Dire Straits

The rattle of Chinese sabres has, of late, been growing steadily noisier. In March 2005, an 'anti-secession' bill was passed which, in the eyes of the People's Republic of China (PRC), legitimised a pre-emptive attack against the Republic of China (ROC - Taiwan) should it declare full independence.

In July 2005, at an official press conference no less, General Zhu Chenghu openly threatened that should the US act in Taiwan's defence, there would be nuclear retaliation. His hawkish remarks were swiftly subdued by his superiors but the point was made.

Significant conciliatory overtures, meanwhile, are being made by Taiwan's opposition parties, most notably the Kuomintang with whom the Communists once fought a bloody civil war, the conflict which determined today�s fragile political situation across the Taiwan Straits.

Whether this thaw in relations is due to a sense of pragmatism or fear is unclear. However, Chen Shui-Ban, the actual leader of this 'renegade province', has made no such visits to date and is not expected to do so. The attitude on the island, certainly from Taiwanese people I have spoken to, remains one of quiet defiance.

Meanwhile, at naval bases along the coastline of the Chinese mainland new shapes have been appearing. Most notably, the People�s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has acquired from Russian shipyards four Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with 3M-80E Moskit SS-N-22 (Sunburn) surface-to-surface missiles, plus a number of new Project 636 Kilo-class attack submarines fitted with the Klub-S anti-ship cruise missile system.

And rumours and uncertain evidence abound pertaining to the construction or refurbishment of an aircraft carrier, perhaps at the port of Dalian. There has also been a considerable build of the PRC's guided missile capability. Having previously lacked the power-projection capability that a carrier group provides, it now appears that this is a concrete PLAN ambition.

The Chinese will tell you that China is not an aggressive nation, but does this attitude count when its sights are set on what is considered as just another part of China? A million dead Tibetans are tragic testament to ignoring these attitudes. Historical but abstract territorial claims may threaten the present and tangible peace; echoes of Hitler's annexation of the Sudentenland are all too apparent. But in the face of the West's increasing reliance on China's economy the desire for appeasement could be overwhelming.

The 'Great Powers'

It appears already that the attitudes of the last remaining great power - the US - and one newly emerging power - the EU - are somewhat different.

While the US, heavily distracted by the new 'war on terror', seems to have shelved some its foreign policy interests in the wake of September 11, the potential threats from China are still being very seriously considered.

Europe, on the other hand, attempted in 2005 to lift the arms embargo imposed on China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Was this in the interests of friendly engagement or the interests of the European defence industry's profit margin? One can only imagine the scenes behind closed doors as the US Secretary of State confronted the Brussels mandarins who had proposed this measure. The embargo remains.

What about Russia? Russia has problems of her own. Economic strife, gangland violence in the cities, terrorist atrocities such as Beslan and the ongoing war in Chechnya. No wonder she has quit the stage for the time being.

However, recent scandals involving the petroleum company Yukos have thrown Russia's relations with China into relief. Oil. China needs oil: Russia has pipelines. How this will affect the balance of power in future years as the engines of fuel-hungry China begin to sputter remains to be seen.

Finally, the second newly emerging power, China herself. For a long time since the PRC replaced the ROC on the UN Security Council, China has been a stubbornly silent abstainer from world affairs. Now, however, she is flexing her economic and political muscles. There can be no doubt that China's phenomenal growth since 1979 has placed her in a unique position: the question is, what will she do with it?

Ask the southern Sudanese. While the US struggles, sometimes violently, to secure oil reserves for the future, behind the scenes China is doing the same. One reason the UN so conspicuously failed to act decisively in Darfur was the Chinese veto. It may be that the PRC�s interests in Sudan outweighed the humanitarian concerns of the rest of the world.

And China has many other stakes outside her own borders, particularly in those countries near her western frontiers that encroach upon the gas and oil-rich Middle East. How deeply is it involved in regional conflicts such as those in Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, India and Pakistan?

As stated above, the PLAN is steadily being built up with massive new technological investments. It is establishing a 'string of pearls' of naval bases across the region, for example at the Malacca Straits and at Gwadar in Pakistan, not just along its own coastline - mirroring perhaps the US Navy's world-wide presence.

The Pentagon estimates that Chinese military spending in 2005 hit $90bn - while still a fraction of America's own spending that's still not far off the GDP of Pakistan. Why are the Chinese doing this? Is it purely and innocently to protect its oil supply and export routes? Should the West really wait to find out?

The Spectre of Nationalism

In 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote of "a spectre haunting the continent of Europe". Ironically, in modern times that spectre is little more than a ghost of its former self. The true shadow across the world is that of nationalism, and nowhere is this more true than in China.

China, it has become obvious in recent years, is the prime beneficiary of globalisation. Deng Xiao-Ping's open door policy and the continuation of his neo-capitalist ideas (can we really call it 'socialism with a Chinese face' any longer?) by subsequent governments does deserve much praise. Millions of rural workers have been lifted more-or-less from poverty and Chinese goods dominate Western supermarkets.

There is another side to this, however. With my own eyes in Shanghai I witnessed both fabulous wealth and abject deprivation. Socialism is clearly dead and the gap between rich and poor is growing more and more enormous by the day. Sooner or later, the 'Communist' Party believes, the masses will rise up and sweep away the bourgeois in the tide of revolution. Except this time, they are the bourgeois.

The answer to internal discontent like this, as has been seen throughout history, is nationalism. In May 2005 I almost wandered into what was the biggest gathering on the mainland since 1989, but it was not a pro-democracy rally but an anti-Japanese demonstration. While (perhaps half-hearted) Japanese apologies and billions of yen in aid are glossed over in the Chinese state-censored press, atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking remain fresh in the minds even of young Chinese born 50 years after the event.

When projected outside China's borders, nationalism flies a slightly different flag. There are increasing numbers of minor disputes between China and Japan over territorial crumbs such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, gas drilling rights and Japan's place on the UN permanent security council. The Taiwan question, of course, is of enduring importance.

It is perhaps nationalism that currently holds China - a country that is effectively a union or empire of many different languages and ethnic groups, albeit dominated by the Han majority - together. But it is an extremely powerful force, perhaps so powerful that the Party cannot completely control it.

Football hooliganism, for example, is not just an English disease any more: witness the anti-Japanese rioting at the 2004 Asian Cup Final. And these days, nationalist fervour spreads with alarming speed through mediums such as the Internet and text messages (one of my former journalism students was interrogated after the May demonstrations simply for posting a view on an Internet message board).

The effect of nationalism on the national psyche is profound. It is not uncommon to find young Chinese who believe that, previously a victim, China with its '5,000 years of history' is again the greatest nation on Earth. Economic realities do give them evidence to base this on, but when they tell you that in a few years time the whole world will be speaking Chinese, the atmosphere becomes a little uncomfortable.

For a long time, China has been an extremely insular nation: now that it is embarking on the world stage it wants to make a world impact. In the face of great internal changes, could the Party even lose its grip? What would replace it?