I never thought I'd end up the same political street as Will Hutton, celebrated socialist British economist and former editor of The Observer. I'm also a little suspicious of his sudden all-seeing-eye on China, since he spent most of his career writing on purely British or European issues.

However, if figures as respected as Hutton are coming up with assessments like this, then it's time to get very concerned indeed:

Dire straits in the East China Sea | Comment | The Observer

China protests that it wants to continue to rise peacefully and does not want to disturb the current world order. It has renounced Maoism, proclaim Western intellectuals, and its aims are surely are capitalist economic growth not mounting invasions. Thus both its neighbours and the West comfort themselves.

The problem is that China has only partially renounced Maoism; the apparatus of dictatorship and one-party rule remain firmly in place but with no viable ideology to justify it. It is a highly unstable, wasteful and inefficient system which is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The party's first claim to legitimacy is that so far it has worked. And its second claim to legitimacy is its appeal to Chinese nationalism. It is the custodian of a strong China that keeps foreigners at bay. Jobs and nationalism would be the only two pillars on which Chinese communism could sustain power, Deng Xiaoping told the party after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Deliver those and it might hold off political challenge. It has. Even Chinese history taught in schools plays up the threat from foreigners, eliminates any Chinese atrocities and emphasises the role of the party as China's saviour. Whenever it has suited the party's interest is has turned to nationalism; it raised 46 million e-signatures last year to oppose Japan winning a seat on the UN Security Council.

I'm afraid to say that while his comments on Maoism are a little skewiff, when it comes to nationalism Hutton is dead-on. If there were two things that terrified me about China during my stay there, it was the wholesale and unapologetic destruction of the environment and the unquestioning rise of nationalism, even among the educated elites.

As always, it comes down to the Taiwan question. For Hutton, the satellite shoot-down made it a question of "not if but when". Despite other entries on this blog, I'm not convinced that war is the only option - if anything, the missile test was a show of force designed to demonstrate capability and thus head off actual combat. But as every poker player knows, it just takes one player to call your bluff.

Since 2000 the Democratic Progressive party, pledged to a fully-fledged independent Taiwanese state, has won two presidential elections. Beijing is increasingly concerned that the possibility of recovering of Taiwan is slipping away.

An invasion would be high-risk. There is only operational airspace over Taiwan for 300 fourth-generation fighters; Taiwan has 300. It would take 1,000 landing craft up to a fortnight to move 30 infantry divisions across the Taiwan Strait - all the time exposed to American and Japanese retaliation. But if the US's command and control satellite network could be knocked out, suddenly the risks would be dramatically reduced. On top, the US is increasingly focusing its military effort in the Middle East. All China needs is a fortnight.

Very few in Europe understand the Bismarkian, pre-1914 Europe feel to Asian great power politics. In February 2005, China issued an ultimatum to Japan over its occupation of the oil-rich Senkaku Islands; withdraw or face the consequences, sending a five-strong fleet to the islands. Japan responded by putting 55,000 men on alert. Both sides backed off. But China distrusts renascent Japanese nationalism, especially with Japan's now stated wish to change its pacifist constitution. Asia is a powder keg of competing nationalisms, battles for scarce energy resources and unresolved mutual enmities.

The West is indeed blinded by China's economic rise. Yes, one day democracy may come, but to complacently assume that it will gradually develop without a major crisis is naive to the extreme.