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Change, the New Order and Capitalism with a Chinese Face
OK, so this blog is closed... but I couldn't resist the temptation to scribble down some predictions about international relations in the year ahead.
First, a debrief on 2008. Last year's predictions were - predictably - mixed. I was right that the Beijing Olympics would be surrounded by controversy - Tibet and Uyghur violence did occur - but they weren't the failure I envisaged. And I was dead wrong about Russia, what with the attack on Georgia and all.
However, predicting a failed ratification for the Lisbon treaty was dead on, and Musharraf bowed out too.
Turning to 2009, the underlying theme has to be the recession. This colours everything, as does the new POTUS, Barack Obama.
Unfortunately for Obama, who will certainly enjoy a protracted honeymoon period, expectations are so high that failure is inevitable. A third intifada is on its way after the December shoot-out in Gaza, and since its the Palestine-Israel conflict that lies at the heart of all the Middle East's woes instability will be high.
This will affect Western policy in Afghanistan too - as political capital dwindles, troubles in that part of the world will increase. I have repeatedly said that Pakistan will eventually implode and have been wrong every time. Civil society is too strong. But eventually the government will collapse, which will lead to renewed tensions with India and Afghanistan and a resurgence of Islamism on the borders.
India is relatively protected from the effects of the global recession, but chances are that the people will still give Congress a bloody nose in the forthcoming elections. That means a return for the Hindu nationalist BJP perhaps, or a looser and inherently ineffective coalition including communists and right-wing elements at best. Again, this will contribute to further tensions with Pakistan and China too.
China is not going to enjoy the depression: closures are already occurring, and renewed protectionism in the West will not help exports. The more jobless and disenfranchised people there are, the less authority the CCP will have. The Party is not going to break yet, but its slide into the abyss may well begin. With a series of government collapses post-Koizumi and a nasty recession, Japan, meanwhile, could also take a turn to nationalism. Not a good combination.
And as Kosovo comes under EU control, it will be a turning point for both 'old' and 'new' Europe. Could Britain be forced to join the Euro? Unlikely, but not unthinkable - just as there's always a chance someone could get kicked out (Greece?). Russia, meanwhile, will take advantage of this year's weakish presidencies (Czech Republic and Sweden) to tighten the screws on the pipelines.
Under these conditions, the role of the UN is going to come under scrutiny. The ICC's ability to try Omar Bashir of Sudan will be the focus of attention, while all eyes will be on the viability of UN peacekeeping in Africa.
Overall, 2009 will be uneventful, something of a holding period setting the scene for the next decade.
I won't publish the entire 2009 deathlist (predicted deaths of famous people), but at least one symbolic leader will kick the bucket in 2009. Maggie Thatcher? Mikhail 'Vuitton' Gorbachev? Or even Mr. Obama? We shall see.
Sorry Brazil, in this analysis the 'big four' are the contender states, Eurasian military-economic powers Russia, India and China plus the rival-cum-ally, the US.
Interesting that coinciding with a Condi trip to Beijing comes a possible US military deal with New Delhi that might undermine Russia's virtual monopoly over its defence equipment. Russia continues to supply China, of course, no big.
If India were to become dependent on the US both for nuclear power, Gulf-related energy security and military hardware, that truly would seal it into Washington's orbit as anti-American social forces in Pakistan begin to spin away and thus towards China instead.
Also interesting to note that China's defence budget took another leap last year, as revealed in the annual Pentagon estimate. Part of the 18% hike is probably down to rising oil and food prices, but there can be no doubt that China is building up its capability while hardly making a major contribution to UN peacekeeping (as does India).
All things being considered, it looks like simple geopolitics to me.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Gates' talking points in Delhi related primarily to defense trade. India's procurement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft in a deal estimated at $10 billion - and possibly, as high as $ 16 billion - was number one priority for him and for the American defense contractors accompanying him. The principal bidders include Lockheed Martin's F-16 and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet.
The importance of the deal is not only commercial, but that the new generation aircraft will be in use with the Indian Air Force for the next 40-year period and, therefore, clinching the deal becomes absolutely vital for the US if it is to aim at "inter-operability" with India. Gates knows it is the sort of deal that will ensure US-India military-to-military cooperation becomes irreversible and pin India down as the US's strategic ally in the region...
Gates expressed satisfaction over the entry that the US has made in the Indian market, which is traditionally dominated by Russia. He said, "We have tried for some years now to get a seat at the table, and we're finally there." Washington is determined to throw Russia out of the Indian defense market in the coming years. The assertiveness of the US sales pitch is evident from the remark by a US official in Gates's entourage, "When you go into joint production [and] cooperative development [with the US], you're getting not only the best product in the world, but you have the best support system, the best maintenance package over the life of the product. You also have companies that operate with integrity, which is different than what India has seen with other partners in the world. We're very transparent."
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
 Shock and awe! Call out the National Guard and move to DefCon 3!
Come on, what did they expect? Everyone knows that the biggest show on earth is also its biggest political platform. Think of the Mexico 1968 Black Power salute, the 1972 Munich atrocity, the 1976 apartheid boycotts at Montreal, the Cold War tit-for-tat spat in the 1980s and the 1996 Atlanta bombings - not to mention Hitler's notorious Berlin 1936. Am I saying anything new?
It should be of no surprise to the Chinese, therefore, that there is going to be a political element. Indeed, they are the ones who are politicizing Beijing 2008 the most.
By presenting it as the showcase event of the 'peaceful rise' of China and the return of the Chinese civilisation to the centre of world affairs, they themselves are couching it in the language of politics. By building several hugely expensive architectural masterpieces, they are deliberately sending a message about their renewed capabilities. And if China wins the biggest haul of gold medals, it will see it not merely as a sporting triumph but as a reification of national superiority.
So of course the games are political: the very last to see it as a mere athletic event are the Chinese themselves. Why pretend the two are separated?
Protests over Beijing games 'will grow' | World news | The Guardian
Qiao Mu, the director of international communication studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University, said the government could no longer ignore foreign opinion.
"China needs big events like the Olympics to prove itself as a powerful nation," he said. "In Mao's days, the government did not need to care about the foreign media because they were easily able to ban information easily and live in the fantasy they created for themselves. But now that we live in an age of globalised information, the government must pay more attention to outside opinion."
Steven Spielberg's decision to withdraw from involvement in Beijing 2008 is laudable (I suspect premeditated from the moment he first signed up), yet misguided. Of all the things he could have chosen to remark upon, choosing Darfur merely gives Beijing ammunition against him as quoted below.
If anything, it is counterproductive. Those who called for Spielberg's 2005 film Memoirs of a Geisha to be banned in China are probably rubbing their hands with glee.
By now the Chinese media corps will busily be drafting editorials brimming with righteous indignation. How dare he meddle in our internal affairs! Had Spielberg commented on human rights, democracy, censorship, political prisoners, corruption, pollution, trade practices, Xinjiang or Tibet, on the other hand, the presses would be silent.
China calls Spielberg's resignation from Olympic role 'unfair' | World news | guardian.co.uk
Hollywood stars have been at the forefront of an international campaign linking China to violence in the Darfur region of Sudan, saying that money and weapons from Beijing have helped fuel a conflict which has claimed 200,000 lives and forced 2.5 million people from their homes.
But the Chinese embassy in Washington said attempts to connect Darfur with the Beijing games goes against the Olympic spirit. "As the Darfur issue is neither an internal issue of China, nor is it caused by China, it is completely unreasonable, irresponsible and unfair for certain organisations and individuals to link the two as one," it said in a statement.
Suppose that would make it the IPC. Need to source this article, but it's potentially significant. All of course rests on the outcome of Pakistan's election on 18 February.
It comes against the backdrop of an Indian admiral's concerns about Gwadar and its "serious strategic implications for India".
China ready to join gas pipeline project if India stays away - International Business-News-The Economic Times
ISLAMABAD: China is ready to join Pakistan and Iran to build a pipeline to transport Iranian gas if India does not participate in the project, the media reported on Monday.
Pakistan plans to import 2.2 billion cubic feet of gas a day from Iran through the pipeline and has said it is willing to consume an additional 1.05 billion cubic feet of gas if India does not join the project.
China has told Pakistan that it is interested in importing the additional gas if India does not join the project, sources. The sources also said Iran has no objection to exporting gas to China.
Pakistan and Iran have finalised a gas purchase agreement. However, Pakistan and India have been unable to narrow their differences over the transit fee to be charged by Islamabad for the Iranian gas.
Reports from India have suggested that it will hold discussions with Pakistan on the pipeline once a new government is formed in the country after the February 18 general election.
In case China joins the project, the pipeline might pass through Gilgit in Pakistan's Northern Area, the sources said. Pakistan has already approved a project in the same area to widen the Karakoram Highway that links it to China.
Pakistan also plans to extend a railway track to China to connect the neighbouring country to the Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast. Chinese experts will visit Pakistan to finalise the route of the pipeline if Beijing joins the project, the sources said.
Iran and Pakistan might sign the gas purchase agreement on February 24, the sources said.
 It's looking increasingly like we have just one week to go before the big events of 2008 really begin. Many of the papers are giving 17 February as the date for Kosovo to declare independence, and it already appears that there's a behind-the-scenes plan.
Under the current Cold War climate, that's really not a good idea. Deliberately orchestrating recognition of Kosovo before the UNSC can meet - and Russia veto - is going to be seen as a big provocation in Moscow. That's not good. We've already got guys getting poisoned with polonium, energy cut-offs and Tupolevs making incursions into sovereign airspace... all getting a bit Tom Clancy for my liking.
What's worse, possibly Beijing will object too. Kosovo's recognition by the US and EU nations may set a precedent for Taiwan, which is set to hold its own referendum on a UN bid in March. If Kosovo can secede and be recognised, Taipei will say, then why can't we? Thus the schism in the UNSC will widen further, undoing much of the good work that's been done in recent years.
Though the prospects of Serbian and Russian tanks rolling in are remote, what may occur could be a re-run of Israel's declaration of independence back in 1948. Just as the Palestinians took up arms and ended up a displaced people, so too could the 200,000-odd Kosovar Serbians. Just as the Arab countries failed to recognise Israel, so too may a number of black sheep within the 'international system'.
An insidious problem that could last for decades may be in the offing. And who's going to manage it? The EU - which can't even come up with a unanimous position on Kosovan independence, let alone deploy a peacekeeping force that can cope when things go bad. Yes, they've been handling Bosnia, but this may heat up.
The biggest contradiction in the UN charter is its respect for both self-determination and sovereignty. If things kick off this month, then there's going to be some grave implications. Better that the situation was managed differently - it's still not too late for compromise.
Serbs warn of Kosovo clash | World news | The Observer
Critics of the plan to declare independence, which follows the failure of Serbia and the Kosovo-Albania leaders to negotiate terms for separation, have already warned of the risk that Kosovo's Serbian population, concentrated in northern Mitrovica, would respond by declaring their own independence, setting the stage for violent confrontation.
The renewed Serbian warning comes as Kosovo's leaders struggled to calm rising 'independence fever', fearful that wild celebrations from the ethnic Albanian majority could spark violent clashes with scared and furious Serbs.
Kosovo is expected to proclaim itself the world's newest state next Sunday or Monday, allowing European Union foreign ministers meeting on Monday to give the green light to a 2,000-strong mission to oversee the running of the ethnically divided region.
While Washington and most EU members will quickly welcome independent Kosovo into the world, Tadic's grim predictions of spiralling instability in the Balkans, still scarred by a bloody decade that ended with Nato bombing Serb troops out of Kosovo in 1999, will gain credence if the region's long-awaited independence celebrations give way to ethnic violence.
Kosovo's parliament is expected to meet next weekend and Hashim Thaci, the former separatist rebel who is now Kosovo's Prime Minister, or President Fatmir Sejdiu is likely to announce independence on Sunday or Monday morning, preventing Russia from immediately responding through the Security Council, six hours behind in New York.
By the time Russia can muster an emergency meeting of the council, the US and major EU nations will have drawn its diplomatic sting by recognising the sovereignty of Kosovo's two million citizens. 'We have the confirmation from some 100 states which say they are ready to recognise Kosovo's independence immediately after we declare it,' Thaci insisted last week after Serbia said that it expected a declaration on 17 February.
With the Beijing Olympics very much round the corner, there's been a real slew of articles recently, reflecting a renewed and critical interest into what's really going on in China.
While the article quoted below really adds little new to the debate (see, for example, my own take on this from some years back) it does provide an insight into the situation: useful for the majority of people who don't yet understand what the conditions are in China.
Also pleasing to see a couple of intelligent opinion-makers such as Jeremy Goldkorn and Isaac Mao (both of whom I knew vaguely during my Living in China days) given a voice.
Behind the Great Firewall | Technology | The Guardian
Hong Bo, who blogs under the name Keso, says the opportunity to speak out online is cherished by a growing band of bloggers and BBS users.
"The Chinese internet has a distinctive character. Its one of the most strictly controlled in the world, but netizens' behaviour still confounds the government's expectations. They ban websites and delete posts, but they haven't got everything under control."
Isaac Mao, a pioneer blogger and researcher, says the number of users is less important than the quality of their online experience, where he says there is a big gap with the United States.
His organisation encourages netizens to connect their real and their virtual lives through blogs and discussions of social issues, including censorship.
"Rulers believe they can build a better system and get others to follow. But even though they want to change the internet, it is part of a globalised world and nobody can afford to build an isolated system.
"I believe the internet will change China more than China changes the internet."
 Next Thursday, 7 February, sees the beginning of the Chinese Year of the Rat, the first in the Chinese Zodiac cycle. No, this isn't some cod astrological analysis: but it does put a little bit of mystical context in. Just look at all the international factors that are just about to converge and you'll see what I mean.
Basically, the next weeks and months could see some rather serious developments in the global political picture.
Kosovo might soon be declaring independence, and despite dissent it looks like most of the international community is going to recognise it. What few realise is that, for Serbia, the secession of Kosovo would be a disaster of monumental proportions. And they're holding an election this weekend in which a hard-right president could be selected.
Already locking horns with the UK, Russia is probably going to stand by Serbia - which means increasing antagonism with the rest of Europe. I can certainly foresee the gas spigot getting turned off for a couple of days, which given the present frigid economic (let alone meteorological) climate could have a severe impact.
Speaking of elections, it's Super Tuesday this week, another moment that's going to define the course of things to come. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney or John McCain: the field of four will probably narrow down to two candidates for the top job in the world.
Not long after that, Monday 18 February is finally going to see elections in Pakistan. Whether rigged or not, there will inevitably be implications for regional stability.
Furthermore, set that against the context of Afghanistan. President Karzai has just shot his nation in the foot by turning away one of Britain's most competent statesmen, Lord Ashdown, as a potential UN envoy.
Moreover, NATO is lumbering towards a crisis with Germany refusing to pull its weight and Canada getting very cold feet in the face of what looks like sheer petulance from its allies. Thus, the NATO conference set for next week could well define the future of the mission, and general stability in Afghanistan. Condi is already jetting in do do her firewoman act.
We don't want to see either Pakistan or Afghanistan go down; both of them falling apart at the same time would be disastrous.
And finally, look at China.
Anyone who's queued for rail tickets at Spring Festival - even in a good year - will tell you what a nightmare it is. This year has seen the worst weather in half a century and chances are that the world's largest internal migration is not going to go ahead as planned. That means some unhappy chappies down Chinatown.
Add to that the very real danger of a food crisis - a failed crop could tip China over the edge - compounded by the general economic malaise and you have a recipe for civil unrest in Olympic year.
And finally, add to that a touch of spice in the form of an upcoming referendum in Taiwan (set for 22 March) and you have a fiery plate of noodles indeed.
In summary, there are various crises impending in Eastern Europe, South Asia and East Asia. The year 2008 could well be going for a bag of rats.
"Yankee go home, but take me with you!" How long is that going to last? This writer seems to believe tha the European and Chinese ways are catching on more now than the American way. I'm slightly sceptical as to the former, but there's certainly an element of truth in it.
On the other hand, the strength of America's style of democracy - I say 'style' since it's not an absolute democracy as one gets from proportional representation methods - does mean that we will have regime change in a year. It's the Bush administration that has sown alienation against the US, not America per se. It can still be turned around, though of course the trend is a general one.
Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
But Europe lacks a coherent foreign policy, even now, and the Treaty of Lisbon probably won't alleviate that fundamental weakness by 2016. Then again, as pointed out, the Euro is now the real tool of Brussels foreign policy.
As for Beijing: "Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example." That's a Warsaw Pact in-the-making if ever I saw one.
Note also the logical follow-on from my 2012 scenario and big picture theory of simultaneous bipolar-multipolarity, plus the importance of Gwadar.
United States - International Diplomacy - Economic Trends - World Economy - Politics - New York Times
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.
The author Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation (sounds disturbingly like PNAC to me, but will let that one go. The essay is adapted from his book, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, to be published by Random House in March. Gonna add it to my Amazon wish list, I think.
Pak's new port has strategic implications for India: Navy chief-India-The Times of India
The Gwadar port being built by Pakistan with Chinese assistance in its Baluchistan coast has "serious strategic implications for India", Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta has said.
"Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being bulit in Baluchistan coast, would enable Pakistan take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers," he said delivering T S Narayanaswamy Memorial lecture in Chennai on Monday night.
A short but insightful look at China's rural economy. It's easy to be blinded by the figures on China's booming export economy, but this correspondent notes that with the changing demography of China the mix of different crops is changing. Pork consumption is on the rise, requiring more grain for fodder: likewise, vegetables are replacing wheat and other staples.
There's a best case and a worst case scenario to this.
In the best case, China's demand for food will fuel agricultural growth around the world as it increasingly turns to imports: this in turn could balance the overall trade deficit and help other countries develop. A rising tide lifts all boats.
On the other hand, accelerating prices in China and the consequent dangers of economically-induced famine comme Amartya Sen could be the final triggers for mass social unrest among the disenfranchised poor. All it would take would be an ecological disaster (perhaps influenced by unchecked environmental degradation) and China would implode just as it has done from time to time over the centuries.
BBC NEWS | Programmes | From Our Own Correspondent | China's farms struggle to meet growing demand
Already, the country that discovered the soya bean has to import most of its needs.
And other crops will follow.
The days of food self-sufficiency in China are numbered.
So, like the rest of us, China will turn to Australia, Africa and South America to fill its belly.
It is small wonder that food prices are climbing everywhere, not just here in China.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
Just to prove I'm not the only doommonger around here (though my prediction is 2012, Beijing isn't going to scupper the Olympics on any account), Canada's Globe and Mail looks forward to some tense moments in 2008.
It's unlikely, however, that the Taiwanese people are going to vote for independence in a referendum.That's been tried before, and it was a close run thing, but the electorate are not crazy. They know that such a decision is likely to visit a world of hurt upon them.
On the other hand, the scenario explored in the article does carry some weight. The elections and referenda will, if nothing else, add to existing animosity, and a small incident like an air-to-air collision or an accidental firing of missiles could escalate horribly.
globeandmail.com: How a miscalculation could spell mayhem in Taiwan
Tensions have been high for years, but 2008 could be the most dangerous year of all. It is filled with potential trigger points, including two Taiwanese elections, a controversial referendum, the final days of Mr. Chen's presidency and the Summer Olympics.
This explosive combination of political events will begin on Jan. 12 with a legislative election in Taiwan, followed by a presidential election on March 22. The elections will be accompanied by Mr. Chen's latest gambit: a referendum on whether Taiwan should apply for membership in the United Nations under the name Taiwan rather than its official name, the Republic of China.
Tucked away in the news-in-briefs, but possible a very significant deal if it can go ahead. Anything that can get a) Japan and China to cooperate and b) help solve the pollution issue has to be very positive indeed.
Japan, China to set up environmental fund - report - Forbes.com
Japan plans to propose a joint fund worth a total of 200 billion yen with China to help Beijing step up environmental protection efforts, a newspaper said Monday.
The government and ruling parties were working out the details, with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda intending to propose the plan during his visit to China starting Thursday, the Nikkei business daily said.
With Pakistan so desperate for the Chinese Yuan, could it be that Musharraf's recent consolidation of his power is in answer to Chinese demands for security and stability? Or would that be "interference in its internal affairs"?
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
The countries are seeking to triple bilateral trade to US$15 billion in the next five years from $4.2 billion in 2006 under a free-trade agreement signed just over 12 months ago. They recently signed agreements worth around $300 million under which Pakistani products would be exported to China, involving 15 Pakistani companies and covering goods such as cotton, chrome ore, leather and rapeseed meal.
The PCIC, established in July with paid-up capital of 4.25 billion rupees ($69 million) with the government in Islamabad a direct shareholder, will help Pakistan to secure Chinese investment in various sectors and help Pakistani exporters target openings in China, according to officials. The company will perform investment banking business on a commercial basis.
Asia Times reports on the $2bn China-Iran Yadaravan oil deal in the wake of the NIE estimate, and analyses the broader implications.
With China's opinion being that the US is now waking up to Iran as a regional power, it seems that India has been put in an awkward position - having already lost out on its dealings with Tehran in order to appease Washington.
Meanwhile, China has seized a massive mining deal in Afghanistan despite all India's efforts in the country (to the chagrin of pakistan). It would appear that New Delhi has made some geopolitical miscalculations.
...by the beginning of June, Chinese regional experts had already assessed, "Iran, with no geopolitical competitors, has become the 'boss' within the Persian Gulf region. Since the US has fallen into the Iraqi quagmire, Iran concludes that the United States dare not use force against Iran. Therefore, it maintains strong strategic determination and refuses to make concessions on the nuclear issue.
"This favorable environment, coupled with a strategic resolve, has earned Iran a certain status of equilibrium with the United States in the contest within the Persian Gulf region. It is this balance of power that has forced the United States to sit down and talk with Iran. Iran, hence, has won the battle for survival and the status of a regional power."
The Guardian picks up and spins a recent pronouncement by Frederick Kagan of AEI. The operative paragraph and conclusion are below, and deserve a bit of picking apart.
A complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum? Highly unlikely. Kagan may say he is not "fear-mongering", but this statement is over the top. Whatever its problems, the moderate mainstream in Pakistan's civil society and the military is more than powerful enough to prevent that eventuality.
There again, it did happen in Iran, but circumstances now are not the same. It is correct, therefore, to make contingency plans, but not to push forward what is not yet an inevitable self-fulfilling prophecy.
A struggle within the Pakistani military? Also not likely. Undoubtedly there remain radicals in the ISI, but if nothing else Musharraf has probably purged the army of the extremist tendencies seen under General Zia, who was himself somewhat discredited by the end of his rule.
However, there is a distinct possibility of Islamabad losing control of the outer regions - some might say it has already done so. This does have implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and thus must be taken seriously.
The basic point is that Pakistan needs well-planned aid and support if its WMD are not to fall into the wrong hands. It's the kind of thinking that should have been deployed prior to the Iraq invasion, which after all was about the same thing - preventing access of the wrong people to WMD.
Finally, two things Kagan fails to mention are the China and India factors. He treats the subject as if it's entirely a US issue, which it is not. The two Asian powers have deep-set interests too, and must be part of the solution rather than allowed to become part of the problem.
Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem - New York Times
The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism...
The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.
Some analysis of largely-unreported recent PLAN exercises and the connection with the Kitty Hawk incident, in which a USN CVBG was turned away from a scheduled visit to Hong Kong.
The author notes the influence of certain Taiwan-orientated officers within the governing set-up, and also some possible lack of co-ordination between the PLA and the civilian executive, for example the ministry of foreign affairs.
His main point, however, is that China is tentatively trying to demonstrate its power projection capability. Notable that also this week there was a friendly naval visit to Japan, intended to 'reassure' the Japanese. AP notes the irony of both the US and Chinese vessels being in port at the same time but under different circumstances.
Also in context was the Dalai Lama's masterstroke pronouncement on his succession. In a sense, he has to ensure that the next Dalai Lama doesn't suffer the fate of the hapless young Panchen Lama, who through no fault of his own remains missing and probably isn't enjoying the best of times.
But also what better way to highlight Beijing's lack of democratic credentials to the international community than by demonstrating your own willingness to shed the feudalism you've been accused of in favour of a modern referendum? Incredibly, Beijing had the cheek to criticise him for rejecting religious traditions. As if razing hundreds of monasteries to the ground during the Cultural Revolution was an act of respect.
Finally, China's meeting with the EU illustrated the other side of China's power projection through economic means. All in all, this week has been quite significant in China's positioning of itself on the world stage.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
The two most powerful bodies in the polity—the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and the CMC—are filled with cadres and generals with long-standing expertise on Taiwan. Three PSC members have served as either governor or party secretary of Fujian, the “frontline province” just opposite Taiwan. They are Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Jia Qinglin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection He Guoqiang, and Fifth-Generation rising star Xi Jinping, the front-ranked secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat. The CMC is replete with Taiwan Strait specialists. This include Defense Minister designate General Liang Guanglie, a veteran commander of war games off the Taiwan coast; the newly promoted Chief of the General Staff, General Chen Bingde, a former commander of the Nanjing Military Region; Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang, who was once based in Fujian; and Naval Commander Admiral Wu Shengli, a former vice-chief of the East Sea Fleet. Since becoming CMC chief in late 2004, Hu has promoted a large number of alumni of the Nanjing Military Region, which has “jurisdiction” over the Strait.
On a larger-scale, last week’s provocative exercises tally with the overall pattern of power projection that began early this year with the destruction of an old weather satellite by state-of-the-art PLA missiles. The feat, which apparently signaled Beijing’s readiness to join the militarization of space, was followed by the country’s successful effort late last month to put a Chinese-made satellite into the moon’s orbit. Moreover, the PLA has for the past year deviated from its past practice of keeping newly developed weapons under wraps. Semi-official military websites regularly run stories and pictures that showcase the prototypes or just-completed versions of soon-to-be-deployed hardware ranging from the Jin-class submarine—which is capable of carrying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles—to the nation’s first aircraft carrier.
Apart from telling Taiwan independence forces—and their sympathizers in the United States and Japan—that Beijing has the wherewithal to maintain national unity, Beijing is flexing its military muscle in a fashion befitting an emerging quasi-superpower. Referring to the 17th Congress, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) strategist Hong Yuan pointed out that “the [defense] concerns of the new leadership and the force projection of China’s military have gone way beyond the Taiwan Strait.” Hong sees the coming five years as “a period of rapid development in areas ranging from the PLA’s establishment, institutions and hardware to the extent and means of force projection” (Wen Wei Po, October 19).
Neat summary of Iran's political and commercial relationships with other nascent Asian powers. Includes some details on the IPI and Chinese economic influence.
PINR - Iran Looks for Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships
On the Asian continent, the Iranian strategic realignment seems to rely on organizational and bilateral cooperation, extending beyond existing relations with other "rogue states" such as North Korea. On the contrary, Iran aims at reaching out to U.S. allies or "friendly" countries, such as India and Pakistan, as well as to emerging global powers, especially to China.
There had to be one, and note how this author neatly ties up all the conflicting elements in the current drama: internal opposition to Musharraf; the Balochistan rebellion; Afghanistan, America and the GWOT; China and Gwadar; India and Kashmir.
The essence of the article is that the current situation is all the result of an American plan to instigate regime change in Pakistan to advance its own interests. Of course much of the report is to be roundly dismissed. I particularly enjoyed this paragraph (I used to work at Jane's):
This was the perfect timing for the launch of Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, a book authored by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, a columnist for a Pakistani English-language paper and a correspondent for ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’, a private intelligence service founded by experts close to the British intelligence.
But the point is that the Pakistan situation is not clear-cut in that all Pakistanis favour democracy and Benazir Bhutto, as the Western powers would have us believe. There are still deep veins of paranoia at work, and it's these that enable the continuing dominance of the military and security forces.
Ahmed Quraishi.com
“We have indications of Indian involvement with anti-state elements in Pakistan,” declared the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office in a regular briefing in October. The statement was terse and direct and the spokesman, Ms. Tasnim Aslam, quickly moved on to other issues.
This is how a Pakistani official explained Ms. Aslam’s statement: “What she was really saying is this: We know what the Indians are doing. They’ve sold the Americans on the idea that [the Indians] are an authority on Pakistan and can be helpful in Afghanistan. The Americans have bought the idea and are in on the plan, giving the Indians a free hand in Afghanistan. What the Americans don’t know is that we, too, know the Indians very well. Better still, we know Afghanistan very well. You can’t beat us at our own game.”
Mr. Bugti’s armed rebellion coincided with the Gwadar project entering its final stages. No coincidence here. Mr. Bugti’s real job was to scare the Chinese away and scuttle Chinese President Hu Jintao’s planned visit to Gwadar a few months later to formally launch the port city.
Gwadar is the pinnacle of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. It’s a modern port city that is supposed to link Central Asia, western China, and Pakistan with markets in Mideast and Africa. It’s supposed to have roads stretching all the way to China. It’s no coincidence either that China has also earmarked millions of dollars to renovate the Karakoram Highway linking northern Pakistan to western China.
One to save and read for later, and not a lot of new int. But this (conservative) report does highlight the increasing threat of Chinese economic intelligence gathering, cyber warfare ("weapons of mass annoyance") and its general commitment to asymmetric capability-building:
China’s search for asymmetric capabilities to leverage against U.S. vulnerabilities represents a serious form of irregular warfare preparation. China is convinced that, financially and technologically, it cannot defeat the United States in a traditional force-on-force match up. However, as Chairman of the Defense Science Board Dr. William Schneider highlighted, if it can acquire niche weapons systems that are relatively inexpensive and that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, it stands a chance of deterring or defeating the United States in a limited engagement. This strategy explains China’s emphasis on acquiring sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, mines, and information and electronic warfare capabilities.
Quite an unusual remark on p10 regarding China's growing submarine capability: with lots of Kilo-class coming on line, plus several indigenous Shang-class SSNs due for launch in 2008 and rumours of some AIP subs on the build too, the USN should even look at the PLAN as a partner in regional naval security.
On the other hand, an upgraded DF-21 ballistic missile with re-entry capability could make the littoral too dangerous for US CVBGs to inhabit.
Full PDF report downloadable here.
 Michael Klare, author of Blood and Oil, was in Amsterdam today to talk on his conception of the impending energy crisis. While he was a good speaker, seeing him in person did begin to reveal some of the flaws in his arguments.
The lecture opened with a bold set of statements: "No government is willing to solve the energy problem by seeking alternative energies... and I have zero confidence that any will try to increase production." Having tantalised us with this and promises of an apocalyptic vision of the future, Klare then utterly failed to expand.
Fortunately, the organisers allowed one student in the audience to ask a question (the other debating time was reserved for the usual blathering incoherence of rival academics failing to make their points or even ask questions) and he did ask what I would have done. The question was "why?"; Klare's answer was that "dysfunctional governments" were at fault, "governments that piss away billions on Iraq yet invest little on finding solutions".
That seems far too easy a way to excuse the actions of the Bush regime, though he did have a good point on China's failure to deal with the crisis. Though the CCP itself is aware of the trouble we're in, grass roots-level corruption means that any efficiency measures are swept under the carpet in favour of improving growth figures.
Yet Klare's overall take on the US-China contest over energy was as simplistic as the rest. It was, he said, a situation analogous to the Cold War, in which both powers supply arms to their energy-supplying clients in a competition for influence.
He did later remark that Beijing's Africa policy also involves economic and infrastructural aid - something that Africans were rightly suspicious of - but did not elaborate further. But his aim was to reinforce his point that the recent creation of America's Africa Command (Africom) was the latest stage in a continuing Kennedy doctrine, building on previous policy in the Persian Gulf. The SCO, moreover, was a front for China to extend its military supply network to Central Asia.
All of that may be true, but overlooks the nuances of an evolving bipolar US-China situation that is far more than a simple military confrontation.
To be fair, Klare did have some good ideas about 'the resource curse' whereby the wealth in countries like Nigeria falls into the hands of those who control the state, thus negating democratic urges in the governing classes. (One could say the same for Burma). And his analogy with the Balkans of 1914 was apt - violent internal social forces could intersect with external geopolitical motives to produce an explosive mixture.
Also, an interesting theory from an otherwise egomaniacal second speaker came to light, in that $100 oil punished the PRC as much as anyone else, and could be a ploy in order to bring down the RMB or lessen China's export deficit. She also highlighted that fact that Klare didn't even mention Europe, though that merely proved his point that Europe's influence is next to negligible.
But overall, Klare was a little disappointing. He was right to note that control of chokepoints such as Hormuz give militarily powerful states great leverage, but his frame of reference was still bound by conventional military thinking.
The reality is that inducing energy scarcity, just like terrorism and WMD, is an asymmetric method of power projection that doesn't necessarily involve military firepower. Having a big technologically-advanced navy isn't the be-all and end-all any more. That's what makes the problems so complicated and so intertwined.
This bears out exactly what I said in my thesis. Guess I'm not that stupid after all. Perhaps under pressure from the US, India has already lost out to China with regard to Burmese energy: a pattern is emerging.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Iran, Pakistan dump India on pipeline
Last week, Iran's deputy minister in charge of the pipeline, Hojatollah Ganimifard, was quoted by the Iranian Oil Ministry's news service Shana as saying, "The content of the peace pipeline contract has been finalized and all the points prepared by the two sides' legal experts have been re-read and agreed by the two sides [Iran and Pakistan]." He said the two sides would ink the contract in December "without a third partner".
And this week, Mokhtar Ahmad, advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, was quoted as saying, "As we expected, the text of the peace pipeline has been made ready for the signing by the two states' heads." Pakistan said that any excess gas that would have been destined for India could be transferred to China.
Exactly as I suggested in my thesis, Indian intransigence over the IPI may well be opening the door to China. Moreover, it's more than likely that the current state of emergency in Pakistan will wipe out the IPI deal once and for all. What the article doesn't make explicit, however, is exactly how Iranian gas would transit from Gwadar to China other than by rail, which is not the most efficient method. Note also that an Abu Dhabi company is investing $5bn in Gwadar.
Press TV
In a major development, Pakistan and Iran have crossed the last stumbling block in the way of a piped gas deal by agreeing on a pricing formula.
Both sides would review the gas pricing mechanism when there is a change in the co-relation between Japan's LNG and crude oil mix.
A high level delegation, headed by Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Furrukh Qayyum dashed to Tehran to seal the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) with the Iranian authorities.
The technical and legal experts are to hammer out the landmark gas deal and both sides will technically finalize the deal after decisive talks by November 9 (today) in Tehran.
According to the officials, under the new scenario in the wake of India's evasive attitude as Indian experts did not participate in the recently held meeting in Tehran and the ongoing meeting in Islamabad, both Iran and Pakistan have decided to materialize the project.
"We have also asked Iranian authorities that the gas to be imported from Iran can also be exported to China as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) as the western part of that country has a shortage of energy", said the Pakistani official.
If it happens, then the project's economic viability would be enhanced.
The LNG terminal would be constructed in Gwadar and the piped gas would be converted into LNG for export to China through a proposed rail link from Gwadar to Xianjiang Province, China.
The Pakistan Ministry of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying the railways line from Gwadar to China.
The official concluded that Pakistan had also extended an offer to Iran to establish its own terminal in Pakistan.
 Kindly understand the criticality of the situation in Pakistan and around Pakistan. Pakistan is on the verge of destabilisation. Inaction at this moment is suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this country to commit suicide.
It's kind of sad. In many ways, General Musharraf has been one of the best leaders Pakistan has had for generations. He has more or less turned around the economic incompetence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as ensuring that General Zia's Islamist agenda was superseded by a more secular outlook.
That's why Musharraf's actions are so deeply disappointing. Probably it's a case of second-term delusion. It's commonly the fact that once leaders have been around for seven or eight years, surrounded by cronies and sycophants they begin to believe in their own infallibility and omnipotence. It even happened to Thatcher and Blair. That's why the US two-term limit on presidents is such a good idea.
Whatever the case, Musharraf has revealed himself for what he always really was: a tinpot military dictator of a teetering banana republic.
I'm not one to support democracy for democracy's sake, and of course it's easy to criticize from the safety and comfort of the West. Ali Eteraz at Comment is Free makes a fair point:
There is a segment of Pakistan - which includes the judges, lawyers, and journalists - which wants to take to the streets. They have dominated the news over the past year and they want to make a democratic push, with some people casting the lawyers in the same role as the Burmese monks. However, Musharraf's shrewd move of setting forth a limited PCO - targeting only the judiciary and leaving the assemblies intact - has neutralised this segment of the population. The illusion of popular participation is retained, while Musharraf's most vexing political opponents - the judges - get sidelined. If he had gone further and cancelled elections, it would have ignited a firestorm, but in his talk to Pakistani public (discussed below), he assured that he would do no such thing.
Disengaged western audiences, pumped full of the current pro-democracy intoxicants, will almost universally decry Musharraf's behaviour. I decry it too, precisely because I am a disengaged westerner and I have that luxury. However, the story in Pakistan is not so straightforward.
What I am being told by bazari merchants, some young professionals, and some industrialists in Karachi and Lahore is that they merely care for stability, whether it comes in the form of the military, or in the form of democracy. Incidentally, many of them believe that it is Musharraf who is more likely to assure that stability. A couple of people, with middle class businesses, suggested to me that Musharraf should behave more like a dictator; a secular version of the previous Islamist dictator, Zia ul Haq, in order to assure stability for business and economic growth. However, that is a minority view.
Yet that being said, history will probably see the state of emergency as Musharraf's biggest mistake. He has almost certainly grossly underestimated the ill-will against him within Pakistan itself. He has in fact strengthened the case against him, which can only help Bhutto, the lawyers and the militants.
In the greater geopolitical scale of things, Musharraf has also effectively chosen sides in the New Great Game too. America is incensed that their puppet president is turning away from even the veneer of legitimacy. Musharraf also mentioned in his address today his embarrassment at the kidnapping of Chinese workers prior to the Lal Masjid siege. Today's effective re-coup shows that Pakistan is now more likely than ever to align with China, which will not interfere in its internal affairs.
The worst case scenario is accelerated destabilisation as the US withdraws support, Bhutto's supporters rise up and in the ensuing unrest the militants seize their chance. Musharraf is committing rather than preventing the suicide of the state.
Heartthrob cricketer-cum-politician, Imran Khan, had a good point today during an interview with the BBC. Dictators always say they're acting for the good of the country; but really the outcome of suppressing the democratic process is to invite change by violent means instead.
"When you stop all legal and constitutional ways of people challenging [the president], then the only ones who challenge him are people with a gun.That's what happened to the Shah of Iran," said Khan, ominously.
It had to happen. Even China is feeling the pinch of the impending global downturn. It's just put up fuel prices by 10%, and the price of pork rocketed this year too. Inflation is at record highs, 6.5% or so.
It's bizarre to think of what is still very much an authoritarian state dabbling in monetary policy, but globalisation may well be revealing the sting in its tail for Beijing. Part of the reason for the high oil prices is the weak dollar, itself due to an extent to the basically false valuation of the RMB. And it's not China's fault that the price of oil is so high these days, blame that on the US too. But a combination of all these factors is going to hurt Joe Zhao in the pocket, and that's a recipe for unrest.
Let's not forget that the protests in Burma were sparked by a fuel price rise, and inflation was a factor in the Tiananmen uprising too. When the inevitable global economic meltdown occurs any time soon, things are going to get even tougher as Chinese businesses lose orders and customers, forcing wage cuts and unemployment. Expect some very worried faces in the Great Hall of the People - the People may just begin to stir.
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | China's fuel dilemma
The country's booming economy is sucking up crude at record rates and China is now the world's second largest consumer of oil after the US.
Net imports in the first eight months of this year soared by nearly 20%.
Beijing exerts a tight control over the yuan
But rising fuel prices may have created another economic headache.
They are likely to add to soaring inflation which in August hit a 10-year high of 6.5%.
The central bank has already raised interest rates several times this year and another hike is likely before the end of the year.
Many analysts think that the increases are still not enough to curb inflation.
The government worries that inflation could lead to social unrest - rising prices were one of the factors in the run-up to the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
Rapid economic growth has allowed Beijing to dramatically increase defense spending since the late 1990s without compelling Chinese leaders to choose between military modernization and China’s other policy priorities. In the not too distant future, however, the Chinese government is likely to face growing pressure to devote a larger share of government spending to coping with serious domestic problems such as income inequality, the collapse of the healthcare system and environmental degradation, all of which contribute to rising social unrest. As these domestic problems become more pressing, Beijing may have to begin to face some of the budgetary tradeoffs it has previously managed to avoid, even if economic growth continues at a fairly impressive rate. Moreover, in the event of an economic downturn, the challenges of balancing these competing budgetary priorities would become much more acute for China’s leaders. At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that Beijing clearly attaches a great deal of importance to military modernization and that even if the need to deal with mounting domestic problems prevents defense spending from continuing to grow at a double digit pace indefinitely, China will remain dedicated to increasing the PLA’s professionalism and enhancing its operational capabilities.
Wide ranging article covering the history of India's relations with its East Asian neighbours along with current concerns such as energy and security threats such as the Taiwan straits.
PINR - India Rediscovering East Asia
China has been increasing its engagement with South Asia to the quiet consternation of India. China's free trade agreement with Pakistan went into effect in July this year and China has also emerged as Bangladesh's leading trade partner and arms supplier. Beijing's support for the regime of Nepal's King Gyanendra following his suspension of democracy from February 2005 until April 2006 has been a source of irritation to India.
China's efforts to develop alternative overland routes to transport oil and gas imports by extending the existing Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan and China and developing port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, as well as through Bangladesh and Myanmar, have been viewed by India as part of a "string of pearls" strategy of economic and military encroachment into South and Central Asia.
India's rapprochement with East Asia is also tied to a number of India's broader strategic interests, including rapprochement with the United States, ensuring stability along India's periphery, meeting its energy security needs, and fueling economic integration in South Asia.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Gwadar Oil City: Pakistan, China to sign agreements in early 2008
During the forthcoming visit of Chinese president in early 2008, Pakistan and China are set to sign agreements on Chinese investments in Gwadar Oil City, incentives for setting-up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Gwadar seaport development programme for expansion of bilateral trade and strengthening of investment relations.
All these initiatives are considered to be essential for the success of Trade Energy, Transport and Industrial Corridor between Pakistan and China, a senior government official told Daily Times on Tuesday.
'Myanmar's "Saffron Revolution", like the Ukraine "Orange Revolution" or the Georgia "Rose Revolution" and the various color revolutions instigated in recent years against strategic states surrounding Russia, is a well-orchestrated exercise in Washington-run regime change, down to the details of "hit-and-run" protests with "swarming" mobs of monks in saffron, Internet blogs, mobile SMS links between protest groups, well-organized protest cells which disperse and re-form. CNN made the blunder during a September broadcast of mentioning the active presence of the NED behind the protests in Myanmar.'
Get out of here! I find this a little hard to believe, though the author makes a good case for Burma's geopolitical relevance - especially to China. It's well-known that the bulk of China's energy passes through the vulnerable Malacca Straits, and that pipelines through Burma would allow both Middle-Eastern and African oil to bypass the chokepoint. It's also well-known that Burma is offering gas of its own, and that it features heavily in China's 'string-of-pearls' plan for naval dominace of the Indian Ocean theatre. Gwadar is another aspect of the strategy.
However, if the US is really meddling in Burma's collapsing revolution, you would have thought that they would have done better. It's not CIA style to sponsor peaceful but ultimately ineffectual protest movements. Where are the guns?
Asia Times Online :: Southeast Asia news - The geopolitical stakes of 'Saffron Revolution'
In fact the US State Department admits to supporting the activities of the NED in Myanmar. The NED is a US government-funded "private" entity whose activities are designed to support US foreign policy objectives, doing today what the CIA did during the Cold War. As well, the NED funds Soros' Open Society Institute in fostering regime change in Myanmar. In an October 30, 2003 press release the State Department admitted, "The United States also supports organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute and Internews, working inside and outside the region on a broad range of democracy promotion activities." It all sounds very self-effacing and noble of the State Department. Is it though?
In reality the US State Department has recruited and trained key opposition leaders from numerous anti-government organizations in Myanmar. It has poured the relatively huge sum (for Myanmar) of more than $2.5 million annually into NED activities in promoting regime change in Myanmar since at least 2003. The US regime change effort, its Saffron Revolution, is being largely run, according to informed reports, out of the US Consulate General in bordering Chaing Mai, Thailand. There activists are recruited and trained, in some cases directly in the US, before being sent back to organize inside Myanmar. The US's NED admits to funding key opposition media including the New Era Journal, Irrawaddy and the Democratic Voice of Burma radio.
The concert-master of the tactics of Saffron monk-led non-violence regime change is Gene Sharp, founder of the deceptively-named Albert Einstein Institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a group funded by an arm of the NED to foster US-friendly regime change in key spots around the world. Sharp's institute has been active in Myanmar since 1989, just after the regime massacred some 3,000 protestors to silence the opposition. CIA special operative and former US military attache in Rangoon, Col Robert Helvey, an expert in clandestine operations, introduced Sharp to Myanmar in 1989 to train the opposition there in non-violent strategy. Interestingly, Sharp was also in China two weeks before the dramatic events at Tiananmen Square.
Will Hutton looks ahead to next week's CCP congress, at which a likely successor to Hu Jintao may be named. Note the date of the potential accession - 2012.
Hutton is sceptical as ever about the legitimacy of the process, remarking that alongside the environment and corruption (those tasked with stemming graft are themselves corrupt), China's massive foreign currency deficit and over reliance on exports will surely have economic repercussions too. The key remark is this:
The story of this week's party congress is how far Hu will be able to manoeuvre between the conservatives, who want to call a halt to even the smallest of reforms for fear it will lead to loss of political control, and the Dengist reformers, who know the Chinese economic and political establishment has got to subject itself to more scrutiny and the rule of law or the game is up.
But one wonders how realistic this analysis is. Surely the majority of current CCP members are thinking in terms of immediate personal gain rather than imaginatively considering the medium-term future of China. The comments are also well worth reading, with the comparisons with the USSR under Gorbachev roundly dismissed.
Guardian Unlimited | Comment is free | Will China's next leader be its Gorbachev?
...as every member of this week's congress knows, their choice has an additional and particular resonance.
They are choosing the fifth generation of Communist party leaders after the 1949 revolution. These are no longer leaders legitimised by revolution or who have the same sense of communist mission. They are managers and administrators who want to make the system work. In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's readiness to question communism was intertwined with his membership of the Soviet Union's fifth generation of leaders. He did not champion perestroika and glasnost alone; much of the nomenklatura had decided that the Soviet economic and social model was dysfunctional, corrupt and endemically inefficient and had to change.
Will one of Hu Jintao's two 'Lis', as the frontrunners to succeed him, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, are popularly known, feel the same way as they walk out in front of the cameras in the Great Hall of the People on Friday? Will one prove to be China's Gorbachev?
More on Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. Despite an apparent cooling of tension in the last few years, the author notes that Hu Jintao's rise to power comes partly on the back of a hardline attitude towards Tibet, always a bone of contention between the two Asian giants.
I disagree slightly with some of the points: for example, the territorial dispute does seem to be under control, mainly due to economic linkages. But the point that India forms part of a nexus of powers on China's borders - Australia, Japan and the US Pacific presence is interesting. Also worth noting that the newly-completed Qinghai-Tibet railway and refurbishments to the Indian road infrastructure near the border would allow both China and India to swiftly step up their military presences. And finally, Chinese plans for Tibetan water resources could also have a devastating effect on the subcontinent.
PINR - India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes
Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."
Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the U.S. saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.
Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about U.S. efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.
As both China and India "rise and shine" economically, so geopolitical questions begin to assume greater importance. Whatever the rhetoric from Beijing, China's neighbours are clearly less comfortable about it than ever. That's good for India, which (aside from Pakistan, of course) is generally viewed as fairly benign.
However, India's growing strategic relationship with the US is opening this to debate. Apparently, talks are in progress regarding a closer partnership with NATO, and the US ambassador to NATO is interestingly quoted as lumping China in with concerns such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. But surely a NATO (read US) - India partnership can only aggravate tensions with China, rather than 'balance' the SCO as noted in the article. Lasting peace in the region needs NATO to engage with the PRC rather than India, in order to pull it into a security structure. Attempting to counteract the SCO via NATO might only lead to an arms race that brings in Russia too.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Any pronounced gravitation toward an "Asian NATO" form of collective security will inevitably affect India's relations with China. (India shares Australia's predicament on this score.) Therefore, India has to perform some very tricky rope acts in the period ahead. In a major speech during a visit to Thailand on September 14, Mukherjee stressed, "The India-China partnership is an important determinant for regional and global peace and development, and for Asia's emergence as the political and economic center of the new international order."
Three days later, addressing the strategic community in Seoul, the minister underlined the importance of a "truly integrated Asian economy that will draw on the economic potential of India and China". Expressing confidence that India's "strategic and cooperative partnership [with China] will mature and steadily develop", he added, "Sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop."
The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to convincingly interpret the implications of its "strategic partnership" with the US. The perception is growing, and is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led security system in Asia. Clearly, the request by the NATO secretary general to call on the Indian foreign minister wouldn't have been made without Washington's nod.
Sanctions. The answer to everything. Impose sanctions on Burma, the international community says, and everything will be fine.
Wrong. One only has to look at the plight of Iraq in the 1990s to confirm that, under some circumstances, economic sanctions actually hurt the people you are trying to help.
Yes, one could say that sanctions had an effect on South Africa, but the regime at the time had links to the global economy that it couldn't afford to lose. That's not the case in Burma, and in fact sanctions would only increase the desire to rebel. After all, the current crisis was triggered by a doubling of fuel prices, which would surely occur again under sanctions.
It's well known that, with their energy interests, China and India are the key players here. But neither would really benefit from the sustained rule of the junta. No successor government, presumably led by Aung San Suu Kyi, is going to back out of the energy deals already made with China and India - indeed, they'll be vital in rebuilding Burma as a nation again. So why support the dictatorship?
Just for a moment, let's think the unthinkable. If China fails to act, then the revolution has little hope. But there is one thing that the West can do - supply arms. The jungles of Burma are filled with guerilla groups itching for a fight, and were the ordinary people be able to contribute too then the military would topple rapidly. Yes, a lot of people will die, but no more than will die anyway under sanctions and repression.
There is a danger of Burma becoming a proxy war between China and India - because India would have to be the major supplier, as it was back in the 1950s when it support the Tibetan independence movement - but with the Beijing Olympics approaching China probably wouldn't want to get too involved.
There would also be potential for Burma to descend into inter-ethnic confrontation too, and thus the supply of weapons may exacerbate tensions. But with a leader of the symbolic strength and legitimacy of Aung San Suu Kyi in place, that prospect would be unlikely and a disciplined UN mission from the very start would hold things together during the reconstruction period.
Most of the revolutions of 1989 were, thankfully, bloodless. Not so in Romania, but the students fought back and Ceausescu fell. In Tiananmen Square, however, there was little the students could do. Moreover, the Bosnian conflict dragged on for ages due to Western reluctance to help the Muslims fight back.
So much for my arch geopolitics. War is a terrible thing, but if it can be over swiftly then it may be the lesser of two evils.
Comment is free: Let's get serious
Beijing wants the killing to stop, not in the name of human rights but for the sake of stability. But China and Russia do not want to see any regime change - either the eventual toppling of the Burmese generals or an implosion of the junta. A triumph of Buddhist-inspired people power might encourage Buddhists in Tibet and Falungong militants in China to defy the communist party control and Beijing's repression.
Still, China is in a bind as Burma conjures up memories of the Tiananmen Square killings just Beijing is preparing to host the Olympics. A repeat of the 1988 massacre in Rangoon when at least 3,000 pro-democracy activists were gunned down in the street, would cast a dark shadow over China's desire to be treated as a responsible global power.
While China will not back any sanctions, it is open to increasing diplomatic pressure to stop the killings, and the junta can ill afford to ignore the anxieties of its number one benefactor.
The US and the EU have many avenues to pressure both China and Asean, even up to the point of threatening a boycott of the Beijing Olympics. A simple threat by Beijing to suspend all arms supplies to Rangoon would deliver the only kind of message that the generals might finally understand.
The time of western countries and Asean paying polite lip-service to human rights and release of national heroine Aung san Suu kyi, still languishing under house arrest, is over. The coming weeks will soon demonstrate how many governments will put human rights and the plight of the Burmese before commercial advantage, trading priorities and comfort zone diplomacy.
 It's not just the moment of truth for Burma. It's a moment of truth for China, and that by implication affects all of us.
The question is: is China now a responsible stakeholder in the international community, or simply a nation concerned only with self-interest at the expense of human rights - both within its own territory and elsewhere?
It is no longer acceptable to trot out that tired old phrase: "We do not interfere in other countries' internal affairs". With the Olympics approaching, if Beijing really wants to be seen as an equal partner then it cannot let its coming-out party be overshadowed by its negligence of well-established international norms.
A former Burmese student leader just appeared on the BBC, insisting that the UN has "failed" his people and that it is no longer time for sanctions. He is right. Sanctions are slow and ultimately will only hurt the Burmese people, not the military elite. So, in a sense, it's a moment of truth for the UN and its ineffectual new chief, Ban Ki-Moon too.
But only China, with its massive investment in Burma's economy via the logging trade and various energy deals can make a real difference. India, I'm afraid to say, is impotent on the matter and is disappointingly reflecting the Chinese sovereignty line.
The CCP is in a difficult position. If it condemns the impending crackdown and acts on Burma, whether in the UNSC or bilaterally, then it opens itself up to a round of internal re-examination of the events of Tiananmen square - which themselves occurred just after a brutally repressed democracy movement in Burma in 1988. Though news of events of Burma is restricted in China, via the Internet, unlike in 1989 people will get to know about them.
In the next 48 hours, there are only two things that can happen. Either the junta relaxes control, frees Aung San Suu Kyi and enters negotiations with the UN. Or the guns begin to fire while the UN, as always, stands by. The world is watching. It's up to China.
International Crisis Group - Myanmar: Time for Urgent Action
Only China, India, and, to a lesser degree, ASEAN have any influence on the military regime. China has very close economic and political links with Myanmar, while India has developed strong military ties. Both would suffer from worsening instability there, as they did after the violent August 1988 military crackdown. In the past, the military junta has fired on peaceful protestors or used vigilante groups to attack them. Demonstrations in recent days have reached a country-wide scale where such action could cause massive loss of life.
China, India and ASEAN should communicate to the military that a repeat of the 1998 violence would be unacceptable and would lead to serious consequences, including action by the UN Security Council. China and Russia should warn Myanmar that they would support full consideration of the situation there by the Security Council, as well as a possible adoption of a Security Council Resolution, if the military use force against protestors.
 Even the US is stepping up support for the current protests in Burma (Myanmar), with a call for added sanctions in the hope of buckling the already-pressured Junta. But like in Sudan, notes Isabel Hilton in The Guardian's Comment is Free, the country that really matters is China:
China has sustained the Burmese military with generous support; Chinese aid has built transport infrastructure and dams; Chinese investment gives Beijing a stake in key sectors of Burma's economy; Chinese immigration has produced large Chinese populations in Burma's cities; and Chinese support has rendered US sanctions against the regime ineffectual. Why, then, is China now being cited as a restraining influence?
China's default diplomatic position is that it does not "interfere" in the domestic politics of other countries - one might add, especially where supplies of energy and natural resources or strategic issues are involved. Beijing is averse to lectures on human rights and democracy at home, so naturally disinclined to deliver them abroad.
But China is now faced with the fact that the high diplomatic profile that goes with greater global power exposes it to new pressures to uphold international standards, and that if the country is to continue to sell her ascent to global superpower status as unthreatening, close partnerships with unsavoury regimes can produce undesirable blowback. China's previous intransigence on Darfur melted when campaigners married the Beijing Olympic games to China's support for the Sudanese regime to produce the slogan "Genocide Olympics". China suddenly found it convenient to send an envoy to Sudan and to play a more constructive role in multilateral efforts to resolve the crisis. A similar pressure is building over Burma.
And inevitably, fears of another Tiananmen square crop uo too. But this author is correct to note that 18 years on from 6/4, the PRC's position is very different. It is now supposed to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and cannot be seen to be supporting the Myanmar regime at this moment.
On the other hand, should Beijing encourage a transition to democracy and the return of Aung San Suu Kyi, what kind of message would they be sending to their own people? There's no doubt that, state censorship aside, the Chinese have more access to outside media than ever and many of them must be watching this closely:
For Beijing, the sight of tens of thousands of citizens in peaceful street protests led by Buddhist monks is little short of a nightmare, since China has its own potentially explosive combinations of religious and civil dissent: Buddhist monks in Tibet, Muslims in Xinjiang, even Falun Gong practitioners at home - all lay claim to the moral authority to challenge a corrupt and self-seeking autocracy. The sight of mass civic demonstrations in pursuit of political reform recalls both 1989's Tiananmen Square and 1979's Democracy Wall.
A bloodbath in Burma, given China's close identification with the dictatorship, would resonate like a Tiananmen Square massacre by proxy, just as Beijing is polishing the silver for next year's Olympics. For China negotiation is infinitely preferable to bloodshed and the instability that could result.
Finally, it's worth considering the implications for India too. Like Pakistan, Burma is a state pivotal to both regional powers' political and economic interests. India must be concerned about potential movements of refugees should things get violent, and along with China it has energy interests vested in the current Myanmar regime.
In fact, The Times of India points out, at times New Delhi's line sounds eerily reminiscent of Beijing's:
India's interests in Myanmar are rooted in energy, security, keeping insurgents in check and countering China's overpowering influence on India's doorstep.
Myanmar is also important to an India seeking to extend its power into southeast Asia, politically and militarily, standing as it does at the mouth of the Malacca Straits. These interests have kept India and China engaged with the unpopular military regime in Yangon. As recently as 10 days ago, foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee was subjected to public questioning by British and American diplomats in Bangkok on India's Myanmar policy. Mukherjee stuck to India's line that it did not interfere in internal developments in any country.
Days later at the APEC summit in Australia, member countries decided Myanmar could only be tackled through India and China. Neither country responded.
So much for democracy's domino effect. But what happens over the next few days will indirectly prove where China and India really do stand in the modern world.
Some bland comments from the Indian external affairs minister. But in the long run, can India really balance the tensions in its relationships with the US and the PRC? The problem for New Delhi is that (aside from Russia, perhaps) it's the only major power that has to live under both US global hegemony and Chinese regional hegemony. And India doesn't wield the economic and political power that Moscow can now boast due to its energy resources. Non aligned movement aside, one day it may just have to make the call.
The Hindu : Front Page : Strategic partnership with China will mature: Pranab Mukherjee
Asked about the possible impact of the emerging U.S.-India equation on China’s ties with New Delhi, Mr. Mukherjee said: “There is no question of cooperation between India and the U.S. to act as some sort of containment of any country, including China.”
Trade and investment “are the great drivers of the new relationship” between India and China.
“The leaders of both countries recognise that co-existence and cooperation is the wise course of action; and sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop and to bring benefit not only to us but also for other partners in Asia.”
Differences, including those over the border question, “did not stand in the way of investment and trade.”
A lengthy but sobering and informative analysis of the crackdown on the Internet in China, specifically at bloggers in the days leading up to the party conference. It sounds much like the situation has deteriorated dramatically since I was blogging in China myself: at that time the authorities were only just wising up to the dangers of people speaking freely on a forum such as the web, and attempt to control them were limited though sometimes effective. One has to ask what the situation will be this time next year after the Olympics have closed down.
Global Voices Online » China: Blogs ground down as National Congress gears up
Having claimed records of Department of Propaganda officials making statements in public like 'we'd be better off without the internet' spread across the internet, blogs and, at one point, even on a CCTV message board hasn't left much room for benefit of the doubt when one considers just how seriously authorities might actually agree with an utterance like that against the backdrop of other recent events.
In other words, if war were to be declared on bloggers, is the state of today's China's blogsphere what it would look like? Starting this month we've seen blog posts being deleted in places where they almost never used to, comment sections being closed out of fear, and the occasional blogger getting a jab in while they're at it - and outspoken bloggers like Wang Xiaoshan who had comments turned off to begin with now also deleting their own posts with no explanation.
 Interesting to see China advertising its humanitarian interest in Darfur, with a military show accompanied by a pledge to send peacekeepers to join the UN mission (though not combat troops, and an uncertain number). The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the world's largest standing army and the PRC has sat on the UNSC since 1971, so it is about time.
The Washington Post is quick to note, however, that the promise to help Darfur comes under the cloud of possible boycotts of the Olympics, and the obvious fact that Sudanese oil is an important facet of China's energy security policy.
Of course, all countries have some kind of interest in UN peacekeeping missions, often financial, but with few obvious threats other than so-called Taiwanese 'secession' (as evidenced by this weekend's demonstrations calling for UN membership, unusually by both the DPP party and the Kuomintang), what does the PLA really exist for otherwise? Now that Tibet and Xinjiang are 'free', is there anyone else left to liberate?
QINYANG BASE, China, Sept. 15 -- The Chinese military put on a display of its first Darfur-bound peacekeepers Saturday, having troops throw up Bailey bridges and feign combat to dramatize Beijing's desire to be seen as a partner in bringing peace to the violence-torn corner of Sudan.
The training demonstration, by an engineering unit of the People's Liberation Army, was observed by foreign journalists as part of a new campaign by the Chinese government to show that it is cooperating with the United States and other nations to end the Darfur fighting, which since 2003 has displaced about 2.5 million people and contributed to the deaths of as many as 450,000 from violence and disease.
Every now and again, Asia Times Online turns up an absolute tour de force of an analysis: this is one of them. It pulls together every thread in the Afghanistan war, from the significance of events on Pakistan to the options available to the local powers China, India and Russia.
The one major beef I have with it is, as before, whether it is truly possible to negotiate with the Taliban. Sure, you can talk to the heads of major Taliban groups, but what are the guarantees that one agreement is going to quell the whole bunch of them? Isn't it likely that large splinter groups that oppose any settlement will break off and carry on doing their own thing? Still, the author seems to think that talks are on the cards.
Below, I attempt a rough summary of all the points, in an actor-by-actor format.
- The Taliban: As NATO and the US tire, the chances of a settlement grow, especially in the light of potential instability in Pakistan too.
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The UN: Growing acceptance of the idea of talking with the Taliban. -
The US: Should seek intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistan dialogue with the aid of China, Russia and India. -
Iran: The US quagmire in Afghanistan is succour to their ambitions for regional dominance. -
Russia: Fears of 'Talibanization' will draw the Central Asian states closer into seurity frameworks such as the SCO. -
China: Stay out of it, and leave the Taliban to the US. -
India: Stick with the US, and hope that Pakistan doesn't regain influence in Afghanistan.
And here's the key:
Clearly, the continued disintegration of the Pakistani state widens al-Qaeda's support base among the Taliban. If US-Iran tensions escalate, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan become intertwined. That means the Afghan war may take a new form rather than lead to peace.
The whole article is reprinted below: check out also Ahmed Rashid's sobering analysis in The Telegraph in which he describes his own land as "a failing state hovering over the abyss".
Continue reading "'Stan - The Big Picture" »
This one's going straight on my blogroll. PostGlobal is a collaboration between The Washington Post and Newsweek that analyses global trends - the fall of America, the rise of China, energy, Islam etc..
In short, it's basically just like my blog, but with flash graphics, real cash backing, plus gurus like Fareed Zakaria on board. The only thing they lack is a decent subeditor, which does let it down a little.
What really caught my eye today was this introduction to 'midrange' trends over the next 36 months. Summary below:
A dramatic global realignment appears to be in progress (and quickening) as the result of several factors:
- The loss of US influence as a result of the Iraq war
- A view across the globe resulting from Abu Ghraib and range of missteps that the US has lost the moral high ground it had enjoyed for decades
- A feeling among global leaders that the US is without a coherent foreign policy strategy...a belief that has started feeding on itself and has emboldened US adversaries
- China's rise, its smooth diplomatic technique, its re-alignment with Russia and its aggressive, clever drive to form new alliances with nations extending from Asia and Africa to South America
- Russia's recent rise combined with Russian President Putin's domestic popularity and his reputation for effectively standing up to the West
- The rise of non-aligned nations emboldened by the inability of the US to effectively use the extraordinary power it possesses
- A view among key global leaders that the US will be bogged down in Iraq for many years (a view heightened by significantly by President Bush's September 13 Iraq speech), thus distracted and unable to respond effectively to key political moves by the range of international players
- A recognition by the international community that the Bush Administration not only hasn't been able to deal effectively with non-state actors (e.g. terror groups like Al Qaeda) but they are holding their own or starting to win
More excellent points culled from the article below.
Continue reading "PostGlobal" »
Just as with Pakistan, India looks like it will lose out to China in the effort to find secure energy transit routes.
PINR - Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar
India has clearly lost an important diplomatic initiative in the attempt to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar. Even after the deal was sweetened with US$20 million in "soft credit" and the proposed construction of a power plant in Myanmar, it would appear that Indian influence was quietly denied by the inevitability of China's international support for Myanmar. Beijing's use of its veto to keep Myanmar's human rights record off of the U.N. Security Council agenda turned out to be more important to the Myanmar junta than the economic incentives.
Missed this: Interesting development.
Asia Sentinel - China’s Pipeline Diplomacy
In securing approval to build a natural gas pipeline from northern Turkmenistan to China, PetroChina, the country’s largest oil company, has pulled off a move with striking geopolitical implications, providing an extra bloodline for the world’s fastest growing economy.
For its part, Turkmenistan regards the China deal, signed in July, as an opportunity to free itself from Russia’s stranglehold over its gas export markets. The country’s entire gas pipeline infrastructure to date was built during the Soviet era by Gazprom, the world’s largest gas exporter.
Amid reports that former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, is criticising the Bush regime for its neglect of Asia comes this report. It is difficult to see India and China forming anything more than a perfunctory strategic relationship - their rivalries over the Indian Ocean region remain strong, especially where Tibet, Pakistan and Myanmar are concerned, but the point is that China is the nascent power these days.
India has to recognise this, and perform a careful balancing act with the US. Its longer term interests, however, may be better served by accepting a role as a partner to China's rise. At present India's fear is that it will be little more than a junior partner, but I suspect that Chinese officials would wish to downplay this and concentrate on economics and trade rather than security. The statement is also a clear rebuff to the American nuclear plan, so some planners in Washington must be reeling.
The Hindu News Update Service
Beijing, Sept. 4 (PTI): China will "vigorously" implement a bilateral agreement to upgrade Sino-Indian relations to strategic levels, Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, said while hinting that Beijing is open to civilian nuclear energy cooperation with all countries under the IAEA safeguards, sources said here on Monday.
Yang who met a joint delegation of members of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) here on Friday told them that he had been instructed by the Chinese leadership that Beijing would vigorously implement the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and cooperation agreed upon by the two countries.
A lengthy but useful summary of everything that's important in the world right now pertaining to the linkages between geopolitics and energy. Must look out for this Dilip Hiro guy's book.
We can now probably add to this list of Bush's errors America's disruption of the world financial system via subprime loans, not to mention high oil prices and a feeble dollar but hey.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US in their sights: The rising powers
...with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of US supremacy - Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode US hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The George W Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, overextending itself...
Yet there are other explanations - unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures - for the current transformation in international affairs. These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.
I'm not sure how much I trust Pakistan's APP news agency, so this is to be taken with a pinch of salt. I can also find no reference to a US "International Oil Company" - unless indeed it is an anonymous one for now. I can, however, find the "Indian Oil Corporation Limited" (IOCL) and the "International Oil Company Limited", based in Hong Kong and thus perhaps a Chinese front. I did discover "Interoil", which is stockmarket listed as IOC, but its main drive is Papua New Guinea.
So the plot thickens. Who, if anyone, is pulling the strings here?
Associated Press of Pakistan - IOC to construct Turkmenistan-Pakistan oil, gas pipeline
The US International Oil Company (IOC) would construct 2,200 km long Turkmenistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline project in a period of three years. Geo News quoting the details released from IOC liaison office reported that the government has awarded the estimated $10 billion project to the IOC.
Two oil refineries and four thermal powerhouses of 1,000 megawatt each would also be set up under the project.
The pipeline with a capacity of supplying 2 million barrel of oil and 4 billion cubic feet of gas would be constructed up to Gawadar, where one refinery would also be constructed at a cost of $3.5 billion, IOC said.
The project also envisages construction of hydro-cracker for the production of JP 1 and JP 4, for the first time in Pakistan.
IOC said that the matters relating to the security in Afghanistan and insurance guarantee have been finalized and the ceremony of the mega-project agreement inking would soon be held.
In July 2007, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation agreed on the foundation of an 'energy club'. In August it will hold its annual summit, and this author considers whether that means another step towards an Asian NATO.
PINR - S.C.O. Summit Demonstrates its Growing Cohesion
...the last couple of years the S.C.O. has taken steps in intensified cooperation in a wide scope of security dimensions. This has occurred to such an extent that development toward a genuine security organization can no longer be excluded, although this still might take a considerable number of years. Although the West at present does not have anything to fear from the S.C.O., current developments might encourage the West to closely observe further activities of the grouping. In any case, the time has gone that Western security experts could depict the S.C.O. as simply one of many insignificant organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.
As China's commitment in Pakistan, especially through Gwadar increases, so too does their interest in the nation's internal security.
Protection of Chinese national
ISLAMABAD: Secretary Interior Syed Kamal Shah and Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo Zhaohi signed an MoU to form a joint task force for the safety and security of Chinese nationals in Pakistan at a ceremony held here on Monday.
The MoU is the first of its kind signed against the backdrop of the rising number of kidnapping incidents and attacks on the Chinese people who are engaged on various development projects in the country. A number of Chinese nationals have also lost their lives in these attacks.
I think it's a little tenuous to suggest that the sole reason for Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid was the abduction of seven Chinese brothel workers. However, this author takes a close look at China's strategic relationship with Pakistan and considers how much Beijing's influence contributes to the conflict with Islamist extremism.
Foreign Policy In Focus | China, Pakistan, and Terrorism
U.S. pressure on Pakistan to clear the region of the Taliban and al-Qaeda has forced Pakistan into an ever-tighter embrace of China. Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid, a potent symbol of this strategic Sino-Pakistani alignment, also sent a blood-soaked message to religious militants that Chinese interests will remain off-limits. Musharraf is not apologetic about defending Chinese interests in Pakistan and punishing those who dared to harm them.
One of the most frustrating things about writing a thesis on contemporary international issues is that, once you have handed in the text, new developments occur and new information becomes available. This Economist Intelligence Unit brief on China and energy could almost have been cut and pasted from my opus magnus, but it does offer extra information. The 'energy intensity' (ie. inefficiency) element didn't occur to me; nor did the economic effects of subsidies.
One sentence is particularly prescient: "For one thing, the need to maintain political stability limits the government's ability to improve efficiency." The point is that an energy crisis will trigger political unrest, but a cut in subsidies to improve efficiency will do too.
Energy for China | Economist.com
China's energy crunch is exacerbated by the country's high energy intensity (the ratio of energy use to economic output). This is partly due to the large share of industry in the economy, but it is also because many sectors—such as steel and cement—are plagued by over-production, waste and inefficiency. China's overwhelming reliance on coal for the bulk of its energy—around 70%—also poses problems. Coal is relatively dirty, inefficient and difficult to transport, but it is by far the most abundant energy resource in China.
China's energy needs are also having geopolitical repercussions, as the country's relative paucity of domestic oil reserves prompts efforts to expand imports and secure supplies abroad. For example, energy competition is a factor in China's territorial disputes with its neighbours, particularly in the East China Sea (with Japan) and the South China Sea (with eight South-east Asian countries). Large potential reserves of oil and natural gas are at stake in these disputes. China's energy security concerns also bolster its determination to develop its naval power, and to impose its rule on Taiwan, a de facto US ally that is adjacent to the shipping lanes to northern China.
A report speculating that the possible delivery of Pakistan's long-owed F-16s is part of a geopolitical strategy on the US's part to undermine the SCO's (and therefore China and Russia's) influence. America also worries about a popular uprising against Musharraf's government - a government that it is increasingly losing the power to manipulate.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan heading for a crackdown
From the proceedings of the meeting of the SCO's Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) held in Bishkek on Monday in preparation of the summit on August 16, trends are available that must definitely be annoying Washington. There is no mistaking that the SCO is slouching toward Afghanistan and Pakistan with an irresistible offer of mutual engagement in terms of shared interests of regional security and stability...
For the first time, the SCO is likely to pose a challenge to the United States' monopoly of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The CFM has taken the view that the existing pattern of involvement by the international community is restricted to specific sectoral problems in Afghanistan. It concluded that such a narrow issue-based approach on the part of the international community will not serve the purpose of stabilizing the country.
The article continues:
Plainly speaking, the SCO is unambiguously proclaiming its intention to work closely with Kabul and Islamabad - a turf that has hitherto been tacitly accepted by the regional powers as more or less the exclusive playpen of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This runs counter to the consistent US approach based on keeping Russia out of Afghanistan, and disrupting any Russian-Chinese coordinated policies in Afghanistan.
An extremely useful summary of China's energy relations with the Middle East - if only I'd had this while I was writing my thesis. Main point to note, highlighted in italics below, is that the big three - Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq - see the main benefit of trading with China as "China is not America". Read into that what you will.
China Brief from the Jamestown Foundation
As the world’s third largest oil importer after the United States and Japan, China is projected to import 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East by 2015, according to the International Energy Agency’s forecast. For this reason, China intends to open a dialogue with OPEC countries. Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun stated, “China wants to participate in making big decisions in the world. We want to set up a mechanism to negotiate and discuss oil market issues with the OPEC countries” (Gulf News, December, 6, 2006).
There appears to be an equal amount of enthusiasm from the Middle Eastern countries to take advantage of the world’s fastest growing market. China’s presence is largely perceived as non-ideological, economically oriented and pragmatic. Furthermore, there is little concern that China’s increasing status as a world power will constitute an international threat. “Hegemony, domination, imperialism are associated with the United States and Europe. China is not seen that way,” commented Sami Baroudi, a Lebanese political scientist, “Arabs appreciate its economic might, but don’t see it as a political threat” (Reuters, November, 27, 2006).
 The siege of the Lal Masjid is over, but in what looks like an increasingly critical juncture for General Musharraf, the repercussions will now begin.
In the next few days, weeks and months, the following questions may be answered. How will the 'martyrdom' of the hardliners and madrassa students who chose to remain at the mosque be perceived in Pakistan and the wider region? Will they inspire a larger movement, or only fuel the growing crisis of Talibanisation in the border regions? How will the aftermath of the siege react with existing political issues such as the sacking of the Chief Justice and the forthcoming elections?
It is also interesting to note that part of the Islamist's agenda relates to Chinese influence in Pakistan. The incidents are comparitively minor, but it appears that one of the extremists' grievances in Islamabad was a Chinese-run brothel: meanwhile, three Chinese workers were shot near Peshawar during the weekend. If this continues, Beijing may have to say a few private but stern words.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistani soldiers storm mosque
Security forces began a full-scale siege of the mosque last week, not long after mosque students abducted seven Chinese workers they accused of running a brothel.
The BBC's M Ilyas Khan in Islamabad says the military operation is a gamble for President Pervez Musharraf who risks a backlash from supporters of those inside the mosque.
In recent days the army has redeployed thousands of troops in north-western Pakistan where pro-Taleban militants opposed to President Musharraf have been carrying out a string of attacks said to be linked to the mosque siege.
Beyond its place in the GWOT, could Pakistan become a staging post for the anti-Iran campaign? The author calls it a new Cold War, alluding to Iraq and Afghanistan's growing proxy war status - but don't forget who sponsors both Iran and Pakistan... China. So if there is a Cold War, it's the ultimate big daddy in the whole deal.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - All roads leading to Pakistan
The fact is Pakistan is uniquely placed - geographically and politically - to affect the outcome of Anglo-American strategy toward Iran and Central Asia. Zia was extremely prescient about such a geopolitical setting.
In recent months, the US media have reported on the role of Pakistani security agencies in enabling covert US operations aimed at destabilizing Iran. If US Vice President Dick Cheney has his way and a US-Iran military confrontation indeed takes place, Pakistan's role becomes of vital importance to Washington.
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
Bound copies are available at lulu.com for around $10 plus P&P; downloadable PDF files are free of charge. Click here to access the virtual storefront.
This work is made available on the understanding that it will not be copied, plagiarised or otherwise reproduced without the explicit consent of the author.
 Very distressing to read - and I suspect that The Guardian chose not to publish many of Jonathan Watts's pictures. More evidence that many Chinese have scant regard for the world we live in and the things we share it. It's not just about 'spectacular' animals such as tigers, it's a wider malaise that affects the air we all breathe and the water we all drink.
Not only this, but a shocking BBC documentary on the failure of Project Tiger to boot. Thousands of tiger skins sold to Tibet (though the ignorant buyers swiftly u-turned when the Dalai Lama issued an edict) and the bones all off to China for TCM.
The sheer irresponsibility is amazing. The effect that 1.3 billion people with a similar mindset could have, especially if they get they way and wriggle out of international conventions, is simply terrifying.
I can hear the excuses now. One China: one rule for us and another for the rest of you. Not as unlike America as they'd like to think.
Bred for the freezer: how zoo rears tigers like battery hens | Conservation | Guardian Unlimited Environment
The park is part farm, part zoo and part circus. Its nursery is the start of a production line that churns out hundreds of tigers each year and ends in the freezer packed with carcasses. In between, most animals spend their lives in hundreds of tiny cages that are lined up in rows around the perimeter wall, each jammed with as many as four animals, which lie around listlessly or pace back and forth between wire and concrete.
More fortunate beasts share a few football pitch-sized enclosures in the main visitor area. Others are trained to perform in the Dream Theatre - a circus where they jump through flaming hoops - or in an outdoor show that also has monkeys riding camels and a bear cycling across a highwire without a safety net.
China, Pakistan team up on energy | csmonitor.com
"I think most security experts are looking at this very closely because this is the closest access point China has to the Persian Gulf," says Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security in Washington. "I don't know that this is something the US particularly likes."
The article concentrates mainly on the US perspective:
Given the energy game's high stakes, some wonder if Gwadar will set off alarm bells in Washington. Last April, while hosting the China-Pakistan Energy Forum in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf was asked as much by a visiting delegate. But to a roar of applause, he quickly deflected the question: "I do not care about pressure from major powers. If Pakistan suffers pressure from certain major powers, I believe China will come forward to help us apply pressure on the other side."
Still, the opening of Gwadar is indicative of how China's largesse in Pakistan is coming into open competition with the US – and how that could alter the region's political landscape.
Apparently, it's all about the money - China has promised $12bn to Pakistan, while the US offers only a paltry $6bn. Who's your daddy, especially in the energy game?
Meetings set for later in April augur well - and China's observer status of the SAARC could be set to make it complement the SCO?
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Pak, China to sign 3 accords during PM’s visit: Kasuri
Islamabad and Beijing are set to sign at least three agreements during Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s visit to China, scheduled from April 16 to April 22, said Foreign Minster Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri here on Sunday while talking to reporters after a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the foreign office.
Kasuri said that there was a complete unanimity of views between the two countries on bilateral, regional and international issues. He said the two countries would sign agreements to establish the Joint Investment Company, University of Engineering and Science and Technology, and the Media University in Pakistan when Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz would visit China in the second week of April.
“We welcome China’s entry in SAARC as an observer,” said Kasuri, and it has heightened the importance of the organisation. “We are confident that China will play an important role in the association,” he added.
Nothing new here, but worth a quick look.
China's footprint in Pakistan - Los Angeles Times
Gwadar would provide a more secure corridor for China's fuel and energy supplies in the face of instability in the Persian Gulf and also down in the pirate-infested Strait of Malacca, by Indonesia, through which 80% of China's oil imports now pass. From Gwadar, imports could travel overland up through Pakistan and into China.
Trade out of China's own restive western region of Xinjiang would also be easier and faster. The distance from Kashgar, on the edge of Xinjiang, to Gwadar is 1,250 miles, versus twice that distance to reach Shanghai.
Some analysts see a more strategic interest in Gwadar. They say it could play host to Chinese vessels, listening stations or an outpost from which Beijing could monitor the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, including the U.S. Navy base on the remote island of Diego Garcia, a key launching pad for operations in the Persian Gulf.
But a beefed-up Chinese military presence in Gwadar probably is years away, if it happens at all.
Comprehensive analysis of Gwadar from Pakistani point of view.
The News - International
 Just when I thought I had the most terribly original thesis topic, The Economist goes and hijacks it - even the title. At least it shows I'm onto something.
It's impossible to disconnect the whole India-Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus, partly because Pakistan is a very artificially-constructed nation and Afghanistan has never really been a natural state at all. It's all very complex, with India close to Afghanistan and meddling in Pakistan's internal conflicts, yet needing Pakistan on side for the pipeline projects. And with China and the US thrown into the mix, the geopolitical implications could be immense.
Game on.
India and Afghanistan | The Great Game revisited | Economist.com
India has an obvious interest in a stable Afghanistan. It hopes the country will one day accommodate transmission lines bringing electricity from Central Asia, as well as a pipeline for oil and gas from the region. There are two competing gas-pipeline projects: “TAPI”, running from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan and on to India; and another from Iran through Pakistan to India. Instability in Afghanistan is a big impediment to the first, but America opposes the second. For now, Pakistan refuses to allow Indian goods to cross its territory. But India also hankers after direct trade routes with Central Asia.
A Chinese-Pakistani joint-venture port at Gwadar in Baluchistan, which had its ceremonial opening this week, is matched by an Iranian-Indian venture to develop the “free port” at Chabahar in the Gulf of Oman. Both would require road links across Afghan territory. Indian engineers are currently connecting Afghanistan's ring road to the Iranian border. The Indian press blamed the abduction and killing in 2006 of an Indian engineer working on the project on Pakistani intelligence, after the Taliban denied involvement.
Pakistan would also benefit from Afghanistan's becoming the land bridge between India and Central Asia. But until a final resolution of its dispute with India, its calculations will be more cynical. Afghanistan is no longer, as it was under Taliban rule, a client of Pakistan. But “an unstable Afghanistan is the second-best option to a stable one ruled by your friends,” says Mr Rubin. “Both are certainly preferable to an Afghanistan ruled by your enemies.”
Bob Hope and no hope, and I believe that Bob Hope is no longer available for USO performances in any case. But seriously, the idea of a 'military hotline' from Washington to Beijing is reminiscent of Cold War thinking. Could the US be implicitly acknowledging a bipolar structure and China's counter-hegemonic status?
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | US urges China military openness
"You don't have to agree or disagree with any particular country's objective," he continued, "but it's very helpful to understand what those objectives are and why they're going in that direction."
He said he urged Beijing to be more open about its military budget.
All you need to know.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan port opens new possibilities
Some analysts see an operational Gwadar port as China's first foothold in the oil-rich Middle East, as well as providing road and rail links to the economic powerhouse. Beijing wants Gwadar to be the gateway port for its western region, as its eastern seaboard is 3,500km from Kashgar, the main city in the far west of China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whereas the distance from Kashgar to Gwadar is only 1,500km. This makes it feasible and cost-effective for China's interior regions to carry out trade through this port. That is why China expressed interest in helping Pakistan to develop Gwadar into a full-fledged deepwater commercial port, capable of handling cargo ships of up to 50,000 tons or more.
Energy-hungry China is eyeing Central Asia's oil and gas reserves and is increasingly looking to Pakistan for oil and gas supplies. Beijing plans to run at least five oil and gas pipelines to Gwadar from the Central Asian republics and wants to turn the facility into a transit terminal for Iranian and African crude-oil imports.
Gwadar is expected to play a key role in China's energy security, as its strategic location gives it greater scope as a free oil port in the region, and it will be the endpoint of all gas pipelines from Central Asian states, Iran and Qatar. Pakistan and China have also held talks on the construction of the strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders, enabling it to import oil from Saudi Arabia.
Pervez Musharraf's sincere thanks to the Chinese FM.
Associated Press of Pakistan - Chinese assistance helped realize dream of Gwadar Port: President
General Pervez Musharraf on Tuesday said the dream of the Gwadar Port was realized with China’s assistance and said its continued involvement will help in further improvement of the facilities and infrastructure at the country’s first deep-sea port.Talking to Chinese Minister for Communication Li Shen, the President said the two countries enjoy an all weather and strategic partnership that will continue to grow for the mutual benefit of the two people.
He said there was a need for greater long term involvement between the two countries to make the Port an important Container and Energy hub for the region.
The Chinese Minister said that with the completion of the second phase, the Gwadar Port will be able to handle the world’s biggest ships and more infrastructure can be added to enable it to serve as an energy hub for the region.
Today would be a good day to attack Gwadar, and the authorities know it.
Reuters AlertNet - Pakistan steps up security ahead of port opening
GWADAR, Pakistan, March 19 (Reuters) - Pakistan tightened security around a coastal town in Baluchistan province on Monday, a day before the opening of a port authorities hope will bring prosperity to the remote and troubled region.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is due to open the Gwadar deep-sea port on the Arabian Sea on Tuesday along with Chinese Minister of Communications Li Shenglin.
China financed 80 percent of the initial development costs of the $248 million project in Baluchistan province, 70 km (45 miles) east of the Iranian border and on the doorstep of Gulf shipping lanes.
Thousands of soldiers and policemen guarded the coast and roads to the port on Monday while fishermen were told to stay well clear.
It could well be a slip of the pen, but note the writer's words here. Pakistan's FM is pushing for the Karakoram pipeline as a "contingency plan". Contingency for what, exactly? And it shows the pipeline is still very much on the table.
Pak bends over backwards for Beijing, offers oil backup-Rest of World-World-NEWS-The Times of India
BEIJING: Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Kasuri, on Monday offered to build oil reservoirs and lay gas pipelines in his country's territory across the Chinese border to help Beijing prepare a contingency plan.
Kasuri, who is here on a four-day trip, is pushing Beijing to set up an energy corridor linking the Chinese-built Gwadar port in Pakistan to western China.
The Gwadar port in Baluchistan, located at the entrance of the Gulf and about 460 km west of Karachi, is due to be opened on Tuesday.
It will be operated by the Port of Singapore Authority, which has obtained a 40-year contract to run it.
"The most important thing is the trust that exists between China and Pakistan. The energy corridor will pass through a friendly country, which will be a big advantage for China,"Kasuri said in an interview to the official media in Beijing.
Anyone would think China has a policy of encirclement...
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - China moves into India's back yard
China is all set to drop anchor at India's southern doorstep. An agreement has been finalized between Sri Lanka and China under which the latter will participate in the development of a port project at Hambantota on the island's south coast.
An agreement on the Hambantota project was among eight that were signed during Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse's recent visit to China. Even as the Sri Lankans were finalizing the deal with the Chinese, they clinched an agreement with the Americans. In Colombo, officials reached agreement on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US.
The agreements come at a time when India is already watching with concern the growing Pakistani influence in Sri Lanka.
The Hambantota Development Zone, which the Chinese will help build, will include a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other facilities. It is expected to cost about US$1 billion and the Chinese are said to be financing more than 85% of the project.
 The Economist is jolly excited about a new law being passed on private property rights. In fact, the law is merely a rubber stamp on what is already going on (in China these days, they tend to make the laws to suit conditions rather than try to shape conditions to suit the laws - a much better system if you ask me.)
It's yet another sign that the Party really ought drop the word 'Communist' once and far all.
Governing China | Caught between right and left, town and country | Economist.com
Many of the law's provisions are contained in other regulations issued in recent years. But supporters of the bill say that combining these elements into one law enacted by the country's top legislature would give them additional weight. Yin Tian of Peking University says the law will be a mark of the government's respect for private property and could help to reinforce social stability by reducing disputes. The draft tries to streamline the registration of property sales and make it easier for interested parties to check details. The difficulty buyers have in getting such information results in frequent ownership wrangles after deals are completed.
Farmers, whose main concern relates to land-ownership rights, would also have something to gain. The good news is that the latest draft, unlike the 2005 version, gives farmers the right to renew their land-use leases after they expire. Unlike urban land, which is state-owned with usage rights granted for periods of between 40 and 70 years, rural land is “collectively” owned. Farmers are given 30-year leases (though often no supporting documents) to use plots of land. But the law will put no new limits on the government's powers to appropriate land. It also says that village committees represent the collective. These are supposedly democratically elected but party regulations still give unelected party chiefs the final say over village affairs. Most important, the ban on mortgaging farmland will remain.
A military spending rise of... er... American proportions.
Asian arms race fear as Beijing raises spending | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
"In recent years, China has steadily increased defence spending based on its economic development," Mr Jiang said. "China has neither the wherewithal nor the intention to enter into an arms race with any country, and China won't constitute a threat to any country."
Yes, thanks for that, Mr Jiang. But China's economy is going up by 10% a year, not 17.8%, the amount of the spending increase. And we all know that in reality it's much more.
Such assurances are unlikely to convince its near neighbours Japan and India. Both countries have increased their defence budgets in what is increasingly looking like an Asian arms race.
In the short term, however, it is Taiwan that has the most to fear from a Chinese military build-up. The island is viewed in Beijing as a renegade province. Hundreds of missiles are aimed across the strait and communist leaders have repeatedly warned that they are prepared to reunite the two sides by force if necessary.
I'd say they've got five years.
Asia Times Online :: China Business News - China aims to diversify oil sources
What has worried Chinese oil-security strategists in recent years is that most of the imported oil comes from the Middle East. Despite China's efforts to diversify sources of imports, it still relies heavily on Middle Eastern oil. In 2005, China's imports of crude oil from the Middle East accounted for 61.1% of its total crude-oil imports, making it the most import link in the country's oil-supply chain.
This amounts to putting most, if not all, the eggs in one basket, which is too fraught with risks for such a big country like China, analysts in Beijing say. If the supply of oil from the Middle East were interrupted, for any reason, the outcome for China would be disastrous beyond imagination.
Not quite as catchy as the 'Silk Road'
Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.
China's ever expanding pipeline network has the potential to bring about a significant strategic realignment of Xinjiang and the adjacent region. Central Asia, with its huge reserves of oil, gas and minerals, has already seen some sharp rivalry among the United States, Europe and Japan. All of the major powers, in conjunction with multinational corporations, are seeking to secure alliances, concessions and possible pipeline routes in the area.
Oil and gas pipelines to China from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could easily be extended to link into the pipeline networks of both Russia and Iran. This model has been dubbed the "Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge" - a Eurasian network of pipelines linking energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia through to China's Pacific coast. A major part of the old Silk Route is inexorably turning into the "Black Gold Route" of the new millennium.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news : China-Pakistan rail link on horizon
Beijing's involvement in several rail projects in Pakistan is motivated primarily by commercial considerations, but it also sees distinct advantages for its improved transportation and access to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf states. A reliable network of road and rail links can only ensure China's access to energy-rich central Asia, serving it both commercially and strategically.
The author does make a bit of a leap in his logic, but his assessment does sound plausible at least.
Militarising Balochistan : outlookindia.com
The following details of this project have since become available from an article titled Militarisation of Balochistan" written by columnist Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur in the Post of February 1, 2007:
* The Chinese will be building the airport 26 km away to the north-east of the existing airport towards Pasni.
* Disregarding the normal procedure, a sum of Rs.1.05 billion for the acquisition of 6,500 acres of land has been released to the Military Estate Officer in Quetta instead of to the Civil Aviation Authority. The land for the airport has already been acquired by the Military Land and Cantonments Department. The JFK airport in New York, one of the largest in the world, covers an area of only 4,930 acres. The land on which the proposed new Gwadar airport will be located is much more than the land on which the JFK airport is located and twice the size of the land on which London's Heathrow airport is located (2,965 acres). In Heathrow, one plane lands or takes off every 46 seconds. Such heavy commercial traffic is never visualied in any airport of Pakistan even in the medium and long terms. Such a huge airport near Gwadar would, therefore, have other objectives. It will serve as a mammoth airbase.
It's all about supply, demand and transit. At best the IPI is a potential solution to the Kashmir issue. But at worst it's yet another point of friction.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - Gas: Iran turns up the heat
Putin paid special attention to cooperation "in building facilities for gas production and transportation in India and the adjacent region" (emphasis added). This is a reference to the highly politicized US$7 billion project for a 2,100-kilometer Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Putin's visit to Delhi came closely on the heels of the latest round of negotiations over the price of gas for the Iran pipeline project. According to a new formula proposed by Iran, the cost of gas will translate at the Pakistan-India border as $4.93 per million British thermal units (mBtu), plus $1.5 per mBtu that India would have to pay to Pakistan as a transit fee. Indian officials have since expressed optimism that the signing of India's $145 billion gas mega-deal with Iran might take place by June.
In geopolitical terms, it could be the focal point of a new power-sharing axis, perhaps under the auspices of the SCO:
In other words, we're talking seriously for the first time about the prospect of a gas market uniting Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and China. This is where a breakthrough in the protracted negotiations over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project could become a defining moment for energy politics in Eurasia.
Russia is not in competition with Iran in tapping the South Asian market for gas. It is expedient for Russia if Iran gets deeply engaged in the Asian market (which includes two energy guzzlers - China and India) and, that, too, with Russian equity participation in the actual construction of Iran's pipeline to South Asia. That could lead to Gazprom's participation in the highly lucrative distribution and retailing of Iranian gas in Pakistan, India and China.
The grand opening swiftly aproaches, and writers are beginning to consider the deeper geostrategic significance of Gwadar. yet we still don't really know that much about it.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
It is expected that with Gwadar port operational, Pakistan will become a key player in the Persian Gulf region and serve as an energy corridor for Central Asia, South Asia and western China. With the exception of Chahbahar port in Iran, Gwadar will be the only free port between Dubai and Colombo providing container storage and warehousing facilities...
Pakistan plans to spend $7 billion in the next eight years to improve the country's road infrastructure, completing a network linking China and South Asia through Gwadar by 2014.
Because of its geo-strategic location, Gwadar has the potential to become a regional maritime hub. The 14.5-meter draft of the port will be able to accommodate up to "fifth-generation" ships, including Panamax and mother vessels.
Islamabad firmly believes that the Gwadar port is a key entry point for energy supplies for Central and South Asia, as well as western China. It will allow the expansion of oil trade in the region, as it provides the shortest possible route to landlocked, oil-rich Central Asian states.
From the man who brought us the 'Beijing Consensus' comes this:
China's National Image
The report argues that China's national image is its greatest strategic threat. The misalignment between China's image of itself and how it is viewed by the rest of the world is China’s major challenge. The report argues that alongside its other reforms, China needs a 'fifth transition' if the trust and understanding necessary for the next stage of its development are to be achieved.
JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, author of Brand China says in the report:
“China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image. The country is not, in the short term, likely to be invaded.
“China’s image of herself and other nations’ views of her are out of alignment. The world’s view of China is too often an unstable cocktail of out-of-date ideas, wild hopes and unshakeable prejudices and fears. China’s view of herself often teeters between self-confidence and insecurity, between caution and arrogance.
This is a very astute observation. I sometimes found teaching 'Western Culture' to students with a very fixed perception of China and the outside world a very perplexing task while I lived in Shanghai, and I'm sure those undergraduates were not unique.
States are not all alike, and China is more unequal than others. The way in which the state and its people perceive itself is fundamental to its behaviour in the international arena, yet this is an area that is often rarely discussed. Yet it is crucial to the way that we on the outside see China too, and is a critical tool in arriving at a better mutual understanding.
Speaking ahead of the launch of Brand China, FENG ZHANG, China Programme Manager at the Foreign Policy Centre said
“The phrase Peaceful Rise, which has been used by China’s image makers for several years, has often backfired. Rather than feeling reassured, China’s critics instead use the slogan to demonstrate China’s untrustworthiness. In the current climate, with China’s military buildup, and satellites being destroyed, the idea of a Peaceful Rise is not going to convince the rest of the world.”
More below, or download the report from the link above.
Continue reading "Brand China" »
One thing that continually irritates me about academics is their blind acceptance of the 'China-will-become-a-democracy-eventually' hypothesis, a beloved fantasy that here is dubbed the 'Soothing Scenario'. And, I must admit, that my own opinion that China could buckle under the pressures of nationalism and disenfranchisment has also been done to death.
However, a recent report looks in detail at an alternative (also seen at The Peking Duck)
The View from Taiwan: China expert's Testimony before US China Panel
What if China manages to continue on its current economic path and yet its political system does not change in any fundamental way? What if, twenty-five or thirty years from now, a wealthier, more powerful China continues to be run by a one-party regime that continues to repress organized political dissent much as it does today; and yet at the same time China is also open to the outside world and, indeed, is deeply intertwined with the rest of the world through trade, investment and other economic ties? Everyone assumes that the Chinese political system is going to open up – but what if it doesn't?...
In sum, I think the paradigm of inevitable change impairs America's thinking and its public discussion of China today. The paradigm prevents us from coming up with policies towards a China whose political may not change, in any fundamental way, for a long time. But I think the paradigm of inevitable change will endure -- that whenever American leaders talk in public about China, we will continue to hear some version or another of the Soothing Scenario.
A very good point indeed. And basically, the scenario is based on the CCP successfully doing what they are doing now - maintaining their own power and social stability at the same time. But you can't account for events - which have a habit of messing up ever single prediction ever made.
You don't say, India. About time too.
IndianExpress.com :: We don’t envy China, will rather emulate it, says FM
Recognising China’s prowess in attracting and implementing infrastructure projects, finance minister P. Chidambaram today said India needs to “emulate” China in infrastructure development.
Despite having a different political environment, he said India can learn from China about execution of projects on time. This according to the FM includes enforcing a disciplined on those leading project execution, along with a reward-punishment incentive structure.
Can Europe Help Tame China’s Environmental Nemesis?
 BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | China admits to climate failings
"Compared with social and economic modernisation, China's ecological modernisation lags far behind," said the research group's director, He Chuanqi.
Damn right. The single most terrifying thing about China is its rampant and relentless self-destruction - a policy which one day could implode with apocalyptic consequences. But what can any of us do about it?
The European Union is China's biggest trading partner: in 2004, trade levels stood at €160 billion. And with financial flows this high, inevitably relations between the two economic giants transcend business alone.
According to liberal and constructivist theorists, the increasing interdependence brought by globalisation brings about a slow but steady ‘diffusion’ of norms and standards across national borders and even continents. The EU itself is a good example of the spread of ideas from country to country, both as a stimulus to and a result of the integration process.
With this in mind, it stands to reason that the EU should be able to ‘diffuse’ its ideas to countries like China. Actually doing so, however, is easier said than done. This paper below looks at how, rather than trying to directly introduce human rights and democracy, Europe can penetrate both China’s economy and its political sphere with ‘green’ values instead.
Download Word file or read main text below. (See Word file for bibliography and footnotes).
Continue reading "Greening the Smoking Dragon" »
A likely successor to President Niyazov of Turkmenistan has emerged in the shape of a former dentist and health minister, the deliciously unpronouncable Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. By the sounds of it, he is going to be very much a puppet of the security services: we shall see.
However, what is more certain is that the parlous state of Turkmenistan is still a likely spark for tension and instability. Agriculture and the energy industry are in meltdown, and various vultures - not just Russia, but China and India too, are hovering. 'Elections' will be held on 11 February, but whether or not Turkmenistan can be turned around without disintegration and intervention is open to debate.
Turkmenistan's new father | Economist.com
One possible scenario would be for the new president to take Turkmenistan some way along the path followed by Kazakhstan, and make the country more welcoming to foreign investment. Turkmenistan has what are believed to be among the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. BP’s conservative official estimate is 2.9trn cubic metres, but the Turkmen authorities claim gas the true figure is up to 20bn cu metres. Even if reserves are only half this level, Turkmenistan would rank above major gas producers such as Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria.
In recent years, Turkmenistan’s gas output has been around 63bn cu metres per year, the majority of which is exported to Russia and Ukraine. The sanctity of long-term deals was always open to question, as Mr Niyazov tended to renege on agreements once a more lucrative offer was on the table. If the gas sector is to be opened up, Russian capital could face serious competition from Western and Chinese companies, as well as Indian. This in turn would open the question of export routes—whether to the West via the Caspian Sea (from where Turkmen gas could conceivably utilise existing pipelines) or to the East to China (perhaps via Kazakhstan, which is due to complete a pipeline to China around 2009). Any redirection of Turkmenistan’s gas exports could have potentially severe repercussions; for it would deprive Russian monopoly Gazprom of sizeable volumes of gas that it is counting on to meet its domestic supply and export commitments.
I never thought I'd end up the same political street as Will Hutton, celebrated socialist British economist and former editor of The Observer. I'm also a little suspicious of his sudden all-seeing-eye on China, since he spent most of his career writing on purely British or European issues.
However, if figures as respected as Hutton are coming up with assessments like this, then it's time to get very concerned indeed:
Dire straits in the East China Sea | Comment | The Observer
China protests that it wants to continue to rise peacefully and does not want to disturb the current world order. It has renounced Maoism, proclaim Western intellectuals, and its aims are surely are capitalist economic growth not mounting invasions. Thus both its neighbours and the West comfort themselves.
The problem is that China has only partially renounced Maoism; the apparatus of dictatorship and one-party rule remain firmly in place but with no viable ideology to justify it. It is a highly unstable, wasteful and inefficient system which is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The party's first claim to legitimacy is that so far it has worked. And its second claim to legitimacy is its appeal to Chinese nationalism. It is the custodian of a strong China that keeps foreigners at bay. Jobs and nationalism would be the only two pillars on which Chinese communism could sustain power, Deng Xiaoping told the party after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Deliver those and it might hold off political challenge. It has. Even Chinese history taught in schools plays up the threat from foreigners, eliminates any Chinese atrocities and emphasises the role of the party as China's saviour. Whenever it has suited the party's interest is has turned to nationalism; it raised 46 million e-signatures last year to oppose Japan winning a seat on the UN Security Council.
I'm afraid to say that while his comments on Maoism are a little skewiff, when it comes to nationalism Hutton is dead-on. If there were two things that terrified me about China during my stay there, it was the wholesale and unapologetic destruction of the environment and the unquestioning rise of nationalism, even among the educated elites.
As always, it comes down to the Taiwan question. For Hutton, the satellite shoot-down made it a question of "not if but when". Despite other entries on this blog, I'm not convinced that war is the only option - if anything, the missile test was a show of force designed to demonstrate capability and thus head off actual combat. But as every poker player knows, it just takes one player to call your bluff.
Since 2000 the Democratic Progressive party, pledged to a fully-fledged independent Taiwanese state, has won two presidential elections. Beijing is increasingly concerned that the possibility of recovering of Taiwan is slipping away.
An invasion would be high-risk. There is only operational airspace over Taiwan for 300 fourth-generation fighters; Taiwan has 300. It would take 1,000 landing craft up to a fortnight to move 30 infantry divisions across the Taiwan Strait - all the time exposed to American and Japanese retaliation. But if the US's command and control satellite network could be knocked out, suddenly the risks would be dramatically reduced. On top, the US is increasingly focusing its military effort in the Middle East. All China needs is a fortnight.
Very few in Europe understand the Bismarkian, pre-1914 Europe feel to Asian great power politics. In February 2005, China issued an ultimatum to Japan over its occupation of the oil-rich Senkaku Islands; withdraw or face the consequences, sending a five-strong fleet to the islands. Japan responded by putting 55,000 men on alert. Both sides backed off. But China distrusts renascent Japanese nationalism, especially with Japan's now stated wish to change its pacifist constitution. Asia is a powder keg of competing nationalisms, battles for scarce energy resources and unresolved mutual enmities.
The West is indeed blinded by China's economic rise. Yes, one day democracy may come, but to complacently assume that it will gradually develop without a major crisis is naive to the extreme.
It's increasingly beginning to look like China has the initiative in the Middle East, not the US. The lynchpin is Iran. Can Washington and Beijing cooperate to head off the incipient crisis? China is one of the only actors that might persuade Iran to stop its "flinty tongue" and save it from itself, but wll the US trust it do so?
Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.
China's Middle East strategy is brilliant. It is a multi-splendored thing. There is great adventure in it insofar as it almost overlooks the so-called non-state actors that one hears so much about in the Middle East - let us say with a dash of Marxian idiom, the "forces of history". China's strategy is cautious, yet pragmatic. It is, arguably, near optimal.
Thus, despite the United States' defeat in the Middle East, China will not take on a condescending attitude toward Washington. On the contrary, this is the time for China to cooperate. If the Bush administration were to work out a withdrawal of US forces from Iraq by manipulating the introduction of a pro-Western Arab military force under United Nations mandate, China would have no problem. China might even counsel Iran to take the bitter pill. China is working hard to expand its influence at the same time with the various Middle East protagonists - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
I think we can forget about this 'China's Peaceful Rise' myth. This month's missile test puts things into perspective - any weapon designed to knock out enemy satellites is not a passive defence but an aggressive capability.
Of course, it may not all be bad: Reagan's 'Star Wars' programme arguably sealed the deal for Gorbachev, forcing him to draw down the arms race leading to the ultimate end of the Eastern bloc. And it would also be hypocritical to suggest that Washington is in any way whiter-than-white, since it is not.
But it's also important to consider why China is doing this. It is not, whatever it may say, under any kind of existential threat from its neighbours. Neither the US, Japan or Taiwan have the will or means to do anything nasty to the PRC.
No, as any defence expert will tell you, the system is intended to knock out enemy communications, surveillance and media satellites - which is what you would do in the first hour of an attack on somewhere like, say...
China hails satellite killer - and stuns its rivals in space | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
The test was especially troubling because it exposed the vulnerability of America's dependence on low-orbiting satellites, which are used for military communications, smart bombs and surveillance. In theory, last week's exercise could give Beijing the capability to knock out such satellites - a realisation that underlay the protests from Washington.
Australia and Canada also voiced concerns; Britain, South Korea and Japan were expected to follow. "The US believes China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation that both countries aspire to in the civil space area," Gordon Johndroe, a White House spokesman, said. "We and other countries have expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese."
Original Aviation Week release is here. Its conclusion:
Although more of a "policy weapon" at this time, the test shows that the Chinese military can threaten the imaging reconnaissance satellites operated by the U. S., Japan, Russia, Israel and Europe.
The Republic of China also operates a small imaging spacecraft that can photograph objects as small as about 10 ft. in size, a capability good enough to count cruise missiles pointed at Taiwan from the Chinese mainland. The Taiwanese in the past have also leased capability on an Israeli reconnaissance satellite.
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Update: Now that the armchair generals have had some time to digest this, the received wisdom is that the test is less about the capability than the signal of intent. It's a brash invitation to the US to re-open the space race, and a not-so-subtle warning to Japan and Taiwan that China is now the boss and they had better not do anything silly like revive a military element to foreign policy or declare independence.
On the other hand, is it also evidence that the PLA is and will act in disregard of CCP wishes, and is thus a sign of a growing schism within the elite?
USCC report here and Jamestown Foundation report here.
 In other circumstances, I would cry 'nationalism' but in this case I'm with the Chinese. To have a Starbucks in the middle of the Forbidden City is indeed sacriligious (though in other senses it was an apt symbol of globalization, and was a warm place to take refuge in Beijing's sub-zero temperatures when I visited in January 2004).
Between the lines, there is a subtext here, that of the growing power of civil society via the Internet. Petitioning is in fact an age-old method used by the Chinese masses to address those in authority. It doesn't always work, of course: the Tiananmen protestors tried petitioning before turning to civil disobedience with the bloody consequences that followed. But they did that because the petition was ignored.
And the web offers opportunities for low-key mass protest petitioning like never before. Taking Starbucks out of the Forbidden City is trivial in itself, as were various recent campaigns against dog licensing etc.. But on the other hand, campaigns against dams and pollution etc. which directly impinge upon local and central government jusrisdiction - have been rather successful. My recent paper on EU-China relations (which will be published here in due course) deals with the grass-roots democracy that the 'non-political' protest movement is engendering.
As the web grows in popularity, the authorities may need to come up with ways to deal with this subtle but effective manifestation of people power. It is only a matter of time before web petitions turn to more serious issues, and if the people see they are being ignored then they can more easily join forces via their Internet networks to try something else.
Starbucks faces eviction from the Forbidden City | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
The trigger was a blog entry posted on Monday by Rui Chenggang, a TV anchorman, who called for a web campaign against the outlet that, he wrote in his blog, "tramples over over Chinese culture".
According to local media, half a million people have signed his online petition and dozens of newspapers have carried prominent stories about the controversy. "The Starbucks was put here six years ago, but back then, we didn't have blogs. This campaign is living proof of the power of the web", said Rui. "The Forbidden City is a symbol of China's cultural heritage. Starbucks in a symbol of lower middle class culture in the west. We need to embrace the world, but we also need to preserve our cultural identity. There is a fine line between globalisation and contamination.
If I had the collaterol, I'd set up a Chinese restaurant and a chain of KTV parlours. Or invest in a few security companies.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Chinese eye Pakistan's real estate
Gwadar is another area where China's stake in real estate will prove strategic. After the completion of the deepsea port project, Gwadar is likely to emerge as a South Asian business hub and modern investment center. Property in Gwadar is considered a good investment and the speculative trade in real estate is booming there.
Islamabad has plans to establish hotels, motels, playgrounds, boating clubs, theme parks, marinas and other recreation projects in Gwadar. The future port city will be connected to the rest of the country by land, sea and air links. The government has decided to set up a tax-free industrial zone of international standard in Gwadar and it has acquired about 4,050 hectares of land for this purpose. Housing schemes and highrise construction on commercial plots are planned and will be up to international standards.
Officials in Islamabad claim that leading international investors have shown keen interest in Gwadar because of its strategic location and potential for becoming a major transshipment trade center in the region. Chinese companies are likely to invest in real-estate projects in the second phase of the Gwadar seaport project.
Gwadar and oil politics -DAWN - Business; January 15, 2007
China needs Gwadar port facilities for future oil and gas imports. While there is a suggestion in Pakistan that Gwadar should be declared a free oil port, Beijing is reportedly negotiating with Islamabad for around five oil and gas pipelines from Central Asian Republics (CARs).
China has shown interest in a trans-Himalayan pipeline to carry the Middle Eastern crude to western China. It would allow Beijing to reduce the portion of its oil shipped through the narrow and unsafe strait of Malacca carrying up to 80pc of its oil imports. The proposed pipeline would link Gwadar port with China's remote western regions, and it would be partly financed by Beijing.
Energy and emissions are bursting onto the mainstream political agenda in a big way already in 2007. First there was the announcement of an EU common energy policy initiative, and now 16 Asian and Pacific states, including Japan, China and India, are bundling on board.
Of course, both are too little too late, but still, it's better than nothing. It is only through the realisation that energy and the enviornment are common problems that need common solutions that conflict can be avoided, and that has to be a good thing.
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Asian states sign key energy deal
Not as facetious as it may appear. Though bringing its population under control was a burning necessity, the long-term effects of the one-child policy are only just coming into view. No country has ever attempted anything like this on such a scale before, and in the not-too-distant future the first generation of the policy will be saddled with their elderly parents.
Meanwhile, as any visitor to Shanghai will tell you, the sex industry is booming. It's not just a symptom of wifeless young men, of course, but also of the economic boom on the east coast. With the menfolk heading to the big cities in search of construction work, as often as not women end up migrating to urban areas as sex workers. It's a sad story that will only get sadder as the true implications emerge.
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Chinese facing shortage of wives
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Syphilis rates 'soaring in China'
It is becoming more and more obvious by the day that the post-Cold War world is not, after all, multipolar but bipolar. The great powers are the US and China. This is especially obvious when it comes to Middle East affairs, though interests coincide as much as they conflict. Of course, the biggest leveller is energy security - and that's the central objective for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese foreign policy | A quintet, anyone? | Economist.com
Never mind that China, in the more than four years since it appointed a special envoy to the Middle East, has offered no original ideas. To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-exporting countries, China has rapidly emerged since the 1990s as a big customer and investor. Some 45% of China's oil imports from January to November last year were from the Middle East. To countries such as Iran and Syria, eager to check American power in the region, China's veto power at the UN and its shared misgivings about America make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy...
China worries about its dependence on American military might for the security of its oil shipments from the Middle East. It is still a long way from being able to project military power over such a distance itself, though a Chinese official was quoted in the state-owned press this week as saying China had the ability to build an aircraft carrier, but had not decided when to do so. China is trying to diversify its sources of energy, buying more from Russia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.
But experts predict that China will long remain heavily dependent on energy from the Middle East. So it has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with America's tactics, but will share the same broad objective. Jeffrey Bader, a former senior American diplomat now at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, DC, says that China's resistance to American initiatives in Sudan and Iran depends on Russian support for its position. If Russia were to switch sides, so too would China, he argues. It is in no mood to take on America alone.
A dismal assessment of 'rising China' by Britian's leading economist, Will Hutton. Being merely an excerpt from a book, the article lacks detail, but Hutton's basic concern is that the system cannot hold. We shall see.
Power, corruption and lies | Extracts | Guardian Unlimited Books
The truth is that China is not the socialist market economy the party describes, nor moving towards capitalism as the western consensus believes. Rather it is frozen in a structure that I describe as Leninist corporatism - and which is unstable, monumentally inefficient, dependent upon the expropriation of peasant savings on a grand scale, colossally unequal and ultimately unsustainable. It is Leninist in that the party still follows Lenin's dictum of being the vanguard, monopoly political driver and controller of the economy and society. And it is corporatist because the framework for all economic activity in China is one of central management and coordination from which no economic actor, however humble, can opt out.
The PLA is not known for its frequent overseas sojourns and joint exercises, so it's significant that the partner this time around is Pakistan. Also worth noting is the rhetoric on the evils of 'terrorism' and 'separatism' - one man's terrorist etc. etc...
Xinhua - English
"For many years Pakistan and China have focused on economic development and regional stability. At the same time, we are confronting the three evil forces, terrorism, extremism and separatism. China is ready to conduct anti-terrorism with Pakistan to construct the area of lasting peace and mutual prosperity," said Lieutenant General Lu Dengming, Chief of Staff of the Chengdu military region of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).
You don't need a degree in development economics to see who the winners and losers will be. Despite China's economy relying on manufactured exports to the West, it still invests nearly twice as much in R&D as India; I dread to think what levels it spends on infrastructure.
In fact, according to the OECD, China will soon be the world's second-biggest R&D spender in dollar terms - $136bn this year as opposed to Japan's $130bn and America's impressive $330bn. You have to hand it to the PRC though - they are full of good sense on a lot of things (shame about the environment).
Europe, on the other hand, would do well to up its spending and encourage the things that it is good at - technology and services - rather than buckling to domestic pressures from trade unions and farmers. I know who the smart money is on.
India’s R&D spend lower than China’s
India’s expenditure on research and development is 0.7% of its gross domestic product (GDP) as compared with China’s 1.2%.
Minister of state for HRD D Purandeswari told the Upper House in a reply that North America spends 2.7%, Japan 3.1% and the European Union 1.8% of their GDP in R&D.
China is investing ever more in Pakistan, particularly with regard to Gwadar in Balochistan. What the benefits for Pakistan are unclear, other than the general boost to the local economy, since most of the cash is going towards Chinese self-interest.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - China's growing stake in Pakistan
Under the FTA signed last week, Pakistan will gain access to the vast Chinese market, while China will sell Pakistan more and more goods, as well as get cheap raw materials and the use of Pakistani ports for the onward export of its goods to world destinations at reduced freight rates.
The biggest chunk of Chinese investment in Pakistan is being spent on development projects in the country's largest province, strategically located Balochistan. The most important projects being launched with Chinese assistance in Pakistan include construction of the Gwadar deepsea port in Mekran, the Saindak copper and gold project in Chaghm, and the lead-zinc-mining project in Balochistan's Lasbela district.
The Chinese have invested about $230 million in the Gwadar port and the Saindak copper project, which is more than 50% of their total investment in the country.
Well, it would suit Saudi fine. No unwelcome criticism of its human rights record; no irritating demands from Indian and Pakistani workers; just a customer willing to pay high prices for the product. Win-win, apart from the loss of the US security umbrella - but that in itself is a provocation to the Islamist element and arguably makes the Middle East more unsafe.
New Saudi alignment with China could challenge U.S|In Depth|Reuters.com
Chietigj Bajpaee, research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., said China risks being seen as trying to "lock up" Saudi oil at the expense of Washington, or India, another Asian tiger economy with a billion-plus population and a voracious appetite for oil.
"(China and the United States) have an increasingly symbiotic relationship," Bajpaee said. "This has led to fears in the United States that China is encroaching into its 'sphere of influence' and undermining relations with its traditional allies."
Hu Jintao's visit to India and Pakistan raises interesting questions. The much-vaunted Pakistan-China nuclear deal has so far failed to materialise, presumably either due to pressure from manmohan Singh, or a realisation by Beijing that to encourage Pakistan too much would create an uneasy balance of power along nuclear superpower axes (US-India and China-Pakistan).
Even trickier for China is the fact that its growing economic and political strength means that it can no longer sit back and mumble its non-intervention mantra. It has to play a part in global affairs, like it or not, and it's in South Asia that it perhaps faces its sternest test. Undoubtedly, China is becoming ever more locked in to the world environment it for so long sought to avoid.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistan - China: Is it really all smiles?
According to Dr Rizvi, China has realised that if it is to play a dominant role in the region, it must first establish its credentials as an "ambassador of peace" in the region.
This could be the toughest bit for Pakistan to swallow.
In essence, it means China may no longer be prepared to be a silent spectator to the many conflicts that Pakistan is involved in.
Nor can it be seen to be lending Pakistan any form of moral, political or material support for its policy of maintaining "low-intensity conflict" with its troubled neighbours.
China may also become more sensitive towards local insurgencies such as the one in Balochistan where it is helping Pakistan build an alternative port that is billed as the gateway to Central Asia.
 If the world were a democracy, 'Chindia' would have the casting vote for sure. But it's not, and the relationship between the Asian giants is a complex one, without doubt.
The Economist is swift to point out the theory:
The appealing notion here is that India and China have complementary economies. China, through its burgeoning factories, is the world’s workshop. India, with its fast-growing IT and outsourcing firms, is becoming the world's back office. With Chinese hardware providing the orchestra and Indian software writing the score, surely they can make beautiful music together?
But it does not gloss over the reality:
The current complementarity in Chindian economic ties, such as it is, looks rather old-fashioned, even colonial. India exports raw materials to China, especially iron ore, and imports cheap Chinese manufactures in exchange.
In future, fierce competition is more likely than closer co-operation. Efforts to join forces in a global search for energy security are unlikely to overcome deeply ingrained Indian suspicions of China. The mistrust dates back to India’s humiliating defeat in the India-China war of 1962, and is fed by China's ties to Pakistan. It still impedes trade and investment. Chinese firms find it hard to secure visas for their staff in India, and are excluded from some projects, such as running ports.
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