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Some analysis of largely-unreported recent PLAN exercises and the connection with the Kitty Hawk incident, in which a USN CVBG was turned away from a scheduled visit to Hong Kong.
The author notes the influence of certain Taiwan-orientated officers within the governing set-up, and also some possible lack of co-ordination between the PLA and the civilian executive, for example the ministry of foreign affairs.
His main point, however, is that China is tentatively trying to demonstrate its power projection capability. Notable that also this week there was a friendly naval visit to Japan, intended to 'reassure' the Japanese. AP notes the irony of both the US and Chinese vessels being in port at the same time but under different circumstances.
Also in context was the Dalai Lama's masterstroke pronouncement on his succession. In a sense, he has to ensure that the next Dalai Lama doesn't suffer the fate of the hapless young Panchen Lama, who through no fault of his own remains missing and probably isn't enjoying the best of times.
But also what better way to highlight Beijing's lack of democratic credentials to the international community than by demonstrating your own willingness to shed the feudalism you've been accused of in favour of a modern referendum? Incredibly, Beijing had the cheek to criticise him for rejecting religious traditions. As if razing hundreds of monasteries to the ground during the Cultural Revolution was an act of respect.
Finally, China's meeting with the EU illustrated the other side of China's power projection through economic means. All in all, this week has been quite significant in China's positioning of itself on the world stage.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
The two most powerful bodies in the polity—the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and the CMC—are filled with cadres and generals with long-standing expertise on Taiwan. Three PSC members have served as either governor or party secretary of Fujian, the “frontline province” just opposite Taiwan. They are Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Jia Qinglin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection He Guoqiang, and Fifth-Generation rising star Xi Jinping, the front-ranked secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat. The CMC is replete with Taiwan Strait specialists. This include Defense Minister designate General Liang Guanglie, a veteran commander of war games off the Taiwan coast; the newly promoted Chief of the General Staff, General Chen Bingde, a former commander of the Nanjing Military Region; Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang, who was once based in Fujian; and Naval Commander Admiral Wu Shengli, a former vice-chief of the East Sea Fleet. Since becoming CMC chief in late 2004, Hu has promoted a large number of alumni of the Nanjing Military Region, which has “jurisdiction” over the Strait.
On a larger-scale, last week’s provocative exercises tally with the overall pattern of power projection that began early this year with the destruction of an old weather satellite by state-of-the-art PLA missiles. The feat, which apparently signaled Beijing’s readiness to join the militarization of space, was followed by the country’s successful effort late last month to put a Chinese-made satellite into the moon’s orbit. Moreover, the PLA has for the past year deviated from its past practice of keeping newly developed weapons under wraps. Semi-official military websites regularly run stories and pictures that showcase the prototypes or just-completed versions of soon-to-be-deployed hardware ranging from the Jin-class submarine—which is capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles—to the nation’s first aircraft carrier.
Apart from telling Taiwan independence forces—and their sympathizers in the United States and Japan—that Beijing has the wherewithal to maintain national unity, Beijing is flexing its military muscle in a fashion befitting an emerging quasi-superpower. Referring to the 17th Congress, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) strategist Hong Yuan pointed out that “the [defense] concerns of the new leadership and the force projection of China’s military have gone way beyond the Taiwan Strait.” Hong sees the coming five years as “a period of rapid development in areas ranging from the PLA’s establishment, institutions and hardware to the extent and means of force projection” (Wen Wei Po, October 19).
Much has been written on Benazir Bhutto but less on Nawaz Sharif, the man who the then General Musharraf ousted in 1999. In many ways, Sharif is the worst option for the West which would like to broker some kind of artificial and inherently unstable alliance between Bhutto and Musharraf. But the Pakistani people may see it otherwise.
PINR - Intelligence Brief: Musharraf Gains an Edge and Increases Chances for Survival
Unlike Bhutto, Sharif is popular in nationalist and religious circles, in addition to military and intelligence ones. This support derives from his previous rule as a religious conservative, which was demonstrated by his support for the Taliban in the 1990s, and for his popular decision to test a nuclear weapon and declare Pakistan as a nuclear power despite U.S. protestations.
These very factors which make him popular among Pakistanis make him somewhat of a wild card to the United States. For instance, his return to Pakistan was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, which has been a strong force behind Pakistan's Salafi/Wahhabi religious radicalism. Furthermore, one day after his return to Pakistan, Sharif said that the country should reassess its approach in the war on terrorism and consider meeting with militants in the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
 So it would appear that Musharraf is a General no longer, though undoubtedly his protege General Ashfaq Kiyani will closely follow his demands for the time being. Kyani is a former head of the ISI and this is also significant. Presumably he himself is already a man with great influence.
Amit Pandya reports from Pakistan, and his findings are a little surprising. But it is a good point that by her perceived closeness to Musharraf and the US, Bhutto has put herself in a tricky position in future elections.
Pandya also points out that for democracy to flourish, the opposition needs to unite, Islamists and the political mainstream alike, but at the time being this does not seem to be the case. Musharraf's gamble with the state of emergency may well have fractured any alliance against him but his doffing of his military role today and promise to end emergency rule once he is sworn in a civilian president will go a long way towards appeasing his US sponsors. He is perhaps more wily than we previously imagined.
Stimson - Pakistan’s Brighter Future: The View from the Ground
While not unimportant to Pakistanis, the principal demands of the US government are less important than the longer term political developments in the society. The elections to be held in a little over a month are not considered significant. Whether the General retires as Army Chief and serves as a civilian President has also become entirely unimportant. The key issue is whether he leads the country, and the actual role of the Army in the government.
The army remains indispensable to any future political order because of the tenacious hold that it has now established in the national economy, and because Pakistan, under any government however democratic, will face armed challenges from within or without. However, there has also been a widespread and growing sense that its long and repeated interference in politics has harmed both the political development of Pakistan and the integrity of its principal mission of national defense against the country’s enemies.
The main political parties, those with sufficient support to be political players in their own right, offered a poor alternative. Widely discredited by their tenures in government in the 1990s, both the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML(N)), were viewed askance by many Pakistanis of democratic conviction. Indeed, many considered the Musharraf regime’s survival a result of the public’s distrust of the large political parties.
Neat summary of Iran's political and commercial relationships with other nascent Asian powers. Includes some details on the IPI and Chinese economic influence.
PINR - Iran Looks for Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships
On the Asian continent, the Iranian strategic realignment seems to rely on organizational and bilateral cooperation, extending beyond existing relations with other "rogue states" such as North Korea. On the contrary, Iran aims at reaching out to U.S. allies or "friendly" countries, such as India and Pakistan, as well as to emerging global powers, especially to China.
At first glance, it would appear that Musharraf's state of emergency/coup cubed is beginning to disintegrate. Now the man he ousted, Nawaz Sharif, is back, quite probably at the behest of the Western powers.
On the other hand, this may well be beneficial to Musharraf. Both Sharif and Bhutto are tainted by their years in power during the 1990s, which saw corruption and economic degradation - not to mention some nasty dodginess involving the ISI and some chaps calling themselves the Taliban. Very many Pakistanis were glad to see the back of Sharif - Musharraf himself was only too happy to oblige. Sharif is one of the few people who makes him look good.
And in fact, just as Musharraf has toyed with the constitution in order to stand for election while in uniform (though he now says he will shed it), both Sharif and Bhutto will also need some constitutional jiggery-pokery to allow them to stand for third terms. Technically not one of the three should be up for office. In the greater scheme of things, this puts the 'democrats' in the tricky position of looking like they are playing Musharraf's own unfair little game.
Instead of strengthening democracy, Sharif's return in fact weakens the chances of a strong mandate for the opposition. Surely he can't join up with his arch enemy Benazir Bhutto? Thus the opposition vote could be split between Sharif's PML-N (or whatever he leads these days) and the PPP, allowing Musharraf's PML-Q to dominate.
Finally, a question no-one seems to be asking: where is the new blood? Why does Pakistan have to bring back tired old figures such as Sharif and Bhtto? Why is there no-one strong enough to rise up and challnge Musharraf by themselves without the awkward legacy of history weighing them down?
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Ex-PM Sharif returns to Pakistan
"I am here to play my role and also make my own efforts to rid the country of dictatorship," Mr Sharif said.
He refused to say whether his party would boycott upcoming elections, saying that the decision would be made by an alliance of opposition parties including his own.
Recognition of global turmoil as the basic challenge of our time requires confronting complexity. That is the weakness of the issue insofar as the American political scene is concerned. It does not lend itself to sloganeering or rouse the American people as viscerally as terrorism. It is more difficult to personalize without a demonic figure like Osama bin Laden. Nor is it congenial to self-gratifying proclamations of an epic confrontation between good and evil on the model of the titanic struggles with Nazism and Communism. Yet not to focus on global turmoil is to ignore a central reality of our times: the massive worldwide political awakening of mankind and its intensifying awareness of intolerable disparities in the human condition
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership
OK, so Pakistan has been dismissed from the Commonwealth. Again. Mobilisation of shame, as our international law professor called it (to much derision from the small but vocal right wing of the classroom).
But it appears that Musharraf's gamble may be paying off after all. The State of Emergency looks like effectively bending the democratic process, not by eliminating the elections, but by provoking the opposition to withdraw in protest. This way, Musharraf wins without even having to rig the poll, which works very nicely for him.
And he can also hold his hands up and say that he's shedding his uniform too, with the judgement of his hand-picked supreme court all he needs to cloak himself in semi-legitimacy. Ms Bhutto might just have to return to the devil's bargain she was already making in order to gain any kind of influence at all. Which would suit the General (retd.) very nicely indeed.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Court opens options for Musharraf
Will the Supreme Court rulings serve as a trigger to restore the process of reconciliation between Gen Musharraf and Ms Bhutto?
The outcome appears to depend on two things; whether Gen Musharraf actually quits the army and whether he restores the constitution and the judiciary.
In the first case, the general view is that he will probably quit his army post as soon as the Election Commission has formally declared him winner of the October vote.
This is because Gen Musharraf badly needs to offer up something to the Western powers that have been pressuring him to end emergency rule.
Analysts say he may even lift emergency rule ahead of elections, due in the second week of January.
This would score points with Western powers. But it could also influence the domestic environment by dividing the opposition which is now threatening an election boycott and a united front if the constitution is not restored.
"It is a sad indictment of the current state of Afghanistan that the question now appears to be not if the Taliban will return to Kabul, but when ... and in what form. The oft-stated aim of reaching the city in 2008 appears more viable than ever and it is incumbent upon the international community to implement a new strategic paradigm before time runs out."
So says some hitherto unheard of thinktank, somewhat pessimistically perhaps, but they do have eyes and ears on the ground. The point is that without strength in depth and in numbers, NATO is not going to be able to hold ground it takes.
That's just what happened in Vietnam. US forces won most battles but lost the war due to bad politics and bad strategy.
Afghanistan 'falling into hands of Taliban' | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
The insurgency is divided into a largely poverty-driven "grassroots" component and a concentrated group of "hard-core militant Islamists", says the Senlis Council, which has an office in Kabul and field researchers based in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in southern Afghanistan.
It says that the Nato-led International Security Force of some 40,000 troops should be at least doubled and include forces from Muslim countries as well as Nato states which have refused to send troops to the country.
Brief profile of the guy responsible for the Islamist takeover in Swat.
Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat
Maulana Fazlullah, who is now leading an extremist Islam-oriented insurgency in the valley of Swat in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, is the son-in-law of Maulana Sufi Mohammad, founder of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM - Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws), which he established in 1989 (see Terrorism Monitor, November 30, 2005). In early 2002, TNSM was banned by the Pakistani government and Maulana Sufi Mohammad was sentenced to a prison term of seven years following a crackdown on jihadi organizations in the aftermath of 9/11 and President Musharraf’s collaboration with the U.S. global war on terrorism.
Fazlullah, born in 1975, was raised in a simple farmer’s family in Mam Dheray...
There had to be one, and note how this author neatly ties up all the conflicting elements in the current drama: internal opposition to Musharraf; the Balochistan rebellion; Afghanistan, America and the GWOT; China and Gwadar; India and Kashmir.
The essence of the article is that the current situation is all the result of an American plan to instigate regime change in Pakistan to advance its own interests. Of course much of the report is to be roundly dismissed. I particularly enjoyed this paragraph (I used to work at Jane's):
This was the perfect timing for the launch of Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, a book authored by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, a columnist for a Pakistani English-language paper and a correspondent for ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’, a private intelligence service founded by experts close to the British intelligence.
But the point is that the Pakistan situation is not clear-cut in that all Pakistanis favour democracy and Benazir Bhutto, as the Western powers would have us believe. There are still deep veins of paranoia at work, and it's these that enable the continuing dominance of the military and security forces.
Ahmed Quraishi.com
“We have indications of Indian involvement with anti-state elements in Pakistan,” declared the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office in a regular briefing in October. The statement was terse and direct and the spokesman, Ms. Tasnim Aslam, quickly moved on to other issues.
This is how a Pakistani official explained Ms. Aslam’s statement: “What she was really saying is this: We know what the Indians are doing. They’ve sold the Americans on the idea that [the Indians] are an authority on Pakistan and can be helpful in Afghanistan. The Americans have bought the idea and are in on the plan, giving the Indians a free hand in Afghanistan. What the Americans don’t know is that we, too, know the Indians very well. Better still, we know Afghanistan very well. You can’t beat us at our own game.”
Mr. Bugti’s armed rebellion coincided with the Gwadar project entering its final stages. No coincidence here. Mr. Bugti’s real job was to scare the Chinese away and scuttle Chinese President Hu Jintao’s planned visit to Gwadar a few months later to formally launch the port city.
Gwadar is the pinnacle of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. It’s a modern port city that is supposed to link Central Asia, western China, and Pakistan with markets in Mideast and Africa. It’s supposed to have roads stretching all the way to China. It’s no coincidence either that China has also earmarked millions of dollars to renovate the Karakoram Highway linking northern Pakistan to western China.
There's been much talk in recent weeks on the Treaty of Lisbon, or the EU constitution that wasn't - but not much talk on these pages. The fact is that in the sum of all things, the EU is simply not yet that significant.
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, however, yesterday set out a bold agenda for the future of Europe that hopefully will be heeded in the corridors of power in Brussels and beyond. You couldn't imagine his predecessor, Margaret Beckett, making such a speech:
My argument is this: The prospects and potential for human progress have never been greater. But our prosperity and security are under threat. Protectionism seeks to stave off globalisation rather than manage it. Religious extremists peddle hatred and division. Energy insecurity and climate change threaten to create a scramble for resources. And rogue states and failing states risk sparking conflicts, the damage of which will spill over into Europe.'
These threats provide a new raison d'etre for the European Union. New because the unfinished business of internal reform to update our economic and social model is on its own not enough to engage with the big issues, nor the hopes and fears, of European citizens.
For the EU because nation-states, for all their continuing strengths, are too small to deal on their own with these big problems, but global governance is too weak.
So the EU can be a pioneer and a leader. Our single market and the standards we set for it, the attractions of membership, and the legitimacy, diversity and political clout of 27 member states are big advantages. The EU will never be a superpower, but could be a model power of regional cooperation.
For success, the EU must be open to ideas, trade and people. It must build shared institutions and shared activities with its neighbours. It must be an Environmental Union as well as a European Union. And it must be able to deploy soft and hard power to promote democracy and tackle conflict beyond its borders.
Granted, Miliband doesn't tackle the EU's key problem, the Common Agricultural Policy, in anything more than veiled terms of anti-protectionism: "Environmental security not food security is the challenge of the future." But he hits every other nail on the head.
Expansion of the EU, perhaps in a series of concentric rings, could help bind the international community into a sphere of peace and prosperity that the UN has never been able to achieve. But for this to happen requires massive investment in European military capability and the will to use it, a shortcoming which Miliband rightly laments.
He also correctly connects the key threats of environmental degradation, energy insecurity and terrorism too. But the focus is on the EU as a "model power" rather than a "superpower", recognising the continued leadership of the US.
In the coming weeks there will be two major tests of the EU. French president Nicolas Sarkozy is already facing his "Thatcher moment" as he attempts to face down the socialist old guard on the streets. And Kosovo is about to come back to haunt us too, with elections currently being contested.
If Europe can ride these through, then the prospects are bright. But, as Miliband reminds us, there is a choice:
Focus on internal not external challenges, institutions rather than ideals. Fail to combine hard and soft power, the disciplines and benefits of membership with the ability to make a difference beyond our borders. The result - the return of protectionism, energy insecurity, division with the Islamic world, and unmanaged migration from conflict.
Or Europe can look global and become a model regional power.
We can use the power of the EU - the size of our single market, our ability to set global standards, the negotiating clout of 27 members, the attractions of membership, the hard power of sanctions and troops, the power of Europe as an idea and a model - not to substitute for nation states but to do those things to provide security and prosperity for the next generation.
I hope someone is listening.
BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Miliband EU speech in full
See also the video.
One to save and read for later, and not a lot of new int. But this (conservative) report does highlight the increasing threat of Chinese economic intelligence gathering, cyber warfare ("weapons of mass annoyance") and its general commitment to asymmetric capability-building:
China’s search for asymmetric capabilities to leverage against U.S. vulnerabilities represents a serious form of irregular warfare preparation. China is convinced that, financially and technologically, it cannot defeat the United States in a traditional force-on-force match up. However, as Chairman of the Defense Science Board Dr. William Schneider highlighted, if it can acquire niche weapons systems that are relatively inexpensive and that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, it stands a chance of deterring or defeating the United States in a limited engagement. This strategy explains China’s emphasis on acquiring sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, mines, and information and electronic warfare capabilities.
Quite an unusual remark on p10 regarding China's growing submarine capability: with lots of Kilo-class coming on line, plus several indigenous Shang-class SSNs due for launch in 2008 and rumours of some AIP subs on the build too, the USN should even look at the PLAN as a partner in regional naval security.
On the other hand, an upgraded DF-21 ballistic missile with re-entry capability could make the littoral too dangerous for US CVBGs to inhabit.
Full PDF report downloadable here.
 Michael Klare, author of Blood and Oil, was in Amsterdam today to talk on his conception of the impending energy crisis. While he was a good speaker, seeing him in person did begin to reveal some of the flaws in his arguments.
The lecture opened with a bold set of statements: "No government is willing to solve the energy problem by seeking alternative energies... and I have zero confidence that any will try to increase production." Having tantalised us with this and promises of an apocalyptic vision of the future, Klare then utterly failed to expand.
Fortunately, the organisers allowed one student in the audience to ask a question (the other debating time was reserved for the usual blathering incoherence of rival academics failing to make their points or even ask questions) and he did ask what I would have done. The question was "why?"; Klare's answer was that "dysfunctional governments" were at fault, "governments that piss away billions on Iraq yet invest little on finding solutions".
That seems far too easy a way to excuse the actions of the Bush regime, though he did have a good point on China's failure to deal with the crisis. Though the CCP itself is aware of the trouble we're in, grass roots-level corruption means that any efficiency measures are swept under the carpet in favour of improving growth figures.
Yet Klare's overall take on the US-China contest over energy was as simplistic as the rest. It was, he said, a situation analogous to the Cold War, in which both powers supply arms to their energy-supplying clients in a competition for influence.
He did later remark that Beijing's Africa policy also involves economic and infrastructural aid - something that Africans were rightly suspicious of - but did not elaborate further. But his aim was to reinforce his point that the recent creation of America's Africa Command (Africom) was the latest stage in a continuing Kennedy doctrine, building on previous policy in the Persian Gulf. The SCO, moreover, was a front for China to extend its military supply network to Central Asia.
All of that may be true, but overlooks the nuances of an evolving bipolar US-China situation that is far more than a simple military confrontation.
To be fair, Klare did have some good ideas about 'the resource curse' whereby the wealth in countries like Nigeria falls into the hands of those who control the state, thus negating democratic urges in the governing classes. (One could say the same for Burma). And his analogy with the Balkans of 1914 was apt - violent internal social forces could intersect with external geopolitical motives to produce an explosive mixture.
Also, an interesting theory from an otherwise egomaniacal second speaker came to light, in that $100 oil punished the PRC as much as anyone else, and could be a ploy in order to bring down the RMB or lessen China's export deficit. She also highlighted that fact that Klare didn't even mention Europe, though that merely proved his point that Europe's influence is next to negligible.
But overall, Klare was a little disappointing. He was right to note that control of chokepoints such as Hormuz give militarily powerful states great leverage, but his frame of reference was still bound by conventional military thinking.
The reality is that inducing energy scarcity, just like terrorism and WMD, is an asymmetric method of power projection that doesn't necessarily involve military firepower. Having a big technologically-advanced navy isn't the be-all and end-all any more. That's what makes the problems so complicated and so intertwined.
This bears out exactly what I said in my thesis. Guess I'm not that stupid after all. Perhaps under pressure from the US, India has already lost out to China with regard to Burmese energy: a pattern is emerging.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Iran, Pakistan dump India on pipeline
Last week, Iran's deputy minister in charge of the pipeline, Hojatollah Ganimifard, was quoted by the Iranian Oil Ministry's news service Shana as saying, "The content of the peace pipeline contract has been finalized and all the points prepared by the two sides' legal experts have been re-read and agreed by the two sides [Iran and Pakistan]." He said the two sides would ink the contract in December "without a third partner".
And this week, Mokhtar Ahmad, advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, was quoted as saying, "As we expected, the text of the peace pipeline has been made ready for the signing by the two states' heads." Pakistan said that any excess gas that would have been destined for India could be transferred to China.
 "The mujahideen have now acquired such strength that neither Pakistan nor NATO can fight against us. The Taliban are standing on both sides of the border. More operations breed more Taliban, and this time the Taliban will rule the whole region."
Not so sure about that as yet, but the superlative Syed Saleem Shahzad of Asia Times Online offers a unique insight into the Taliban - or what he calls the 'neo-Taliban' - their weapons, tactics and unhinged mentality and ideology.
Cynicism aside, there certainly appears to be a lot of confidence among them. They are more than willing to die in large numbers since many more will certainly follow; whereas in the West, every setback and casualty brings howls of despair. While there have been significant casualties among NATO, to suggest that we have been dying like flies is not true. It's more accurate that Western publics don't have the stomach for the campaign that the Taliban do, and that is our enemy's most significant advantage.
Another card up their sleeve is their lack of a single command and control structure, which renders them less vulnerable to attacks on their leadership. The only unifying factor is their ideology:
I launched a series of questions. "It is still not clear who is in whose command. What is the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [leader of the Hezb-i-Islami]? Is [veteran Afghan resistance figure] Jalaluddin Haqqani under [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar, or is he commanding separately? Who do the Pakistan Taliban answer to? To Mullah Omar? And what are Pakistani jihadis up to?
Sadiq smiled at the barrage of questions and responded with some breaking news, "Mullah Omar, the Taliban shura [council], al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban have resolved this issue once and for all. Soon the mujahideen will announce the revival of a [region-wide] Islamic emirate, and after this - like all fighting groups gathered under a single command in Iraq - all commanders in Afghanistan will fall under the umbrella of the Islamic emirate."
With the current state of emergency only distracting the Pakistani army from the fight, you can be sure that the Taliban are readying themselves to extend the conflict. Perhaps a little implausible, but not totally out of the realms of fantasy, is this reminder of how quickly the tables could turn in asymmetric war:
"The Americans know exactly how near we are to Islamabad and they are aware of defections in the Pakistani army, and they are also aware that only one or two defections at the level of colonel will mean that the mujahideen will get their hands on some batteries of missiles which can carry nuclear warheads.
"And they [Americans] know the moment the mujahideen get that, the game will turn in favor of the mujahideen both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then nobody will be able to stop our march. So the Americans want a big battle between the army and the mujahideen so that the end game will be that they can step in and destroy Pakistan's nukes under the pretext that the Pakistani army cannot protect them from the mujahideen," Sadiq said.
Chilling stuff.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - 'Pain has become the remedy'
Exactly as I suggested in my thesis, Indian intransigence over the IPI may well be opening the door to China. Moreover, it's more than likely that the current state of emergency in Pakistan will wipe out the IPI deal once and for all. What the article doesn't make explicit, however, is exactly how Iranian gas would transit from Gwadar to China other than by rail, which is not the most efficient method. Note also that an Abu Dhabi company is investing $5bn in Gwadar.
Press TV
In a major development, Pakistan and Iran have crossed the last stumbling block in the way of a piped gas deal by agreeing on a pricing formula.
Both sides would review the gas pricing mechanism when there is a change in the co-relation between Japan's LNG and crude oil mix.
A high level delegation, headed by Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Furrukh Qayyum dashed to Tehran to seal the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) with the Iranian authorities.
The technical and legal experts are to hammer out the landmark gas deal and both sides will technically finalize the deal after decisive talks by November 9 (today) in Tehran.
According to the officials, under the new scenario in the wake of India's evasive attitude as Indian experts did not participate in the recently held meeting in Tehran and the ongoing meeting in Islamabad, both Iran and Pakistan have decided to materialize the project.
"We have also asked Iranian authorities that the gas to be imported from Iran can also be exported to China as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) as the western part of that country has a shortage of energy", said the Pakistani official.
If it happens, then the project's economic viability would be enhanced.
The LNG terminal would be constructed in Gwadar and the piped gas would be converted into LNG for export to China through a proposed rail link from Gwadar to Xianjiang Province, China.
The Pakistan Ministry of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying the railways line from Gwadar to China.
The official concluded that Pakistan had also extended an offer to Iran to establish its own terminal in Pakistan.
Pervez Musharraf really isn't doing himself any favours. Take, for example, this editorial in The Telegraph in which an allusion is made to Roosevelt's (alleged) comment exemplifying the ultimate realpolitik: "He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."
The response? Three Telegraph journalists are kicked out of Pakistan. This can only go to show that the regime has now become utterly self-indulgent. Even if Musharraf is saying - only saying, mind - elections will be held in January; even if the clampdown on Bhutto has been lifted; it still goes to show the direction the emergency is taking.
Bankrupt relationship - Telegraph
Despite George W Bush's rhetoric about freedom, the struggle against terrorism is provoking a reaction familiar from the Cold War and nowhere is that clearer than over Pakistan.
In the old parlance, General Pervez Musharraf is "our sonofabitch". He has failed to stamp out extremist groups and close the madrassas that inspire them. He has allowed the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to fall into the hands of assorted jihadis. And he has sacked independent-minded judges for fear that the Supreme Court declare illegal his re-election as president last month.
Yet, despite this combination of incompetence and brutality, America and Britain continue to back him as head of what has a strong claim to be the most dangerous country in the world.
With Benazir Bhutto threatening a mass rally and even George Bush issuing a couple of mild rebukes, Musharraf is predictably coming under fire from all sides - from civil society and the international community.
One thing he does not appear to have anticipated, however, is the backfiring of the ostensible reason behind the emergency declaration. The army is so distracted and overwhelmed with containing civil protests that it doesn't have the resources to fight the militants. The Taliban must be chuffed to bits.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Taliban stage a coup of their own
The November 4 declaration of an emergency and the preparations before it was enforced distracted the military. As a result, several villages and towns in the Swat Valley, only a drive of four hours from Islamabad, have fallen to the Taliban without a single bullet being fired - fearful Pakistani security forces simply surrendered their weapons.
The Taliban have secured similar successes in the northwestern Afghan province of Farah and the southwestern provinces of Uruzgan and Kandahar, where districts have fallen without much resistance.
A new wave of attacks is expanding the Taliban's grip in the southeastern provinces of Khost and Kunar. And on Tuesday, the Taliban are suspected to have been responsible for the massive suicide attack in northern Baghlan province in which scores of people died, including a number of parliamentarians, most notably Sayed Mustafa Kazimi, the Hazara Shi'ite leader.
Such unexpected offensives have become a hallmark of the Taliban. They surprised many with their successful spring offensive in 2006, when the West had already anticipated their demise.
The article notes that, despite a continued lack of agreement on demarcation of the Caspian, Iran is still moving towards improved ties with Central Asia. There are also elements of both cooperation and disagreement with Russia too, for example a route for Turkmen gas to Europe.
PINR - Iran Strengthens its Role in the Caspian Sea and Central Asian Regions
A prime example of the increased autonomy and influence of Iran in Central Asia is its recent energy and electricity cooperation with Turkey and Turkmenistan. In July 2007, Iran signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey to transport Turkmen gas to Europe, and to allow Turkey to operate Iranian natural gas fields, granting the right to extract and sell 30 billion cubic meters of gas from the South Pars region.
This agreement is particularly significant, as it would concretely offer Turkmenistan -- also a participant in the Caspian Sea summit -- an alternative route, away from Russia, to transport its gas into European markets. This new energy corridor, favorably seen by the European Union -- which is increasingly worried about its over-reliance on Russia to obtain natural resources from Central Asia -- would go against Russian interests, as it would break its current route monopoly.
The energy agreement is thus a significant example of Iran's current regional diplomacy, aimed at increasing its influence through energy and economic cooperation.
More below.
Continue reading "Iran's Caspian Diplomacy" »
 Kindly understand the criticality of the situation in Pakistan and around Pakistan. Pakistan is on the verge of destabilisation. Inaction at this moment is suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this country to commit suicide.
It's kind of sad. In many ways, General Musharraf has been one of the best leaders Pakistan has had for generations. He has more or less turned around the economic incompetence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as ensuring that General Zia's Islamist agenda was superseded by a more secular outlook.
That's why Musharraf's actions are so deeply disappointing. Probably it's a case of second-term delusion. It's commonly the fact that once leaders have been around for seven or eight years, surrounded by cronies and sycophants they begin to believe in their own infallibility and omnipotence. It even happened to Thatcher and Blair. That's why the US two-term limit on presidents is such a good idea.
Whatever the case, Musharraf has revealed himself for what he always really was: a tinpot military dictator of a teetering banana republic.
I'm not one to support democracy for democracy's sake, and of course it's easy to criticize from the safety and comfort of the West. Ali Eteraz at Comment is Free makes a fair point:
There is a segment of Pakistan - which includes the judges, lawyers, and journalists - which wants to take to the streets. They have dominated the news over the past year and they want to make a democratic push, with some people casting the lawyers in the same role as the Burmese monks. However, Musharraf's shrewd move of setting forth a limited PCO - targeting only the judiciary and leaving the assemblies intact - has neutralised this segment of the population. The illusion of popular participation is retained, while Musharraf's most vexing political opponents - the judges - get sidelined. If he had gone further and cancelled elections, it would have ignited a firestorm, but in his talk to Pakistani public (discussed below), he assured that he would do no such thing.
Disengaged western audiences, pumped full of the current pro-democracy intoxicants, will almost universally decry Musharraf's behaviour. I decry it too, precisely because I am a disengaged westerner and I have that luxury. However, the story in Pakistan is not so straightforward.
What I am being told by bazari merchants, some young professionals, and some industrialists in Karachi and Lahore is that they merely care for stability, whether it comes in the form of the military, or in the form of democracy. Incidentally, many of them believe that it is Musharraf who is more likely to assure that stability. A couple of people, with middle class businesses, suggested to me that Musharraf should behave more like a dictator; a secular version of the previous Islamist dictator, Zia ul Haq, in order to assure stability for business and economic growth. However, that is a minority view.
Yet that being said, history will probably see the state of emergency as Musharraf's biggest mistake. He has almost certainly grossly underestimated the ill-will against him within Pakistan itself. He has in fact strengthened the case against him, which can only help Bhutto, the lawyers and the militants.
In the greater geopolitical scale of things, Musharraf has also effectively chosen sides in the New Great Game too. America is incensed that their puppet president is turning away from even the veneer of legitimacy. Musharraf also mentioned in his address today his embarrassment at the kidnapping of Chinese workers prior to the Lal Masjid siege. Today's effective re-coup shows that Pakistan is now more likely than ever to align with China, which will not interfere in its internal affairs.
The worst case scenario is accelerated destabilisation as the US withdraws support, Bhutto's supporters rise up and in the ensuing unrest the militants seize their chance. Musharraf is committing rather than preventing the suicide of the state.
Heartthrob cricketer-cum-politician, Imran Khan, had a good point today during an interview with the BBC. Dictators always say they're acting for the good of the country; but really the outcome of suppressing the democratic process is to invite change by violent means instead.
"When you stop all legal and constitutional ways of people challenging [the president], then the only ones who challenge him are people with a gun.That's what happened to the Shah of Iran," said Khan, ominously.
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