Introduction

“There is no evil in the atom,” once said Adlai Stevenson, who ran unsuccessfully for the White House in the 1950s, “only in men’s souls”. But it would not seem that the current occupant is in agreement with him.

George W Bush’s infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in 2002, the first State of the Union address since the events of 11 September 2001, set the tone for global relations this decade. The twin evils of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, not to mention their solutions, became inextricably entwined.

Faced with this, world leaders and citizens alike wish to understand how things will develop. But to attempt to predict the future with theory is always dangerous. We must remember the words of Robert Cox: “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” Cox reminds us that theory is rooted in history, time and space: in a way there is no such thing as ‘theory’ in itself. Neo-realism, for example, can never be completely ‘value free’: all actors still understand the system in some unique manner that depends on their particular circumstances. Thus an American or European understanding of the world may well be very different to a Chinese understanding of it.

But lacking a crystal ball or a time-machine with which we can see the future, theory is all that we have. So, in the new world disorder dominated by a wounded and belligerent US set against the rampant economic growth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which theory predicts best where we are and what will happen? Will a bipolar order as predicted by the neo-realists emerge, or the more co-operative global society as envisioned by the neo-liberals?

By focussing on the major issues of the day in which both the US and China are involved we can examine how western policymakers, politicians, scientists and journalists generally 'perceive' China's role, interests and behaviour in global politics. Of the three states named in the ‘Axis of Evil’, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq has been dealt with by unilateral US / UK force despite opposition from the rest of the world. The North Korea crisis more or less remains on the table; the major powers appear to wish to resolve the problem between them and indeed Beijing chairs the irregular ‘six party talks’. We can thus see both of the ruling theories of IR being applied in real life circumstances; a 1-1 draw in the Realist v Liberal champions league.

But it leaves us with Iran. The UN Security Council can only deal with Iran with the consent of China; therefore, Iran is a useful test bed for discerning possible future patterns.

After establishing our theoretical understandings in the light of the neo-realist / neo-liberal debate, we can examine the US-China-Iran situation through weighing up the balance of interests. These interests, the dependent variables, include: strategic stability (maintaining regional security and a place in the world); domestic stability (keeping a grip on power at home); economic stability (keeping control of the domestic economy); and energy security (fuelling the above). Whether one’s view is realist or liberal, in these aspects the US and China have relatively similar aims.

Expanding on this, we can offer some sketchy hypotheses on the progress of the next few weeks and months. A neo-realist might say that Iran will become the subject of escalating superpower rivalry, over which China and the US compete through economic and technological sanctions or aid, propaganda, intelligence, weapons supplies and even covert or overt military action. On the other hand, the neo-liberal view would suggest that the US and China will together help negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement, perhaps encouraging Iran to reject its nuclear ambitions and join the fold of globalization as a valued node in the energy supply network.

Or will the situation evolve into something else altogether, something that we in the West have still not completely conceived? Western observers may be failing to understand many of the cultural differences in Chinese behaviour and attitudes, and our Western assumptions may not always be relevant or helpful. This paper is thus not so much about Iran as about theorising China. Do we really grasp the implications of what the economic dominance of an authoritarian regime governing 1.3 billion people means for the world? Perhaps a constructivist solution offers a viable alternative.

Theory – the importance of ‘interests’

Crucial to the analysis is an understanding of the differences between the theories in question – neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Though each divides and sub-divides into a number of different schools, from the qualified optimism of Francis Fukuyama to the doom-laden predictions of Samuel P. Huntingdon , it is probably best to define each via the ideas of two of their ‘founding fathers’, Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane.

According to Waltz, it is the structure of the political order that shapes outcomes. States, all of which are basically alike and act only in their national interests, are the most important actors and in a bipolar system there is a balance of power. Waltz was writing during the ‘Cold War’, an era that has now passed but no doubt still colours political judgements in Washington, Moscow and Beijing. During this period, the US and the USSR never met in battle but they did skirmish via ‘proxy conflicts’ such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, not to mention diplomatic storms such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Taking this theory to heart, we might consider the new world structure to be bipolar. The US and China are the key antagonists and power remains the only determinant of foreign policy. If this is the case then events in Iran should proceed in a similar form to the small, dirty wars of the last century, with the US asserting its hegemony through decisive action and China providing indirect economic and military assistance to Iran to counter it.

Turning to neo-liberalism, rather than becoming obsessed with state security and the balance of power, we should look to Keohane’s ideas of ‘complex interdependence’. While Keohane accepts that state power is still significant, institutions can facilitate co-operation. Both actors would consider economic welfare and the fate of the world in general as more important than the abstract notion of ‘power’.

Since the US and China are effectively economically interdependent (there are even some who argue that China already runs the world economy ), it is thus not in either of their interests for Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Such a development would fundamentally alter already fragile international relations in the Middle East; it would be a severe provocation to Israel at the very least, and could trigger an armed response that would lead to a wider conflict.

That would hardly be in either Chinese or US interests. At $75 per barrel, oil prices this year have already hit record highs and more military action in the Persian Gulf would only send them skyrocketing further, not to mention the risks of the whole region falling apart and the energy supply (over 60% of the world’s reserves are still in the Middle East) becoming dangerously disrupted.

Even from a liberal perspective, Iran’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could pose a threat that would irreparably damage the prospects of a peaceful solution to the Palestine and Iraq crises. It would destabilise the tenuous détente between Sunni and Shiite in the Middle East as a whole and thus the supply of oil to the world market, giving the global economy a deep shock along the way.

Under these considerations, the US and the PRC should therefore resolve the Iran crisis through international institutions such as the UN rather than through the bomb and the bullet. It is the intrinsic rationality of economic factors that will drive their final call, not the power posturing of neo-realism.

With this in mind, let us now take a look at the current situation regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

The backdrop to the current crisis

By the time you read this paper, events may have already unfolded another stage. The situation with Iran continues to be dynamic and we can only judge it with what information we have at this moment in time and space. Cox’s point (see Introduction) is amply proven.

The political assumption of the US is that nuclear weapons in the hands of the ‘Axis of Evil’ nations would endanger not only America and its interests, but the entire international community. Its policy, post 9/11, is to threaten sanctions and even military action against states developing nuclear technology and it opposes their right to develop it even for ostensibly peaceful means.

The US did not turn a blind eye to similar developments in South Asia back in the 1990s when India and Pakistan both tested nuclear weapons. On the other hand, during President Bush’s visit to India earlier this year, he effectively extended an invitation for India to join the ‘nuclear club’ by offering technological assistance. Pakistan is hardly short of US assistance either. American policy thus seems to be realist-inspired: impose power upon one’s enemies while encouraging balancing alliances through ‘bandwagoning’.

The consequences and ramifications of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ and the pre-emptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 do not need to be discussed here, but since, like Iran, the crisis over North Korea is ongoing, it does deserve brief attention. The perceived threat resurfaced in 2002, when North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK) announced that it had been involved in a uranium enrichment programme in order to develop nuclear weapons. Then followed Pyongyang’s declaration in February 2005 that it possessed the bomb. Though it remains in question whether or not it really is in possession of nuclear weapons (the statement might just be a swaggering bluff), US policy seems to be ‘better safe than sorry’.

The trouble for the US is that it has little leverage over North Korea. It can’t risk unleashing another war in the Korean peninsula, especially one that might just involve nuclear weapons. The only way it can influence the DPRK is through China, which can hold Kim Jong Il to ransom by cutting off supplies of food and energy.

Thus, when the US is constrained by other powerful parties such as China, and is afraid that it may be at a military disadvantage against the ‘rogue state’ with which it is dealing, its policy is less clear than it was over Iraq. It must accept co-operation. Likewise, when China realises that it can influence a situation, it takes advantage (North Korea), though it will stand back and avoid confrontation if it feels it must (Iraq).

How does the Iran situation compare? There is one essential assumption, for a start. This is the assumption that Iran is indeed developing nuclear technology with the aim of building nuclear weapons – either for its own use or, even worse, to sell to terrorists. Such is the view of American realist par excellence, Henry Kissinger:

For an oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources. What Iran really seeks is a shield to discourage intervention by outsiders in its ideology-based foreign policy.

The very fact that Iran has been concealing some of its nuclear technology programmes from the IAEA indicates that something untoward is going on. Other motivations could include the perceived nuclear threat from Israel and the US, and the fact that Saddam’s Iraq (a regime that inflicted WMD upon Iran during the 1980s war) was believed to be developing nuclear technology too.

Iran certainly seeks to improve its international standing, and to be accepted as a regional power in the Middle East: existing US sanctions only increase its feeling of victimisation and it would like to find a way out. Other aims may include a way to negotiate the unfreezing of Iranian assets and some form of security guarantee from the US. Since 1996, American sanctions over Iran (the Iran Libya Sanctions Act - ILSA) have denied the country the opportunity to fully benefit from globalisation and have certainly hampered economic development.

But another goal for Iran is economic advantage. Given its unique geographical position and bountiful energy resources, it could position itself as a hub for the transit of oil, gas and goods between the Gulf and East Asia, especially China. With a nuclear umbrella, it could dissuade the US from enforcing its commercial and diplomatic will in the region and gain untold political and economic advantage.

China’s interests in Iran

China’s very stability depends on its continued economic growth, and this growth needs fuel. The demand for energy is massive, amounting to around 40 billion kilowatt hours every year. Although much of it comes from coal, which can be mined locally, an increasing proportion of China’s energy needs are met by oil and gas. The International Energy Agency predicts that by 2030, net oil imports will reach 10m barrels per day, representing over 8% of world demand.

So China’s economic interests in the Middle East are obvious. The region currently supplies around 57% of China’s oil. And China’s logical partner in the region is Iran. Even before since the discovery of a further 132 billion barrels of oil in Iran in 2004, China’s interest has been keen, and annual Sino-Iranian trade currently totals around $3.3bn. China is already the biggest consumer of Gulf crude oil and Iran is the second biggest supplier in the region, providing 13.6% of China’s oil imports. State oil company Sinopec has signed a massive $100bn deal with Iran to buy 10m tonnes of Liquid Natural Gas each year over 25 years, plus a 50% stake in the Yadavaran oilfield.

Other than oil, Sino-Iranian trade tots up to a massive $7bn. Chinese companies are heavily involved in building badly-needed transport infrastructure in Iran, which is China’s largest market for large projects and labour exports. China is also a key weapons supplier to Iran, not to mention the origin of some of its nuclear technology.

But what are China’s interests in the current nuclear dispute? Shanghai Fudan University’s Professor Dingli Shen lists five considerations:

1. Iran’s right under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop civilian technology
2. China’s energy and industrial ties with Iran
3. The doctrine of nuclear non-proliferation
4. Protecting the Sino-American relationship
5. Promoting the image of the PRC as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in world affairs.

China needs a stable Middle East almost as much as the US does, and anything that happens in Iran will inevitably have unforeseen consequences that could disrupt China’s energy supplies.

Through its energy and industrial ties with Iran, China has more reason than any of the other UN Security Council members to protect it. It also has more political and economic leverage over the Islamic Republic than any other state. At the time of writing, China is in a position to manage the whole affair in the UN Security Council via its veto: even by merely threatening to scupper US proposals on Iran sanctions, it wrests control from Bush’s hands. Or it could support the resolution and endanger its relationship with Iran, not to mention its oil supplies – but show itself to be a worthy strategic partner. Finally, it could simply abstain, which might diminish its role as an equal partner in world affairs for the time being but allow it to save face with both Iran and the US.

Therefore its choices are crucial. But what motivates it: realism or liberalism?

A neo-liberal perspective

If China really does aim to affirm its position as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in world affairs, then the liberal path of co-operation and dialogue through institutions such as the UN and the IAEA is the only road open to it. As a signatory to the NPT since 1992 (and to the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty in 1998, plus membership of the nuclear suppliers group gained in 2004), China is bound by its rules. It should therefore ensure that Iran complies too.

The crisis therefore provides the PRC with an opportunity to show the other powers that it ascribes to the institutional liberal agenda. It is already working on preventing North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, so it should put its money where its mouth is on Iran too.

However, remaining with the liberal agenda and the rule of international law, particularly dear to China’s heart is the idea of sovereignty enshrined in the UN charter. It is this doctrine that inspires China’s foreign policy disputes – most notably Taiwan. Meanwhile, since 9/11 the US has exhibited something of a disregard for the idea of sovereignty in favour of the idea of pre-emptive action. Since there is no specific law that bans Iran from developing civilian nuclear technology – in fact, under the NPT, this is a right – its sovereignty may be something that China wishes to protect. This kind of by-the-book liberalism does not necessarily provide a clear path for the PRC to follow.

A neo-realist perspective

The logic of a realist approach sounds just as compelling. Take the argument that China is brokering an agreement with the DPRK and is thus a responsible stakeholder on the world stage. This can easily be shot down by realist arguments. North Korea poses a problem to China: but Iran is a partner. Sanctions on Iran would mean the loss of massive amounts of Chinese trade.

Since China’s thirst for hydrocarbons is eventually going to place it into competition with the equally addicted USA, naturally (from a realist point of view) it may as well veto sanctions and begin strengthening its position with arms and advisors in places such as Iran.

It is also a moot point as to whether the PRC would follow to the letter any UN sanctions that were passed anyhow. Unafraid of the existing Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 – a unilateral measure taken by the Clinton administration that penalises companies investing in Iran – China’s position in the Iranian economy is now second to none, while Iran provides a significant proportion of China’s oil and gas requirements. They have become mutually interdependent. Though ending this cordiality via UN sanctions may not be the sole factor that triggers collapse in either the PRC or Iran, it could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.

Iran also shares with China an interest in countering or containing US hegemony and brokering a multipolar world order. There is little political will in the US to broker a solution that will allow Iran some dignity: and any solution dictated by America naturally makes Iran lose face. Therefore, should the situation escalate, Iran will inevitably turn to China, one of its few friends, placing Beijing in a difficult position. Should it back Iran and anger the US, or back off and forfeit its energy and logistical interests? In fact, it may even be to the PRC’s advantage to see a nuclear-armed Iran in the Middle East, since this might just make the oil supply a little safer against US military pressure in the Persian Gulf region.

On the other hand, China’s biggest economic interest of all is not Iran but America: last year’s trade surplus was a staggering $202bn. The US is critical for China’s future: it is the greatest source of trade, investment and technology by far. Thus the realist view is ambivalent: China cannot both scorn and appease the US at the UN. It does not appear that Waltz provides us with a satisfactory answer any more than Keohane. There are concrete and rational reasons for China to take various courses of action, and no simple judgement can be made.

A constructivist approach

To paraphrase the teachings of the Buddha, International Relations is full of suffering. The cause of suffering is desire; we might call it ‘interests’. And perhaps one of biggest failings in International Relations has been an insistence on the validity of rational choice theory, the idea that actors choose their paths in the pursuit of interests alone. It betrays what is in fact a disinterest in the internal workings of actors and a deep insensitivity to their own realities.

To eliminate suffering we must eliminate desire, and this obsession with ‘interests’ to boot. Is there a Third Way, a Noble Eightfold Path for International Relations, and specifically for China in the Iran crisis?

In his 2003 presidential address to the International Studies Association, Steve Smith outlined in more detail the flaws of rational choice theory, many of which may assist us in our reading of the PRC’s motives. One mistake is labelling political assumptions as technical realities:

There is no view from nowhere: all views make assumptions about actors, identities and interests, and all of them mix together statements about what is and what should be.

Again, Robert Cox’s guiding presence is felt. Smith goes on to list his 10 bugbears of current IR thinking:

1. The focus on the state as the unit of analysis

2. Distinction between inside and outside of the state

3. Distinction between economic and politics

4. The notion of human progression towards one end-state

5. Absence of consideration of gender and ethnicity

6. Definition of violence as war alone, ignoring ‘economic violence’

7. Stress on structure over agency

8. Idea of a universal rationality underlying all theories

9. Underplaying of the importance of the issues of identity

10. Domination of the search for explanation rather than understanding

Understanding China is not something that can be achieved by examining it as a simple state-entity with behaviour that mirrors identically that of other states. Though it is not hard to find authors who assume that its foreign policy approach is essentially ‘realist’ , in truth China is not just another billiard ball. More than this, China is not so much a state, but an empire, a civilisation, a culture and an ethnic group – even a political party. To label it as a state is simply fallacious, just as it is to expect it to conform to state behaviour as we know it.

Understanding China

There are as many factors to take into account as commentators who make them. First of all, China’s current ‘rise’ is extraordinarily rapid – averaging around 9% growth per year. Some might say that this is a ‘miracle’, but the real explanation is simple: China has abandoned the ideologically-driven and incompetent policies of the past and embraced its own form of market capitalism – ‘Capitalism with Chinese characteristics’, we can call it – by harnessing the massive labour force of its 1.3 billion people. Such unprecedented growth colours Chinese thinking on everything.

While, like the US, China sees an essentially anarchic world order in which it is no longer the ‘Middle Kingdom’, it knows that without access to global markets, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), energy supplies and Western technology its industrial boom will die on its feet. Thus its very economic power is both its main strength and its weakness.

It was China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 that set it upon this path of no return. Despite its historical insularity, the much-coveted membership of this institution put the international focus on China and its economy like never before. But even five years on, China seems to prefer doing things its own way, rather than the WTO and the international community’s way.

Reform is at best slow and at worst non-existent. Only last year did the PRC relax the fixed exchange rate of the Yuan to bring it more in line with international expectations, and even then it was by half-measures. Banks and capital markets remain a mess. And Chinese markets are not nearly as open as they should be under international standards: the EU found in 2005 that China fulfilled just one out of five criteria of a true market economy. What at first appears like laudable engagement and economic liberalisation in reality is not altogether what it appears.

It is a point not lost on EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, who recently called on China to “apply rather than circumvent the rules.” When it comes to membership of multilateral institutions, China doesn’t always play fair. International institutions are sometimes nothing but ‘decoration’ to conceal the true policy within. Rather than conforming to the rules of the international community, according to Ross Terrill China’s foreign policy actions have various ulterior motivations. First among these is supporting the party-state; then building wealth through mercantilism; then being perceived as an equal to America and a leading force in Asia, while supporting the idea of ‘One China’. It is a complex cocktail indeed.

From a semi-official Chinese perspective, the prevalent policy is one of “a developmental path to a peaceful rise”. Commentators such as Zheng Bijian emphasise that China remains a poor country, challenged by a lack of resources; its emergence is thus driven by capital rather than power projection. The challenges are to transcend both “the old model of industrialisation” and the “traditional ways for great powers to emerge” i.e. through the plundering of resources and the pursuit of hegemony.

However, what he doesn’t mention is that China’s developmental aspirations are matched by something akin to paranoia. History is of vital importance in Chinese culture, and after the humiliations of the 19th and 20th centuries at the hands of the West, the nation now feels that it is re-emerging into a period of prosperity, a new renaissance of the precedence it enjoyed during its greatest moments such as the Tang dynasty (618-907AD). But it notes two aspects of contemporary history with particular care: the undignified collapse of the Soviet Union; and the belligerent posturing of a US hegemon it conceives as trying to restrain it. “An objectively secure nation of China is interestingly displaying a strong sense of insecurity,” writes Fei-Lin Wang. Once a great power, always a victim.

Another irony is the link between development and authoritarian rule, something that surely lies to rest hypotheses such as that laid out by Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man. The governing Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) top concern is preserving its own power. It cannot allow China to derail from the track of its stunning development; such a disaster would not only dislodge the Party but it could throw the country into disorder. And there is currently no viable alternative to the party: its challenge is to maintain the domestic status quo and continue to provide effective governance in a time of immense change. The interests of the CCP thus become the interests of the PRC.

Of most concern to the Party in Beijing is the gap between rich and poor. There are millions of unemployed or underemployed workers in the countryside, where levels of development are little improved on those seen during the Qing Dynasty. Every day, thousands of so-called ‘farmers’ from the rural areas stream into eastern China’s prospering cities, creating a tense social dynamic that the Party fears could erupt at any time. At the moment it is doing its best to raise the standard of living in the countryside, but despite the iron hand of the government, land-reform and other protests are on the increase.

When there is a conflict between liberalisation and social conflict, therefore, policy that helps keep the CCP in control comes out on top every time. First and foremost it does as it sees fit to manage its own problems. What on the outside looks like a shining example of liberalisation sometimes is anything but. The financial system is a case in point. Despite the lip service to a free market, much of China’s heavy manufacturing sector remains state-controlled. Loss making factories are propped up by state banks, which in turn are held together by the Chinese people’s propensity to save. Should any one of these elements come apart, the whole artificial edifice would tumble. It is more important to hold it together than to truly liberalise.

Predicting outcomes for the Iran crisis

So, with all the above in mind, can we really define China’s interests in the Iran crisis as ‘rational’, ‘realist’ or ‘liberal’? China’s foreign policy is usually conservative, pragmatic, pro-status quo and reactive : it doesn’t want to upset the apple cart. Its voting record on the UN Security Council is a good example of this caution: even in situations where is disapproves of US policy (such as the Iraq War) it often abstains rather than putting itself into a situation of confrontation. Deng Xiao Ping’s policy of ‘keeping a low profile’ and holding the status quo still guides the thinking in Beijing, where the primary aim is domestic stability above all else.

When it comes to international relations, China tends to bring a mixture of ideals and realpolitik, not to mention a sensitivity to ‘face’ – a cultural concept where to be seen to be inferior or in error is worse than actually being so. But, in part due to its authoritarian nature, the CCP is not well-equipped to deal with change and is still prone to mismanagement of crises which diminish its image on the world stage: the bungling and cover-ups over SARS is a prime example. It is something of a delicate balance to keep ‘face’ with the people and yet to maintain the appearance of a strategic partner to foreign powers. China’s refusal to admit to or to deal with SARS until the last moment is stark evidence that despite being ‘realist’, the CCP is not always ‘rational’.

Take as another example China’s Taiwan and Japan policy. Still deluded by an irrational view of history in which China is the centrepiece , PRC pronouncements have become more and more belligerent of late, despite the essential economic ties. Take, for example: the government-sanctioned anti-Japanese riots of 2005; or General Zhu Chengu’s nuclear threats over Taiwan. Are these the actions of a nation concerned only with the rationale of economic stability? In fact the assumption that China’s actions (or America’s, for that matter) are always ‘rational’ is frankly irrational. There is no reason to indicate that its Iran policy will be ‘rational’ either.

Conclusions

Once, while teaching English to Chinese students in Shanghai in 2003, I began a discussion about the legitimacy of the Iraq War. Not only did most of the students voice their opposition to the war itself, but they also indicated their strong support for Saddam Hussein and his regime. I asked them why. One boy stood up and, with great candour, told me: “My enemy’s enemy is my friend.” How does China really feel about Iran?

The Iran situation is a case in point for Steve Smith’s revision of conventional thinking in International Relations. The ruling Party is caught in a trap whereby it must continue China’s incredible growth or trigger collapse. These are the factors that motivate Chinese interests, not the abstract ideas of ‘the security dilemma or ‘economic liberalisation’.

Balancing these factors with the framework of international law that we currently base our analysis of the Iran crisis upon is not easy. Whether or not China respects international law any more than Iran (or the US…) is dubious. China may have signed the NPT but it is also a signatory to the UN Charter which sanctifies human rights and non-violence: this piece of paper didn’t stop the People’s Liberation Army from opening fire at Tiananmen Square. Nor has the ILSA deterred China from investing billions of dollars into Iran. But sovereignty is of such importance to the PRC that to betray this principle would be tantamount to an act of self-denial.

Economics aside, despite the perceived irrationality in Western eyes, one also should not discount the relevance of history. Sino-Iranian contact dates back to the 2nd century BC, via the Silk Road, and even in the 20th century the two have enjoyed a significant political and economic relationship. Despite ideological differences – revolutionary Islam and Maoism don’t mix – neither has publicly criticized or interfered in the other’s ‘internal affairs’.

This is essential in a Chinese cultural framework that values history and relationships – ‘guanxi’ – above all else. And if China were to publicly abandon Iran, it would ‘lose face’ among the other Middle Eastern and Muslim nations it relies upon for energy, not to mention its image as a ‘alternative model’ of economic growth that resists America and the inconvenient doctrines of human rights, democracy and determination espoused by the West. Though economics will be vital in Beijing’s deliberations, these will come into play too.

So International Relations theory may not necessarily help us in our explanation or understanding of the current Iran crisis. We cannot say for sure that China’s vote in the UN will be inspired by realism or liberalism: we cannot even be certain that its motivations are linked to what we understand as ‘rationality’, though of course in the PRC itself the choice will be perceived as entirely rational.

At present, it already appears that China is following a third path towards resolving the Iran crisis. By June 2006, the US appeared to have given up for the time being on pushing sanctions through the UN. Currently, the emphasis is upon informal talks between Iran, the US, China, Russia and the ‘EU three’ outside the arena of international institutions. Though the US appears to be taking the lead, in many ways the tactic is motivated by the need to accommodate China’s perspective on the issue. If it works, it is a solution that allows China to keep its hand in the outcome while avoiding the loss of face involved in making a public decision via the UN Security Council. If it doesn’t, then China has proved that it is a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and has less to lose if it abstains during any vote on the draft resolution. Just like Deng Xiao Ping would do it.

There thus appears to be a growing acceptance of China’s nature as neither predictably ‘liberal’ or essentially ‘realist’ when it comes to world affairs. But of course, the final outcome is up to Iran itself – and that’s a whole new ball game altogether.