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Islam, Israel and the War on Terror
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
Asia Times reports on the $2bn China-Iran Yadaravan oil deal in the wake of the NIE estimate, and analyses the broader implications.
With China's opinion being that the US is now waking up to Iran as a regional power, it seems that India has been put in an awkward position - having already lost out on its dealings with Tehran in order to appease Washington.
Meanwhile, China has seized a massive mining deal in Afghanistan despite all India's efforts in the country (to the chagrin of pakistan). It would appear that New Delhi has made some geopolitical miscalculations.
...by the beginning of June, Chinese regional experts had already assessed, "Iran, with no geopolitical competitors, has become the 'boss' within the Persian Gulf region. Since the US has fallen into the Iraqi quagmire, Iran concludes that the United States dare not use force against Iran. Therefore, it maintains strong strategic determination and refuses to make concessions on the nuclear issue.
"This favorable environment, coupled with a strategic resolve, has earned Iran a certain status of equilibrium with the United States in the contest within the Persian Gulf region. It is this balance of power that has forced the United States to sit down and talk with Iran. Iran, hence, has won the battle for survival and the status of a regional power."
Neat summary of Iran's political and commercial relationships with other nascent Asian powers. Includes some details on the IPI and Chinese economic influence.
PINR - Iran Looks for Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships
On the Asian continent, the Iranian strategic realignment seems to rely on organizational and bilateral cooperation, extending beyond existing relations with other "rogue states" such as North Korea. On the contrary, Iran aims at reaching out to U.S. allies or "friendly" countries, such as India and Pakistan, as well as to emerging global powers, especially to China.
Exactly as I suggested in my thesis, Indian intransigence over the IPI may well be opening the door to China. Moreover, it's more than likely that the current state of emergency in Pakistan will wipe out the IPI deal once and for all. What the article doesn't make explicit, however, is exactly how Iranian gas would transit from Gwadar to China other than by rail, which is not the most efficient method. Note also that an Abu Dhabi company is investing $5bn in Gwadar.
Press TV
In a major development, Pakistan and Iran have crossed the last stumbling block in the way of a piped gas deal by agreeing on a pricing formula.
Both sides would review the gas pricing mechanism when there is a change in the co-relation between Japan's LNG and crude oil mix.
A high level delegation, headed by Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Furrukh Qayyum dashed to Tehran to seal the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) with the Iranian authorities.
The technical and legal experts are to hammer out the landmark gas deal and both sides will technically finalize the deal after decisive talks by November 9 (today) in Tehran.
According to the officials, under the new scenario in the wake of India's evasive attitude as Indian experts did not participate in the recently held meeting in Tehran and the ongoing meeting in Islamabad, both Iran and Pakistan have decided to materialize the project.
"We have also asked Iranian authorities that the gas to be imported from Iran can also be exported to China as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) as the western part of that country has a shortage of energy", said the Pakistani official.
If it happens, then the project's economic viability would be enhanced.
The LNG terminal would be constructed in Gwadar and the piped gas would be converted into LNG for export to China through a proposed rail link from Gwadar to Xianjiang Province, China.
The Pakistan Ministry of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying the railways line from Gwadar to China.
The official concluded that Pakistan had also extended an offer to Iran to establish its own terminal in Pakistan.
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
 On the back of the BBC's excellent analysis of the Bush administration's failure on Iraq, 'No Plan, No Peace' comes a similar analysis from The Economist. The essence of both is that Cold War thinking is useless in the modern era.
It's hard to summarise two hours of BBC documentary, but the essence was this: the US didn't have a plan for the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and while the British had deep misgivings they failed to make an impact. Memorable moments include: the admission that the only intelligence on Iraqi culture came from the Lonely Planet; the discovery that orders for the aftermath had been copied directly from the Marshall Plan ("the only currencies shall be the US Dollar and the Reichsmark"); and the description of Rumsfeld's deputy as "the dumbest m****f***** I've ever met". Timeless comedy, were it not so tragic.
There needs to be a realisation in the corridors of power that the days of pitched battles and supremacy by superior firepower are gone. That was true in Vietnam, and arguably as far back as the Battle of Jutland. What matters is intelligence and boots on the ground - not soldiers brainwashed in bootcamp but educated professionals able to understand and adapt to the alien culture around them. No amount of technology can replace that. After all, the true weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47.
The reluctance of politicians to accept that this is the true 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is saddening. Rumsfeld's assumption was that a light force could take Saddam out in a matter of weeks, which was correct: but this did not dovetail well with his deeply flawed assumption that everything would be fine afterwards. The surge does appear to be working, but it would have been better in 2003 than now, after thousands have died, the country in chaos and Iran is in the ascendency. You need lots of well-worn boots, not a few shiny new hi-tech weapons.
Armies of the future | Brains, not bullets | Economist.com
The “transformation” advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed forces would be slimmed down and money invested in “smart” weapons, reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its “future warrior” was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an artificial “exoskeleton” (a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his limbs.
The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states. Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians.
Finding a resolution to the crisis on the Turkish-Iraqi border has deep implications for many of the parties involved.
Turkey in particular, with its ambitions to be viewed as a leading state in the Islamic world as well as its aspirations to join the European Union, is under scrutiny as never before. Its actions over the next weeks will define whether its neighbors and allies will continue to regard Ankara as a reliable partner or a potentially destabilizing force within the region.
The United States of America must also impose its will but faces a tricky balancing act between its commitment to Turkey and the need to maintain regional stability. And Iraq, already engulfed in violence, cannot afford more conflict and the flows of arms and refugees that will ensue.
Continue reading "Turkey and Iraq: The Implications" »
Not much analysis on the political situation, but interesting to note that talks are ongoing regarding an electricity line from Iran to Gwadar. Though Pakistan has gas resources of its own, its power situation is currently rather bleak and so in the short term it may well need to import electricity direct.
Also worth posing the question: what significance does control over the transmission grid have on Pakistani politics? If the army were to shut down the already-parlous energy sector (much of it run by retired officers), it could hold the other parties to ransom.
United Press International - International Security - Energy - Analysis
The approval of a $60 million electric line between Iran and Pakistan reflects a regional trend toward electrical grid interconnection, but its path through the unstable Baluchistan region of Iran and Pakistan also highlights the troubles facing energy cooperation between the two countries, as well as the difficulty in protecting a proposed $7.5 billion scheme to send natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan.
In late September, Tehran and Islamabad made another step toward building a 220 volt power line between Iran and Gwadar in Pakistan. The estimated $60 million cost of building the transmission line will be borne by both countries and will supply Pakistan with 100 megawatts of electricity from Iran.
If the first casualty of war is the truth, then its first omen is also linguistic. The French foreign minister's remarks on Iran and the IAEA's subsequent riposte are eerily reminiscent of the war of words that took place in 2002 between the UN's inspectors led by Hans Blix and the hawks in the Pentagon.
What is very unusual is that it's the French that are the hawks this time. That's quite a major shift in international relations. Up until this year, Blair and his predecessors would have been the swiftest to cosy up to Washington, while Chirac and his forebears would bang the drum of protest. Perhaps, with Gordon Brown visibly shying away from Bush, the French are seizing the opportunity to regain a world voice in the absence of a coherent EU foreign policy.
Whatever the case, with a UNSC meeting scheduled for Friday, the path of no return may already be opening up.
UN nuclear boss warns warmongers over Iran | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war," Bernard Kouchner told French TV and radio.
While talks over Iran's nuclear programme should continue "right to the end", Mr Kouchner said, an Iranian nuclear weapon would pose "a real danger for the whole world". France has taken a much harsher line towards Iran since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to success Jacques Chirac as president.
Every now and again, Asia Times Online turns up an absolute tour de force of an analysis: this is one of them. It pulls together every thread in the Afghanistan war, from the significance of events on Pakistan to the options available to the local powers China, India and Russia.
The one major beef I have with it is, as before, whether it is truly possible to negotiate with the Taliban. Sure, you can talk to the heads of major Taliban groups, but what are the guarantees that one agreement is going to quell the whole bunch of them? Isn't it likely that large splinter groups that oppose any settlement will break off and carry on doing their own thing? Still, the author seems to think that talks are on the cards.
Below, I attempt a rough summary of all the points, in an actor-by-actor format.
- The Taliban: As NATO and the US tire, the chances of a settlement grow, especially in the light of potential instability in Pakistan too.
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The UN: Growing acceptance of the idea of talking with the Taliban. -
The US: Should seek intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistan dialogue with the aid of China, Russia and India. -
Iran: The US quagmire in Afghanistan is succour to their ambitions for regional dominance. -
Russia: Fears of 'Talibanization' will draw the Central Asian states closer into seurity frameworks such as the SCO. -
China: Stay out of it, and leave the Taliban to the US. -
India: Stick with the US, and hope that Pakistan doesn't regain influence in Afghanistan.
And here's the key:
Clearly, the continued disintegration of the Pakistani state widens al-Qaeda's support base among the Taliban. If US-Iran tensions escalate, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan become intertwined. That means the Afghan war may take a new form rather than lead to peace.
The whole article is reprinted below: check out also Ahmed Rashid's sobering analysis in The Telegraph in which he describes his own land as "a failing state hovering over the abyss".
Continue reading "'Stan - The Big Picture" »
A lot of this Guardian article on the likelihood of US-Israeli strikes on Iran is purely speculative, and thus must be taken with a large pinch of sand. Neither the commentator quoted below, Patrick Cronin, and an ex-CIA source can offer any hard evidence, though both believe that an attack is imminent.
However, one prescient remark from Cronin is that, with elections coming up in November 2008, any action taken in the six months prior to the poll would be seen as 'political'. That would mean that if it's going to happen, it'll happen this winter. Just as with Iraq, it's highly probable that there are already plans drawn up to effect the mission, so all Bush needs is another plausible 'smoking gun'.
Proxy war could soon turn to direct conflict, analysts warn | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.
Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."
In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea.
The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
This one's going straight on my blogroll. PostGlobal is a collaboration between The Washington Post and Newsweek that analyses global trends - the fall of America, the rise of China, energy, Islam etc..
In short, it's basically just like my blog, but with flash graphics, real cash backing, plus gurus like Fareed Zakaria on board. The only thing they lack is a decent subeditor, which does let it down a little.
What really caught my eye today was this introduction to 'midrange' trends over the next 36 months. Summary below:
A dramatic global realignment appears to be in progress (and quickening) as the result of several factors:
- The loss of US influence as a result of the Iraq war
- A view across the globe resulting from Abu Ghraib and range of missteps that the US has lost the moral high ground it had enjoyed for decades
- A feeling among global leaders that the US is without a coherent foreign policy strategy...a belief that has started feeding on itself and has emboldened US adversaries
- China's rise, its smooth diplomatic technique, its re-alignment with Russia and its aggressive, clever drive to form new alliances with nations extending from Asia and Africa to South America
- Russia's recent rise combined with Russian President Putin's domestic popularity and his reputation for effectively standing up to the West
- The rise of non-aligned nations emboldened by the inability of the US to effectively use the extraordinary power it possesses
- A view among key global leaders that the US will be bogged down in Iraq for many years (a view heightened by significantly by President Bush's September 13 Iraq speech), thus distracted and unable to respond effectively to key political moves by the range of international players
- A recognition by the international community that the Bush Administration not only hasn't been able to deal effectively with non-state actors (e.g. terror groups like Al Qaeda) but they are holding their own or starting to win
More excellent points culled from the article below.
Continue reading "PostGlobal" »
A balanced perspective from The Economist, which does look closely at the reasons for leaving: America no longer influences Iraqi politics; disaster has already befallen the nation. But the reasons for staying are even more compelling.
The Iraq war | Why they should stay | Economist.com
If the case for staying depended on extrapolating from the modest gains the general claims for his surge, it would be a weak one. The strong case is that if America leaves, things will get even worse. This can only be a guess, but it is more plausible than the alternative guess that America's going will nudge Iraq in the right direction. In the past two years, violence has tended to decline where American troops are present and to rise in the places they leave. There is no doubt that some Shia militias want to rid Baghdad of its Sunnis and that American troops are for now the only thing stopping them. Contrary to what foreigners think, most Iraqis say they oppose partition: in the BBC/ABC poll, 62% said Iraq should have a unified government and 98% said it would be a bad thing for the country to separate on sectarian lines...
If America could choose again, it would not step into a civil war in Mesopotamia. But there are worse reasons than preventing a bloodbath for a superpower to put its soldiers at risk. Having invaded Iraq in its own interest—to remove mass-killing weapons that turned out not to exist—America owes something to Iraq's people, a slim majority of whom want it to stay. It is hard to know how Iraq can be mended. At some point it may become clear the country has sunk so low it is simply beyond saving. But it is not possible to be sure of that yet.
A lengthy but useful summary of everything that's important in the world right now pertaining to the linkages between geopolitics and energy. Must look out for this Dilip Hiro guy's book.
We can now probably add to this list of Bush's errors America's disruption of the world financial system via subprime loans, not to mention high oil prices and a feeble dollar but hey.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US in their sights: The rising powers
...with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of US supremacy - Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode US hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The George W Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, overextending itself...
Yet there are other explanations - unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures - for the current transformation in international affairs. These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.
Authoritative figures such as Lords Inge and Ashdown have reiterated the fact that Britain is in the 'Stan for the long haul. Their foreboding does smack of the 'domino effect', but the danger in Pakistan is more real than it was in Southeast Asia back in the '60s. The battle of Las Masjid is testament to that. And if both Afghanistan and Pakistan succomb to Islamism, then the potential for a stream of trained-up bombers heading for the Piccadilly line multiplies fivefold.
The Lords are also correct to identify a double problem - NATO's lack of coordination with the US forces in country and lack of long-term development. Development can only come with security in place, goes the theory, though I wonder if anyone has ever tried promoting development and waiting for the security situation to calm down as progress is made.
Lastly, Iraq. The Brits look like pulling out of Iraq and leaving it to the Americans: the other side of the deal should be an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. That way, NATO can attempt to deal with Afghanistan - which is certainly not a hopeless case - without American impediments, and America can be left to its deserved fate in Iraq.
Generals' warning on Afghanistan | World | The Observer
Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.
'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'
Update: Things just went from bad to worse. The fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and one could even go so far to say that the Durand Line is no real border - they are one and the same problem.
Events in Islamabad over the last few weeks have now provoked the Taliban sympathisers in Waziristan to relinquish their tenuous truce - an added headache for both Musharraf and NATO. What chance is there of a NATO intervention within Pakistan proper?
An extremely useful summary of China's energy relations with the Middle East - if only I'd had this while I was writing my thesis. Main point to note, highlighted in italics below, is that the big three - Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq - see the main benefit of trading with China as "China is not America". Read into that what you will.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
As the world’s third largest oil importer after the United States and Japan, China is projected to import 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East by 2015, according to the International Energy Agency’s forecast. For this reason, China intends to open a dialogue with OPEC countries. Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun stated, “China wants to participate in making big decisions in the world. We want to set up a mechanism to negotiate and discuss oil market issues with the OPEC countries” (Gulf News, December, 6, 2006).
There appears to be an equal amount of enthusiasm from the Middle Eastern countries to take advantage of the world’s fastest growing market. China’s presence is largely perceived as non-ideological, economically oriented and pragmatic. Furthermore, there is little concern that China’s increasing status as a world power will constitute an international threat. “Hegemony, domination, imperialism are associated with the United States and Europe. China is not seen that way,” commented Sami Baroudi, a Lebanese political scientist, “Arabs appreciate its economic might, but don’t see it as a political threat” (Reuters, November, 27, 2006).
I've been thinking this for quite a while, and looks like Gordon has been too. The essential problem with the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is that it is not actually a war. 'War' implies some kind of competition for territory and resources; even the Cold War was stretching the point, being as it was an economic and ideological conflict fought for real only by proxy.
The thing is that, once you have got into the 'war' mindset, your approach to the situation is defined by it. Military commanders throughout the world are obsessed with retaining a warfighting capability - MBTs, carrier groups and suchlike that project power over national borders. But the situation we are facing now is not about national borders. Terrorists simply cannot be fought with conventional military forces. Even guerilla armies can't be beaten this way - look at Vietnam.
What the US needs to do is acknowledge that there are two ways to defeat terrorism - through both hard power and soft power. The hard power part is about eliminating those terrorists who are an immediate threat, either through small tactically-inserted special forces teams working overseas or via intelligence and policing within home territory. Wading in with tanks and Apache helicopter gunships will simply create alienation and more terrorists, something the Israelis too have yet to cotton on to. The soft power part is about tackling the warped ideologies that fuel terrorism, which in turn are inspired by disenfranchisment and economic or social deprivation.
It's the classic speak-softly-big-stick argument, but I see little evidence that force structures and governmental foreign policy apparatus are being adapted to meet the moderm world. With the military brass - not to mention the defence industry and the trade union lobbies - eager to obtain and supply hugely-expensive power projection platforms, the real need is overlooked. Yes, of course retain a warfighting capability - but realise that a small nation such as the UK is unable to fight a real war larger than a Falklands/Sierra Leone scale without US assistance. Hold on to what we need to stay militarily viable, but spend the rest on restructuring the surveillance, intelligence and development side of the equation - all of which the military could still turn its hand to and prove its usefulness.
Language and terrorism | Don't mention the GWOT | Economist.com
To speak of a “global war on terror” is over-simple. Shortened to the acronym GWOT, it conflated the military campaign against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan in 2001 with the war two years later to overthrow Saddam Hussein, an old foe who almost certainly had nothing to do with September 11th. That Iraq is a magnet for al-Qaeda is the result of the invasion of Iraq, not its cause. GWOT also implies, wrongly, that there exists a military solution to a problem that for a few countries (eg, Afghanistan) requires a co-ordinated nation-building effort but for most demands patient police and intelligence work. “War” should be the exception, not the focus of the effort against terrorists.
The inevitable reams of analysis on the three bomb attacks in the UK once again miss the point. While there's no denying that there is a large and well-funded network known as Al-Qaeda - which is certainly still in existence notably in the Afghan-Pakistan border area, Iraq and doubtless many other countries in the Muslim world and the West - Al-Qaeda in itself is not really the threat any more.
The incompetence of the June plots indicates that the perpetrators were effectively 'freelancing' more than anything. They could well be a bunch of disparate people with a point to make about Britain's foreign policy - not even necessarily 'Islamists' as is widely assumed, though quite probably disgruntled about the fate of Muslims in the wider world. Had they been 'linked to Al-Qaeda' as the newspapers would love to report, there would have been two symptoms:
1. A greater sophistication of techniques and materiels, and a willingness to die;
2. A greater chance of detection prior to the attacks being carried out.
The truble with freelancers is that, without financial or organisational links to known terror networks, they are that much harder to detect. Intelligence needs a starting point somewhere, and one lead leads to more which lead to more. The readiness of the press and public to assume that all terrorists are somehow 'linked to Al-Qaeda' diminishes the significance of what is going on. These guys are working independently, and though this means greater incompetence it also means they are much harder to find in time.
Comment is free: Strings of terror are knotted internally
Sadly, their lack of professionalism is not necessarily heartening. We know already that the al-Qaida hard core of Osama bin Laden and the few dozen senior militants around him has been seriously degraded in recent years. Experienced, competent bomb-makers are now few and far between.
However, instead there are scores - if not hundreds - of young men who have been radicalised by al-Qaida's propaganda. Al-Qaida has traded competence and discipline for resilience and dispersion. Both are effective in their way. The threat has evolved but remains relatively constant - ie severe.
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
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