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China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
Rapid economic growth has allowed Beijing to dramatically increase defense spending since the late 1990s without compelling Chinese leaders to choose between military modernization and China’s other policy priorities. In the not too distant future, however, the Chinese government is likely to face growing pressure to devote a larger share of government spending to coping with serious domestic problems such as income inequality, the collapse of the healthcare system and environmental degradation, all of which contribute to rising social unrest. As these domestic problems become more pressing, Beijing may have to begin to face some of the budgetary tradeoffs it has previously managed to avoid, even if economic growth continues at a fairly impressive rate. Moreover, in the event of an economic downturn, the challenges of balancing these competing budgetary priorities would become much more acute for China’s leaders. At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that Beijing clearly attaches a great deal of importance to military modernization and that even if the need to deal with mounting domestic problems prevents defense spending from continuing to grow at a double digit pace indefinitely, China will remain dedicated to increasing the PLA’s professionalism and enhancing its operational capabilities.
Abu Dhabi to set up $5bn refinery - DAWN - Top Stories; October 31, 2007
http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/31/top15.htm
ISLAMABAD, Oct 30: Abu Dhabi will set up an oil refinery in Gwadar at a cost of $5 billion, according to Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Arab Emirates Ihsanullah Khan.
He told the state-run Pakistan Television on Tuesday that the project would be known as Khalifa Coastal Refinery and would be set up at the Khalifa Point in Gwadar.
He said that the refinery was promised by the Abu Dhabi government to President General Pervez Musharraf and the project had been finalised.
He said the refinery’s production capacity would be 200,000 barrels a week.—APP
On the back of the BBC's excellent analysis of the Bush administration's failure on Iraq, 'No Plan, No Peace' comes a similar analysis from The Economist. The essence of both is that Cold War thinking is useless in the modern era.
It's hard to summarise two hours of BBC documentary, but the essence was this: the US didn't have a plan for the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and while the British had deep misgivings they failed to make an impact. Memorable moments include: the admission that the only intelligence on Iraqi culture came from the Lonely Planet; the discovery that orders for the aftermath had been copied directly from the Marshall Plan ("the only currencies shall be the US Dollar and the Reichsmark"); and the description of Rumsfeld's deputy as "the dumbest m****f***** I've ever met". Timeless comedy, were it not so tragic.
There needs to be a realisation in the corridors of power that the days of pitched battles and supremacy by superior firepower are gone. That was true in Vietnam, and arguably as far back as the Battle of Jutland. What matters is intelligence and boots on the ground - not soldiers brainwashed in bootcamp but educated professionals able to understand and adapt to the alien culture around them. No amount of technology can replace that. After all, the true weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47.
The reluctance of politicians to accept that this is the true 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is saddening. Rumsfeld's assumption was that a light force could take Saddam out in a matter of weeks, which was correct: but this did not dovetail well with his deeply flawed assumption that everything would be fine afterwards. The surge does appear to be working, but it would have been better in 2003 than now, after thousands have died, the country in chaos and Iran is in the ascendency. You need lots of well-worn boots, not a few shiny new hi-tech weapons.
Armies of the future | Brains, not bullets | Economist.com
The “transformation” advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed forces would be slimmed down and money invested in “smart” weapons, reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its “future warrior” was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an artificial “exoskeleton” (a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his limbs.
The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states. Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians.
Finding a resolution to the crisis on the Turkish-Iraqi border has deep implications for many of the parties involved.
Turkey in particular, with its ambitions to be viewed as a leading state in the Islamic world as well as its aspirations to join the European Union, is under scrutiny as never before. Its actions over the next weeks will define whether its neighbors and allies will continue to regard Ankara as a reliable partner or a potentially destabilizing force within the region.
The United States of America must also impose its will but faces a tricky balancing act between its commitment to Turkey and the need to maintain regional stability. And Iraq, already engulfed in violence, cannot afford more conflict and the flows of arms and refugees that will ensue.
Continue reading "Turkey and Iraq: The Implications" »
Wide ranging article covering the history of India's relations with its East Asian neighbours along with current concerns such as energy and security threats such as the Taiwan straits.
PINR - India Rediscovering East Asia
China has been increasing its engagement with South Asia to the quiet consternation of India. China's free trade agreement with Pakistan went into effect in July this year and China has also emerged as Bangladesh's leading trade partner and arms supplier. Beijing's support for the regime of Nepal's King Gyanendra following his suspension of democracy from February 2005 until April 2006 has been a source of irritation to India.
China's efforts to develop alternative overland routes to transport oil and gas imports by extending the existing Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan and China and developing port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, as well as through Bangladesh and Myanmar, have been viewed by India as part of a "string of pearls" strategy of economic and military encroachment into South and Central Asia.
India's rapprochement with East Asia is also tied to a number of India's broader strategic interests, including rapprochement with the United States, ensuring stability along India's periphery, meeting its energy security needs, and fueling economic integration in South Asia.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Gwadar Oil City: Pakistan, China to sign agreements in early 2008
During the forthcoming visit of Chinese president in early 2008, Pakistan and China are set to sign agreements on Chinese investments in Gwadar Oil City, incentives for setting-up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Gwadar seaport development programme for expansion of bilateral trade and strengthening of investment relations.
All these initiatives are considered to be essential for the success of Trade Energy, Transport and Industrial Corridor between Pakistan and China, a senior government official told Daily Times on Tuesday.
One to bookmark for later - but interesting how ICG sees connections between Balochistan and the other key elements in the Pakistan story - military versus democracy, Talibanisation and the GWOT.
International Crisis Group - B69 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochista
Violence continues unabated in Pakistan’s strategically important and resource-rich province of Balochistan, where the military government is fighting Baloch militants demanding political and economic autonomy. President Pervez Musharraf’s government insists the insurgency is an attempt to seize power by a handful of tribal chiefs bent on resisting economic development. Baloch nationalists maintain it is fuelled by the military’s attempts to subdue dissent by force and the alienation caused by the absence of real democracy. Whether or not free and fair national and provincial elections are held later this year or in early 2008 will determine whether the conflict worsens.
Instead of redressing Baloch political and economic grievances, the military is determined to impose state control through force. The killing of the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the army in August 2006 was followed by the incarceration of another, Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, who has been held on terrorism-related charges without due process since December. Law enforcement agencies have detained thousands of Baloch nationalists or those believed to be sympathetic to the cause; many have simply disappeared. With the nationalist parties under siege, many young activists are losing faith in the political process and now see armed resistance as the only viable way to secure their rights.
Relying also on divide-and-rule policies, the military still supports Pashtun Islamist parties such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) in a bid to counter secular Baloch and moderate Pashtun forces. The JUI-F is the dominant member of the six-party Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Musharraf’s coalition partner in the provincial government since October 2002. It is also a key patron of the Afghan Taliban. Using Balochistan as a base of operation and sanctuary and recruiting from JUI-F’s extensive madrasa network, the Taliban and its Pakistani allies are undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. and other Western support for Musharraf is alienating the Baloch, who otherwise could be natural partners in countering extremism in Pakistan.
It's that time of year again - the 1929 Wall Street Crash occured in the last week of October, as did 'Black Monday' in 1987. Already today, stockmarkets have begun to tumble, and the NYSE isn't even open yet. I don't pretend to understand economics, but I do know that oil at an incredible $90 per barrel, jitters on the trading floors down to the subprime credit crisis, geopolitical uncertainties over Iran and Iraq (it looks like the Turks will attack some time this week) and a general sense of doom will probably trigger another slump.
Commodities | Material world | Economist.com
Individual commodity prices are still highly volatile thanks to speculative demand. A sharp rise tends to attract “momentum” investors, who push prices up even further until end users start looking for alternatives. At that point, the momentum buyers retreat. But oil's attractions to investors have increased recently because the market has moved into “backwardation”, where futures prices are lower than the current price. Investors can thus earn a “roll yield” by buying the future and waiting for the price to rise to the spot level.
The key factor, however, is the tightness of supply. Francisco Blanch of Merrill Lynch reckons that supply contracted by 500,000 barrels a day in the third quarter while leading economic nations entered the fourth quarter with their lowest stocks for four years. Mr Blanch reckons it would not take much to push the price to $100 a barrel. If it gets there, stockmarkets may face an interesting test of confidence.
Well, if we ignore it it'll go away.
Steep decline in oil production brings risk of war and unrest, says new study | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
World oil production has already peaked and will fall by half as soon as 2030, according to a report which also warns that extreme shortages of fossil fuels will lead to wars and social breakdown.
The German-based Energy Watch Group will release its study in London today saying that global oil production peaked in 2006 - much earlier than most experts had expected. The report, which predicts that production will now fall by 7% a year, comes after oil prices set new records almost every day last week, on Friday hitting more than $90 (GBP44) a barrel.
Carnage in Karachi as suicide bombers attack Benazir Bhutto's homecoming parade - Reuters is now putting the death toll at 133. Sad to say, but it's a safe bet that just as many died in the panicked stampede and crush as were killed by the explosions.
It's happened: now attention must turn to the implications. First, let's take a look at the likely culprits and motivations. First among them is the Islamist movement and 'Al Qaeda', the Taliban and 'related groups' such as Jamaat-e-Islami. There's already been heavy fighting in Waziristan this month, and there have apparently been threats to Bhutto from extremist elements in response to her promise to crack down on them. The sensible fingers will be pointing at them first.
On the other hand, many - including Ms. Bhutto's rather indiscreet husband Asif Ali Zardari - will have conspiracy theories of their own. The ISI, once a sponsor of the Taliban, is foremost among the other possible instigators of the bombings. In fact, the ISI would have been in a good position to create a security loophole for the bombers to get through. And also worth noting that the blasts occurred at the right moment for prime-time UK TV and the US evening news, though not for the Pakistani newspapers. It was about international impact as much as anything.
Elements within the ISI - perhaps not under President Musharraf's control - will fear losing their grip on the country should 'democracy' prevail, though it hardly did badly in the '90s last time Bhutto was in charge. But the General himself or his uniformed cronies could also have a hand in things, since a dead Benazir would solve their short-term angst about handing over the reins and declaration of a state of emergency would certainly hold up the 'elections'.
One figure commentators seem to forget about is the current prime minister, Shaukut Aziz. It has to be said that he's done a reasonable job since 2004 and may well resent being demoted back to finance minister. Could he be raising a faction within the government to further his interests?
In effect, it doesn't matter who really perpetrated the outrage, since Pakistani public opinion - volatile at the best of times - is likely to become highly polarized now. What's for sure is that there will be a reaction.
All of the above - Bhutto, Musharraf and Aziz - are seen by many in the country as US puppets. The blasts are therefore not so much about pro-Islam or pro-PML(Q) [ie. pro-Musharraf] but also anti-American. Thus there's a couple of ways the camps could divide.
It's likely that Bhutto's PPP supporters will be enraged and will seek to vent their anger somehow, but whether this will be against the Islamists or the more obvious target of the military regime remains to be seen. Civil society in the shape of the strengthening lawyers' movement may be their key allies in this - but could there be a Devil's deal with the Islamists too in a union against the army? Alternatively, could the army and ISI be in cahoots with the Islamists, as they were in the last elections?
On the other hand, since Bhutto has effectively sold out to Musharraf anyway, it could be that the army sees this another excuse to crack down on militants, as occurred during the siege of the Lal Masjid a couple of months back. For this it will need the PPP's support. Asia Times sees the current fight against militants in Waziristan as "but a precursor of the bloodiest battle that is coming". And that could have wider implications:
A qualified estimate by intelligence officials is that Pakistani military pacification of the Waziristans would slash the capability of the Afghan resistance by 85% as well as deliver a serious setback to the Iraqi resistance.
Back to Karachi. If anything, Bhutto herself is indirectly responsible. Her showmanlike return - complete with a riotous reception on board the flight, swarms of supporters at the airport and rally and all kinds of thetrical gestures like wearing a sloganized baseball hat above her trademark white headscarf and the intended homage to Jinnah's tomb - was engineered to elicit an extreme mass reaction.
Now she's got it. Pakistani politics was galvanised enough as it was, and the bombs will have intensified the situation even further. What will transpire over the next days and weeks remains to be seen.
'Myanmar's "Saffron Revolution", like the Ukraine "Orange Revolution" or the Georgia "Rose Revolution" and the various color revolutions instigated in recent years against strategic states surrounding Russia, is a well-orchestrated exercise in Washington-run regime change, down to the details of "hit-and-run" protests with "swarming" mobs of monks in saffron, Internet blogs, mobile SMS links between protest groups, well-organized protest cells which disperse and re-form. CNN made the blunder during a September broadcast of mentioning the active presence of the NED behind the protests in Myanmar.'
Get out of here! I find this a little hard to believe, though the author makes a good case for Burma's geopolitical relevance - especially to China. It's well-known that the bulk of China's energy passes through the vulnerable Malacca Straits, and that pipelines through Burma would allow both Middle-Eastern and African oil to bypass the chokepoint. It's also well-known that Burma is offering gas of its own, and that it features heavily in China's 'string-of-pearls' plan for naval dominace of the Indian Ocean theatre. Gwadar is another aspect of the strategy.
However, if the US is really meddling in Burma's collapsing revolution, you would have thought that they would have done better. It's not CIA style to sponsor peaceful but ultimately ineffectual protest movements. Where are the guns?
Asia Times Online :: Southeast Asia news - The geopolitical stakes of 'Saffron Revolution'
In fact the US State Department admits to supporting the activities of the NED in Myanmar. The NED is a US government-funded "private" entity whose activities are designed to support US foreign policy objectives, doing today what the CIA did during the Cold War. As well, the NED funds Soros' Open Society Institute in fostering regime change in Myanmar. In an October 30, 2003 press release the State Department admitted, "The United States also supports organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute and Internews, working inside and outside the region on a broad range of democracy promotion activities." It all sounds very self-effacing and noble of the State Department. Is it though?
In reality the US State Department has recruited and trained key opposition leaders from numerous anti-government organizations in Myanmar. It has poured the relatively huge sum (for Myanmar) of more than $2.5 million annually into NED activities in promoting regime change in Myanmar since at least 2003. The US regime change effort, its Saffron Revolution, is being largely run, according to informed reports, out of the US Consulate General in bordering Chaing Mai, Thailand. There activists are recruited and trained, in some cases directly in the US, before being sent back to organize inside Myanmar. The US's NED admits to funding key opposition media including the New Era Journal, Irrawaddy and the Democratic Voice of Burma radio.
The concert-master of the tactics of Saffron monk-led non-violence regime change is Gene Sharp, founder of the deceptively-named Albert Einstein Institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a group funded by an arm of the NED to foster US-friendly regime change in key spots around the world. Sharp's institute has been active in Myanmar since 1989, just after the regime massacred some 3,000 protestors to silence the opposition. CIA special operative and former US military attache in Rangoon, Col Robert Helvey, an expert in clandestine operations, introduced Sharp to Myanmar in 1989 to train the opposition there in non-violent strategy. Interestingly, Sharp was also in China two weeks before the dramatic events at Tiananmen Square.
Will Hutton looks ahead to next week's CCP congress, at which a likely successor to Hu Jintao may be named. Note the date of the potential accession - 2012.
Hutton is sceptical as ever about the legitimacy of the process, remarking that alongside the environment and corruption (those tasked with stemming graft are themselves corrupt), China's massive foreign currency deficit and over reliance on exports will surely have economic repercussions too. The key remark is this:
The story of this week's party congress is how far Hu will be able to manoeuvre between the conservatives, who want to call a halt to even the smallest of reforms for fear it will lead to loss of political control, and the Dengist reformers, who know the Chinese economic and political establishment has got to subject itself to more scrutiny and the rule of law or the game is up.
But one wonders how realistic this analysis is. Surely the majority of current CCP members are thinking in terms of immediate personal gain rather than imaginatively considering the medium-term future of China. The comments are also well worth reading, with the comparisons with the USSR under Gorbachev roundly dismissed.
Guardian Unlimited | Comment is free | Will China's next leader be its Gorbachev?
...as every member of this week's congress knows, their choice has an additional and particular resonance.
They are choosing the fifth generation of Communist party leaders after the 1949 revolution. These are no longer leaders legitimised by revolution or who have the same sense of communist mission. They are managers and administrators who want to make the system work. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's readiness to question communism was intertwined with his membership of the Soviet Union's fifth generation of leaders. He did not champion perestroika and glasnost alone; much of the nomenklatura had decided that the Soviet economic and social model was dysfunctional, corrupt and endemically inefficient and had to change.
Will one of Hu Jintao's two 'Lis', as the frontrunners to succeed him, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, are popularly known, feel the same way as they walk out in front of the cameras in the Great Hall of the People on Friday? Will one prove to be China's Gorbachev?
The comment below, delivered at a conference on genocide is heretical but true. In the 2005 film Lord of War it is said that "the real weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47". That's entirely correct, but the real engines of genocide are poverty and weakness - accompanied by complacency on the part of the "international community".
Give people the arms to fight evil - it's bloody and nasty and lots of people suffer terribly - but in the long run, less of them will die. Allow them to retaliate back with superior armed force. Horribly Machiavellian, but such is the reality of geopolitics.
BBC NEWS | Americas | Can the world stop genocide?
French author Gerard Prunier, like the proverbial ghost at a wedding, said genocides could not be prevented by the international community.
"When you see a dictatorial regime heating up, everyone starts talking, talking, talking ... and by the time the talking stops, either matters have quietened down or they have happened."
And that is the crux of the matter, according to Mr Prunier - it is difficult for politicians or the military to intervene in a situation that has not yet evolved into a crisis.
So what is Mr Prunier's solution?
"Genocides can only be stopped by the people directly involved - and usually that means people involved in the war that accompanies most mass killings."
And if it is the government committing the genocide, the solution is "arm the rebels", he says.
"It won't be clean - it will be messy," the French author said, "but it is more likely to stop the mass killing than international intervention."
India's spectacular growth is only matched by its spectacular poverty, runs the trailer for a recent BBC World debate. Very true, and ultimately (as always with India) it's the very policies designed to protect the poor that damage them most.
Shockingly free-market liberal statement coming up: in order to bring people out of poverty, as has occurred in China, India needs to create the right conditions for business. Unfortunately, the very fact that India is a liberal democracy stands in the way of this, with so many interest groups protecting their own interests. The communists may do well in land reforms in West Bengal, but fail miserably when it comes to the next step in Friedrich List's stages of economic development - creating a manufacturing base.
Same goes for caste reservations (also dealt with by The Economist this month). You can't break the cycle by positive discrimination, that just makes things worse: only universal primary education is the answer.
India's economy | A Himalayan challenge | Economist.com
India has by far the most restrictive employment-protection laws for collective dismissals, scoring much worse than China and Brazil as well as all the rich countries. Manufacturing firms need to obtain government permission to lay off a worker from factories with more than 100 staff. This partly explains why most firms are so small: 87% of employment in Indian manufacturing is in firms with less than ten employees, compared with only 5% in China. Small firms cannot reap economies of scale or exploit the latest technology, and so suffer from lower productivity than big firms...
There is compelling evidence that further reforms would boost India’s growth. Industries in which the government has eased regulation and encouraged competition, such as telecommunications and IT services, have grown fast. State-owned firms still account for 38% of output in the formal non-farm business sector, yet the OECD estimates that private firms are on average one-third more productive than public-sector ones. States with looser labour-and product-market regulations enjoy higher labour productivity.
Sadly, further bold reform is currently blocked by the communist parties on which the coalition government depends for its majority. In an economy where income per head used to rise by barely 1% a year, current growth rates feel like a miracle. But to eliminate India’s vast poverty the country must try harder.
I'll never forget a rather unconsidered remark made to me by a Pentagon official shortly after 9/11. I was writing about the sales of Apache gunships to Pakistan, to which the officer replied: "As long as they're helping us against terrorism, they can have whatever they want."
More evidence here of America's continuing military commitment to Pakistan - yet the US is even more unpopular there than India (the second largest third-world buyer of arms behind Pakistan). And in India too, misgiving about the US are high, mainly due to its criticism of New Delhi's energy-based relationship with Tehran.
Meanwhile, China's investment in Pakistani infrastructure is only increasing - and that seems to be buying more love than US weapons ever will. Because roads and railways benefit the people, whereas guns are just used an an instrument of US foreign policy. Indeed, they are often turned on Pakistani people themselves. Reports that 50 civilians were killed in clashes in Waziristan this week are of course to be considered carefully, but the bad blood generated is the real effect of the US arms trade.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Arms sales: How the US is not winning friends
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has given over $10 billion to Pakistan to buy or reward President General Pervez Musharraf’s support for its newest war, the “war on terror”. Pakistan has spent over $1.5 billion of this amount on buying new weapons. To understand the scale of this aid, consider Pakistan’s total military budget in 2006, estimated at about $4.5 billion. The United States is now giving Pakistan aid to pay for the new deal for F-16s, bombs, and missiles. It is likely to win few friends.
There is little doubt today about how unpopular the United States is in Pakistan. A Pew poll released in September 2006 found that in Pakistan, the United States is viewed less favorably even than India (with which Pakistan has fought four wars). Just over 25% were favorable toward the United States, compared to one-third who felt that way toward India.
Picking away at three apparent setbacks for Al Qaeda, the author highlights some flaws in the arguments. A mildly critical letter from one of Bin Ladin's theological mentors (who recently emerged from prison) doesn't prove much. A rift between Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda bigshot Ayman Al-Zawahiri is also dismissed.
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism analyst who writes for The Washington Post among others, seems to accept the split in Al Qaeda's leadership and asserts that the real man in charge is now Al-Zawahiri. "It has been two years," he writes, "since bin Laden reportedly chaired a meeting of al-Qaeda's Majlis al-Shura—the movement's most senior deliberative body." That's according to "Asian intelligence", presumably from Pakistan's ISI. This in turn opens the following questions:
Al-Qaeda: Beginning of the End, or Grasping at Straws?
Dr. Hoffman's reference to "Asian intelligence" certainly is interesting, but one must, with respect, suggest one of four conclusions about its viability: (A) If it is true, U.S. and NATO forces should have been able to wipe out the Majlis al-Shura and much of al-Qaeda—though not bin Laden—based on Asian information about the timing and deliberations of the Shura's meetings over two years; (B) If it is true, and the Majlis has not been destroyed, one of America's Asian allies apparently did not share highly actionable data with Washington; (C) If it is true, and the Majlis has not been destroyed, Western authorities must have decided not to attack, perhaps because the Shura meets in Pakistan; and, (D) The information is not true.
In any case, it's all irrelevant. Even if Al Qaeda is refocusing its mission under new leadership; even if all the bigwigs got wiped out in an airstrike tomorrow; it's not going to affect the overall global security question. It's wrong to focus on the simplistic idea of Al Qaeda as some kind of overarching command structure (significant as it is) and right to look more deeply into the grassroots, not the tip of the iceberg.
Not much analysis on the political situation, but interesting to note that talks are ongoing regarding an electricity line from Iran to Gwadar. Though Pakistan has gas resources of its own, its power situation is currently rather bleak and so in the short term it may well need to import electricity direct.
Also worth posing the question: what significance does control over the transmission grid have on Pakistani politics? If the army were to shut down the already-parlous energy sector (much of it run by retired officers), it could hold the other parties to ransom.
United Press International - International Security - Energy - Analysis
The approval of a $60 million electric line between Iran and Pakistan reflects a regional trend toward electrical grid interconnection, but its path through the unstable Baluchistan region of Iran and Pakistan also highlights the troubles facing energy cooperation between the two countries, as well as the difficulty in protecting a proposed $7.5 billion scheme to send natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan.
In late September, Tehran and Islamabad made another step toward building a 220 volt power line between Iran and Gwadar in Pakistan. The estimated $60 million cost of building the transmission line will be borne by both countries and will supply Pakistan with 100 megawatts of electricity from Iran.
More on Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. Despite an apparent cooling of tension in the last few years, the author notes that Hu Jintao's rise to power comes partly on the back of a hardline attitude towards Tibet, always a bone of contention between the two Asian giants.
I disagree slightly with some of the points: for example, the territorial dispute does seem to be under control, mainly due to economic linkages. But the point that India forms part of a nexus of powers on China's borders - Australia, Japan and the US Pacific presence is interesting. Also worth noting that the newly-completed Qinghai-Tibet railway and refurbishments to the Indian road infrastructure near the border would allow both China and India to swiftly step up their military presences. And finally, Chinese plans for Tibetan water resources could also have a devastating effect on the subcontinent.
PINR - India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes
Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."
Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the U.S. saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.
Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about U.S. efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.
Finally, I've found an IR thinker who isn't wrapped up in misconceived notions of 'science', 'method' and 'theory' and sees the field for what it really is - an infinitely complex and mutable non-systemic entity that warrants close examination in context of itself, not someone's tired old ideas from the last century.
The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct. Naive falsificationism takes it for granted that the laws of nature are manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. Empiricism takes it for -ranted that sense experience is a better mirror of the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that the artifices of Reason give better results than the unchecked play of our emotions. Such assumptions may be perfectly plausible and even true. Still, one should occasionally put them to a test. Putting them to a test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them, start doing science in a different way and see what happens. Case studies such as those reported in the preceding chapters show that such tests occur all the time, and that they speak against the universal validity of any rule. All methodologies have their limitations and the only 'rule' that survives is 'anything goes'.
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method
Saturday sees the first phase of this year's 'election' process in Pakistan, but the event is becoming ever more clouded in controversy and confusion.
It's now very apparent that Musharraf's dismissal of the chief judge back in the spring was probably the biggest miscalculation of his career. However, the courts - clearly up in arms against him now - are obscuring matters further for their own political reasons.
It might be best for the country if the law fraternity were to take a back seat for now, and let the 'election' take place without meddling. Obviously, Musharraf will win and has promised to shed his uniform too. Benazir Bhutto also appears to be moving closer to an acceptable deal, though it does remain in some doubt. "At this stage nothing is finalised," she said yesterday. "Now we are waiting for the ordnance... Until we see it in writing we can't be sure." There again, Benazir is quite an opportunist and is only biding her time in order to secure the best outcome.
That should be enough. Any interference in the inevitable is only going to destabilise Pakistani politics further and create an opening for the Islamists. It's time for the judges to back off.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Musharraf faces election setback
President Musharraf is expected to be able to easily muster a majority in the national parliament and four provincial assemblies that select the president.
But the court ruling means that even if he gets most votes, he cannot be declared winner until the court has decided if he was a valid candidate in the first place.
As both China and India "rise and shine" economically, so geopolitical questions begin to assume greater importance. Whatever the rhetoric from Beijing, China's neighbours are clearly less comfortable about it than ever. That's good for India, which (aside from Pakistan, of course) is generally viewed as fairly benign.
However, India's growing strategic relationship with the US is opening this to debate. Apparently, talks are in progress regarding a closer partnership with NATO, and the US ambassador to NATO is interestingly quoted as lumping China in with concerns such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. But surely a NATO (read US) - India partnership can only aggravate tensions with China, rather than 'balance' the SCO as noted in the article. Lasting peace in the region needs NATO to engage with the PRC rather than India, in order to pull it into a security structure. Attempting to counteract the SCO via NATO might only lead to an arms race that brings in Russia too.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Any pronounced gravitation toward an "Asian NATO" form of collective security will inevitably affect India's relations with China. (India shares Australia's predicament on this score.) Therefore, India has to perform some very tricky rope acts in the period ahead. In a major speech during a visit to Thailand on September 14, Mukherjee stressed, "The India-China partnership is an important determinant for regional and global peace and development, and for Asia's emergence as the political and economic center of the new international order."
Three days later, addressing the strategic community in Seoul, the minister underlined the importance of a "truly integrated Asian economy that will draw on the economic potential of India and China". Expressing co
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