|
Main
Islam, Israel and the War on Terror
OK, so this blog is closed... but I couldn't resist the temptation to scribble down some predictions about international relations in the year ahead.
First, a debrief on 2008. Last year's predictions were - predictably - mixed. I was right that the Beijing Olympics would be surrounded by controversy - Tibet and Uyghur violence did occur - but they weren't the failure I envisaged. And I was dead wrong about Russia, what with the attack on Georgia and all.
However, predicting a failed ratification for the Lisbon treaty was dead on, and Musharraf bowed out too.
Turning to 2009, the underlying theme has to be the recession. This colours everything, as does the new POTUS, Barack Obama.
Unfortunately for Obama, who will certainly enjoy a protracted honeymoon period, expectations are so high that failure is inevitable. A third intifada is on its way after the December shoot-out in Gaza, and since its the Palestine-Israel conflict that lies at the heart of all the Middle East's woes instability will be high.
This will affect Western policy in Afghanistan too - as political capital dwindles, troubles in that part of the world will increase. I have repeatedly said that Pakistan will eventually implode and have been wrong every time. Civil society is too strong. But eventually the government will collapse, which will lead to renewed tensions with India and Afghanistan and a resurgence of Islamism on the borders.
India is relatively protected from the effects of the global recession, but chances are that the people will still give Congress a bloody nose in the forthcoming elections. That means a return for the Hindu nationalist BJP perhaps, or a looser and inherently ineffective coalition including communists and right-wing elements at best. Again, this will contribute to further tensions with Pakistan and China too.
China is not going to enjoy the depression: closures are already occurring, and renewed protectionism in the West will not help exports. The more jobless and disenfranchised people there are, the less authority the CCP will have. The Party is not going to break yet, but its slide into the abyss may well begin. With a series of government collapses post-Koizumi and a nasty recession, Japan, meanwhile, could also take a turn to nationalism. Not a good combination.
And as Kosovo comes under EU control, it will be a turning point for both 'old' and 'new' Europe. Could Britain be forced to join the Euro? Unlikely, but not unthinkable - just as there's always a chance someone could get kicked out (Greece?). Russia, meanwhile, will take advantage of this year's weakish presidencies (Czech Republic and Sweden) to tighten the screws on the pipelines.
Under these conditions, the role of the UN is going to come under scrutiny. The ICC's ability to try Omar Bashir of Sudan will be the focus of attention, while all eyes will be on the viability of UN peacekeeping in Africa.
Overall, 2009 will be uneventful, something of a holding period setting the scene for the next decade.
I won't publish the entire 2009 deathlist (predicted deaths of famous people), but at least one symbolic leader will kick the bucket in 2009. Maggie Thatcher? Mikhail 'Vuitton' Gorbachev? Or even Mr. Obama? We shall see.
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
Asia Times reports on the $2bn China-Iran Yadaravan oil deal in the wake of the NIE estimate, and analyses the broader implications.
With China's opinion being that the US is now waking up to Iran as a regional power, it seems that India has been put in an awkward position - having already lost out on its dealings with Tehran in order to appease Washington.
Meanwhile, China has seized a massive mining deal in Afghanistan despite all India's efforts in the country (to the chagrin of pakistan). It would appear that New Delhi has made some geopolitical miscalculations.
...by the beginning of June, Chinese regional experts had already assessed, "Iran, with no geopolitical competitors, has become the 'boss' within the Persian Gulf region. Since the US has fallen into the Iraqi quagmire, Iran concludes that the United States dare not use force against Iran. Therefore, it maintains strong strategic determination and refuses to make concessions on the nuclear issue.
"This favorable environment, coupled with a strategic resolve, has earned Iran a certain status of equilibrium with the United States in the contest within the Persian Gulf region. It is this balance of power that has forced the United States to sit down and talk with Iran. Iran, hence, has won the battle for survival and the status of a regional power."
Neat summary of Iran's political and commercial relationships with other nascent Asian powers. Includes some details on the IPI and Chinese economic influence.
PINR - Iran Looks for Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships
On the Asian continent, the Iranian strategic realignment seems to rely on organizational and bilateral cooperation, extending beyond existing relations with other "rogue states" such as North Korea. On the contrary, Iran aims at reaching out to U.S. allies or "friendly" countries, such as India and Pakistan, as well as to emerging global powers, especially to China.
Exactly as I suggested in my thesis, Indian intransigence over the IPI may well be opening the door to China. Moreover, it's more than likely that the current state of emergency in Pakistan will wipe out the IPI deal once and for all. What the article doesn't make explicit, however, is exactly how Iranian gas would transit from Gwadar to China other than by rail, which is not the most efficient method. Note also that an Abu Dhabi company is investing $5bn in Gwadar.
Press TV
In a major development, Pakistan and Iran have crossed the last stumbling block in the way of a piped gas deal by agreeing on a pricing formula.
Both sides would review the gas pricing mechanism when there is a change in the co-relation between Japan's LNG and crude oil mix.
A high level delegation, headed by Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Furrukh Qayyum dashed to Tehran to seal the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) with the Iranian authorities.
The technical and legal experts are to hammer out the landmark gas deal and both sides will technically finalize the deal after decisive talks by November 9 (today) in Tehran.
According to the officials, under the new scenario in the wake of India's evasive attitude as Indian experts did not participate in the recently held meeting in Tehran and the ongoing meeting in Islamabad, both Iran and Pakistan have decided to materialize the project.
"We have also asked Iranian authorities that the gas to be imported from Iran can also be exported to China as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) as the western part of that country has a shortage of energy", said the Pakistani official.
If it happens, then the project's economic viability would be enhanced.
The LNG terminal would be constructed in Gwadar and the piped gas would be converted into LNG for export to China through a proposed rail link from Gwadar to Xianjiang Province, China.
The Pakistan Ministry of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying the railways line from Gwadar to China.
The official concluded that Pakistan had also extended an offer to Iran to establish its own terminal in Pakistan.
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
 On the back of the BBC's excellent analysis of the Bush administration's failure on Iraq, 'No Plan, No Peace' comes a similar analysis from The Economist. The essence of both is that Cold War thinking is useless in the modern era.
It's hard to summarise two hours of BBC documentary, but the essence was this: the US didn't have a plan for the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and while the British had deep misgivings they failed to make an impact. Memorable moments include: the admission that the only intelligence on Iraqi culture came from the Lonely Planet; the discovery that orders for the aftermath had been copied directly from the Marshall Plan ("the only currencies shall be the US Dollar and the Reichsmark"); and the description of Rumsfeld's deputy as "the dumbest m****f***** I've ever met". Timeless comedy, were it not so tragic.
There needs to be a realisation in the corridors of power that the days of pitched battles and supremacy by superior firepower are gone. That was true in Vietnam, and arguably as far back as the Battle of Jutland. What matters is intelligence and boots on the ground - not soldiers brainwashed in bootcamp but educated professionals able to understand and adapt to the alien culture around them. No amount of technology can replace that. After all, the true weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47.
The reluctance of politicians to accept that this is the true 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is saddening. Rumsfeld's assumption was that a light force could take Saddam out in a matter of weeks, which was correct: but this did not dovetail well with his deeply flawed assumption that everything would be fine afterwards. The surge does appear to be working, but it would have been better in 2003 than now, after thousands have died, the country in chaos and Iran is in the ascendency. You need lots of well-worn boots, not a few shiny new hi-tech weapons.
Armies of the future | Brains, not bullets | Economist.com
The “transformation†advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed forces would be slimmed down and money invested in “smart†weapons, reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its “future warrior†was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an artificial “exoskeleton†(a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his limbs.
The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states. Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians.
Finding a resolution to the crisis on the Turkish-Iraqi border has deep implications for many of the parties involved.
Turkey in particular, with its ambitions to be viewed as a leading state in the Islamic world as well as its aspirations to join the European Union, is under scrutiny as never before. Its actions over the next weeks will define whether its neighbors and allies will continue to regard Ankara as a reliable partner or a potentially destabilizing force within the region.
The United States of America must also impose its will but faces a tricky balancing act between its commitment to Turkey and the need to maintain regional stability. And Iraq, already engulfed in violence, cannot afford more conflict and the flows of arms and refugees that will ensue.
Continue reading "Turkey and Iraq: The Implications" »
Not much analysis on the political situation, but interesting to note that talks are ongoing regarding an electricity line from Iran to Gwadar. Though Pakistan has gas resources of its own, its power situation is currently rather bleak and so in the short term it may well need to import electricity direct.
Also worth posing the question: what significance does control over the transmission grid have on Pakistani politics? If the army were to shut down the already-parlous energy sector (much of it run by retired officers), it could hold the other parties to ransom.
United Press International - International Security - Energy - Analysis
The approval of a $60 million electric line between Iran and Pakistan reflects a regional trend toward electrical grid interconnection, but its path through the unstable Baluchistan region of Iran and Pakistan also highlights the troubles facing energy cooperation between the two countries, as well as the difficulty in protecting a proposed $7.5 billion scheme to send natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan.
In late September, Tehran and Islamabad made another step toward building a 220 volt power line between Iran and Gwadar in Pakistan. The estimated $60 million cost of building the transmission line will be borne by both countries and will supply Pakistan with 100 megawatts of electricity from Iran.
If the first casualty of war is the truth, then its first omen is also linguistic. The French foreign minister's remarks on Iran and the IAEA's subsequent riposte are eerily reminiscent of the war of words that took place in 2002 between the UN's inspectors led by Hans Blix and the hawks in the Pentagon.
What is very unusual is that it's the French that are the hawks this time. That's quite a major shift in international relations. Up until this year, Blair and his predecessors would have been the swiftest to cosy up to Washington, while Chirac and his forebears would bang the drum of protest. Perhaps, with Gordon Brown visibly shying away from Bush, the French are seizing the opportunity to regain a world voice in the absence of a coherent EU foreign policy.
Whatever the case, with a UNSC meeting scheduled for Friday, the path of no return may already be opening up.
UN nuclear boss warns warmongers over Iran | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war," Bernard Kouchner told French TV and radio.
While talks over Iran's nuclear programme should continue "right to the end", Mr Kouchner said, an Iranian nuclear weapon would pose "a real danger for the whole world". France has taken a much harsher line towards Iran since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to success Jacques Chirac as president.
Every now and again, Asia Times Online turns up an absolute tour de force of an analysis: this is one of them. It pulls together every thread in the Afghanistan war, from the significance of events on Pakistan to the options available to the local powers China, India and Russia.
The one major beef I have with it is, as before, whether it is truly possible to negotiate with the Taliban. Sure, you can talk to the heads of major Taliban groups, but what are the guarantees that one agreement is going to quell the whole bunch of them? Isn't it likely that large splinter groups that oppose any settlement will break off and carry on doing their own thing? Still, the author seems to think that talks are on the cards.
Below, I attempt a rough summary of all the points, in an actor-by-actor format.
- The Taliban: As NATO and the US tire, the chances of a settlement grow, especially in the light of potential instability in Pakistan too.
-
The UN: Growing acceptance of the idea of talking with the Taliban. -
The US: Should seek intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistan dialogue with the aid of China, Russia and India. -
Iran: The US quagmire in Afghanistan is succour to their ambitions for regional dominance. -
Russia: Fears of 'Talibanization' will draw the Central Asian states closer into seurity frameworks such as the SCO. -
China: Stay out of it, and leave the Taliban to the US. -
India: Stick with the US, and hope that Pakistan doesn't regain influence in Afghanistan.
And here's the key:
Clearly, the continued disintegration of the Pakistani state widens al-Qaeda's support base among the Taliban. If US-Iran tensions escalate, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan become intertwined. That means the Afghan war may take a new form rather than lead to peace.
The whole article is reprinted below: check out also Ahmed Rashid's sobering analysis in The Telegraph in which he describes his own land as "a failing state hovering over the abyss".
Continue reading "'Stan - The Big Picture" »
A lot of this Guardian article on the likelihood of US-Israeli strikes on Iran is purely speculative, and thus must be taken with a large pinch of sand. Neither the commentator quoted below, Patrick Cronin, and an ex-CIA source can offer any hard evidence, though both believe that an attack is imminent.
However, one prescient remark from Cronin is that, with elections coming up in November 2008, any action taken in the six months prior to the poll would be seen as 'political'. That would mean that if it's going to happen, it'll happen this winter. Just as with Iraq, it's highly probable that there are already plans drawn up to effect the mission, so all Bush needs is another plausible 'smoking gun'.
Proxy war could soon turn to direct conflict, analysts warn | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.
Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."
In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea.
The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
This one's going straight on my blogroll. PostGlobal is a collaboration between The Washington Post and Newsweek that analyses global trends - the fall of America, the rise of China, energy, Islam etc..
In short, it's basically just like my blog, but with flash graphics, real cash backing, plus gurus like Fareed Zakaria on board. The only thing they lack is a decent subeditor, which does let it down a little.
What really caught my eye today was this introduction to 'midrange' trends over the next 36 months. Summary below:
A dramatic global realignment appears to be in progress (and quickening) as the result of several factors:
- The loss of US influence as a result of the Iraq war
- A view across the globe resulting from Abu Ghraib and range of missteps that the US has lost the moral high ground it had enjoyed for decades
- A feeling among global leaders that the US is without a coherent foreign policy strategy...a belief that has started feeding on itself and has emboldened US adversaries
- China's rise, its smooth diplomatic technique, its re-alignment with Russia and its aggressive, clever drive to form new alliances with nations extending from Asia and Africa to South America
- Russia's recent rise combined with Russian President Putin's domestic popularity and his reputation for effectively standing up to the West
- The rise of non-aligned nations emboldened by the inability of the US to effectively use the extraordinary power it possesses
- A view among key global leaders that the US will be bogged down in Iraq for many years (a view heightened by significantly by President Bush's September 13 Iraq speech), thus distracted and unable to respond effectively to key political moves by the range of international players
- A recognition by the international community that the Bush Administration not only hasn't been able to deal effectively with non-state actors (e.g. terror groups like Al Qaeda) but they are holding their own or starting to win
More excellent points culled from the article below.
Continue reading "PostGlobal" »
A balanced perspective from The Economist, which does look closely at the reasons for leaving: America no longer influences Iraqi politics; disaster has already befallen the nation. But the reasons for staying are even more compelling.
The Iraq war | Why they should stay | Economist.com
If the case for staying depended on extrapolating from the modest gains the general claims for his surge, it would be a weak one. The strong case is that if America leaves, things will get even worse. This can only be a guess, but it is more plausible than the alternative guess that America's going will nudge Iraq in the right direction. In the past two years, violence has tended to decline where American troops are present and to rise in the places they leave. There is no doubt that some Shia militias want to rid Baghdad of its Sunnis and that American troops are for now the only thing stopping them. Contrary to what foreigners think, most Iraqis say they oppose partition: in the BBC/ABC poll, 62% said Iraq should have a unified government and 98% said it would be a bad thing for the country to separate on sectarian lines...
If America could choose again, it would not step into a civil war in Mesopotamia. But there are worse reasons than preventing a bloodbath for a superpower to put its soldiers at risk. Having invaded Iraq in its own interest—to remove mass-killing weapons that turned out not to exist—America owes something to Iraq's people, a slim majority of whom want it to stay. It is hard to know how Iraq can be mended. At some point it may become clear the country has sunk so low it is simply beyond saving. But it is not possible to be sure of that yet.
A lengthy but useful summary of everything that's important in the world right now pertaining to the linkages between geopolitics and energy. Must look out for this Dilip Hiro guy's book.
We can now probably add to this list of Bush's errors America's disruption of the world financial system via subprime loans, not to mention high oil prices and a feeble dollar but hey.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US in their sights: The rising powers
...with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of US supremacy - Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode US hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The George W Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, overextending itself...
Yet there are other explanations - unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures - for the current transformation in international affairs. These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.
Authoritative figures such as Lords Inge and Ashdown have reiterated the fact that Britain is in the 'Stan for the long haul. Their foreboding does smack of the 'domino effect', but the danger in Pakistan is more real than it was in Southeast Asia back in the '60s. The battle of Las Masjid is testament to that. And if both Afghanistan and Pakistan succomb to Islamism, then the potential for a stream of trained-up bombers heading for the Piccadilly line multiplies fivefold.
The Lords are also correct to identify a double problem - NATO's lack of coordination with the US forces in country and lack of long-term development. Development can only come with security in place, goes the theory, though I wonder if anyone has ever tried promoting development and waiting for the security situation to calm down as progress is made.
Lastly, Iraq. The Brits look like pulling out of Iraq and leaving it to the Americans: the other side of the deal should be an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. That way, NATO can attempt to deal with Afghanistan - which is certainly not a hopeless case - without American impediments, and America can be left to its deserved fate in Iraq.
Generals' warning on Afghanistan | World | The Observer
Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.
'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'
Update: Things just went from bad to worse. The fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and one could even go so far to say that the Durand Line is no real border - they are one and the same problem.
Events in Islamabad over the last few weeks have now provoked the Taliban sympathisers in Waziristan to relinquish their tenuous truce - an added headache for both Musharraf and NATO. What chance is there of a NATO intervention within Pakistan proper?
An extremely useful summary of China's energy relations with the Middle East - if only I'd had this while I was writing my thesis. Main point to note, highlighted in italics below, is that the big three - Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq - see the main benefit of trading with China as "China is not America". Read into that what you will.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
As the world’s third largest oil importer after the United States and Japan, China is projected to import 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East by 2015, according to the International Energy Agency’s forecast. For this reason, China intends to open a dialogue with OPEC countries. Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun stated, “China wants to participate in making big decisions in the world. We want to set up a mechanism to negotiate and discuss oil market issues with the OPEC countries†(Gulf News, December, 6, 2006).
There appears to be an equal amount of enthusiasm from the Middle Eastern countries to take advantage of the world’s fastest growing market. China’s presence is largely perceived as non-ideological, economically oriented and pragmatic. Furthermore, there is little concern that China’s increasing status as a world power will constitute an international threat. “Hegemony, domination, imperialism are associated with the United States and Europe. China is not seen that way,†commented Sami Baroudi, a Lebanese political scientist, “Arabs appreciate its economic might, but don’t see it as a political threat†(Reuters, November, 27, 2006).
I've been thinking this for quite a while, and looks like Gordon has been too. The essential problem with the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is that it is not actually a war. 'War' implies some kind of competition for territory and resources; even the Cold War was stretching the point, being as it was an economic and ideological conflict fought for real only by proxy.
The thing is that, once you have got into the 'war' mindset, your approach to the situation is defined by it. Military commanders throughout the world are obsessed with retaining a warfighting capability - MBTs, carrier groups and suchlike that project power over national borders. But the situation we are facing now is not about national borders. Terrorists simply cannot be fought with conventional military forces. Even guerilla armies can't be beaten this way - look at Vietnam.
What the US needs to do is acknowledge that there are two ways to defeat terrorism - through both hard power and soft power. The hard power part is about eliminating those terrorists who are an immediate threat, either through small tactically-inserted special forces teams working overseas or via intelligence and policing within home territory. Wading in with tanks and Apache helicopter gunships will simply create alienation and more terrorists, something the Israelis too have yet to cotton on to. The soft power part is about tackling the warped ideologies that fuel terrorism, which in turn are inspired by disenfranchisment and economic or social deprivation.
It's the classic speak-softly-big-stick argument, but I see little evidence that force structures and governmental foreign policy apparatus are being adapted to meet the moderm world. With the military brass - not to mention the defence industry and the trade union lobbies - eager to obtain and supply hugely-expensive power projection platforms, the real need is overlooked. Yes, of course retain a warfighting capability - but realise that a small nation such as the UK is unable to fight a real war larger than a Falklands/Sierra Leone scale without US assistance. Hold on to what we need to stay militarily viable, but spend the rest on restructuring the surveillance, intelligence and development side of the equation - all of which the military could still turn its hand to and prove its usefulness.
Language and terrorism | Don't mention the GWOT | Economist.com
To speak of a “global war on terror†is over-simple. Shortened to the acronym GWOT, it conflated the military campaign against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan in 2001 with the war two years later to overthrow Saddam Hussein, an old foe who almost certainly had nothing to do with September 11th. That Iraq is a magnet for al-Qaeda is the result of the invasion of Iraq, not its cause. GWOT also implies, wrongly, that there exists a military solution to a problem that for a few countries (eg, Afghanistan) requires a co-ordinated nation-building effort but for most demands patient police and intelligence work. “War†should be the exception, not the focus of the effort against terrorists.
The inevitable reams of analysis on the three bomb attacks in the UK once again miss the point. While there's no denying that there is a large and well-funded network known as Al-Qaeda - which is certainly still in existence notably in the Afghan-Pakistan border area, Iraq and doubtless many other countries in the Muslim world and the West - Al-Qaeda in itself is not really the threat any more.
The incompetence of the June plots indicates that the perpetrators were effectively 'freelancing' more than anything. They could well be a bunch of disparate people with a point to make about Britain's foreign policy - not even necessarily 'Islamists' as is widely assumed, though quite probably disgruntled about the fate of Muslims in the wider world. Had they been 'linked to Al-Qaeda' as the newspapers would love to report, there would have been two symptoms:
1. A greater sophistication of techniques and materiels, and a willingness to die;
2. A greater chance of detection prior to the attacks being carried out.
The truble with freelancers is that, without financial or organisational links to known terror networks, they are that much harder to detect. Intelligence needs a starting point somewhere, and one lead leads to more which lead to more. The readiness of the press and public to assume that all terrorists are somehow 'linked to Al-Qaeda' diminishes the significance of what is going on. These guys are working independently, and though this means greater incompetence it also means they are much harder to find in time.
Comment is free: Strings of terror are knotted internally
Sadly, their lack of professionalism is not necessarily heartening. We know already that the al-Qaida hard core of Osama bin Laden and the few dozen senior militants around him has been seriously degraded in recent years. Experienced, competent bomb-makers are now few and far between.
However, instead there are scores - if not hundreds - of young men who have been radicalised by al-Qaida's propaganda. Al-Qaida has traded competence and discipline for resilience and dispersion. Both are effective in their way. The threat has evolved but remains relatively constant - ie severe.
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
Bound copies are available at lulu.com for around $10 plus P&P; downloadable PDF files are free of charge. Click here to access the virtual storefront.
This work is made available on the understanding that it will not be copied, plagiarised or otherwise reproduced without the explicit consent of the author.
Iran's nuclear shenanigans have wider repercussions for near neighbours such as India, which may find itself in a diplomatic confrontation with the US.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - India grapples with energy issues
A prominent US legislator, Congressman Tom Lantos, who is head of the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations, has introduced a bill that, if passed, will ensure that India and Pakistan are not able to proceed with their gas pipeline connecting to Iran.
The legislation, the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, seeks to target companies investing in Iran's energy sector by ensuring that deals with Iran worth more than $20 million will bring the investors under US sanctions.
According to reports, the US government has been quietly warning foreign energy companies, including Europe's Shell and Repsol and Malaysia's SKS, as well as the governments of China, India, Pakistan and Malaysia, that penalties are possible if they pursue energy deals with Iran.
Also worth noting is the concept of a 'South Asian Energy Ring':
The SAARC, for which energy is a very high priority for cooperation, comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Key SAARC nation Pakistan has welcomed the energy-ring concept. Amanullah Khan Jadoon, minister for petroleum and natural resources, said Pakistan is a strong advocate of energy cooperation in South Asia.
 Not one but two articles in today's Asia Times highlight the difficult geopolitical position of Pakistan, sandwiched as it is between both Iran and Afghanistan.
In the first, the author notes that the Balochistan issue is a common problem for Iran and Pakistan, while not forgetting that Iran is in truth a more fractured society than it would appear. Morover, the IPI pipeline gets into it too. How the US will deal with this is anyone's guess:
The moot point is to what extent Musharraf is willingly cooperating with US regional policy against Iran. He is skating on thin ice. He may endear himself to Washington as a brave leader in the Muslim world, but Pakistani public opinion is averse to serving the US agenda over Iran. This contradiction is fraught with dangers. It can only further accentuate Musharraf's isolation within Pakistan and add to the country's overall political uncertainties.
Washington could be miscalculating that only the Shi'ites in Sunni-dominated Pakistan will feel alienated by Musharraf's unfriendly attitude toward Tehran. The fact is, in emotive terms, the average Pakistani citizen is bound to view US hostility toward Iran as yet another instance of Washington's "crusade" against the Islamic world.
But Washington, on its part, can draw satisfaction that it is killing two birds with one stone. It may become difficult to advance the Iran-Pakistan-India gas-pipeline project when a thick cloud of distrust threatens to engulf Pakistan-Iran relations.
Musharraf's problems do not end there, with the US and NATO now threatening to extend the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan's NWFP:
"It was not an option for Pakistan to carry out any operations on its own, as Washington has completely shown its mistrust in Pakistan's ability to conduct any credible military operations against militant hideouts," a top security official told Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity. "There was only one demand: that Pakistan allow NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] troops the right of hot pursuit of al-Qaeda in Pakistani territory, or NATO would force its own way in."
Will they really go in 'hot pursuit' of al-Qaeda and the Taliban across the Durand Line? To do so could well further destabilise an already shaky Islamabad. It just goes to show that the GWOT, energy and the nexus of world instability (what I may begin to call the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan or IPA triangle) are intimately connected.
Asia Times Online :: China Business News - China aims to diversify oil sources
What has worried Chinese oil-security strategists in recent years is that most of the imported oil comes from the Middle East. Despite China's efforts to diversify sources of imports, it still relies heavily on Middle Eastern oil. In 2005, China's imports of crude oil from the Middle East accounted for 61.1% of its total crude-oil imports, making it the most import link in the country's oil-supply chain.
This amounts to putting most, if not all, the eggs in one basket, which is too fraught with risks for such a big country like China, analysts in Beijing say. If the supply of oil from the Middle East were interrupted, for any reason, the outcome for China would be disastrous beyond imagination.
It's all about supply, demand and transit. At best the IPI is a potential solution to the Kashmir issue. But at worst it's yet another point of friction.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - Gas: Iran turns up the heat
Putin paid special attention to cooperation "in building facilities for gas production and transportation in India and the adjacent region" (emphasis added). This is a reference to the highly politicized US$7 billion project for a 2,100-kilometer Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Putin's visit to Delhi came closely on the heels of the latest round of negotiations over the price of gas for the Iran pipeline project. According to a new formula proposed by Iran, the cost of gas will translate at the Pakistan-India border as $4.93 per million British thermal units (mBtu), plus $1.5 per mBtu that India would have to pay to Pakistan as a transit fee. Indian officials have since expressed optimism that the signing of India's $145 billion gas mega-deal with Iran might take place by June.
In geopolitical terms, it could be the focal point of a new power-sharing axis, perhaps under the auspices of the SCO:
In other words, we're talking seriously for the first time about the prospect of a gas market uniting Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and China. This is where a breakthrough in the protracted negotiations over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project could become a defining moment for energy politics in Eurasia.
Russia is not in competition with Iran in tapping the South Asian market for gas. It is expedient for Russia if Iran gets deeply engaged in the Asian market (which includes two energy guzzlers - China and India) and, that, too, with Russian equity participation in the actual construction of Iran's pipeline to South Asia. That could lead to Gazprom's participation in the highly lucrative distribution and retailing of Iranian gas in Pakistan, India and China.
The grand opening swiftly aproaches, and writers are beginning to consider the deeper geostrategic significance of Gwadar. yet we still don't really know that much about it.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
It is expected that with Gwadar port operational, Pakistan will become a key player in the Persian Gulf region and serve as an energy corridor for Central Asia, South Asia and western China. With the exception of Chahbahar port in Iran, Gwadar will be the only free port between Dubai and Colombo providing container storage and warehousing facilities...
Pakistan plans to spend $7 billion in the next eight years to improve the country's road infrastructure, completing a network linking China and South Asia through Gwadar by 2014.
Because of its geo-strategic location, Gwadar has the potential to become a regional maritime hub. The 14.5-meter draft of the port will be able to accommodate up to "fifth-generation" ships, including Panamax and mother vessels.
Islamabad firmly believes that the Gwadar port is a key entry point for energy supplies for Central and South Asia, as well as western China. It will allow the expansion of oil trade in the region, as it provides the shortest possible route to landlocked, oil-rich Central Asian states.
Who said democracies never go to war with each other? If this escalates, and Lebanon is extremely shaky at the moment, it's goodbye and good riddance to Immanuel Kant.
BBC NEWS | Middle East | Clashes on Israel-Lebanese border
Israeli and Lebanese forces have exchanged fire on the border between the two countries, reports say.
The clash broke out after Israeli troops searched a border area for bombs, following the discovery of four explosives on Monday.
Lebanese troops fired on Israeli tanks inside the border zone, prompting retaliatory fire, Israeli reports said.
Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah militia fought a 34-day war last year sparked by flare-ups on the tense border.
Someone had to do it. But poor old Shell, stuck between a rock and a hard place with neither the US nor Russia playing ball. They'll be OK.
Shell defies US pressure and signs GBP5bn Iranian gas deal | | Guardian Unlimited Business
Shell has signed an important deal to help Iran develop a major gas field, ignoring growing pressure from George Bush to isolate the country for being part of what he alleges is an "axis of evil".
The Anglo-Dutch group, which is struggling to bring more momentum to its business after being forced to hand over vital Russian reserves at Sakhalin island to the Kremlin, confirmed it had finally reached agreement on various aspects of its "Persian LNG" - liquefied natural gas - project centred on the South Pars gas field...
The move is a bold one by Shell because its arch-rival BP has declared itself unwilling to invest in Iran at a time when the international political climate surrounding the country is so forbidding.
Iraq's sectarian strife haunts Pakistan|International News|Reuters.com
As if he didn't have enough to worry about with al Qaeda, the Taliban, jihadi groups fighting the Indian army in Kashmir, and Baluch separatist rebels, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf shudders at the spectre of sectarian strife.
"The Islamic world is heading toward a crisis," Musharraf told university students earlier this month, at a time when the world was aghast over Shi'ite guards taunting Iraq's Sunni former ruler, Saddam Hussein, at the gallows.
"If we don't get our act together, there will be a sectarian catastrophe in the Islamic world," said Musharraf.
Could Pakistan also descend into Iraq-style anarchy? The conditions appear to be there:
Pakistani intelligence channelled funds, covertly supplied by the United States and Saudi Arabia, to hardline Sunni groups to recruit and arm fighters for a jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Simultaneously, the success of the Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran led to a wave of Shi'ite radicalism in Pakistan that set the scene for a feud with the Deobandi groups that has dragged on for the past quarter century.
It's increasingly beginning to look like China has the initiative in the Middle East, not the US. The lynchpin is Iran. Can Washington and Beijing cooperate to head off the incipient crisis? China is one of the only actors that might persuade Iran to stop its "flinty tongue" and save it from itself, but wll the US trust it do so?
Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.
China's Middle East strategy is brilliant. It is a multi-splendored thing. There is great adventure in it insofar as it almost overlooks the so-called non-state actors that one hears so much about in the Middle East - let us say with a dash of Marxian idiom, the "forces of history". China's strategy is cautious, yet pragmatic. It is, arguably, near optimal.
Thus, despite the United States' defeat in the Middle East, China will not take on a condescending attitude toward Washington. On the contrary, this is the time for China to cooperate. If the Bush administration were to work out a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by manipulating the introduction of a pro-Western Arab military force under United Nations mandate, China would have no problem. China might even counsel Iran to take the bitter pill. China is working hard to expand its influence at the same time with the various Middle East protagonists - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
I don't believe in Al Qaeda: that is I don't think there is some kind of unified Islamic terrorist group that can be stopped by any means at the West's disposal. But I do believe that there is such a thing as terrorism inspired by Islamic as well as political objectives, and I do believe that current foreign policy is doing them more favours than anything else.
The problem is that the West is now fighting on two fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which are bordered by Iran (which can supply oil and weapons). Pakistan is also a grand source of personnel.
Sooner or later, if the West is to 'win', it will have to join these dots - but of course that will only create more of them.
Global terrorism | On the march | Economist.com
Western security officials say the revitalisation of al-Qaeda is partly due to the fact that “the pressure is off†in North Waziristan, a Pakistani tribal region where the army agreed a ceasefire with militants last September. Afghan and NATO commanders complain that the truce has also provided cross-border safe havens for the Taliban. Mr Negroponte called Pakistan an important ally, but also “a major source of Islamic extremismâ€.
Western officials also worry about what they call “blowback†from Iraq: instead of sucking in would-be suicide bombers on one-way tickets, it could pump out battle-hardened fighters to wage violent campaigns elsewhere. Mr Negroponte said an American pull-out would allow Iraq to replace Afghanistan as an al-Qaeda sanctuary.
It is becoming more and more obvious by the day that the post-Cold War world is not, after all, multipolar but bipolar. The great powers are the US and China. This is especially obvious when it comes to Middle East affairs, though interests coincide as much as they conflict. Of course, the biggest leveller is energy security - and that's the central objective for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese foreign policy | A quintet, anyone? | Economist.com
Never mind that China, in the more than four years since it appointed a special envoy to the Middle East, has offered no original ideas. To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-exporting countries, China has rapidly emerged since the 1990s as a big customer and investor. Some 45% of China's oil imports from January to November last year were from the Middle East. To countries such as Iran and Syria, eager to check American power in the region, China's veto power at the UN and its shared misgivings about America make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy...
China worries about its dependence on American military might for the security of its oil shipments from the Middle East. It is still a long way from being able to project military power over such a distance itself, though a Chinese official was quoted in the state-owned press this week as saying China had the ability to build an aircraft carrier, but had not decided when to do so. China is trying to diversify its sources of energy, buying more from Russia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.
But experts predict that China will long remain heavily dependent on energy from the Middle East. So it has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with America's tactics, but will share the same broad objective. Jeffrey Bader, a former senior American diplomat now at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, DC, says that China's resistance to American initiatives in Sudan and Iran depends on Russian support for its position. If Russia were to switch sides, so too would China, he argues. It is in no mood to take on America alone.
When you look at the mobile phone camera footage of Saddam Hussein's execution, and think to yourself: "What a sad and undignified end, though he holds himself well," you know things have gone badly wrong. For years he was the West's biggest bogeyman - now even he is a martyr.
If that's not enough, rumours are beginning to circulate of an Iranian hand in the Iraqi government. It could all be part of the Sh'ia revival. It couldn't backfire more for the US. Welcome to 2007...
Won't be able to post again this year, so I'll leave you with a nice little festive roundup of this year's flashpoints.
Predictions for next year? On top of the usual, Somalia, Syria, Zimbabwe and of course Pakistan - watch this space.
 The problem with dictators is that, whatver their faults, they do tend to hold their countries together. It's hard to say what will happen in the next days after the sudden death of Saparmurat Niyazov, but the medium-term prospects for his country and the region as a whole in 2007 are bleak. Who, or what will replace him? There's no obvious party that could step into his shoes, and with the whole country quite literally revolving around his megalomaniacal projects (for example, the statue of Turkmenbashi that turns to face the sun).
The Economist and I predict imminent collapse. There is no experience or tradition of democracy; the country is in ruins, despite great gas wealth; it boders Iran, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Instability in Turkmenistan will shake the other three, already increasingly wobbly. Another piece of the jigsaw is about to fall in place.
Turkmenistan | An iron ruler dies | Economist.com
But without a mechanism for an orderly transfer of power, coupled with the lack of any democratic tradition in a conservative, tribal society, there is a fear of instability in the country. It is not clear who will take over now. Nor what will happen in the longer term. Pessimistic Turkmen fear that a lost generation, largely uneducated, may fall prey to Islamic radicalism—and create a nasty failed state that could destabilise an already volatile region. As with dictatorships everywhere, the worst consequences of misrule by one man may in fact be felt only after he departs the scene.
In fact, Christmas time has been less and less merry of late. The Asian Tsunami in 2004; the Kashmir earthquake in 2005. This time around we've got near civil war in Palestine and Iraq, and war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Happy new year.
Who says no-one talks about philosophy any more?
Guardian Unlimited | Comment is free | Bush has created a comprehensive catastrophe across the Middle East
Claiming to move Iraq forward towards Lockean liberty, we hurled it back to a Hobbesian state of nature. Iraqis - those who have not been killed - increasingly say things are worse than they were before. Who are we to tell them they are wrong?
Well, it would suit Saudi fine. No unwelcome criticism of its human rights record; no irritating demands from Indian and Pakistani workers; just a customer willing to pay high prices for the product. Win-win, apart from the loss of the US security umbrella - but that in itself is a provocation to the Islamist element and arguably makes the Middle East more unsafe.
New Saudi alignment with China could challenge U.S|In Depth|Reuters.com
Chietigj Bajpaee, research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., said China risks being seen as trying to "lock up" Saudi oil at the expense of Washington, or India, another Asian tiger economy with a billion-plus population and a voracious appetite for oil.
"(China and the United States) have an increasingly symbiotic relationship," Bajpaee said. "This has led to fears in the United States that China is encroaching into its 'sphere of influence' and undermining relations with its traditional allies."
Almost everything you needed to know about Balochistan, but were afraid to ask, neatly summed up here. The only aspect which is not dealt with is the presence of the US in Afghanistan and its uneasy influence over Pakistan, and also India. One couldn't ask for a situation where so many rival powers were so interdependent and intermeshed.
Note also that India is building a rival port in Iran at Chabahar - that I did not know, and it only makes the situation more volatile.
The Geostrategic Implications of the Baloch Insurgency
Balochistan's strategic significance and natural endowment makes it a critical province for Pakistan. Strategically, Balochistan bridges Central, South, Southeast and East Asia on one end, and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East on the other. Regional states, especially India, cannot reach the energy and trade markets of the Caspian Sea region without transit through Balochistan, which Pakistan denies to India despite repeated pleas on New Delhi's behalf by Washington. India absorbs punitive freight costs by routing its trade goods through the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, even for shipments to Afghanistan. Since 2001, New Delhi has made great strides in reaching out to Baloch leaders, whose National Jirga has now made it a party to the arbitration of their "Accession to Pakistan Pact" in the ICJ (The Nation, November 13).
India is also wary of the Sino-Pakistan naval port on the Arabian Sea, which has raised Beijing's profile in the Indian Ocean. India is even more concerned over Taliban-inspired "militant groups" who operate in Indian-administered Kashmir. As the Taliban are widely believed to have their operational bases in Balochistan, they equally worry India's allies in the region, especially Afghanistan and Iran. Afghanistan resents Pakistan's patronage of the Taliban, which have become the largest threat to its stability since their regrouping in 2003. Iran is also unhappy with Islamabad's policy toward the Taliban due to the group's anti-Shiite theology and the subversive operations of the Taliban's allies, such as Jandallah, in Iran's Sunni-dominated province of Sistan-Balochistan.
The last few weeks - which have seen China tighten its grip over Africa and Asia, and the Republicans lose their grip in the Capitol and rethink their whole strategy - has generated a slew of articles over at Asia Times Online.
One author speaks of a new East-West Cold War style conflict developing, though I'm not so sure how stable or even feasible a China-Russia-India alliance would be:
It isn't yet fashionable to speak openly of a world subdividing itself again into two camps - those aligned with the US and those aligned with the Russia-China axis at the core of a new rising, multifarious yet coherent pole of the East - with the dividing line between the two camps consisting of the contest for control over global strategic resources.
Despite all the relevant signs pointing precisely in that direction:
# The deepening accord in all key spheres between Russia, China, India, the other rising powers of the East and the key resource-rich regimes of the world.
# Steadily rising East-West tensions, the ever-more divergent interests between East and West.
# The increasingly incompatible approaches to global issues and problems resulting in an ever-widening chasm between East and West.
Far too long to analyse in full, but worth looking at at a later date.
Another writer re-examines the China-India relationship:
Professor Ma Jiali, a veteran South Asia expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), says India's recent economic performance combined with its growing importance in international affairs has led to a rethink in Beijing of India as zhong he guoli, a Mandarin term that translates roughly as a "comprehensive national power".
For Beijing, relations with India are now considered the highest priority, according to Professor Ma, given that India is what he calls a "four-in-one" country. "India falls into each of the four major categories of countries that China wants to focus its diplomatic energies on," he explained. The four categories are: Developing countries, neighboring countries, rising powers, and influential actors on the international stage.
Another still looks at China and Russia, and finally we have the four horsemen of America, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.
There's really far too much to read here, but the implication is clear - the world is shaking into what looks like being its new order for quite a while. I personally will suggest that the US will remain one major pole, with China its key rival and Europe, Russia, India and Iran as second-tier powers that either ally with the gig pair or stand their distance. Both a multipolar and a bipolar environment at the same time - twice as nasty, twice as unpredictable.
  Oh, irony of ironies. It's not been a good week for warmongering dictators. Heads had to roll for Iraq. First, almost literally, was Saddam's. It was kind of his fault in the first place. Now Rummie's out too: someone had to take the fall for the biggest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam.
But getting rid of either them isn't going to make the slightest bit of difference.
 Nuclear-weapons proliferation | Going critical, defying the world | Economist.com
IT TOOK quite literally a bomb to shift the big powers into concerted action at the United Nations Security Council against a long-defiant, boastfully nuclear-capable North Korea. What will it take for Europe, America, Russia and China to agree on the sort of sanctions that might oblige a nose-thumbing but not yet nuclear-armed Iran to obey the council's demand to stop enriching uranium and messing with plutonium, from which its own future bombs could be made?
Great question. The whole Iran-North Korea issue - in many ways it is the same issue, just with different constituent elements - is certainly going to show us the reality of how China will really behave in the context of international institutions like the UN. Is it truly a responsible stakeholder, or will it turn as usual to balance-of-power politics instead?
The Economist thinks the latter:
Having long insisted that the North Korean nuclear issue was better handled outside the UN, China is livid that Mr Kim brushed aside repeated warnings not to test. But if the Chinese are now ready to work through the Security Council, that is chiefly in the hope of forestalling unilateral American action. That still leaves room for dispute that Mr Kim will do his best to widen.
It is becoming increasingly certain, however, that the US's strategy has been appallingly counterproductive. The world has become a more dangerous place since the War on terror; the 'Axis of Evil' has only grown stronger; and America is rapidly losing its diplomatic power to rising China and the the resurgent Russia. Time for reform at the UN.
Reproduced below.
Continue reading "Where the UNSC Now?" »
Dutch Multiculturalism in Question
A draft report of proceedings in New York, by Jessica Serraris and Philip Sen.
Those who managed to get in – people were literally lining up around Washington Square to attend the debate at NYU’s Tischman Auditorium – were warned that they’d hear some views that would be “a little more direct than Americans are used toâ€. They were not to be disappointed.
Integration and its Discontents
Students, professors, journalists and VIPs alike gathered to see arguably one of the most celebrated Dutch women in recent history. The notoriously outspoken Ayaan Hirsi Ali had been invited to discuss the dark side of Islam and Dutch multiculturalism, and along with former EU commissioner FFrits Bolkestein and writer Bas Heijne she certainly managed to captivate the audience.
But the debate was deeply one-sided. If Heijne was supposed to counter the rightist views of the other two, he did not live up to the task. Perhaps the debate would have benefited had a prominent and outspoken Muslim been invited to the stage too. Still, what ensued was otherwise a representative discussion on Holland’s controversial and divisive integration issues. After Professor Tony Judt's introduction, in which he set recent upheavals (including two political assassinations) into context, it was time to hear the speakers make their cases. It soon became clear that there would be more than one star of the show.
Read on below.
Continue reading "Religion and the Limits of Tolerance" »
Today's good news:
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Japan visit warms ties with China
At a meeting in the capital, both sides said they hoped to overcome tensions that have hampered progress on trade, territorial and energy disputes.
The two nations also agreed that it would be "unacceptable" for North Korea to conduct a nuclear test, Mr Abe said.
And bad news:
BBC NEWS | Europe | Iran rejects six nations' demands
Iran has refused to suspend its uranium enrichment programme after six key countries agreed to discuss possible sanctions against Tehran.
A spokesman for Iran's foreign ministry said suspension was "unacceptable" and the threat of sanctions "inefficient".
Who's got the back seat in both these stories? That's right - America. Traditionally, the new Japanese premier makes his first trip to Washington; by choosing Beijing instead, Shinzo Abe not only makes much-needed conciliatory overtures but a statement of realpolitik that the US is losing influence in the region. Same goes for Iran: the situation is governed by what China and Russia do, not America.
 With late-night TV-movie plots unfolding in the Amish school massacre and the Miss World hijacking, it's easy to overlook todays two more sobering stories, but the BBC's Paul Reynolds does make the effort to join the dots.
Both the North Korean announcement of a potential test and Iran's statement of refusal to suspend uranium enrichment are further blows to the authority of the UN and US interests. To resolve both situations, we have to look to China.
North Korea's activities may have a more long-term strategic effect, especially if South Korea and Japan feel obliged to go nuclear in order to enhance their self defence. This is the first big foreign policy test for new Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, who was quick to condemn North Korea's missile tests earlier in the year, and Beijing will no doubt be looking closely at what he has to say, or not say. But it certainly won't please China if an arms race emerges in East Asia, particularly one involving Japan. That would certainly complicate matters.
If China takes the lead over quelling Kim Jong-Il's unpredictable ambitions, it is more likely to sit back and watch the Iran situation, or even veto snactions in the UNSC.
In many ways, as a major trading partner of Iran, it is in China's interests to allow it to develop its capability and reinforce it as a friendly power in the Middle East in opposition to the US and Israel. Lack of censure from Beijing is sure to ease the flow of oil to China too.
In a sense, it's also fair to say that the Iran crisis is one of America's own making. Through its aggressive Middle East policy and pursuit of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, an Islamic nuclear conundrum was in a sense an inevitable consequence. On the other hand, China's support for North Korea in the 1950s have let it with an uncomfortable responsibility on its own doorstep.
While the US and Europe stand relegated the sidelines of both issues, China's role becomes ever the greater. But with nuclear weapons, the wait-and-see tactic is a risky one indeed. If things go wrong, can we expect China to be a responsible stakeholder in preventing a drama from becoming a crisis?
BBC story below. See also Asia Times Online, which examines in more detail US and Chinese relations with the extended 'Axis of Evil'. In short, while American political opinion is against the four, China's economic ties with them are on the increase:
The Bush administration's efforts to isolate Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela economically are implicitly designed to promote "regime change" from unfriendly to friendly government in each of these countries. Beijing has explicitly worked against Washington's isolation and regime-change endeavors by deepening its relations with Tehran, Pyongyang, Damascus and Caracas...
Continue reading "Two Balls in Beijing's Court" »
Comment is free: Fighting the wrong war
It is ironic that an administration fixated on the risks of Middle East oil has chosen to spend hundreds of billions - potentially trillions - of dollars to pursue unsuccessful military approaches to problems that can and should be solved at vastly lower cost, through R&D, regulation, and market incentives. The biggest energy crisis of all, it seems, involves the misdirected energy of a US foreign policy built on war rather than scientific discovery and technological progress.
 The latest no-brainer from US intelligence - fighting Muslims makes them hate us:
The intelligence estimate, completed in April, is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism by United States intelligence agencies since the Iraq war began, and represents a consensus view of the 16 disparate spy services inside government. Titled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,’’ it asserts that Islamic radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread across the globe.
An opening section of the report, “Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement,†cites the Iraq war as a reason for the diffusion of jihad ideology.
The report “says that the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse,†said one American intelligence official.
Duh. Even better, a public document also cited in the New York Times article reminds us again that the war has not actually made us safer but put us in more danger than ever:
“The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry,†it states.
The report mentions the possibility that Islamic militants who fought in Iraq could return to their home countries, “exacerbating domestic conflicts or fomenting radical ideologies.â€
Fantastic. We can look forward sooner or later to lots of radicalised and combat-experienced Muslims coming back to set Europe alight, though with its tiny Muslim population America itself won't have that problem. With Iraq now the terrorist academy of choice, whether Osama bin Ladin is alive or dead is of less relevance than ever.
At least the intelligence assessment on Iraq is uniform: everyone knows what the score is:
“New jihadist networks and cells, sometimes united by little more than their anti-Western agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge,†said Gen. Michael V. Hayden, during a speech in San Antonio in April, the month that the new estimate was completed. “If this trend continues, threats to the U.S. at home and abroad will become more diverse and that could lead to increasing attacks worldwide,†said the general...
Original article below.
Continue reading "Iraq Worsens Terrorism" »
 "We are used to thinking in terms of conventional warfare between nations, but energy is becoming a weapon of choice for those who possess it." Such is the assesment of Senator Richard Lugar, and it is not a bad one at all.
There's a long piece about energy security in Asia Times, coming from an unusual angle. Should the US ally with the big four Asian economies - China, Japan, South Korea and India - rather than Europe?
Here's the most interesting paragraphs, paraphrased from an expert from China's Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Su Jingxiang:
...if only Washington were savvy enough to "revalue the tremendous market potential" in China and "abate unnecessary doubts toward China", closer cooperation between Beijing and Washington on international energy issues could be realized...
He pointed out that gunboat diplomacy was no longer workable either in the Middle East or Latin America as it produced only terrorism and resistance. At the same time, Su acknowledged that growing dependence of energy imports "weakened the competitiveness and injured the economic security of the US"...
Su advised that the US should "steer away to more cooperation" with other major oil consumers (such as China and India). "The new type of strategic partnership will consolidate the negotiating capacity of oil consumers in their talks with the oil producers, thus helping boost the economic boom and national security of the US," he wrote.
It's not a bad idea, but it does overlook that essential strategic reality - China and the US are competing for the same limited supply. That, after all, is why Russia and the the Middle East have them over a barrel.
But the author does note that the recent visit to China by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has resulted in some concessions by either side (another minor Yuan devaluation, and increased voting power for the PRC in the IMF) that must improve the relationship.
In a sense, then, China has jumped at the chance to manoeuvre the US, weakened as it is by Iraq, into a bargaining position.
Meanwhile, Putin is taking the opportunity to buy back some control over the former Eastern Bloc via gas pipelines. You need to read the article to get the full details, but basically Russia is playing a clever political hand in its negotiations over routes for Kazakh oil. Unencumbered with concerns about democracy and human rights, it's also sorted out its difficulties with Turkmenistan too.
The wheeler-dealings have implications for both Asia and Europe:
Curiously, Gazprom struck the deal with Turkmenistan soon after the US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, Steven Mann, visited Ashgabat to lobby for progress on the moribund Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAP) gas-pipeline project, which was supposed to be an integral part of the new grand US strategy of creating a "Greater Central Asia" with a unified energy structure for the countries of Central and South Asia. It was hoped to draw Central Asia into the US sphere of influence and pit Indian interests against Russian influence in the region.
But the TAP and the United States' "Greater Central Asia" strategy are not the only casualties of Gazprom's Turkmen deal. The ramifications of the deal run in far-flung directions deep into the European continent. The deal arguably frustrates the US attempt to reduce the European Union's dependence on Russian energy supplies.
Since Russia looks like it has clinched the stranglehold over Europe's gas supply, a remaining factor is Iran. Europe has to get access to Iranian gas somehow, in order to give itself an alternative to Russian gas:
And this is undoubtedly a critical factor of divergence in the respective approaches of Russia, the EU and the US toward the Iran nuclear issue. Though Russia is certainly interested in a solution to the Iran crisis, Moscow will have reason to worry about an EU-Iran agreement that may lead to an improved energy dialogue between the two protagonists, as that would make Iran a rival to Russia on the European gas market. As for Tehran, it, too, perfectly well understands that its preference should be to settle with Western Europe rather than with Russia. That is why Tehran has opted for independence in its gas policy and has scrupulously kept Gazprom out of its Southern Pars gas fields.
Yet there is another chance - China. China is a key competitor for Central Asian gas and has bought up large holdings of it.
In summary:
Russia is in control of Central Asian gas routes to the EU
The EU's only alternative is Iran
The US is constraining Iran over the nuclear issue, so that's off the agenda for the time being, which suits Russia fine
Only China can compete with Russia for control of Central Asian energy
Can the US really broker a deal with China and India, or will national interests win through?
Fascinating stuff. Full article below.
Continue reading "Axis of Oil" »
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | China ups Lebanon force to 1,000
Mr Prodi said it showed China was taking on a greater diplomatic role.
"This shows that China is assuming more and more international responsibility," he said.
In the past, China has been reluctant to play leading roles in UN peacekeeping missions.
But as its economy has grown more powerful, it has faced calls from the US and EU to play a greater role. It own foreign policy has shifted so that ensuring access to natural resources like oil is now a priority.
 Even now, five years on, the events of 11 September 2001 possess a certain surreality, a lack of context in the state of things then and the state of things now.
It's certainly one of those 'Kennedy moments', which we will all look back upon decades from now. For me it was doubly unreal, since I was at that time on a military exercise up in the wilds of Scotland, at Garelochhead, an army base near Faslane submarine station. Our SOPs were to remain isolated from external influences, even other units, and when the news broke all we has was a tiny transistor radio that could only pick up the crackly local Scottish station.
The fumbling attempts of those underfunded reporters to take stock of the situation were typical of all media outlets, in a way: CNN didn't do much better. It was weeks before I got to see the footage, by which time its impact had faded; it felt like it hadn't really happened, it was just another late-night disaster movie on repeat showing.
But it was real, and the world we live in now is as much a consequence of 9/11 as 9/11 was a consequence of the world we lived in then. But no-one saw it - it was impossible - even if we had effectively (in the words of IR professor Steve Smith) "sung that world into existence".
The world we are singing into existence now is certainly a bleaker one than we thought we had in 1989, the year of revolutions. It's telling that despite the failure of China's 1989 pro-democracy revolution and the success of those in Europe, it's China that is leading now while Europe is swiftly falling behind.
But that's by the by. The new world disorder is one where terrorist attacks are more, not less, likely. Afghanistan seemed to be a success for a while, but that image is fading fast. Post-Iraq the suicide bombers there and elsewhere have added motive and impetus. This year's 'spectacular' failed, but there'll be another.
North Korea and Iran are both enjoying their spell in the limelight due to the nuclear issue, and post-Lebanon, Israel and Palestine are further than ever from reconciliation while Britain and Blair are now looking like the lame ducks of international affairs.
Ultimately, it looks as if the bigger picture is one where the enemies of the US are winning. In the past five years it has lost so much of the legitimacy it built up since World War II, and squandered the sympathy, solidarity and support of 12 September. It's almost as if 9/11 didn't happen: Bush started it, didn't he?
Perhaps the world didn't change on 9/11; perhaps we just perceived it to have done. If anything, it's a massive distraction from the real underlying and interlinked problems of the planet: overpopulation, poverty, pollution.
But what is happening now and what happens next is and will be the result of the changes that we have wrought. Let's hope that we can turn the tide before that cycle spins out of control.
 Kofi Annan is trumpeting, in typically understated manner, his progress in talks with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad over the nuclear issue. But the question is: -"Who is really holding the cards?"
Annan would promote his success - after all, that is his job. He is the ultimate international diplomat, a soft talker, not an actor. The upshot of the talks is really just that there will be more talks. This is not necessarliy a bad thing: as Churchill said, "jaw jaw is better than war war".
But it would seem that the stick-wielding US is eager as ever to sideline any success by the UN or the EU in favour of its own agenda:
Mr Annan's remarks came in the face of a US-led clamour for sanctions. They appeared destined to further slow the momentum after EU foreign ministers gave Tehran another two weeks to clarify its position and called for negotiations.
The security council is expected to meet soon to discuss a new resolution that could include punitive measures. But hard-hitting sanctions are unlikely because of the opposition of Russia and China, which have strong economic ties to Tehran.
The US is holding the card of sheer economic and military power; Russia and China command the true influence over what happens in the UNSC.
That leaves Iran itself, and it is holding the rest of the cards. Despite its anti-Israel rhetoric (the report also notes a Holocast satire hosted in Tehran, which does at least cast the Danish cartoons in a new light), it is teetering on the moral high ground at the moment. What right does the US really have to deny it a nuclear power-generating capability?
Iran, it appears, can also choose where, when and how to negotiate wth international institutions. And Iran is also aware that the last months have seen its ascendency as a regional influence, especially after the Lebanon conflict.
Ahmedinejad may look like a taxi driver and sound like a little Hitler, but he may be shrewder than we previously imagined.
Original Guardian story below.
Continue reading "Holding the Cards" »
Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | US interventions have boosted Iran, says report
A report published by Chatham House said the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had removed Iran's main rival regimes in the region.
Israel's conflict with the Palestinians and its invasion of Lebanon had also put Iran "in a position of considerable strength" in the Middle East, said the thinktank.
Unless stability could be restored to the region, Iran's power will continue to grow, according to the report published by Chatham House.
Comment is free: The end of the beginning
Lots of observation but little analysis, punditry or general smart-arsery from Dan Plesch, associate at the SOAS IR school. However, he does agree with other commentators that current events are part of the big picture:
Both the Iranian and US governments regard the fighting in Lebanon and Israel as related to their own conflict. President Bush made the end of Iranian and Syrian support of Hizbullah a condition of any ceasefire, though he has since softened his stance at the UN. Condoleezza Rice remarked that "we do know that this is more than just Hizbullah in Lebanon. This is an extension of Iranian power through a proxy war."
Many useful links also provided. I disagree that this is the end of the beginning: I think that it is merely the middle of the beginning. But sooner or later, we'll be at the beginning of the middle.
 The Beeb's Paul Reynolds takes a brief and orderly look at what's at stake in the current round of Middle East crises (Lebanon invasion, Palestine troubles, Iraq violence, Iran's nukes). Summarized from my own point of view below, it's all (as always) about interests:
Israel - credibility, not only to its own people but to arch enemies in Iran and Syria. Let's be honest here: Hizbollah is a disruptive and lethal nuisance, but it is not a threat to Israel's very existence any more than al-Qaeda is capable of toppling the entire Western world and creating a global Islamic caliphate. We need to be reasonable, and looking at this from a distance it's as much about Israel than it is about the extremists.
Lebanon - continued progress towards true independence and democracy. Lebanon needs to remove all foreign influences from its borders, not just Iran's proxies Hizbollah. It succesfully ejected Syria from the political scene last year, but the current conflict could see them creep back in. Lebanon will surely want assurances from Israel that it will not occupy its territory or manipulate its government as it has done. For Lebanon, national survival truly is at stake.
Hizbollah - their survival is not in doubt, and in fact the situation could be manipulated to strengthen them further, whether via new recruitment or extra supplies via Iran and Syria. As with all terrorism, their objectives are nebulous to say the least, and the conflict has now gone way beyond the release of a few prisoners.
Iran - nothing less than regional hegemony. With instability everywhere, Iran is on the rise and it knows it. The nuclear issue is closely related to this and if the West does not deal with it effectively then Iran will stack its deck even more. It's a win-win situation for Tehran. Even if airstrikes do take out its nascent nuclear capability, such an action would rally support throughout the region, not to mention the wider Dar-el-Islam (despite Iran's minority Shia faith).
Syria - in a sense is caught between a rock and a hard place. It would like to regain influence but may be relegated to the position of a junior partner to Iran in all this.
Palestine - also caught in a tricky situation. Israel's recent withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the election of Hamas have made a volatile situation even more delicate: the best the Palestinians should hope for is that the status quo remains and a deal can be brokered regarding the West Bank too. Unfortunately, the actions of Hizbollah and Iran reflect indirectly on Palestine too and they could end up victims of others' bravado.
United States - despite the plummeting credibility of this administration, it still clings to the dream of spreading democracy in the Middle East. Yet the lack of assistance to Lebanon and Palestine shows the qualified nature of this doctrine, since both of these entities are weak but de facto democracies that conceivably could become an alternative to the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah nexus. However, in order to retain credibility at home and abroad, the US is obliged to stand by Israel and its own War on Terror strategy, which is now leading it into a blind alley. The oil factor mustn't be forgotten either, since a more powerful Iran means more expensive oil and ultimately a poorer American economy. And what America does in the Levant also affects its standing in Iraq, and vice versa. It has to be seen to be strong and fair more than any other state.
Europe - Tony Blair looks increasingly ineffectual, while France is one of the few nations to have come of this smelling of roses. The weakened Blair will eventually bow down, and France will resume its authoritative position in the EU just as it has always wanted. However, as the Middle East situation drags on, the overall schism in the EU might grow even wider.
Russia and China - both will be watching very closely to see who ends up as the final victor in the battle for Middle East hegemony - the US via Israel or Iran. Both will probably be counting on Iran. If the Middle East should slide towards the Islamists, Russia would profit from the better energy security it can offer Europe as an alternative to the Mullahs, while China will be able to access Middle East energy more safely through its influence over Iran.
United Nations - make or break. Probably the very last chance the UN has to demonstrate its relevance and credibility, before it is either crippled or dissolved.
That's my two-pennorth. Original report below. See also the Winds of War briefing and also at at Security Watchtower.
Continue reading "A Tangled Web" »
BBC NEWS | Middle East | Stressed out and anxious in Beirut
Many Lebanese readily agree that Hezbollah gravely miscalculated when they captured those two Israeli soldiers on 12 July - but now they go on to say: "We were never Hezbollah. But we are all Hezbollah now. The Israeli response is completely unjustified."
I have met some who curse Hezbollah, and who say the Israeli bombardment is understandable. Some, but not many.
And I don't think "But we are all Hezbollah now" is just talk. The more Israel destroys, the more supporters Hezbollah will be able to recruit.
 The Economist dares to say it in this week's leader - this is not just a war between Israel and Hizbollah, or even Israel and Iran, but between American and Iran. And while we're at it, let's tie in Iraq and the US strategy to spread 'freedom and democracy' in the Middle East:
That makes it much harder to resolve, not least because the superpower, so far from being a mediator, is in effect a protagonist, competing with Iran for domination of the post-Saddam Middle East, and to some extent tempted in this war to use Israel as a proxy.
And not forgetting the 'War on Terror' too:
Even al-Qaeda, which detests Shias and murders them in Iraq, has felt obliged this week to join the fray. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy, popped up from his cave to say that Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine were now just one seamless front of warfare between Islam and the Jews and crusaders.
Fantastic. The whole thing is now not lots of small disasters but one big mess that crosses the entire region. Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, the Taliban, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Hamas, Hizbollah... everything is connected.
But the current US administration, not to mention the terminally weakened Tony Blair, basically doesn't have the intellectual or moral stature to do anything about it it:
One idea gathering pace among some American foreign-policy realists—in opposition to the neoconservatives—such as Henry Kissinger is to seize this opportunity to bring about the “grand bargain†that has been mooted for years between America and Iran. Since all the region's quarrels—Iran's bomb, Iraq's future, the isolation of Syria, the Hizbullah state inside Lebanon and the unrequited cause of the Palestinians—are interlinked, why not think now about starting to sort out the lot of them?
It certainly would not hurt, after a week in which the Security Council has again told Iran to stop enriching uranium, for America to emphasise again the political and economic benefits Iran stands to gain by complying with this demand. America and Iran must talk. All the same, a bargain this grandiose may be beyond the reach of even the most creative diplomacy.
The Economist concludes by stating the obvious - that at the rotten core of this there is one big infection. It's the Israel-Palestine conflict:
In the end, it is only Israel that can give the Palestinians their state, and only the Palestinians can give Israel the legitimacy it craves in the Middle East. In a region of conflict, it is these two peoples whose interests coincide most closely. Solving that problem remains the best of all ways to promote a wider peace.
Idealistic as this sounds, it is of course absolutely correct. My solution (I know no-one asked me) would be this. A temporary ceasefire agreement is brokered and is backed by massive international force.
The first side to breach the ceasefire - whether Palestine or Israel - is completely cut off by the international community. If the ceasefire isbreached a second time, the international force hits them with everything they've got. It's not pretty, but if it can get this problem nearer to a solution then everything else will eventually follow.
Continue reading "A Proxy War" »
 ...only makes me stronger, and since the likelihood of Hizbollah being wiped out by the weekend looks remote then this is the situation that Israel and the US may have to face.
Far from being annihilated by the continued offensive, yesterday Hizbollah fired 230 rockets into Israeli territory, though causing relatively little damage or loss of life.
This is the ultimate, then, in asymmetric warfare - the deaths of 19 Israelis so far has brought the deaths of 900 Lebanese. Perhaps 3,000 are injured and hundreds of thousands are on the move. There is no symmetry in that at all.
What next? Asia Times' reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad, who claims to be the first into the Baalbek area (which is next on the Israeli target list), managed to speak to a Hizbollah fighter who indicated that there could be grave strategic implications to the current round of fighting:
Further Israeli attacks in the Baalbek area, though, throw the shadow of war directly over Syria. Baalbek and the Eastern Mountains are the main supply lines of the Lebanese resistance from Syria, which would be very concerned about the Israeli military operating just across its border.
Similarly, this area is a virtual outpost of the Iranian revolution. Each and every village square and the walls are decorated with portraits or posters of Iranian revolutionary leaders. All major hospitals, shopping malls and education centers are named after Iranian clerics and leaders and run by Hezbollah.
Thus the next few days will be crucial, as the Baalbek area is not only the strategic capital of Hezbollah, it is also a strategic back yard of Syria and Iran.
The Economist would appear to agree. It is now reporting that this 'Sixth War' (the embryonic conflict has yet to attain a recognizable name), far from breaking the grip opf Hizbollah is the best thing that's happened to Islamist extremism since 9/11:
Increasingly, this conflict has come to be seen by the combatants as one of survival. For Hizbullah, the aim is not just to bloody the nose of a more powerful adversary but to thwart the perceived evil intention of Israel’s staunchest backer, the United States, to dominate the region.
This notion of a wider dimension has taken hold around the region. To many it is a proxy war between Hizbullah’s main sponsor, Iran, and America. But it may also herald the re-emergence, after a decades-long trend among Israel’s neighbours to accommodate the Jewish state, of a broad rejectionist front, this time inspired by pan-Islamist feeling rather than the pan-Arab nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s.
So far, so bad then. Not only this war it making heroes of Hizbollah, not only is it dragging down the international image of the US, UK and Israel axis of denial, but it is even diminishing the status of the friendly Muslim states:
“May God inflict on the children of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia what He has inflicted on the children of Lebanon,†said a placard brandished by a protester in Beirut, pointing to America’s closest Arab allies as complicit, by virtue of silence and inaction, in Israel’s crime.
So the King of Jordan, for example, has had to step off the fence and condemn the war. As ever a voice of reason, he recognises that it has weakened his own moderate stance and further reinforced the extremists. President Mubarak of Egypt now faces daily demonstrations that threaten to reduce his own legitimacy and will have to act too.
Should either of these leaders fall Shah-of-Iran style, unlikely as it is, then we truly will be up to our necks in it. And it does look like times running out for Lebanon's elected and moderate leader too:
Lebanon’s shaky coalition government, hamstrung by sectarianism, has been weakened by its physical impotence in the face of Israel’s onslaught and by its failure to win diplomatic support for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire. Many think the prime minister, Fouad Siniora, brave and capable but doomed by too close an association with the West. Even if Hizbullah emerges militarily weaker, it may become more popular and more extreme, empowering those who now condemn Mr Siniora and his allies as traitors.
Only a year ago, after the assasination of his predecessor and the ejection of Syria from Lebanese affairs, Siniora was the great hope for democracy in the Middle East. Now look at him. What happened to the ideal that democracies don't go to war with each other - since this is looking more like a war on Lebanon rather than a war on Hizbollah?
The saddest thing is that, just like the Iraq war, it was so predictable. You don't need a doctorate in strategic studies to understand that bombarding a light guerilla movement like Hizbollah with conventional force is going to be ineffective. It was blatently obvious that the civilian population was not going to turn against them, as was hoped, but would turn against Israel and their own government - and would gain the support of Islamists across the world.
Yet Olmert, Bush and Blair could not be persuaded - even though they'd seen exactly the same thing happen in Iraq. All three need now to be removed before this current crisis expands to swallow us all.
Economist report below.
Continue reading "What Does Not Kill Me..." »
 What's going on in the Middle East is a perfect example of the interconnectedness of various actors and issues. On 31 July, the UNSC finally got together and ordered Iran to close down its nuclear programme. What are the implications?
Well, The Economist takes a look at this from the viewpoint of how it affects the Lebanon crisis. Basically, while Iran needs to be confronted in some fashion, Syria ought to be engaged and the nexus thus broken somehow.
Asia Times Online's perspective is more detailed still. The author, an acknowledged Iran expert, looks at a number of different scenarios, the first being a relative victory for Israel.
I'm not clear how a Hizbollah defeat would threaten Iran directly, but this is what some are thinking (or want others to think):
...there are strong voices of concern within Iran's ruling establishment, some claiming the war in Lebanon as a victory for Israel, with serious negative ramifications for Iran's "national security and even her territorial sovereignty", to quote Ali Montaseri, an Iranian penning in Baztab.com, a website closely linked to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad.
It's a matter of credibility more than territorial integrity, I believe. Syria also comes into the equation. Here's the key paragraph:
Whereas a stalemate or even quagmire may benefit Iran's position with respect to the nuclear crisis, the obverse possibility of Hezbollah's substantial weakening, not to mention the squeeze on Damascus, will translate into a more vulnerable Iran confronted with the distinct possibility that Phase 1 of a multi-stage conflict with the US and Israel has already started in Lebanon and Gaza.
There's no concrete conclusions on the main questions: Will Iran cut Hezbollah loose and stay out of it? What will it do about the threat of sanctions? These will only be answered after more time unfolds. But at least we know when D-Day is going to be - 31 August. Watch this space.
Continue reading "The Iran Question" »
 The war goes on, and peace looks ever more distant.
Is the value of human life less in Lebanon than that of citizens elsewhere? Are we children of a lesser God? Is an Israeli teardrop worth more than a drop of Lebanese blood?
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora
The alliance begins to fracture in despair, and a thousand terrorists are born.
Lots of useful stats and analysis on the Iran-Pakistan-India LNG pipeline, and more besides on India's energy issues.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Price imbroglio stymies Iran pipeline
The United States is no longer the main stumbling block to the planned US$7 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline. All issues, including US pressure to abandon the 2,100-kilometer project, have been relegated to the back burner as India and Pakistan team up to try to persuade Iran to soften the price at which it wants to deliver the gas.
Tehran is demanding $7.20 per million British thermal units, linked to global crude-oil prices. The Iranian position is considerably higher than India's offer of $4.25 per mBtu at its border with Pakistan. Though Pakistan has been voicing plans of going it alone in case India decides to drop out, that may not happen if the price issue is not resolved.
Iran has rejected India's demand for a price equivalent to international long-term gas-supply contracts, saying that New Delhi should forget about buying Iranian gas at a low price. Tehran's stand has been emboldened by a Europe desperately seeking other sources of gas after last year's crisis due to the spat between Russia and Ukraine.
 The accidental (?) deaths of four UN observers after an Israeli bomb went astray may actually have some positive side-effects. Much as I sympathise with the families of the dead, there's two things worth mentioning.
Firstly, it lays to rest the myth that Israel is conducting a campaign of surgical strikes against Hizbollah. Hardly. It proves once and for all that Israel is firing indiscriminately into Lebanon, unmindful of the effects it may have on the civilian population.
While I agree that Israel has the right to conduct a military campaign against Hizbollah, it must be conducted under the rules of war.
More significantly, aside from prompting righteous indignation from Kofi Annan and the UN, it has forced China well and truly into the picture. It's not as severe as the bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, but now that a Chinese is dead then there has to be a response.
With its rising economy and political and military power, it is about time that China drifted away from its position of abstention and began taking sides. It may be too late for Darfur, but if it goes to a Security Council vote, it looks like China will have an influence.
What effect this will have when China begins to engage in the region remains to be seen, but it's not looking like it will side with Israel. Let's also not forget that the PRC has close links with Iran.
Story below.
Continue reading "China Comes Off the Fence" »
 The Spanish Civil War was really just a prelude to World War II. Could a similar pattern of events alreay be unfolding?
Perhaps somewhat fanciful, premature and over-the-top, but at least someone is thinking about it. Asia Times' Chan Akya considers, in a two part series, how China and India might get involved should the tide of conflict in the Middle East expand further.
After a somewhat overenthusiastic reference to Huntingdon's Clash of Civilizations and a long historical passage, the author then hits a nail more-or-less on the head:
There are today not enough Christians or Muslims in China to push the country in the direction of supporting either the West or Islam in any global conflagration. However, a resurgent West poses more of a threat to China's patriarchal culture, which is not very different from the centralized authority-driven culture of Islam. Given that, it is more likely that China would tilt toward supporting Islam, as its weapons-proliferation efforts over the past few years have shown.
Yep. The Uyghurs are hardly a threat to China, while if India were to side with the West then its Muslim population might just explode. And China has been sponsoring Iran (not to mention Iraq, too) for decades. If the price is right, they'll sell to anyone - and they get the oil rights in return.
As to whether I agree with the concluding paragraphs, I'm not sure:
This leads me to conclude that an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East would eventually necessitate the West to demand adequate support from China, failing which the country itself could become a target. The waxworks of Beijing are likely to grant enough concessions to the West to avoid being attacked, and then lie in wait for their revenge.
The Indian situation is more precarious. While much of the country's right-wing intelligentsia would push it to war against Islam, there is enough of a fifth column in place to thwart the country's historic quest for vengeance. India's Muslims number more than any other country's in the world with the exception of Indonesia. Add to these the populations of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Indian military might is in essence boxed in.
The West demand support from China? Like it is already trying to do over sanctions for Sudan, North Korea and Iran? Give me a break. The West knows it won't get a smidgin of help from Beijing, and will thus be more likely to expect direct (or indirect) conflict. China will probably see its opportunity to firm up its energy security, not to mention nationalist ambitions such as Taiwan when the West's back is turned.
India, on the other hand, I do expect to be somehow squeezed in the middle, unable to act in its own interests, effectively encircled by China via Sino-friendly states such as Pakistan and Burma, a weak and politically fractured Nepal and the conquered territory of Tibet.
Read on below.
Continue reading "China, India and WW3" »
A neat piece of analysis.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs
Given that Hezbollah emplaced its rocketry in Shi'ite civilian neighborhoods, Israel must reduce civilian areas to stop rocket attacks. The fact that casualties number in the hundreds rather than the tens of thousands shows that Israel has been meticulous about creating refugees rather than corpses. Nonetheless, Israel has forced the burden of uncertainty on its enemies, including by implication Syria and eventually Iran.
At least 200,000, and perhaps twice that number of refugees, have descended on Syria, joining half a million displaced Iraqis and perhaps 300,000 Palestinian refugees. Refugee streams clog the few undamaged routes between Syria and Lebanon. Evidently Syria fears destabilization; Information Minister Mohsen Bilal linked his July 23 threat of military action against Israel to the "evacuation" of Lebanon.
 More analysis, this time from Auntie Beeb, attempting to answer the questions we all want answered. What happens next? What does all this mean for the Middle East and for the world as a whole?
It's not as if there hasn't been a crisis in the Levant before. However, moving on from the second intifadah, this is the first time that Israel's army has started spilling over its borders since 9/11. It's the first local conflict of the 'War on Terror', and with Islam militating across Eurasia the repercussions may be very different to 1982.
Like myself, the author believes that things are basically going to get worse:
Israel's actions may indeed be counter-productive, by boosting support for these groups beyond the immediate circle of their core Islamist constituencies.
Israel's underlying dilemma remains unchanged.
If it does not wish to re-occupy either Gaza or southern Lebanon, then there needs to be in place a Lebanese government and a Palestinian Authority strong enough to prevent rocket or other cross-border attacks.
Air strikes coupled with limited military incursions in both territories have made this less, rather than more, likely.
And he is right to identify the fact that events are occuring within a far wider context. The world is globalised. The 'War on Terror' is globalised too. Not just TV but now the Internet make these events seem very very close to home, even to those very very far away. In a sense there is no such thing as a 'regional conflict' any more:
As Arab rulers are only too well aware, the current conflict has inflamed anti-Israeli and anti-American feeling to a new pitch.
In this sense its impact extends well beyond the Middle East.
The issue of Israel and the Palestinians still has the power to mobilise Muslims as far away as Indonesia - or for that matter Muslims living in the West.
Moreover the conflict comes against a backdrop of other events which have aggravated tensions between Islam and the West.
The vicious circle within which we find ourselves is only going to get broader. Can Israel and the US really step pull back from the brink? Do they even want to?
Continue reading "A War Within a War" »
 BBC News | In pictures | Beirut destruction | A city in ruins
This is going to make the Lebanese turf out Hezbollah? Or is it just going to make them - and every Muslim who sees these images - turn against Israel and their Western sponsors instead?
No brainer.
 The Observer has a theory. There's a new phenomenon in the Middle East, the 'Shia Resurgence' and what we're seeing in the Levant is a little taste of it.
The article is balanced enough to give voice to those who both advocate the idea and those who dismiss it. However, some facts do seem inescapable.
Since the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Shia there have enjoyed more power than they have had for a long time, though there are deep splits between the factions. Furthermore, there's little doubt that Iran has a hand in things there just as much as it influences Hezbollah.
However, local politics and ethnicity show that there's not necessarily a regional shift towards Tehran. After all, the Shias are still in the minority among the Sunnis, and are viewed as somewhat radical even by them.
But down on the ground, the theory does seem to hold water:
All analysts agree Iran has gained a huge amount of influence - 'soft' power - by saying openly what the majority, Arabs and Persians, Shia and Sunni, in the Middle Eastern 'street' say privately. 'The [Iranian] discourse is pan-Islamist and plays the chord of anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism,' said Olivier Roy, the director of the National Scientific Research Centre in Paris.
What Tehran says is also exactly what rulers like King Abdullah, Mubarak or the House of al-Saud cannot say for fear of angering Western allies. And though such regimes can buy off local discontent for a period with increased expenditure on social services and finely calibrated political concessions, the anger in the bazaars and the mosques cannot be contained for ever. It needs an outlet. Tehran, Hizbollah and others have understood this. In the great game of Middle Eastern politics, Western analysts are not the only ones joining the dots.
There's also a very interesting theory over on China Confidential. Basically, with China having a very strong relationship with Iran, it's effectively a win-win situation for them both.
The Iranians, according to the Chinese, see a no-lose opportunity. On the one hand, Iranian ally Syria could surprise Israel and recover the Golan Heights, which the Jewish State captured during the Six-Day War of June 1967. On the other hand, should Syria suffer a humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel's superior military forces, the secular Baathist regime in Damascus would almost certainly be toppled by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. Either way, Iranian influence in the region would increase, even though the non-Arab Iranians are Shiites and the Syrian Islamists are Sunnis.
Continue reading "A Shia Resurgence?" »
 With Israeli reserves being called up, expect to see a ground offensive launched in the next couple of days. This war is escalating rapidly, and as all students of military history know, it's now easier to keep on going than to change direction and pull back. Just like the great powers mobilised at the opening of World War I, Israel is gaining momentum, and it can't just apply the brakes.
The Economist, nevertheless, calls for exactly that. And so it should, even though it's unlikely. It also argues that this conflict may in fact be a gross miscalculation by both Hizbollah - who didn't expect such a robust response - and by Ehud Olmert, keen to show the electorate and the international community that he's no softie. He's a man conspicuously living in the shadow of Ariel Sharon and other hard-man warrior politicians, and he's got a point to prove.
But the whole premise of the crisis rests on a Hobson's choice. Neither side actually can back down anyway:
If Hizbullah is beaten, it risks losing its position as the strongest power in the fractious Lebanese state, with damaging consequences in the region for its Iranian sponsor and Syrian ally. If Israel falters, many of its people think, the iron wall of military power that has enabled it to win grudging acceptance in the Middle East will have been seriously breached.
That being said, neither are involved in a conflict that it's possible to 'win' an any conventional sense:
However much punishment Mr Olmert inflicts on Hizbullah, he cannot force it to submit in a way that its leaders and followers will perceive as a humiliation. Israel's first invasion of Lebanon turned into its Vietnam. It is plainly unwilling to occupy the place again. But airpower alone will never destroy every last rocket and prevent Hizbullah's fighters from continuing to send them off. No other outside force looks capable of doing the job on Israel's behalf. At present, the only way to disarm Hizbullah is therefore in the context of an agreement Hizbullah itself can be made to accept.
It's amazing that even after decades of terrorism, Israel still assumes that conventional military power can flush out the Islamists. It can't. Even in the unlikely event that Hizbollah was 'wiped out', a new group would simply rise in its place. And hopes that it can be 'beaten' are also misguided:
Hizbullah cannot be uprooted. It is not going formally to surrender. Its past struggle against Israel has won it the fierce loyalty of many Lebanese Shias, and its present one will add to their number even if it comes off worse. Israel's security will not be enhanced by destroying the rest of Lebanon. By weakening the Lebanese state, and its fragile but well-intentioned government, Israel just weakens the already feeble constraints Lebanon tries to impose on Hizbullah's actions.
The only answer The Economist has is for America to promptly broker a settlement. But it doesn't even look like Condi's packed her handbag yet, and Bush is quite happy to let 'this shit' go on for an undetermined period.
Meanwhile, the chances of the rest of the region being sucked in when the invasion begins grow stronger. We don't hear very much from Iran and Syria in the Western media, but you can be sure they'll have something to say when the time is right.
Full article below.
Continue reading "The Accidental War" »
 Oxford Professor and all-round commentator Timothy Garton-Ash takes a timely look at the state of the world in mid-2006.
His analysis is bleak. Of course, no writer on current affairs has the benefit of hindsight and it'll be a long time before we know how history will view this little episode. But Garton-Ash takes the essentially neo-realist view that a multipolar order is a recipe for disaster.
The neo-liberalist argument that the US will create stability through institutions and 'enlightened self-interest' no longer washes, and the hegemon is clearly on the decline as other powers rise. The kernel of the argument is quite succinct:
This new multipolarity is the result of at least three trends. The first, and most familiar, is the rise or revival of other states - China, India, Brazil, Russia as comeback kid - whose power resources compete with those of the established powers of the west. The second is the growing power of non-state actors. These are of widely differing kinds. They range from movements like Hamas, Hizbullah and al-Qaida, to non-governmental organisations like Greenpeace, from big energy corporations and drug companies to regions and religions.
A third trend involves changes in the very currency of power. Developments in technologies with violent potential mean that very small groups of people can challenge powerful established states, whether by piloting an aeroplane into the World Trade Centre in New York, targeting a missile at Haifa, taking on the US military in Iraq, bombing the London underground, or squirting sarin gas into the Tokyo subway.
Not to mention the US's loss of EH Carr's third kind of power, 'power over opinion' (the others being military and economic power). Since the war America has been much better at provoking than winning hearts and minds. It just can't let go of those balls, and unfortunately Israel tends to follow suit.
Most of all, Garton-Ash displays his disillusionment with the tenets of liberalism (which encompasses a convenient jibe at the commander-in-chief of misplaced liberal values, the French President):
When Jacques Chirac spoke fondly of multipolarity, back in 2003, he conflated two claims: the world is multipolar, and that's a good thing. Claim 1 is being proved right. Claim 2 has yet to be confirmed. For a start, it matters a lot whether this is multipolar order or multipolar disorder. Order is a high value in international relations. It stops a lot of people being killed. At the moment, we have multipolar disorder, and it's not clear what the shape of a new multipolar order might be. Historically, the emergence of new powers, elbowing for position, has increased the chances of violence. So has contested authority within the frontiers of states.
I disagree with the author's fears that nuclear conflict is impending; no state (apart from North Korea, perhaps) would be willing to act in such self-disinterest, and I can't see any terrorist organisations gaining the capability or the will to use the bomb.
But the essence of his fears is spot-on:
We liberal internationalists dream of a world of democratic, peace-loving, human-rights-respecting states... Some of the growing powers fit that vision... to a large extent, India and Brazil. China and Russia definitely do not, nor do many of the non-state actors that are currently making the running in world politics. Henry Kissinger has suggested that the geopolitics of Asia in the 21st century could resemble those of Europe in the 19th century, with great powers jockeying for position, using war as the continuation of politics by other means. But it could be worse. It could be that kind of great-power rivalry on a world scale, plus terrorists. And corporations. And transnational religious communities. And international NGOs. No moral equivalence is suggested between these very different kinds of actor, but what they all have in common is that they don't fit neatly into a world order of states.
By other means, indeed.
Continue reading "New World Disorder 2.0" »
 Diplomacy at work again. Probably it'll provoke Hizbollah to continue doing their shit.
So, in the spirit of the academic study of international relations, if this is the language of political discourse then there are some things I too would like to add:
Hamas - you can stop doing this shit to boot. And Israel, for that matter. Get your shit together and just be friends.
North Korea and Iran, stop doing this nuclear weapons shit. It's really bad for regional stability, OK?
Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, just turn this shit in and live in peace for God's sake.
That goes for you too, Taliban. Get your shit out of here.
Meanwhile, America, lose that shit-for-soul Guantanamo Bay shit.
India and Pakistan - enough Kashmir shit already. Don't want to see any more of this blowing up trains shit. You Pakistani boys from Yorkshire had better give over this shit and all.
Burma - stop this shit and release Aung Saan Suu Kyi
You Islamic terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Phillipines can cease shitting with us as well.
Get over yourselves and stop this Taiwan shit, China. And forget about that Japanese shit too. It's just shit.
Orangemen, stop doing this shit in Northern Ireland. It just pisses everyone off and makes matters worse. Hurry up and die, Rev Paisley.
Russia, Chechnya, you know what's coming. I shit you not. And Uzbekistan, you'd better sort your shit out too over that massacre at Andijan.
Somalia, Sudan. Just stop this shit.
You and all, Columbia.
In fact, all of you, just stop this shit. Now.
Original Bush-Blair conversation below.
Continue reading "Stop Doing This Shit" »
 A complex and highly-involved essay on an alternative model to the OPEC system features in Asia Times Online. Far too detailed to get into the nuts and bolts of it - reprinted below - but just imagine for a moment what the planet would look like if we were able to rid ourselves of the political weight of the OPEC cartel.
For a start, the energy security issue could be removed from the Middle East conflict, radical Islam and terrorism. I'm not saying that Russia is a safe and stable country, far from it, but the balance of economic power would shift significantly once the Kremlin became the overlord of our energy supplies rather than the failing states and dictatorships that are lackeys to the US military-industrial complex.
With the Levant disintegrating as I write, war in Iran looming, Iraq a centre of instability and Somalia looking like a new challenge to oil security - commanding as it does the sea lanes to the south of Saudi Arabia - it's an impossible dream that's worth at least considering.
It is quite tough to understand exactly how this would all work:
The OPEC model has been limited to crude oil; the Russian model aims at covering supply of both crude oil and natural gas. The OPEC model has been limited to regulating supply and price, according to the swing-producer mechanism. Until now, this role has been played by Saudi Arabia, with its global lead in crude-oil reserves, and in its flexible capacity to lift, pump to port, and ship.
The Russian model aims to supplant the Saudis, emphasizing Russia's global lead in gas reserves and in barrel of oil equivalent (boe). Already, Russia exceeds Saudi Arabia as the largest producer in boe terms (13.3 million boe per day, compared with 10 million boe/d for Saudi Arabia); the largest exporter in boe terms (18.7% of global hydrocarbon exports); and the largest reserve base (16.3% of world hydrocarbon reserves boe).
From the Russian perspective, the Saudi role and OPEC model have benefited the United States, which can pressure Saudi Arabia into opening the spigot to deal with supply emergencies; the US also pressures other oil producers, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Indonesia, by military methods, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. In the Russian alternative, the US will be far less influential, and have fewer levers, commercial or military, to effect pressure on the energy suppliers. Russian arms and defense-industry partnerships are on offer to relatively weak, intervention-prone energy producers in Africa and Latin America to offset US pressure.
In short, it's a direct affront to US hegemony, and so it ain't gonna happen - at least at this summit. It is also a threat to the lynchpins of globalization - transnational private companies - since the Russian model is based on mega-firms like Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft, all of which are at least partly state-controlled.
But there may be benefits:
The security of Russian energy supply is thus to be contrasted with the unreliability of US behavior. In the short term, this Russian strategy also enables Russian companies to secure the capital and technology they need for high-cost, high-risk projects in difficult terrain. Reciprocally, the strategy offers access to stable supply and pricing of oil and gas to consumer countries, including diversion of energy transportation away from military pressure at chokepoints - for example, the Strait of Hormuz, through which most oil tankers sail en route to Asia and South Africa. In America's wars with Iraq, and its threatened attack on Iran, oil consumers are dependent on the US Navy to keep the Hormuz waterway open. They are obliged to pay for this protection through the premium US oil companies charge for delivery risk.
And guess who leapt onto the bandwagon straight away:
India was the first to buy into the new Russian model, purchasing a minority shareholding in the first of the Sakhalin Island offshore oilfields to come onstream. This does not supply crude oil directly from Russia - a short-term Indian priority that the government in New Delhi is also pursuing. China followed India with different tactics, first by funding the proposed East Siberian Oil Pipeline, which will assure direct oil deliveries to Daqing; and most recently, by buying into Rosneft's public share flotation.
Immediate success for this model is unlikely. But with energy security such a fundamental issue these days - more important at a globalized economic level than simple political ideology or cultural identity - then we are perhaps seeing the seeds being sown for a new non-aligned movement.
It's no coincidence that these three guys had a meeting today. No coincidence at all.
Continue reading "A Different Model for a Different World" »
 Very dangerous games are being played out in the Levant: The Observer (quoted in full below) attempts to make sense of them:
The argument here is simple. The past few months have seen several developments that have displeased those who stand to benefit from continued strife. There has been an improvement in relations between moderate Palestinian leaders and Olmert, who is committed to a disengagement of Israeli forces and settlers from the West Bank and hints that even elements of Hamas might be shifting towards a more pragmatic position. In addition, the Syrians, forced to leave Lebanon last year, have become marginalised and Hizbollah has begun to lose credibility. In addition, Tehran is under huge international pressure because of its nuclear programme. Nothing would benefit hardliners in Gaza, Lebanon, Damascus and Tehran more than a nasty and bloody war...
However, experts point out that there is little history of contact between Hizbollah and the Sunni Muslim Hamas. And though a senior Hamas militant in Damascus is suspected of running the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier in Gaza, that does not mean, says one Western intelligence source, that the Hizbollah strike last week was part of a co-ordinated strategy. And the relationship between Iran and Hizbollah may be more nuanced than often thought. 'The Iranians are in trouble over the nuclear programme, and the Syrians are under pressure, too, and chaos and diversions benefit both,' said Nadim Shehadi, of London's Chatham House think tank. 'But Hizbollah is more linked to Tehran than Damascus.'
An axis may exist, but in a rougher, more informal form than the tight-knit institutional connections seen by the Israelis and their allies. 'If you ignore state borders, you can see a broad anti-American and anti-Israeli front, with Iran leading it. They are playing a clever game. The Iranians are playing chess: their opponents are playing poker.'
History has a habit of repeating itself in the Middle East, and it's pretty obvious that Israel's tactic is going to backfire, though the biggest tragedies probably won't be for the Israelis. The notion that attacking Lebanon is going to turn the Lebanese against Hizbollah is simply absurd, yet the ruthlessness of war seems to be ingrained in the Israeli political mindset:
A tight cordon coupled with air strikes would allow the destruction of Hizbollah's military capacity. In addition, the physical damage wreaked by the bombing would force the government of Lebanon (and the international community) to act against the Islamic militia, hopefully implementing a recent UN Security Council resolution calling for Hizbollah's disarmament and the positioning of Lebanese troops on the southern border. Civilian suffering leading to anger against Hizbollah would, the politicians and military men knew, force the Lebanese, or the international community, or both, to act rapidly. The plan was accepted unanimously. 'If our security and economy is being hit,' said one minister, 'so shall Lebanon's.'
Did the bombing of Belgrade turn the people of Serbia against Milosevic? No, it merely strengthened him, until a year later he was finally overthrown by a populace that had simply had enough. Removing Hizbollah from Lebanon is not going to be nearly as simple, and now things will simply snowball in its favour.
Today, the bloodshed continues, with Hizbollah retaliating in the only way it knows how. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinijad, no lover of Israel to put it mildly, threatens "unimaginable losses" should Syria be dragged in, and in St Petersburg the G8 leaders are divided. Things are looking worse and worse by the day.
...it may be that a fuse has been lit. 'The nightmare scenario is war in Gaza, widespread war against the Israelis in Lebanon and between factions, Syria and Iran being dragged into the conflict and a steady escalation from there to who knows where, widespread conflict, oil prices through the ceiling, bombs going off all over the place' said the diplomat. 'You don't usually see the nightmare scenario evolve in the Middle East but, if it does, we are all in deep, deep trouble.'
Continue reading "Chess, Poker or Plain Old War?" »
 Go away for a week and the world seems to change in your absence. No exception this time, as all-out war looms in the Levant and terrorists strike again, this time in Bombay.
Both incidents are symptoms of intractable conflicts over Israel and Kashmir. Fortunately, while Israel has let loose - one suspects that the capture of two soldiers was the excuse is was looking for to strike against Hezbollah - India's reaction has been restrained, despite the clear indications that the bombers hailed from Pakistan.
In both cases, the actions serve only to provoke retaliation. But Israel can't help itself, while India clearly can. If only the former could learn from the latter, the terrorists would soon be out of business. Instead, another generation is being created.
Whether there will be a repeat of 1978 and 1982 remains to be seen, but all efforts must now be made to stop Syria getting sucked into the conflict. Prospects for the region as a whole don't look good.
 It was those words, delivered in the broadest of Yorkshire accents, that hit home most of all. They came from a young man just like me: almost exactly the same age; raised in Britain, the son of an immigrant from the subcontinent; well-educated and articulate. Yet Muhammed Sidique Khan was prepared to die and to kill for the most abstract of hatreds:
I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam - obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad. This is how our ethical stances are dictated.
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.
Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight.
We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.
He could so easily have been myself; a twisted reflection from a world we still barely understand. The parallel universe of Jihad, Shar'ia, martyrdom and the AK-47, all served up for our consumption on prime time al-Jazeera.
A year on from the 7/7 bombings and thankfully there has been no repeat. It's no consolation for the families of the dead, but the attack could have been so much worse. Fortunately the second wave failed in a blur of incompetence. But as Khan's fellow bomber Shehzad Tanweer reminded us in a new video aired yesterday, it certainly isn't over:
What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks that will continue and increase in strength until you withdraw your soldiers from Afghanistan and Iraq, and until you stop your financial and military support for America and Israel.
So where are these men - who justify the murder of random people by drawing tenous connections with participation in the democratic process and complicity with government foreign policy - going to come from? There's two answers. The first, and most obvious, is that they will come from within. But the second, and the most worrying, is that they will have been trained and indoctrinated where else but Pakistan.
Pakistan is becoming the new front in the War on Terror, taking the place that Afghanistan held before 9/11. There's plenty more Pakistani diaspora around, from Britain to Bahrain, and it's more easily accessible than Afghanistan was.
Yet by no means is Pakistan under control, and it's doubtful whether the ruling regime has a clue as to what is going on in 80% of the country.
The BBC takes an in-depth look at this and related issues and asks whether or not the bombers were linked to what is nebulously termed 'al-Qaeda'. The conclusion is that indeed someone in Pakistan was directing the bombers, and this has implications for the War on Terror in general:
...in recent months Western intelligence agencies have begun shifting away from the notion that al-Qaeda has largely become an ideology rather than a structured operation, to once again believing that there remains some capability for direct operational planning within al-Qaeda's leadership.
This denies the fact that whether or not al-Qaeda physically exists, it is both an organisation and an idea. It's this idea that inspired the bombers, not the organisation; and their action was a continuation and a reflection of this idea that no doubt will give it further power.
The group itself is becoming increasingly complex, and is intertwined with the many factions fighting for Islam or independence within Pakistan itself:
"There is very much an integration between the Pakistani jihadi community and al-Qaeda's leadership and I think this is the galaxy that spawned the 7 July bombings," explains Alexis Debat, a counter-terrorism expert.
"But it's very hard for investigators to find out where the Pakistani jihadi community stops and al-Qaeda starts. And it's much more difficult for the Pakistani government to go after the Pakistani jihadis."
The only thing that is certain is that of the hundreds of thousands of visitors to Pakistan each year, more than one of them will bring something back with them - a plan, a tactic, a mission. The only questions are when will they release it upon us, and will we catch them first?
Khan's entire speech and BBC story below.
Continue reading "We Are At War and I Am a Soldier" »
 However emotive and symbolic, sometimes events can get out of control and surpass their actual significance. The capture of an Israeli soldier by Palestinians this week is one of them - and in the past hours appears to have triggered another and far scarier international incident:
Air defences fired on Israeli warplanes that entered Syrian airspace early today and forced them to flee, according to state-run Syrian TV, as tensions escalated over the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian militants.
Israel said its planes buzzed the summer residence of Syrian President Bashar Assad in the Mediterranean coastal city of Latakia, flying low enough to cause a noise on the ground.
Israeli officials said on condition of anonymity that Assad was targeted because of the "direct link" between Syria and Hamas, the Palestinian militant group holding Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, 19, in the Gaza Strip. Syria hosts Khaled Meshaal, Hamas' exiled supreme leader.
Syria hasn't fired in anger at Israel since the 1980s Lebanon conflict, and with tensions in the Middle East as high as they can get, this could be more than just sabre-rattling.
The solution is simple: the disarmingly dorky Cpl Shalit needs to be released ASAP, and top-ranking ministers in Syria and Israel ought to have a hotline chat, preferably with mutual apologies. That'll be the only way to calm down a situation that could rapidly spiral out of control.
Continue reading "One Man Army" »
Cold War Standoff, Lukewarm Co-operation or Something Else Altogether?
In Iran is embodied all of the issues of our time: nuclear ‘rogue states’; Islamic fundamentalism; energy security. And both the US and its rising rival, China, have vital interests in its future.
America’s policy is heavily discussed, and the newspapers are filled with fact, hearsay and rumour about its next move. But what will China do? Given that it has more significant stakes in Iran than in the other ‘Axis’ members, can the Chinese ruling classes just look the other way as they did with Iraq? Will they push for a settlement as they are doing with North Korea? Or will they confront the US in the United Nations and even on the ground?
At this crucial junction for the world order, neither neo-realism and neo-liberalism – both written and practised by ‘Occidental’ thinkers, not ‘Oriental’ – may be fully adequate to explain what happens next. Indeed, are our understandings of Chinese interests correct at all?
Download Word file here or read the main text below. (File contains additional footnotes and bibliography).
Continue reading "Theorising China's Iran Crisis Policy" »
 Or 14 "observations" on counter-insurgency, in this case.
Quite a few years ago, a British Army TV recruiting campaign veered away from the glamorisation of military life and served up something else altogether. In one ad, the viewer was confronted with an angry African refusing to give soldiers access to his well. The officer removed his sunglasses and calmed the man with eye contact.
It was an example of the way we do things in Britain, and I remember my own officer once telling me to take off my shades one day at the range. "Only Americans wear those," he told me. The implication was: "And the American soldier doesn't understand how to get on with the civilian."
In retrospect it comes as no surprise that the US military did not have any knowledge about how to conduct an operation of the type it finds itself embroiled in today. How this is still possible after Vietnam, however, beggars belief. According to the BBC's Paul Reynolds:
...there was no such counter-insurgency doctrine in the US military as a whole when the invasion of Iraq was launched in early 2003. There was no expectation that one would be needed. The hope was for a quick war and a quick peace.
In the aftermath of Haditha, the US have belatedly turned to their UK allies for a bit of advice - and even to TE Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom, from which the title quote comes.
The author is careful to point out that the British are not perfect, but I'd still say that we are a lot better than the US when it comes to judicious use of "underwhelming force". Part of this is down to experience, but the rest of it is down to a different mindset.
With notable exceptions, on the whole the British soldier is disciplined and aware of the environment he is operating in. That means knowing a bit about the local culture and being able to communicate with the local people.
It's softly, softly catchee monkey out there. The Cold War is over - that's what force transformation was meant to be all about. No good charging around in your APCs all day, dressed in full kit, Ray-Bans on and rock music blaring. That's not how to win hearts and minds.
But if America is not a "learning culture", what's the point in telling them that?
Continue reading "Wearing Shades and Eating Soup With a Knife" »
 Maybe it's not the right analogy, but in the recent cabinet reshuffle Tony Blair has thrown the baby out with the bathwater. He has given Britain's international role a backseat and decided to concentrate instead on his own political survival.
Sacking the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, was not a good move. Straw was Home Secretary from 1997-2001 and headed the Foreign and Commonwealth office after that for five years. For all his faults, he was well known in international circles and had proved himself to be an effective diplomat in the trying circumstances of the post 9/11 world.
Britain is probably the only country that can restrain the US. None of the other UN Security Council members enjoy this 'special relationship'; indeed, France, Russia and China actively oppose the US on many issues.
They are not able to stop America hitting Iran. They will just veto it in the UN, stand back and watch the fireworks.
So why, of all times, sack Straw now, on the eve of crisis talks on Iran? His replacement Margaret Beckett is also an experienced politician but no-one is going to be able to just turn up for dinner at New York and make themselves heard. What the hell will she know about tackling Iran?
Blair has not done anyone any favours with this short-term barracking of political allies. He showed such promise in 1997, but like all politicians he has grown weak and arrogant. By reshuffling the cabinet to surround himself only with friends at this crucial moment, he shows that he no longer has Britain or the world's best interests at heart.
It's the right decision, both legally, politically and morally.
Evil as the man is, he did not actually kill anyone himself: he only plotted to do so. The other 19 hijackers gained for themselves martyrdom, if not in the eyes of God, certainly in the eyes of legions of angry young Muslims looking for heroes.
Were Moussaoui to be executed, he would become another such beacon for Islamic extremism. Osama Bin Laden would have a field day: imagine the speech he would make on al-Jazeeera.
The US needs to regain the international legitimacy for its human rights policy that was lost at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. This is a step towards achieving that aim, and placing the US back on the legal and moral pedestal that it needs to assert its primacy.
Most people wish it could be Christmas every day. Zacarias Moussaoui wishes it could be 9/11 every day. I'm sure he'll do well in a US jail, just like Jeffrey Dahmer.
BBC report here and reprinted below.
Continue reading "Moussaoui to Live" »
 So, if we already know that a UN resolution is going to be vetoed, why bother even drafting it?
The basic point of today's news is that a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is being prepared to try to manage the Iran nuclear crisis. This follows the IAEA's report to the UN Security Council that Iran is breaking its obligations on the enrichment of uranium - confirmed by Iran itself.
The relevant part of the chapter is Article 41:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
However, as we read in The Guardian (also below), China and Russia will both veto any decision on actual sanctions. So what's the point?
There basically is none, other than as a face-saving measure for the US (and most likely its special friend, the UK). As long as the appearance of going the UN is kept up, then the US can later say "well, the UN was ineffective, so we had to go it alone".
There is zero chance that military action will be authorised under Article 42, but we all know it's going to happen eventually. This is the beginning of the diplomatic process of preparing the ground for the recriminations that will come later.
Continue reading "So the Point Is, Exactly?" »
...can I have some more?
It's becoming increasingly obvious that China's foreign policy is exclusively based around energy. Since leaving Washington, Hu Jintao made a beeline for Saudi Arabia (where he discussed a refining project and a weapons contract) and is now in Nigeria where he just signed another $4bn deal.
Meanwhile, there'll be more anti-terror exercises in Central Asia next year via the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
China is clearly cosying up to all its energy supplying allies who, with the US weakened by Iraq, are all looking for reliable customers.
You can't seperate them.
George Monbiot writes an eloquent article on this in Comment is Free. He doesn't really come up with any viable solutions, but his logic in arguing his point is sound.
Firstly, most countries are reliant on other regions - namely the Middle East, the Former Soviet Union and Central Asia - for their oil and gas supplies. There's lots of demand and less and less supply. So there's high competition, and it's a seller's market.
This gives them power over us. Russia, for example, had no qualms about cutting off the Ukraine's gas to make a political point (whether it would have the guts to do this to China, who knows).
So, we have to come up with alternatives. Hydrogen is the best answer at the moment, but currently hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels too and not from electrolysis.
There's the economic issue too:
But a hydrogen network will be viable only if it is cheap. According to a report by the US National Academy of Engineering, the wholesale price of hydrogen made from natural gas with carbon capture will, in "the future", be $1.72 (96p) per kilogramme; from coal, $1.45; and from electrolysis $3.93. In other words, if a hydrogen economy is to be taken seriously, the fuel has to be made from gas or coal, rather than by either wind turbines or nuclear generators.
Now, here is when his argument goes a bit wrong. It's too short term:
So it seems to me that a key environmental challenge, odd as this seems, is to ensure that gas has a future in the UK by making its supplies more secure. I don't mean invading Iran or sucking up to Saparmurat Niyazov. I mean increasing our storage capacity so that we cannot be held to ransom - in the short term at least - either by Gazprom or by the companies that control the flow through the interconnector.
Think long term and put the massive investment into creating realistic alternative energy - sorry, this means nuclear as well as wind farms. This will be economically painful in the short term, but in 2050 we'll be able to sit back and watch the rest of the west collapse.
Assuming China hasn't wiped our economies and the environment out by then already.
Continue reading "Energy Security and the Environment" »
 Another Bin Laden tape surfaced today, and the BBC offers a translation. Yes, OK, I'm guilty of it myself, but it's amazing how much interest the old duffer can still provoke, even three-and-a-half years after 9/11.
Osama Bin Laden is no longer a relevant figure. Whatever 'al-Qaeda' actually is, and whether or not he is still the nominal head of it, international Islamic terrorism has transcended his influence. Terrorists act more or less alone these days. They attack independently and with minimal supervision from the FBI's most-wanted. But for the need for finance and supplies, they would be outside the jurisdiction of all but the most local of groups.
And there have been few significant attacks since Madrid. Of course I wouldn't be saying this were I in Baghdad, but killing other Muslims isn't part of the strategy, I reckon.
Parts of Bin Laden's speech itself are notable for their twisting of logic, but that's propaganda for you. On Sudan:
One of the areas of gravest strife was western Sudan, where some differences among the tribesmen were used to trigger a ferocious war among them that consumes everything in its way, in preparation for sending Crusader forces to occupy the region and steal its oil under the cover of maintaining security there. It is a continuous Zionist-Crusader war against the Muslims.
Wrong. In fact Chinese and Malaysian companies hold the majority of the equity in Sudan's oil production.
The next paragraph also makes me wonder:
...you smile in our faces, saying: We are not hostile to Islam; we are hostile to terrorists, and we advocate peaceful coexistence and dialogue rather than a clash of civilizations. The reality belies their pronouncements, for the Western diplomats only seek dialogue for the sake of dialogue. They aim to deceive and anaesthetise us in order to buy time. They only want us to observe a truce.
Well done Osama for flicking through Huntingdon's book (I wonder if The Clash of Civilizations is available in Arabic?), but despite appearances the West is not really bent on destroying Islam. It would be more than happy to co-exist with Muslims, so long as it can buy their oil under favourable terms. That's the real point.
Go back to your cave, Osama (though I suspect that you're actually hiding in Pervez Musharraf's spare room) and leave us in peace. Leave the jihad to those who are actually out there fighting.
Update: Even Hamas and the Sudanese government don't want to know about this.
There again, there's always going to be someone who buys this stuff and goes out and acts upon it...
 Or is it too early to tell?
Firstly Nepal. The despotic King Gyanendra appears to have performed a U-turn, and is now saying that he will return power to the people. But there are many who are still dissatisfied. The unrest of the last fortnight continued - fortunately there hasn't been another Tiananmen or Andijan, but tomorrow is another day.
Gyanendra may say things like "the source of sovereign authority is inherent in the people", but how far is he prepared to go? And what do the people really want? The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is in some ways a reaction to the institutions of government and monarchy, and things may well get worse before they get better.
I visited Nepal in 2004, and happened to arrive there on the day of a prime ministerial resignation. There were troops on the street, but it seemed to be business as usual in Kathmandu. Things have changed since then, and I'd like to see Nepal return to normality. Strange how countries I come to like - Zimbabwe was another - fall into chaos just after I leave.
Nepal needs the tourism business, frankly: and it doesn't need to become a geopolitical pawn in the heart of Asia. The king has acted in the country's best interests, but he had better be sure that the country will act in his - lest he find himself with his head on a stick.
Meanwhile, Iraq has a new Prime Minister, Jawad al-Maliki. Not a name that we have heard a lot over the last couple of years. He does, however, recognize the ambivalence of the US's policy of divide and rule - you can't dismiss and rebuild the conventional army and state and rely on local militias and mullahs to keep order for you at the same time:
In his first policy speech after being asked to form a government, Mr Maliki said Iraq's militia groups must merge with the country's security forces, the Reuters news agency reported.
"Arms should be in the hands of the government. There is a law that calls for the merging of militias with the armed forces," Mr Maliki was quoted as saying.
Time will tell. I, for one, am glad I'm not in either of these gentlemen's shoes.
 When I was at journalism college, we were always told to write about what has happened, never about what has not happened.
Then again, we were also told 'break any rule if you have to', and today's non-news from Israel is a case in point.
The only way for the Palestine situation ever to be solved is for one side to step back and hold off. Hopefully, the new government in Israel will make this their policy. Fiery rhetoric aside, the ball is now firmly in Hamas's court.
Once the bombers (whether from Hamas, Islamic Jihad or the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade is irrelevant, though it seems the recent attack was an Islamic Jihad act) see that their terror tactics are having no effect at all - no concessions, no compromises, no talks, not even any reprisals - they will have no choice but to change their strategy. Of course this may lead to even more extreme and atrocious moves, but I doubt it.
Israel have Hamas over a barrel - they can starve them out, and they know it. Now that Hamas have the political legitimacy and the mandate of the Palestinian people, they absolutely have to act in the people's best interests, and that means looking after their day-to-day needs rather than pursuing the pipe dream of the end of Israel.
Both sides can win the day if they can restrain themselves. It's not much, and I don't expect an immediate breakthrough, but it's the best news out of the Middle East for a long time.
Guardian story below. See also The Economist Global Agenda.
Continue reading "When Inaction is the Best Action" »
 Talk of the day has to be Seymour Hersh's article in The New Yorker. The whole text is reprinted below, and here's a couple of the best moments:
One former defense official, who still deals with sensitive issues for the Bush Administration, told me that the military planning was premised on a belief that “a sustained bombing campaign in Iran will humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public to rise up and overthrow the government.” He added, “I was shocked when I heard it, and asked myself, ‘What are they smoking?’ ”...
The lack of reliable intelligence leaves military planners, given the goal of totally destroying the sites, little choice but to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. “Every other option, in the view of the nuclear weaponeers, would leave a gap,” the former senior intelligence official said. “ ‘Decisive’ is the key word of the Air Force’s planning. It’s a tough decision. But we made it in Japan.” ...
Under Ahmadinejad, the Revolutionary Guards have expanded their power base throughout the Iranian bureaucracy; by the end of January, they had replaced thousands of civil servants with their own members. One former senior United Nations official, who has extensive experience with Iran, depicted the turnover as “a white coup,” with ominous implications for the West. “Professionals in the Foreign Ministry are out; others are waiting to be kicked out,” he said. “We may be too late. These guys now believe that they are stronger than ever since the revolution.” He said that, particularly in consideration of China’s emergence as a superpower, Iran’s attitude was “To hell with the West. You can do as much as you like.” ...
“If you attack,” the high-ranking diplomat told me in Vienna, “Ahmadinejad will be the new Saddam Hussein of the Arab world, but with more credibility and more power. You must bite the bullet and sit down with the Iranians.”
The diplomat went on, “There are people in Washington who would be unhappy if we found a solution. They are still banking on isolation and regime change. This is wishful thinking.” He added, “The window of opportunity is now.”
Now, I still find it incredibly hard to believe that after the Iraq debacle, the US is seriously going to attack Iran. It has to be a bluff, right? OK, so Clinton struck Iraq a couple of times during the 1990s too, but actical nukes? And would a hit on Iran be followed by a ground invasion? It doesn't bear thinking about.
Well, Seymour Hersh is a pretty senior journalist. He's ëffectively staking his reputation on this, so there must be something in it.
Continue reading "The Iran Plan" »
 Instapundit via Comment is Free gives us The Right Brothers.
OK, I'm not sure about the first verse (the whole lot is reprinted below) but surely this is meant to be ironic? Or is my sense of humour too sophisticated to handle this? Does not compute...
Click here to play the song... Some of their lyrics are as follows:
Democracy is on the way, hitting like a tidal wave
All over the middle east, dictators walk with shaky knees
Don’t know what they’re gonna do,
their worst nightmare is coming true
They fear the domino effect, they’re all wondering who’s next
The line "Cindy Sheehan - wrooooong!" gets me especially. As if the mother of a dead soldier is a legitimate subject for attack in a political rock song. It convinces me all the more that this is an incredibly subtle spoof. What do you reckon?
Continue reading "Surely Ironic? Surely?" »
 An interesting article by the admirable Max Hastings on Comment is Free.
I think two things have been lacking in the Bush / Blair Iraq policy. The first is honesty. Rather than spinning out the rhetoric on WMD, building upon zavaell's letter reproduced in the comments, our political leaders should should have said this:
"Iraq has the second largest known oil reserves in the world, and is bang in the middle of an unstable, strategically vital and oil-rich region.
"We are sorry, but as you all know the economies of the West are totally dependent on oil. If someone like Saddam gets his hands on WMD in the future, or gets away with anything funny like he did in 1991, we're stuffed.
"So we'd really better take him out while we have the chance. Unfortunately blood does have to be spilt for oil and we should have done it 12 years ago, really."
Not pretty, but at least it's honest. I think that voters may have appreciated this message more than than the one we actually got.
The second failure is in historical, political and strategic awareness, and it makes me wonder what the point of the US Army War College and other institutions is unless politicians listen to them.
I wasn't around around during the Vietnam war but I've read some books on it. That's been enough to teach me a few things about what can go wrong in a foreign war. I'm not saying I'm an expert but it seemed pretty obvious that the more the US forces alienated the local population then the stronger their enemies became.
It's not rocket science. Isn't there a library at the White House? Doesn't it contain some of these books and journals, A Bright Shining Lie for example? A lot of lives could have been saved had Bush and his people had simply studied history a bit harder and learnt from previous mistakes.
 Or is it?
The Sunday Telegraph today boasts this exclusive on 'secret' talks to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. The authorities of course deny it.
Whether it's true or not, it does raise legitimate questions. It's clearly current policy - the 'Bush Doctrine', some call it - to pre-emptively strike countries you suspect to be developing WMD. Even Clinton did it back in the 1990s, so it's not just a neocon thing.
So what to do about Iran? Negotiation isn't going to work - unless, of course, there's a clear threat of force behind it. Perhaps the deliberate spreading of rumours (note how this follows very swiftly from Condi's visit to the UK) is a tool to nudge Ahmedinejad back to the table.
However, the consequences of actual attack on Iran would obviously be dire. It would justify what Islamists would call a defensive jihad. Iran would be able to retailiate against the US and UK on not one but two fronts - Iraq and Afghanistan - possibly in the shape not of MBTs and fighter planes but the far more troublesome supply of weapons and the insertion of guerrilla support for anti-Western factions.
It may be that Iran is already doing so, and hence an extra impetus for the threats.
On the other hand, Iran's impudence is a clear threat to US influence in the region. If Iran were to successfully develop a nuclear weapon, it would become a regional hegemon and thus would be in a far better position to negotiate on topics such as Israel, oil and pipeline routes.
Who'll blink first? If I were Ahmedinajad, I'd stand my ground, knowing that I'm already in more favour with my own voting public than either Bush or Blair - and, moreover, that any infraction on Iranian territory is going to enhance my support while it will inevitably weaken and even topple my enemies.
Your call, Condi.
Continue reading "April Fool, Iran" »
 April Fools' day came early for Blackburn, with the visit of the tricky-to-spell Condoleeza Rice.
The surreality of the event was probably lost on all but the British, who know that Blackburn is about as drab and conventional as a spent industrial town can get. No wonder Jack Straw hails from there.
Yet Condi chose the moment to make quite an admission - that the US administration is fallible. Well sort of. Grunts on the ground make 'tactical errors', often because they are hot, tired, scared and badly trained. Strategic brilliance, lest we forget, is down to politicians. Like Condi.
Continue reading "Strategic Remarks" »
Again, too knackered to comment effectively, but I direct you to read these two articles on The Guardian's Comment is Free by Martin Jacques. He's a senior visiting research fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, so should know what he's on about.
The most recent, Imperial overreach is accelerating the global decline of America, is a useful analysis of how the US is blind to what the real issues are, though I disagree that the Middle East is completely irrelevant. See the sample quote below:
In becoming so catastrophically engaged in the Middle East, making the region its overwhelming global priority, it downgraded the importance of everywhere else, taking its eye off the ball in a crucial region such as east Asia, which in the long run will be far more important to the US's strategic interests than the Middle East.
A real shame that we can't comment on it, though perhaps I'll e-mail him instead.
The other, How the west is lost, I've already commented on in the past. However, scroll down to the bottom for the 22 March comment by Franc. This is a perfect summary of how a Chinese person would typically think on the issues, and as such is an incredibly useful reference for anyone who wants to begin to understand China from a non-Western perspective.
 Just when you thought the US forces in Iraq couldn't get any more inept, they surprise you again.
It's sometimes hard to believe how badly the Iraq war is being conducted. Everything the US military does - and even if it's Iraqi forces on the scene, the US army is still culpable - seems calculated to aggravate the situation:
"In our observation of the place and the activities that were going on, it's difficult for us to consider this a place of prayer," said US military spokesman Barry Johnson.
How stupid do you have to be? Even if you are not sure about the status of the venue where guerilla fighters are congregating, you don't just march in guns ablazing. That way you fall straight into the propagandist's hands. Any ambiguity at all about the target has to make it a no-no.
I realise that this ties the US military's hands somewhat, but surely that's better than aggravating an already bad situation. In a war like this sensitivity is just as important as firepower. But it's as if the US is incapable of learning from past mistakes.
BBC report below.
Continue reading "Bulls in a China Shop" »
Reports on Russia supplying intelligence to Saddam Hussein during the run-up to the Iraq invasion omit one significant question: whose side were they on?
At first glance, the answer seems obvious. Keen to temper US influence in the region, Russia was attempting to aid the Iraqi regime in the only way it could short of straight military support. But the US deception effort was so skilful the Russians were fooled too and fed the Iraqis the very same disinformation.
But it's a well known irony of intelligence work that in order to sell a big lie, you have first to feed the enemy a few small truths. That way you gain their trust - they can see your intelligence has value - and they are more likely to fall for the sting in the tail.
So was this in fact Russia's real tactic? Though he outwardly opposed US policy in the UN, Putin had no real desire to see the continuation of Saddam Hussein's reign. It was a destabilising influence that affected the whole Middle East and thus Russian security too - particularly with regard to their pipelines to Europe.
And the report also emphasises Russian business interests in Iraq. It's all about oil, everyone, don't forget it.
BBC Report below.
Continue reading "Whose Side Are They On?" »
 Compare and contrast these two articles from the BBC:
After the invasion: Iraqis speak
Kyrgyzstan's revolution: One year on
They make for depressing reading. Though the circumstances of regime change in Iraq and Kyrgyztan wer profoundly different - the first imposed by the US and heavily criticised, the second an organic uprising by the people - the comments are the same.
None of the people interviewed in either Krygyzstan and Iraq are happy. In Central Asia the corruption continues; in the Middle East the violence has simply taken on new clothing.
If neither invasion nor revolution were successful ways to remove authoritarianism and oppression, is there anything, then, that can work?
Iraq interviews below.
Continue reading "Whatever it was, it didn't work" »
 I was astonished to read in The Economist that I am, in fact, a neocon:
...neoconservatives came to believe that American power should be used for moral purposes, that democracy and human rights in other countries were a legitimate foreign-policy concern, but that international law and institutions were generally unable to solve serious security problems. This strand of thinking blended some fairly left-wing elements with a right-wing belief in the use of military power...
The snippet comes from a review of Francis Fukuyama's latest book, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, which I'd like to get my hands on once I have time and money.
I didn't agree with much of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man, and he doesn't agree with much of it any more either. The reason is Iraq, the invasion of which occurred three years ago today.
This raises the question of the lasting effects of the Iraq policy and of George W in general, another subject raised by The Economist this week. At present, it certainly does not appear that Iraq has dug the foundation for democracy in the Middle East, far from it.
But hold on - what's this? The US holding talks with Iran over Iraq? OK, on the one hand they are fighting a war by proxy in the south of the country. On the other, anything that gets the US and Iran into dialogue isn't a complete disaster; America has to begin at least listening to the other side of the story and I suspect it's about to get an earful.
Finally, with Bush and Blair's credibility at their lowest ebb, what next? Though many are eager to demonstrate against the war, it is a question few are ready to answer. Simple withdrawal from Iraq would be catastrophic and would almost certainly lead to wider Sunni-Sh'ia conflict that may well spill over across the region. Yet as long as they are there, the troops are part of the problem as well as part of the solution.
The Economist passes on a couple of ideas in the last paragraphs of the article 'Resolve, but no solution':
For instance, one of the war's main cheerleaders, Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution, recommends securing the calmest parts of Iraq first, rather than concentrating American forces in Sunni Arab areas where the insurgency is strongest. That way, he argues, more Iraqis can establish normal lives more quickly. Political power and oil revenues should be decentralised, he says, and some powers transferred to a UN high commissioner, as happened in Bosnia.
By contrast, in the latest Foreign Affairs Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations urges America to concentrate on brokering a compromise between the Kurds and Shia and Sunni Arabs by threatening to manipulate the military balance of power between them. To force the Sunnis to the negotiating table, America must threaten to arm and train a Shia-Kurdish army. To force the Shias and Kurds to compromise, it must threaten to pull out of Iraq prematurely, or back the Sunnis. Mr Biddle admits that such a radical shift from idealism to realpolitik would be “a challenge” to explain to American voters.
It may be a challenge to explain to voters, but not as hard as explaining 2,000 more American bodybags and tens of thousands of forgotten victims in the Middle East.
I reproduce this last article below.
Continue reading "An End of History, Three Years On" »
 Breaking news of a major air assault on Iraq. What's the bigger picture, though? Is this intended as a sign that the US is still in control? Is it a warning to the factions that lethal force may be visited upon them at any moment? Is it intended to mark the three year anniversary of the beginning of hostilities?
Probably all of these things. But what's for sure is that an all-guns-blazing Colonel Kildare-style attack is not the best way to deal with insurgents. And this is what the US forces just don't get.
The kind of war they are fighting is not a war where you can fight enemy formations in pitched battles over defined stretches of territory. It's a guerrilla war, where the enemy is smart, elusive and blends into the civilian population. Small groups, often acting entirely independently, make their move and then melt back into the towns and cities.
Just like in Vietnam. Except none of the lessons appear to have been learned.
My prediction for the news over the next few days: tens of American bodybags; scores of dead terrorists; hundreds of wounded and displaced civilians; maybe a thousand new recruits, militated to the cause; and increased tension across Iraq.
It's not going to reassure the Sh'ia majority; it'll only provoke the Sunnis. Even if it solves the Samarra problem, ultimately it'll create new ones.
Continue reading "Operation Swarmer" »
 Condi's new buzzword, as elaborated upon in this lengthy Guardian special report (also below) is hijacked from DoD-speak: probably coined in this speech back in 2002, 'transformational' originally referred to a huge shift in military doctrine (including strategy and procurement) inspired by the end of the Cold War and then, of course, 9/11.
Now, according to Ms Rice, we need 'transformational diplomacy'.
Perhaps it's a shame that transformational diplomacy didn't precede transformational military doctrine, but better late than never. The article below elucidates on the new policy - which is basically a diplomatic paradigm shift of the West away from Europe (particularly the former Warsaw Pact) and towards - you've guessed it - Asia and the Middle East.
We can already see it in action:
Exemplifying the new American thinking, George Bush this week travelled to three countries at the heart of the new strategy. First stop was Afghanistan, to reassure its nascent yet fragile government that the US would not abandon its fight against the Taliban. Then India, a new economic powerhouse, which according to some is being courted as a counterweight to the rapidly expanding ambitions of China. And finally to Pakistan, another nuclear power, whose volatile regions provide a harbour for al-Qaida.
This attention to diplomatic in addition to pure military power perhaps reflects a small nudge to the left in US policy, and can only be read as a positive move.
However, Condi and George would do well to read a book by Harvard history professor, Niall Ferguson, named 'Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'. It's reviewed here by The Guardian.
I admit, from a personal point of view as someone who's considering a Foreign Office career, that I wouldn't like a posting to Baghdad or Kabul, and certainly wouldn't want to take my loved ones there.
But for diplomats to have just one-year postings defeats the purpose of ambassadorial staff. Why send them home just as they gain contacts, linguistic skills and experience? Is America really in this for the long run?
It's exactly the kind of 'attention deficit' that Ferguson criticises:
...namely, the attention deficit that seems to be inherent in the American political system and that already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not intended as a term of abuse. The problem is systemic: it is the way the political process militates against far-sighted leadership.
The US needs to realise that it's in this for well beyond the forseeable future. It can't just walk away from Iraq, Afghanistan, or China and India for that matter. Transformational diplomacy is all very well, but the first thing it needs to transform is itself.
Continue reading "Transformational Diplomacy" »
 Bush's visit to India, reported here by the BBC, shows that the US can indeed engage with major third-world nations in a positive and constructive manner.
But it really begs the question: why can't this be done with Iran?
Iran also has nuclear ambitions, and has every right to pursue atomic energy. At the end of the day, it's still the best option we have to counter the incresing threat of global warming.
There are differences between Iran and India, however. India already has the bomb, which is a big stick to be carrying during any negotiations. Iran does not.
Furthermore, Iran is viewed as a pariah state, a member of the 'axis of evil'. Thus the US is out to block it from gaining nuclear technology. It's this dichotomy that is the most hypocritical, and ultimately the least helpful.
Arguably, US policy against Iran - the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, for example - has done little but encourage the radical elements it is supposed to subdue, and has held back Iran from serious development.
While I too would not like to see a nuclear-armed Iran, the presence of nuclear detente between India and Pakistan has kept the peace between them for a few years. So the bomb is not such a bad thing after all. If only the US were willing to engage with Iran the way they can with India, then a lot of problems would fade away.
Continue reading "The Nuclear Family" »
 Just over ten years ago, there was a comedy series on the BBC called 'The Day Today'. It wasn't so much a satire on current affairs as a spoof on the whole TV news industry. We had the video cassetes - this was before CDs - and we watched them all a couple of times.
In one memorable episode, a hapless reporter made some accidental remarks which led to him nervously stating that there might be a war. All of a sudden, the mock-up of the studio went into overdrive: flashing lights strobed the anchors; the screens and panels revolved; giant maps and ranks of armchair generals appeared; all under an enormous banner declaring in four-foot letters - 'WAR!'.
This is the way I feel that the media is behaving today. As if the attack on the the Al-Askari shrine wasn't bad enough, the media are now in a feeding frenzy over this incident and are exacerbating the confrontation even further.
It's a little sad to see, especially as a journalist myself. This is the other side of 'sexing up', the way in which the media spins a story to milk every ounce of truth from it, regardless of the consequences. They are speaking as if there is already a civil war, and the more they do so, the more likely it becomes.
Look at the headlines. At the BBC, the usually sober Jeremy Bowen's acutely-considered report has been titled (possibly not by he himself) 'Iraq's civil war nightmare'. Over at The Guardian, it's 'Iraq slips towards civil war'.
Turning to the news itself, then, admittedly it's not good. At the time of writing there's 80 or so dead, and there will be more, I'm certain. Al-Sadr's mobs are back on the streets and reprisals are widespread.
Perhaps the saddest thing is that this is turning Moslem against Moslem, Iraqi against Iraqi. But at the end of the day it's not about interpretation of religious doctrine - it's about power.
The Sunni extremists who perpetrated this blast are gunning for civil war. It's up to the Shia majority politicians - not to mention US and UK forces - to calm the situation. They may have only hours to do so.
It's perhaps a similar situation to the Danish cartoon riots - the flames are being fanned by the oxygen of publicity. Despite the media's duty to report the facts, it also has a responsibility to report them objectively. Of course, all this being said, it was terrorists who destroyed the dome, not journalists.
There is no civil war. Yet. But by tomorrow, there probably will be.
Guardian article below.
Continue reading "War. Again." »
 Inevitably, inexorably, Israel and Palestine move towards all-out conflict.
Hamas will not recognise Israel. Israel now will not deal with Hamas, the legitimate, democratically-elected government of Palestine. Thus the ruling party in Israel effectively no longer recognises Palestine.
The imposition of sanctions is the next step on the road to full-scale war. Palestine's only neighbour is Israel, and effectively it will become a nation under siege.
Nations under siege tend to lash out at the one besieging them, and Hamas will do so with rockets, mortars and suicide bombs. Israel will retaliate with gunships and missiles.
Foreign intervention will take the shape of increased smuggling of weapons and militants - and eventually, I expect, food and water - via the Gaza Strip's coastal zone. To which the Israeli Navy will have to react with gunboats and a blockade.
And the cycle of death and suffering will continue. Which, ultimately, is what they all want.
Continue reading "The Road to Hell" »
 Sometimes reading the news just makes you weep. Not just because of the death and suffering and tragedy, but because it reminds you of just how stupid and petty people can be.
Take a look at this one for example - 'Iranians rename Danish pastries'. If it's not sad and pathetic enough that a score of people have died over this incident, and that Danish embassies have been evacuated around the world because of the actions of a couple of irresponsible individuals, now Iranians have to make their point known semantically.
Or pedantically, should I say.
To rename Danish pastries 'roses of the Prophet Muhammed' is nothing new, of course: we all remember the silly season story about 'freedom fries' in the US.
On the one hand it's just a bit amusing, something of a harmeless joke to defuse the tension. But on the other this kind of behaviour serves to reinforce and promote nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment in a far more insidious way than mere newspaper reports.
Consider also China's kneejerk reaction to the film 'Memoirs of a Geisha'. Poor Zhang Ziyi can't even step into the PRC these days due to her taking on the role of a Japanese woman in the movie.
Give me strength. She's an actress, for God's sake! It's her job to pretend to be people she is not. Just because she played a Japanese in a film doesn't mean she condones the Rape of Nanking - any more than Ralph Fiennes promoted anti-Semitism and the Holocaust by playing a Nazi in 'Schindler's List'.
How utterly ridiculous. Read the report below.
Continue reading "How Foolish People Can Be" »
 The French are not the types to mince their words, and foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy is no exception:
"No civil nuclear programme can explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a clandestine military nuclear programme," he said.
But is he right? Probably. The only chance Iran has of proving its benign intentions is to accept the Russian offer to assist with uranium enrichment on Russian soil. Otherwise, it's a pretty certain thing.
Then again, why shouldn't Iran develop nuclear power? Sure, it has massive oil reserves. But it realises that in a way it is just as reliant on oil exports as other countries are on imports. Anything goes wrong, and it's down the sink. It's just as well to have an alternative, just in case. Besides, one day the oil will run out too.
Perhaps the greatest significance of this story is the apparent unity of the UNSC, plus Germany as the 'three' of the EU3 of Britain and France. As Mr Douste-Blazy points out, it's not often that the US, UK, France, Russia and China are agreed on something.
Perhaps, however, this goes beyond the Iran nuclear issue. France and Russia are both keen to assert their presence on the international stage, and this is a PR-friendly way to do it.
Most interesting is China, in the past a serial abstainer from these kind of debates. And China has a lot to lose - it is a big importer of oil from Iran. Could it be that the dragon has awoken and wants to play the UN game at last?
Article form the BBC reprinted below.
Continue reading "United Against Iran?" »
 Something which entirely slipped me, and a lot of others, by when it came out last week is this new US National Military Strategic Plan, part I believe of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
I remember writing an analysis of the QDR back in 2000, some time after the USS Cole attacks, when I worked for Jane's - some confusion about the title? Anyway, since the US armed forces have an unusually open policy on some of their documents at least, PDFs of the strategic plan and the QDR can be downloaded from the DoD website.
The Guardian also has an analysis of the plan, which can be read by clicking on the link and/or below.
It's pretty significant. Basically, the 'War of Terror' doctrine, which was pretty much rhetoric coined off-the-cuff in September 2001, has been replaced by this 'Long War' model.
Looking beyond the Iraq and Afghan battlefields, US commanders envisage a war unlimited in time and space against global Islamist extremism. "The struggle ... may well be fought in dozens of other countries simultaneously and for many years to come," the report says. The emphasis switches from large-scale, conventional military operations, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, towards a rapid deployment of highly mobile, often covert, counter-terrorist forces.
Moreover, in terms of long-term spending and boots-on-the-ground there has been a massive shift away from previous policy. The US at last recognises that it has to create what some might call a 'medium-to-lightweight capability' and others could term 'guerrilla forces'. There is a great emphasis on intelligence and information technology too - good old C4ISR.
As well as big expenditure projects, the report calls for: investments in signals and human intelligence gathering - spies on the ground; funding for the Nato intelligence fusion centre; increased space radar capability; the expansion of the global information grid (a protected information network); and an information-sharing strategy "to guide operations with federal, state, local and coalition partners". A push will also be made to improve forces' linguistic skills, with an emphasis on Arabic, Chinese and Farsi...
..."Long duration, complex operations involving the US military, other government agencies and international partners will be waged simultaneously in multiple countries round the world, relying on a combination of direct (visible) and indirect (clandestine) approaches," the report says. "Above all they will require persistent surveillance and vastly better intelligence to locate enemy capabilities and personnel. They will also require global mobility, rapid strike, sustained unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities. Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required."
All well and good. I haven't read the full report yet, but I'll make two observations:
1. To me this is indicative that we are indeed in a new phase of international relations, one dominated by the US's 'Long War' to maintain its hegemonic position. It's not World War Three, though, it's something different.
2. The focus is too narrow. Political Islam is significant, true, but it doesn't pose a direct threat to the West. The Mussulman hordes aren't going to sweep into Europe and North America, scimitars shining in the dawn sunlight. The threat basically comes down to energy resources - we are running out of oil, and most of it is still contorlled by nations where Islam is the dominant force.
Bush may have admitted in his State of the Union address that America is "addicted to oil" but the measures the US is taking may be too little too late.
The competition is not Islam; it is China. Islam is merely a powerful piece on the chessboard, not the game itself.
Continue reading "The Long War" »
 A rare example of positive news regarding Islam and the Middle East - some very astute remarks by ex-Iranian president Mohammad Khatami at a conference in Kuala Lumpur (entitled 'Who Speaks for Islam? Who Speaks for the West?').
Mr Khatami said that after centuries of struggle between Islamic traditionalists and modernisers, he believes Muslims are ready for a major transformation in their minds and lives.
He spoke of Muslim societies embracing freedom, progress and democracy, and helping to create a calm and secure world for all.
However, despite the encouraging noises, is anyone actually listening? Who actually does speak for Islam?
No-one does. The trouble is that, unlike the US, EU or PRC, the 'nation' of Islam has no obvious voice or leader. Does Khatami have any authority within the Muslim world? I doubt that he has much even in his own country.
A great way to help solve the crisis between Islam and the West would be to appoint some kind of council of leaders, a new Caliphate with enough theological, moral and political legitimacy to make it comparable to similar institutions of the nation state.
But by its very nature, Islam is divided into factions and subgroups as well as various Muslim nations and a vast diaspora. It needs to unite behind someone like Khatami (he did defend Iran's right to nuclear energy, but I'll let him off for the time being), but I doubt that this is a realistic proposition.
Continue reading "But Who Cares?" »
 The sheer absurdity of the issue burning up the papers at the moment is what bowls me over.
In some ways, the Danish cartoon issue is a very effective red rag to two camps which, in a better world, would be desperately seeking to build relations with each other rather than tear them down.
It has to be said that in the light of the Salman Rushdie fatwah and the Theo Van Gogh murder, to name but two incidents in recent memory, any newspaper editor who knowingly sets out to confront Islam really should know what to expect.
Instead, however, the media is perceiving this all as a debate on 'free speech'. Get real. The idea of 'free speech' is basically a Western sensibility which is not compatible with many elements of the religious right - whether in Islam, the Roman Catholic church or elsewhere.
As deliberate provocations go, it takes some beating. Yes, I agree that the media has an inalienable right to free speech, but this is a trivial and petty way to go about it.
The leader from this week's Economist is reprinted below. As is to be expected, it comes down heavily on the side of the newspapers.
But it ignores the other side of media freedom, which is responsibility. Freedom is not free, and it is the duty of the media in the west to use its freedom responsibly. There are many other ways in which the paper could have tackled the issues it wished to tackle without the blatent disregard for religious sensibilities.
The affair is also an illustration of how events in the globalised world are not necessarily under the control of conventional 'state-based' entities. The Muslim protests are disorganised and spontaneous. The European newspapers' declarations of solidarity were likewise spontaneous and uncontrolled. There is nothing that yet exists to temper either force - either the force of righteous indignation or the force of free will.
11.2.06 - Note - see also this entry by Dave...
Continue reading "Cartoon Violence" »
I won't be around for a couple of weeks now, so won't be able to write much about this year's Davos meetings. Suffice it to say - it'll be worth coming back to.
Bye for now, and see you in Amsterdam in early February.
 Let's hope not. Despite the inevitable allegations of fraud and vote rigging, the results do seem realistic, with no party obtaining an overall majority. What this election means for the future is hard to tell, and inevitably the bloodshed will go on for some time to come yet, but at least it is an election.
Arguably, one of the greater ambitions (or ulterior motives, depending on your point of view) on the Iraq invasion and the War on terror in general is to impose some kind of democratic system on a couple of Islamic countries, and hope that the movement spreads. There has perhaps been some limited success with this, Lebanon and Kirgizstanfor example. All good so far.
But hold on a second. Is it really fair to impose democracy? Isn't it better for the people of a country to choose democracy for themselves? This is the argument of this week's Economist special feature (also reprinted below).
While some reformist Islamic nations, Turkey for example, are striving to be more and more 'Western' in both their outlook and internal affairs, I'm not sure that it is effective or even fair to make democracies by force. There is the argument that modern conservative Islam is not necessarily even compatible with Western liberal democracy - it's a cultural thing, not a political one.
And finally, and most importantly, the whole essence of democracy is choice. If people don't choose to choose, what hope is there for free and fair elections?
Articles reprinted below.
Continue reading "A False Dawn in Iraq?" »
This is the way things are going:
Russia, though slowly shifting towards the west's position, is still holding out hope that Tehran may yet accept a compromise. China, which has close economic ties with Iran, is the most hardline in opposing tough action against Tehran.
One European diplomat said: "What is really crucial is support from Russia and China. China does not look too good. China is the major obstacle."
 At the moment, the subject is Iran's referal to the UN Security Council due to its nuclear ambitions. Arguably it's only a blip, due to shabby-taxi-driver-cum-zealous-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's combatative approach, but it's a microcosm of the times.
The UN Security council is certainly becoming more and more fractured. Previously a serial abstainer, China is now beginning to pull its weight. It has the veto, and that means it has the power.
Last year it was Sudan over Darfur. Again, China vetoed action to protect its oil interests. And there'll be more incidents like this in the future, no doubt.
Of course the other four nations more often than not will act purely in their own interests, and usually have done - most notably the US. So there is certainly an element of hypocrisy here.
But surely the purpose of the UNSC is to establish consensus between the world's premier military and economic powers in order to provide a safer and more secure planet for all 6 billion of us.
Article from The Guardian reprinted below.
Continue reading "Microcosm of the Future" »
 The very reasons we invaded Iraq were:
a) the presence, or potential presence, of WMD
b) the dangerous rhetoric and past behaviour of a clearly uncontrollable and egotistical leader
Though, to be fair, President Ahmadinejad of Iran doesn't have the same track record of death and destruction as Saddam, he certainly seems to have similar intentions.
And this leaves the UN, the IAEA and everyone else in quite a tizz.
It would surely be complacent to allow Iran to develop nuclear technology - yet surely it is their right as a developing nation to do so.
It would surely be insane to take action against them, but with Ariel Sharon close to the end and the Middle East approaching another state of flux similar to that triggered by the death of Yasser Arafat, more than just strong words are required.
It is at times like these that the role of the international community - or lack of it - comes to the fore. And all the players are involved - Russia and China have their interests just as the EU and the US have their qualms.
Article from The Guardian reproduced below.
Continue reading "Catch-22 for the IAEA" »
 Nothing wrong with this per se, but it does exemplify the general direction things are going.
As the world's second largest consumer of oil, and the fourth or the sixth largest world economy (depending on how you reckon it), China's demand for oil can only grow. Currently most of its energy demands are met by coal, with is not only extremely damaging for the environment but inefficient and unsustainable. There's a mine disaster every week in China.
Moreover, petroleum products contribute more than just energy to China's economy, but also transportation and plastics etc..
Thus it makes a lot of sense for China to improve ties with Opec.
Read between the lines, however, and a couple of things come to light. China's recent restatement of its economic figures for example - is it mere co-incidence or was the CCP showing its hand before entering the talks?
And finally the obvious point that most of Opec's members are Islamic nations. They have probably never been more hostile to the US than now; not only has the Iraq invasion angered the general populace but the seeming positive moves towards democracy may well have unnerved the current generation of sheikhs and other unelected despots that pull the Opec strings.
Everyone's unhappy with the West. So time to make new friends, perhaps.
So there's no better time for China to be getting in there. The middle eastern and central Asian oil-producing nations that lie between Europe and East Asia are the new battlegrounds of the new cold war. BBC report reprinted below.
Continue reading "Opec on the Cheek from the PRC" »
 Not as I do. George Bush on his visit to Asia today urged China to look to Taiwan as a model of, among other things, openness and human rights. Under the current climate, however, this is only likely to send the Chinese sniggering behind their hands.
As George was exhorting, it emerged that there's even more torture and abuse going on than we were aware of. Not to mention a bit of Willie Pete going around.
The problem with this is not just the fact that the US continues to turn a blind eye to rough stuff in the cells and uses munitions that some might describe as 'chemical'. Not that it should be condoned or encouraged but this kind of stuff goes on in war. War is bad and bad things happen.
The problem is that in order for the US to appear in a position of world leadership, as it would claim to be, and make pronouncements on human rights outside its own jurisdiction it needs to be whiter then white. Events in Iraq simply hand carte blanche to those regimes such as China which really do have institutionalised human rights abuses.
Upon a tip-off from Nevin, I took a look at this video. (Links at Nevin's site, click the pictures - downloads nicely on broadband.)
While there are a few inaccuracies in the voiceover - I assume it's translated from the Italian - the general message of the video holds true. It's simply incredible how few of the lessons of Vietnam have been learned - from the dangers of alienating the local population to the dangers of alienating your own people. Lessons both military and political.
It also makes some allegations which may go some way to explain the fate of a couple of Italian journalists, though this is of course pretty speculative.
Whether or not it is fair to describe napalm as a 'chemical weapon' or a 'Weapon of Mass Destruction' is debatable, but the point is that as weapons go it's a particularly nasty one. Moreover, when the enemy is an elusive and mobile guerrilla force sheltered by the local population, napalm is hardly going to be effective.
 Details on the bombings in Amman, Jordan, are as yet still sketchy, but they seem to be on the scale of 7/7, for example, or any number of daily occurrences in Iraq.
The war on terror does have another dimension, however, as illustrated by the opening paragraphs of this BBC report:
Chinese police have warned that Islamic militants could be planning an attack on luxury hotels in Beijing in the coming week, the US embassy has said.
The authorities pledged to investigate the threat and take appropriate action, the embassy said in a statement.
The warning comes 10 days before US President George Bush visits Beijing.
China is often accused of exaggerating the threat of Islamic militancy to justify its crackdown on groups such as its Uighur minority.
It would appear that the 'War on Terror' can be manipulated in a number of ways, depending on one's point of view. Terrorism is certainly unpredictable, as tonight's attacks demonstrate, and the targets as often as not are Westerners.
But the other side of the story takes us to that old cliché: "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". It's the same situation in Russia, with Putin's crackdown on Chechen activities (these, it must be acknowledged, are far more visible and brutal than those of the Uyghurs). At the end of the day, however, the very people the West encourages to seek 'freedom' are often the very same as those it condemns.
 In the Christian calendar, yesterday was Hallow'een, the night the spirits of the dead cross the border between the afterlife and this world. Today was Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights. But people in Delhi were subdued, says BBC News. No wonder - on Saturday bombers killed 62 people.
Not yet proven, but pretty likely, is that the culprits were Kashmiri separatists, trying to scupper the brokerage of a temporary peace deal between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute is about the border between the area controlled by Pakistan and the area controlled by India. Simple enough stuff, but what actually is a border?
Continue reading "Borders, Borders, Everywhere" »
Switch on the TV or open a newspaper or magazine and what you see or read are events and themes in isolation. Each exists by itself: you watch a programme or read an article and that's it. Nothing more. Over.
 Surf the Internet, on the other hand, and everything is interconnected, part of the overarching phenomenon known as the World Wide Web. And that is a lot more like real life. Things don't happen on their own. They happen for a reason, often a multitude of reasons and they are driven by a host of differing influences.
War, the nineteenth century strategist Karl von Clausewitz once wrote, is a continuation of politics by other means. It is a bold statement of the most simple but the most profound and important of connections. This blog is about war and politics, but more specifically about the inextricable links and parallels between the events we see unfold every day. The things that the papers don't always pick up on, or that the networks don't have time to run.
So, in the true pre-commercial spirit of the Internet, what I aim to write here is not conventional journalism: but maybe journalism by other means.
You can read more about the idea behind this blog on the about page. In summary, my interests are in the global politics that lead to the breakdown of diplomacy and the advent of war, plus the technology and operations of war itself.
And since the events that we know of occur only on this one planet, I also aim to examine the broader contexts of environmental issues - since the depletion of our natural resources and environment are perhaps the biggest single threat that 'the international community' - if such a thing exists - will have to face. If only they would see it.
My personal background is in defence and technology journalism, but in a larger sense I consider myself not a subject of the country I live in but a citizen of the world. In many ways, I am a product of globalisation - born to an Asian father in North America, yet raised in Britain as a European.
I have two passports, Canadian and British, I am entitled to a special 'Person of Indian Origin' permit and for the last couple of years I lived in a country and among a culture quite alien to my own, China. Other than my interests and my general journalistic skills, these are my only qualifications - but that's the beauty of blogging. You don't need to be an expert, just an observer.
My areas of interest are thus these three continents - North America, Europe and Asia - and the relations between them. South America and Africa are not specifically covered (other than under the 'Unrepresented' and perhaps the 'Travel and Miscellany' categories), not because they are unimportant, but in order to keep some kind of focus.
In brief then, I aim to examine the news and events of the day in context, viewing them not in isolation but paying attention to the wheels within wheels that turn to drive the world we live in. As the motto reads, I study war and peace that my sons may study mathematics and philosophy. As a private individual I acknowledge that I don't stand a chance of changing the world, but it's my generation that's got to at least start.
Many thanks for reading, and welcome again to the weblog.
|
|
