomes.

Posted by: Jing at July 23, 2004 01:16 AM

Horrible analysis. Reminds me of another Falklands war, writ large. I think we know what happened to the Argentine generals in the end. I do agree that American forces will be entirely Naval and Air. But I somehow don't see much of a fifth column developing in Taiwan clamoring for the freedoms and lifestyle of their cousins across the strait. Just the opposite in fact.

Finally, while there is no chance of a CCP victory any time in the next ten years given even a modicum of backbone on our and Taiwan's part, time is not on our side. The sooner Foggy Bottom encourages all parties to acknowledge the reality of Taiwan independence, the better. If this causes China to run around in shame like a chicken with their head cut off, all the better.

Posted by: Lloyd at July 23, 2004 03:10 AM

One of the hazards for China in this war would be having its coast blockaded. The US has enough attack submarines to devastate shipping from Chinese ports. With a largely export-driven economy China would pay a big price for the war.

OTOH, China might attack even if it thinks it has a slim chance of winning. This is the Falklands scenario--if the government fears losing enough popular support to be overthrown, it could launch a war in the hopes that victory would sustain them for a few more years.

If Taiwan can keep the morale of its army from collapsing they can probably survive even a large invasion. US air power will cripple the Chinese troops on the ground and cut off reinforcement, while other Asian nations may supply more ground troops to put the brakes on Chinese adventurism. I'd see a long struggle ended by the collapse of the Chinese government because of economic dislocations, or escalation to nuclear war.

Posted by: Karl Gallagher at July 23, 2004 03:39 AM

"One of the hazards for China in this war would be having its coast blockaded. The US has enough attack submarines to devastate shipping from Chinese ports. With a largely export-driven economy China would pay a big price for the war."

Yes, but they wouldn't be the only ones. Those exports play a rather important role in the US and world economies. I'm not sure whether or not the effects would be worse for the PRC than for the US. I'm certain that it would be worse for the US government than the CCP.

Posted by: Duane at July 23, 2004 04:28 AM

You wrote for Jane's, but thought the USN only had 18 nuclear submarines. I think you might want to assume that a similar gap may likley exist in the rest of your analysis, and adjust accordingly. Your assumptions of PLAN combat effectiveness are wildly optimistic. Saddam Hussein had lots of second-hand toys too, for all the good it did him. Twice. And much dryer conditions...

You should read up on our kill ratios latley. A couple of Aegis and an MEU, with a few SSN pickets, ought to be able to handle things just fine.

Posted by: John at July 23, 2004 05:08 AM

I've heard this comment from several other people, that other Asian nations would somehow get involved in a war over Taiwan. I've been argueing against the Tom Clancification (my own creation ^_^) of foreign policy for a while now but it seems to be such a popular approach. Realistically, how likely is it that other neighboring nations, namely South Korea or Japan would intervene militarily. Just take into account the political realities on the ground and you'll realize that neither country will even remotely be involved. As for the submarine force torpedoing commercial shipping, this scenario is even more preposterous.

Posted by: Jing at July 23, 2004 05:19 AM

My two cents:

1) Air: Most of the PLAAF is obsolete Soviet-era junk (MiG-19 and 21 knockoffs), and their pilots recieve nowhere near as much training as either the Taiwanese or USAF/USN pilots. In addition, China has only a rudimentary mid-air refueling capability, limiting the amount of time any fighter or bomber could remain on station. This could be somewhat solved if the outlying Pescadores islands could be captured and airfields quickly constructed, but that would pose its own problems.

2) Ground: Taiwan has a standing army of 200,000, plus another 1.5 million reserves specifically trained for counter-landing operations. Given Chinese technological and training disadvantages, they will have to land at least 1 million troops on Taiwan with only 300 landing craft.

3) Navy: The majority of Chinese ships do not have the capability to defend themselves against modern mines or air-launched anti-shipping missiles. This is especially true of their amphibious and support vessels.

4) Logistics/Intelligence: There is no way the Chinese could mass the amount of equipment and men needed into Fujian or Shanghai without anyone noticing. Satellites, comm intercepts, and even human sources could quite easily indicate that an invasion was in the works, giving Taiwan time to prepare.

5. Terrain: According to the maps (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/images/taiwan-terrain.gif) at Global Security, about half of the west coast of Taiwan is mud flats, which could easily bog down landing ships, armor, and artillery. To avoid them, Chinese forces would either have to assault a densely-populated coastal area like Kaohsiung or the Taipei suburbs, concentrate their landing forces on two or three scattered plains-type beach heads, or sail around and land on the mountainous east coast.

Also, you may want to add (http://denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2003/12/InvasionofTaiwan.shtml) to your list of Taiwan entries.

Fire away.

Posted by: Thief at July 23, 2004 05:53 AM

Everything I've read and heard about the Taiwanese military suggests vast numbers of them would go over to the mainland side or just plain desert. Where does the assumption that they would actually put up any real resistance come from? As for independance giving the US early warning, wouldn't sending ships to the straits early enough to deter an attack kinda give the game away, giving China enough warning to alter its strategies? Yup, there is a bit too much Tom Clancification going on here.

Posted by: chriswaugh_bj at July 23, 2004 12:13 PM

Your all selling China rather short on determination and military power, and have forgotten about all of those mig-29s and SU-27 that China is packing, also you've forgotten that the rules of engagement for both sides are distinctly different.

Us forces operate to minimise risk to personnel, they fly from long sitance air bases and use tankers that can't enter a live fire zone (during the Balklands US pilots loved the British tankers because they could refuel them anywhere, and the US had to issue speed and other stimulants to keep their pilots alert on long runs), and they are answerable to the US public who get angry at the sight of American body bags, no matter how just the war.

On the other hand China will pile troops on top of troops, soldiers who are used to operating with maximun risk and in far worse conditions than their US counterparts.

Chinese troops can survive longer on low rations and in poor conditions that US troops (see Vietnam) and their equippment is rough and ready and able to survive longer without repairs, this closes some of the gap.

Your not compairing like with like here, America and Taiwan have high technology but are restricted by their rules of engagement, a ninety percent casulty ratio is not acceptable to them. China on the other hand has short supply lines, strength of numbers, and is willing to sacrifice its own men to win, the Chinese will also fight harder and can fight with less support, your not going to exaust the PLA but you can exaust the US and Taiwanese forces.

America also can't bomb the Chinese mainland or destroy it's ships in port, this would create an internaitonal president, remember the UK couldn't bomb Argentina, that would be very dangerous. But even if they did China wouldn't dare to use nuclear weapons, the damage to its international reputation would be worse than if it lost the war.

Japan can't intervien because of its pacafist constitution though it would allow US forces to be station in its base and South Korea would be too afraid of the North taking advantage of the conflict and attacking to contribute substantial troops or vehicles to the fray.

This leaves high technology and low risk fighting staying power and strength of numbers.

Look at Russia and Germany during world war two, Germany had superior technology (until a new family of Russian tanks was built) and better trained soldiers, it also had air superiority, yet it was worn down by a larger army.

The outcome of a war is not a sure thing, I put my money on China and Taiwan reaching the brink and then pulling back before a shooting war breaks out and then each side simmering for a bit before anouncing that they forced the other to back down from the fight.

Posted by: angry Chinese Blogger at July 23, 2004 02:04 PM

I don't know about defecting or deserting, but the loyalty of the RoC army is suspect. Actually, to attack the situation from another angle, the RoC army is perhaps very loyal. Loyal to the Republic of China, and not to any separate political entity of Taiwan. Though all of this is uncertain, the possibility exists (one more probable than many of the others bandied about) that the RoC army may not even fully mobilize or resist. Here is an editorial originally from the Taipei Times, a shoddy English language Taiwanese paper that is notoriously pro-green. I'd have linked to it, but it seems the original article is gone now.

Editorial: `Territorial integration' or treason?

Monday, Jun 14, 2004,Page 8
Yesterday saw 1,000 ex-generals meet in a Taipei's Ta-an Park to rail against President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) as being a "a sinner to harm territorial integration," as the ex-general and former premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝伯村) put it. Hau, who has always been contemptuous of democratic values and steadfastly supported the Mainlander ascendency, told Chen that he "must respect the generals' will."

Some people might think that this is a triumph of free speech -- and it certainly is worth pointing out that such a meeting would not have been allowed when Hau sat atop the greasy pole. But the meeting forces us to address again a question that seems to be at the heart of the conundrum that is Taiwanese liberal democracy: Where is the line between tolerance and irresponsibility?

These were 1,000 ex-generals, remember, not bank managers or schoolteachers, nothing so innocuous. A thousand men who until quite recently were supposed to lead the armed forces in providing security for the nation. Yet it is quite obvious from their wish for "territorial integration" that protecting Taiwan is the last thing on their minds.

It is hard to imagine anything like this happening anywhere else, no matter how tolerant the society or entrenched its democratic values. Imagine 1,000 retired US generals (to make the analogy fit, you would also have to imagine they were all foreign-born Muslims) meeting on the Mall in Washington to demand that George W. Bush cease punitive measures against al-Qaeda.

American society would be aghast. Why aren't we?

Some might say that people like has-been Hau simply don't matter anymore. But the problem is that the sentiments expressed by Hau and endorsed by his audience are almost certainly shared by a significant number of still-serving officers.

The military was, after all, simply an arm of the Chinese Nationalist Party, rather than the government, until that party lost power in 2000 -- and some readers will remember the reluctance of many senior officers to serve under a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. The military is perhaps the last secure bastion of the Chiang era's reunificationist sentiments, alien as they are to the majority of Taiwanese.

The very fact that so many retired senior officers can both threaten the president and show sympathy with the goals of Taiwan's enemy suggests that something is still very wrong with the military, despite the last four years of professionalization.

What people say in parks is an issue of free speech -- let Hau and his friends say what they like. But the reflection this cast upon the sentiments of the armed forces is a national security issue and of deep concern to us all. The DPP government has been discussing the issue of new national security legislation for a few years, mainly in response to pan-blue-affiliated civil servants defecting to China. What it wants to do is introduce a system of vetting to assess the trustworthiness of those who are involved with national security. The pan-blues have predictably called this "green terror" -- God forbid that they should ever find out what "green terror" actually would be if it ever happened -- but the system the government wants to put into place is no different from the security clearance systems used in the US and the UK.

This is something that the pan-green majority in the legislature resulting from December's elections will, we hope, speedily address. It might be liberal to tolerate Hau and his ilk, but it is folly to allow disloyalty in the armed forces, and the current don't-ask-don't-tell attitude about sentiment toward reunification and China is simply not good enough. A purge is necessary of both the military and the civil service if Taiwan's sovereignty is to be protected, and we need the legal means to effect this as quickly as possible.

Posted by: Jing at July 23, 2004 04:04 PM

Keep in mind that the PRC is exceptional at denial and deception.

Posted by: Prague at July 23, 2004 09:51 PM

The above comments about rules of engagement and capabilities of the ROC military vs American is very interesting. Flying from "long distance airbases, living on poor food and having rough and ready weapons" does not describe today's reality. If the US intervenes, carriers and bases in Taiwan will be available. Tankers in fire fights can't refuel. "Piling troops upon troops" describes a target rich enviroment. Also how does one transport those many troops with such little amphib support? If the US has the capability to project the power it does, WITHOUT nearby basing, just think what it can do with a nearby freindly land mass.

Posted by: Walker at July 25, 2004 12:55 PM

as implied in the taipei times article, there is also a very strong possibility that the military will revolt and stage a coup should abian proclaim independence.

a military takeover will stall a full scale chinese invasion and saves face for both sides of the straits and the us. the chinese will claim that the taiwanese wants a one china. the roc will claim that one china will happen sometime in the hazy future. the us will have status quo and continue to sell billions $$$$ worth of arms to roc.

Posted by: mw at July 26, 2004 06:06 PM

You assume a full-scale, frontal attack. Surely a more feasible scenario from Beijing's point of view would involve gradual infiltration of forces and agents into Taiwan over several years. Then - when the time is ripe - sudden declaration of an air/sea exclusion zone around the island with simultaneous sabotage from within and pinpoint air/sea strikes on airstrips and ports. Then switch on the charm and offer the Taiwan people a 1 country-2 systems deal they can't refuse.

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