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South Asia: rags and riches in the lands of extremes
Sorry Brazil, in this analysis the 'big four' are the contender states, Eurasian military-economic powers Russia, India and China plus the rival-cum-ally, the US.
Interesting that coinciding with a Condi trip to Beijing comes a possible US military deal with New Delhi that might undermine Russia's virtual monopoly over its defence equipment. Russia continues to supply China, of course, no big.
If India were to become dependent on the US both for nuclear power, Gulf-related energy security and military hardware, that truly would seal it into Washington's orbit as anti-American social forces in Pakistan begin to spin away and thus towards China instead.
Also interesting to note that China's defence budget took another leap last year, as revealed in the annual Pentagon estimate. Part of the 18% hike is probably down to rising oil and food prices, but there can be no doubt that China is building up its capability while hardly making a major contribution to UN peacekeeping (as does India).
All things being considered, it looks like simple geopolitics to me.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Gates' talking points in Delhi related primarily to defense trade. India's procurement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft in a deal estimated at $10 billion - and possibly, as high as $ 16 billion - was number one priority for him and for the American defense contractors accompanying him. The principal bidders include Lockheed Martin's F-16 and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet.
The importance of the deal is not only commercial, but that the new generation aircraft will be in use with the Indian Air Force for the next 40-year period and, therefore, clinching the deal becomes absolutely vital for the US if it is to aim at "inter-operability" with India. Gates knows it is the sort of deal that will ensure US-India military-to-military cooperation becomes irreversible and pin India down as the US's strategic ally in the region...
Gates expressed satisfaction over the entry that the US has made in the Indian market, which is traditionally dominated by Russia. He said, "We have tried for some years now to get a seat at the table, and we're finally there." Washington is determined to throw Russia out of the Indian defense market in the coming years. The assertiveness of the US sales pitch is evident from the remark by a US official in Gates's entourage, "When you go into joint production [and] cooperative development [with the US], you're getting not only the best product in the world, but you have the best support system, the best maintenance package over the life of the product. You also have companies that operate with integrity, which is different than what India has seen with other partners in the world. We're very transparent."
Interesting to see US intelligence crawl out of the shadows again, this time making strong comments about Afghanistan. Like the Iran report back in December, this seems to be a sign of a growing political movement within the intelligence community, perhaps a reaction to the misunderstandings of the role of intelligence that led to the failure in Iraq.
Afghanistan mission close to failing - US | World news | The Guardian
After six years of US-led military support and billions of pounds in aid, security in Afghanistan is "deteriorating" and President Hamid Karzai's government controls less than a third of the country, America's top intelligence official has admitted.
Mike McConnell testified in Washington that Karzai controls about 30% of Afghanistan and the Taliban 10%, and the remainder is under tribal control...
But the gloomy comments echoed even more strongly worded recent reports by thinktanks, including one headed by the former Nato commander General James Jones, which concluded that "urgent changes" were required now to "prevent Afghanistan becoming a failed state".
General Jones's comment requires a little deconstruction: Afghanistan is not going to "become a failed state" - it has pretty much always been one. I would argue that it is not even a state at all, dominated as it is by tribal factions.
McConnell mentions that "Karzai controls about 30% of Afghanistan and the Taliban 10%, and the remainder is under tribal control." There's your key. Rather than 'Afghanisation', it may be better to recognise that the 60% under tribal control is the key ground. Just as with Pakistan's NWFP, it's impossible to rule over these chaps in a conventional manner - so why try?
The way to bring stability is to support local governance networks and hope that security and development will mean that they in turn don't support the Taliban. Unfortunately that means massive amounts of troops and cash, not the paltry 30,000 troops or so under ISAF and the other 30,000 separately-led and counter-productive US contingent.
Force multipliers such as PNGs and AH-64s help, but do not solve the problem of space. To cover an area as large as Afghanistan you need a lot more than that. Can't find the stats but I'm sure that there was ten times that number in the initial occupation of Germany post-WW2. Boots on the ground.
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
 Contrary to my expectations, Pakistan appeared to have behaved very sensibly in this critical election. Despite the violence preceding the ballot, with the eyes of the world upon him, Musharraf neither imposed damaging restrictions on the process of democracy nor attempted to rig the poll.
The people themselves chose as wisely as they could under the circumstances, and the Islamist MMA was routed - illustrating a laudable commitment to secularist politics.
Furthermore, Bhutto's tainted widower, Asif Zardari, will not stand for prime minister which is quite a relief. That does leave us, however, with a major question: is there anyone out there with the strength and popular support to lead the country?
Reinstating Nawaz Sharif would be a major mistake: an Islamist appeaser in the mould of General Zia, he is demonstrably not a safe pair of hands. Musharraf's initial coup in 1999 was something of a deliverance.
But no name springs to mind that could hold together a PPP/PML(N) coalition for long, even if the bombers don't strike first. If the civilian leadership proves weak, and begins to crack under pressure from the US to take more decisive action on the militants, would the army or ISI effect another coup?
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistan parties agree coalition
"We will work together to form the government in the centre and in the provinces," Mr Sharif, head of the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N), said at a joint news conference with Mr Zardari.
He said the two parties had agreed that the country's chief justice, sacked by President Musharraf in November, should be immediately reinstated.
Mr Zardari said there was "a lot of ground to cover" between the two parties, but "in principle, we have agreed to stay together".
Doubts remain about who will emerge as a possible prime minister.
Can Musharaff, the PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) forge a workable coalition? If not, which will be the first to go?
Musharraf's party admits defeat | World news | guardian.co.uk
As president, Musharraf, a former army chief, did not contest the elections, aimed at completing a transition to civilian rule, but the outcome could hasten his political demise.
"It's the moment of truth for the president," Abbas Nasir, the editor of the Dawn newspaper told Reuters. "There will be thoughts swirling in his mind, whether he can forge a working relationship with two parties whose leadership he kept out of the country."
And something else to consider:
The results could hold important implications for the US-led "war on terror", especially Pakistani military operations against al-Qaida and Taliban-style militants in the border areas with Afghanistan.
Sharif and others have called for dialogue with the extremists and have criticised military operations in the area because of heavy civilian casualties.
What would that mean for Afghanistan and US policy in the region? Can the US accept the result?
Suppose that would make it the IPC. Need to source this article, but it's potentially significant. All of course rests on the outcome of Pakistan's election on 18 February.
It comes against the backdrop of an Indian admiral's concerns about Gwadar and its "serious strategic implications for India".
China ready to join gas pipeline project if India stays away - International Business-News-The Economic Times
ISLAMABAD: China is ready to join Pakistan and Iran to build a pipeline to transport Iranian gas if India does not participate in the project, the media reported on Monday.
Pakistan plans to import 2.2 billion cubic feet of gas a day from Iran through the pipeline and has said it is willing to consume an additional 1.05 billion cubic feet of gas if India does not join the project.
China has told Pakistan that it is interested in importing the additional gas if India does not join the project, sources. The sources also said Iran has no objection to exporting gas to China.
Pakistan and Iran have finalised a gas purchase agreement. However, Pakistan and India have been unable to narrow their differences over the transit fee to be charged by Islamabad for the Iranian gas.
Reports from India have suggested that it will hold discussions with Pakistan on the pipeline once a new government is formed in the country after the February 18 general election.
In case China joins the project, the pipeline might pass through Gilgit in Pakistan's Northern Area, the sources said. Pakistan has already approved a project in the same area to widen the Karakoram Highway that links it to China.
Pakistan also plans to extend a railway track to China to connect the neighbouring country to the Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast. Chinese experts will visit Pakistan to finalise the route of the pipeline if Beijing joins the project, the sources said.
Iran and Pakistan might sign the gas purchase agreement on February 24, the sources said.
If there's one thing that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - and arguably, sad to say, Vietnam - have proved is that in order to bring peace and stability to a country you need a lot of troops, a lot of money and a lot of time. All of them must be spent wisely.
That was the essence of Donald Rumsfeld's disastrous failure of vision, the deeply misguided belief that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs was the be all and end all. But he eventually found out that once the high-tempo warfighting phase is over, then the force multipliers of US technology count for nothing.
Incredibly, the US Army has only just redrafted its manual to suggest that "stabilising countries and winning over locals required more than just military skills... and knowledge of foreign languages and local cultures are also important." Duh. That says it all.
That's why developments in NATO are alarming. The SecGen attempts to gloss over the problem, but it's certainly the case that many of the old European nations are still cashing in on the post-Cold War peace dividend. Times have changed, however. At least France under Sarkozy is beginning to pull its weight.
What NATO has to do is create a virtuous circle in Pakistan: contain the Taliban long enough for development and prosperity to flourish, which in turn will provide people with an alternative to fighting for scarce resources and political control. For that there need to be boots on the ground, because one thing's for sure - there's plenty more where the Taliban came from.
Nato crisis grows over Afghan troops | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited
In Washington on Wednesday Gates told the House of Representatives' armed services committee that the alliance could split into countries that were "willing to fight and die to protect people's security and those who were not". He added: "My view is you can't have some allies whose sons and daughters die in combat and other allies who are shielded from that kind of a sacrifice."
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato's secretary-general, said more forces were needed to combat Taliban and al-Qaida violence but dismissed Gates' suggestion that Nato could become a "two-tiered alliance" based on a country's willingness to fight. "I do not see a two-tier alliance, there is one alliance," he said as he arrived for the Vilnius meeting.
The pertinent point in the analysis below is perhaps overlooked. The problem with American democracy, from a non-American point of view, is that it is almost wholly concerned with issues of domestic policy. Iraq maybe, but that's because it has a direct and visible effect on the voting population.
However, as the writer points out, the responsibility of the Presidential office more often than not turns to foreign policy, like it or not. Yet it's not something the candidates are judged upon until their baptism of fire - as we saw with Bush and his pet goat.
Super Tuesday neglects Pakistan at America’s peril
Heading towards Super Tuesday, Pakistan has dropped off the radar of the primaries although it is the most likely place for the next civil war between Islamic terrorists and civilians. It might even become a cause of war with India and near total loss of American influence in the entire region.
Terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists supported by the Taliban and Al Qaeda has spread almost all across Pakistan. Terrorists killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and have attacked Air Force and Army personnel near military bases. Nearly half of Pakistani territory from Baluchistan to the North West Frontier is unstable and extremists seem to fear the army less.
Yet, none of the Presidential candidates seem to be aware of the dangers inherent in this situation for America, which is deeply engaged in the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts while trying to win over India as a strategic counterweight to China.
 Next Thursday, 7 February, sees the beginning of the Chinese Year of the Rat, the first in the Chinese Zodiac cycle. No, this isn't some cod astrological analysis: but it does put a little bit of mystical context in. Just look at all the international factors that are just about to converge and you'll see what I mean.
Basically, the next weeks and months could see some rather serious developments in the global political picture.
Kosovo might soon be declaring independence, and despite dissent it looks like most of the international community is going to recognise it. What few realise is that, for Serbia, the secession of Kosovo would be a disaster of monumental proportions. And they're holding an election this weekend in which a hard-right president could be selected.
Already locking horns with the UK, Russia is probably going to stand by Serbia - which means increasing antagonism with the rest of Europe. I can certainly foresee the gas spigot getting turned off for a couple of days, which given the present frigid economic (let alone meteorological) climate could have a severe impact.
Speaking of elections, it's Super Tuesday this week, another moment that's going to define the course of things to come. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney or John McCain: the field of four will probably narrow down to two candidates for the top job in the world.
Not long after that, Monday 18 February is finally going to see elections in Pakistan. Whether rigged or not, there will inevitably be implications for regional stability.
Furthermore, set that against the context of Afghanistan. President Karzai has just shot his nation in the foot by turning away one of Britain's most competent statesmen, Lord Ashdown, as a potential UN envoy.
Moreover, NATO is lumbering towards a crisis with Germany refusing to pull its weight and Canada getting very cold feet in the face of what looks like sheer petulance from its allies. Thus, the NATO conference set for next week could well define the future of the mission, and general stability in Afghanistan. Condi is already jetting in do do her firewoman act.
We don't want to see either Pakistan or Afghanistan go down; both of them falling apart at the same time would be disastrous.
And finally, look at China.
Anyone who's queued for rail tickets at Spring Festival - even in a good year - will tell you what a nightmare it is. This year has seen the worst weather in half a century and chances are that the world's largest internal migration is not going to go ahead as planned. That means some unhappy chappies down Chinatown.
Add to that the very real danger of a food crisis - a failed crop could tip China over the edge - compounded by the general economic malaise and you have a recipe for civil unrest in Olympic year.
And finally, add to that a touch of spice in the form of an upcoming referendum in Taiwan (set for 22 March) and you have a fiery plate of noodles indeed.
In summary, there are various crises impending in Eastern Europe, South Asia and East Asia. The year 2008 could well be going for a bag of rats.
Pak's new port has strategic implications for India: Navy chief-India-The Times of India
The Gwadar port being built by Pakistan with Chinese assistance in its Baluchistan coast has "serious strategic implications for India", Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta has said.
"Being only 180 nautical miles from the exit of the Straits of Hormuz, Gwadar, being bulit in Baluchistan coast, would enable Pakistan take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers," he said delivering T S Narayanaswamy Memorial lecture in Chennai on Monday night.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
With Pakistan so desperate for the Chinese Yuan, could it be that Musharraf's recent consolidation of his power is in answer to Chinese demands for security and stability? Or would that be "interference in its internal affairs"?
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
The countries are seeking to triple bilateral trade to US$15 billion in the next five years from $4.2 billion in 2006 under a free-trade agreement signed just over 12 months ago. They recently signed agreements worth around $300 million under which Pakistani products would be exported to China, involving 15 Pakistani companies and covering goods such as cotton, chrome ore, leather and rapeseed meal.
The PCIC, established in July with paid-up capital of 4.25 billion rupees ($69 million) with the government in Islamabad a direct shareholder, will help Pakistan to secure Chinese investment in various sectors and help Pakistani exporters target openings in China, according to officials. The company will perform investment banking business on a commercial basis.
Asia Times reports on the $2bn China-Iran Yadaravan oil deal in the wake of the NIE estimate, and analyses the broader implications.
With China's opinion being that the US is now waking up to Iran as a regional power, it seems that India has been put in an awkward position - having already lost out on its dealings with Tehran in order to appease Washington.
Meanwhile, China has seized a massive mining deal in Afghanistan despite all India's efforts in the country (to the chagrin of pakistan). It would appear that New Delhi has made some geopolitical miscalculations.
...by the beginning of June, Chinese regional experts had already assessed, "Iran, with no geopolitical competitors, has become the 'boss' within the Persian Gulf region. Since the US has fallen into the Iraqi quagmire, Iran concludes that the United States dare not use force against Iran. Therefore, it maintains strong strategic determination and refuses to make concessions on the nuclear issue.
"This favorable environment, coupled with a strategic resolve, has earned Iran a certain status of equilibrium with the United States in the contest within the Persian Gulf region. It is this balance of power that has forced the United States to sit down and talk with Iran. Iran, hence, has won the battle for survival and the status of a regional power."
 It seems that there is a realisation now (as probably there always was) in Whitehall that there is no direct military solution to Afghanistan. The problem, however, is something of a chicken-and-egg situation: development will give the people the prosperity and stability they need to rid themselves of extremism, but without security there can be no development.
That's why some of the thinking outlined below is slightly worrying. Rushing things - as occurred under 'Vietnamisation' - will not improve the situation. At worst, it's merely a cover for an undignified retreat.
The battle of Musa Qula also has some uncomfortable analogies. Great that the town has been retaken - but why was it lost in the first place? That's just what went wrong in Vietnam: military victory on the ground was not backed up with long-term support. The Vietcong simply moved back in after the Americans left, as per Mao's doctrine of guerilla warfare.
The problem is that there are simply not enough NATO troops to do the job and the Afghan Army is not up to the job.
BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Dismantling the Taleban is the aim
The concept is that there are three tiers in the Taleban. The top tier is made up of the irreconcilable leadership. The second tier consists of locally based commanders and the bottom tier are the ordinary foot soldiers.
It is the second tier that is being targeted and the hope is that middle level commanders will bring a lot of the third tier with them. Some 5,000 ex-Taleban fighters are said to have come over before...
The buzzwords being used about Afghanistan right now are - Afghanistan, localisation, reconciliation, and (an old one) reconstruction.
The Guardian picks up and spins a recent pronouncement by Frederick Kagan of AEI. The operative paragraph and conclusion are below, and deserve a bit of picking apart.
A complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum? Highly unlikely. Kagan may say he is not "fear-mongering", but this statement is over the top. Whatever its problems, the moderate mainstream in Pakistan's civil society and the military is more than powerful enough to prevent that eventuality.
There again, it did happen in Iran, but circumstances now are not the same. It is correct, therefore, to make contingency plans, but not to push forward what is not yet an inevitable self-fulfilling prophecy.
A struggle within the Pakistani military? Also not likely. Undoubtedly there remain radicals in the ISI, but if nothing else Musharraf has probably purged the army of the extremist tendencies seen under General Zia, who was himself somewhat discredited by the end of his rule.
However, there is a distinct possibility of Islamabad losing control of the outer regions - some might say it has already done so. This does have implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and thus must be taken seriously.
The basic point is that Pakistan needs well-planned aid and support if its WMD are not to fall into the wrong hands. It's the kind of thinking that should have been deployed prior to the Iraq invasion, which after all was about the same thing - preventing access of the wrong people to WMD.
Finally, two things Kagan fails to mention are the China and India factors. He treats the subject as if it's entirely a US issue, which it is not. The two Asian powers have deep-set interests too, and must be part of the solution rather than allowed to become part of the problem.
Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem - New York Times
The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism...
The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.
Much has been written on Benazir Bhutto but less on Nawaz Sharif, the man who the then General Musharraf ousted in 1999. In many ways, Sharif is the worst option for the West which would like to broker some kind of artificial and inherently unstable alliance between Bhutto and Musharraf. But the Pakistani people may see it otherwise.
PINR - Intelligence Brief: Musharraf Gains an Edge and Increases Chances for Survival
Unlike Bhutto, Sharif is popular in nationalist and religious circles, in addition to military and intelligence ones. This support derives from his previous rule as a religious conservative, which was demonstrated by his support for the Taliban in the 1990s, and for his popular decision to test a nuclear weapon and declare Pakistan as a nuclear power despite U.S. protestations.
These very factors which make him popular among Pakistanis make him somewhat of a wild card to the United States. For instance, his return to Pakistan was orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, which has been a strong force behind Pakistan's Salafi/Wahhabi religious radicalism. Furthermore, one day after his return to Pakistan, Sharif said that the country should reassess its approach in the war on terrorism and consider meeting with militants in the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
 So it would appear that Musharraf is a General no longer, though undoubtedly his protege General Ashfaq Kiyani will closely follow his demands for the time being. Kyani is a former head of the ISI and this is also significant. Presumably he himself is already a man with great influence.
Amit Pandya reports from Pakistan, and his findings are a little surprising. But it is a good point that by her perceived closeness to Musharraf and the US, Bhutto has put herself in a tricky position in future elections.
Pandya also points out that for democracy to flourish, the opposition needs to unite, Islamists and the political mainstream alike, but at the time being this does not seem to be the case. Musharraf's gamble with the state of emergency may well have fractured any alliance against him but his doffing of his military role today and promise to end emergency rule once he is sworn in a civilian president will go a long way towards appeasing his US sponsors. He is perhaps more wily than we previously imagined.
Stimson - Pakistan’s Brighter Future: The View from the Ground
While not unimportant to Pakistanis, the principal demands of the US government are less important than the longer term political developments in the society. The elections to be held in a little over a month are not considered significant. Whether the General retires as Army Chief and serves as a civilian President has also become entirely unimportant. The key issue is whether he leads the country, and the actual role of the Army in the government.
The army remains indispensable to any future political order because of the tenacious hold that it has now established in the national economy, and because Pakistan, under any government however democratic, will face armed challenges from within or without. However, there has also been a widespread and growing sense that its long and repeated interference in politics has harmed both the political development of Pakistan and the integrity of its principal mission of national defense against the country’s enemies.
The main political parties, those with sufficient support to be political players in their own right, offered a poor alternative. Widely discredited by their tenures in government in the 1990s, both the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML(N)), were viewed askance by many Pakistanis of democratic conviction. Indeed, many considered the Musharraf regime’s survival a result of the public’s distrust of the large political parties.
Neat summary of Iran's political and commercial relationships with other nascent Asian powers. Includes some details on the IPI and Chinese economic influence.
PINR - Iran Looks for Allies through Asian and Latin American Partnerships
On the Asian continent, the Iranian strategic realignment seems to rely on organizational and bilateral cooperation, extending beyond existing relations with other "rogue states" such as North Korea. On the contrary, Iran aims at reaching out to U.S. allies or "friendly" countries, such as India and Pakistan, as well as to emerging global powers, especially to China.
OK, so Pakistan has been dismissed from the Commonwealth. Again. Mobilisation of shame, as our international law professor called it (to much derision from the small but vocal right wing of the classroom).
But it appears that Musharraf's gamble may be paying off after all. The State of Emergency looks like effectively bending the democratic process, not by eliminating the elections, but by provoking the opposition to withdraw in protest. This way, Musharraf wins without even having to rig the poll, which works very nicely for him.
And he can also hold his hands up and say that he's shedding his uniform too, with the judgement of his hand-picked supreme court all he needs to cloak himself in semi-legitimacy. Ms Bhutto might just have to return to the devil's bargain she was already making in order to gain any kind of influence at all. Which would suit the General (retd.) very nicely indeed.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Court opens options for Musharraf
Will the Supreme Court rulings serve as a trigger to restore the process of reconciliation between Gen Musharraf and Ms Bhutto?
The outcome appears to depend on two things; whether Gen Musharraf actually quits the army and whether he restores the constitution and the judiciary.
In the first case, the general view is that he will probably quit his army post as soon as the Election Commission has formally declared him winner of the October vote.
This is because Gen Musharraf badly needs to offer up something to the Western powers that have been pressuring him to end emergency rule.
Analysts say he may even lift emergency rule ahead of elections, due in the second week of January.
This would score points with Western powers. But it could also influence the domestic environment by dividing the opposition which is now threatening an election boycott and a united front if the constitution is not restored.
"It is a sad indictment of the current state of Afghanistan that the question now appears to be not if the Taliban will return to Kabul, but when ... and in what form. The oft-stated aim of reaching the city in 2008 appears more viable than ever and it is incumbent upon the international community to implement a new strategic paradigm before time runs out."
So says some hitherto unheard of thinktank, somewhat pessimistically perhaps, but they do have eyes and ears on the ground. The point is that without strength in depth and in numbers, NATO is not going to be able to hold ground it takes.
That's just what happened in Vietnam. US forces won most battles but lost the war due to bad politics and bad strategy.
Afghanistan 'falling into hands of Taliban' | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
The insurgency is divided into a largely poverty-driven "grassroots" component and a concentrated group of "hard-core militant Islamists", says the Senlis Council, which has an office in Kabul and field researchers based in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in southern Afghanistan.
It says that the Nato-led International Security Force of some 40,000 troops should be at least doubled and include forces from Muslim countries as well as Nato states which have refused to send troops to the country.
Brief profile of the guy responsible for the Islamist takeover in Swat.
Revolt in Pakistan’s NWFP: A Profile of Maulana Fazlullah of Swat
Maulana Fazlullah, who is now leading an extremist Islam-oriented insurgency in the valley of Swat in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, is the son-in-law of Maulana Sufi Mohammad, founder of the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM - Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws), which he established in 1989 (see Terrorism Monitor, November 30, 2005). In early 2002, TNSM was banned by the Pakistani government and Maulana Sufi Mohammad was sentenced to a prison term of seven years following a crackdown on jihadi organizations in the aftermath of 9/11 and President Musharraf’s collaboration with the U.S. global war on terrorism.
Fazlullah, born in 1975, was raised in a simple farmer’s family in Mam Dheray...
There had to be one, and note how this author neatly ties up all the conflicting elements in the current drama: internal opposition to Musharraf; the Balochistan rebellion; Afghanistan, America and the GWOT; China and Gwadar; India and Kashmir.
The essence of the article is that the current situation is all the result of an American plan to instigate regime change in Pakistan to advance its own interests. Of course much of the report is to be roundly dismissed. I particularly enjoyed this paragraph (I used to work at Jane's):
This was the perfect timing for the launch of Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, a book authored by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, a columnist for a Pakistani English-language paper and a correspondent for ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’, a private intelligence service founded by experts close to the British intelligence.
But the point is that the Pakistan situation is not clear-cut in that all Pakistanis favour democracy and Benazir Bhutto, as the Western powers would have us believe. There are still deep veins of paranoia at work, and it's these that enable the continuing dominance of the military and security forces.
Ahmed Quraishi.com
“We have indications of Indian involvement with anti-state elements in Pakistan,” declared the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office in a regular briefing in October. The statement was terse and direct and the spokesman, Ms. Tasnim Aslam, quickly moved on to other issues.
This is how a Pakistani official explained Ms. Aslam’s statement: “What she was really saying is this: We know what the Indians are doing. They’ve sold the Americans on the idea that [the Indians] are an authority on Pakistan and can be helpful in Afghanistan. The Americans have bought the idea and are in on the plan, giving the Indians a free hand in Afghanistan. What the Americans don’t know is that we, too, know the Indians very well. Better still, we know Afghanistan very well. You can’t beat us at our own game.”
Mr. Bugti’s armed rebellion coincided with the Gwadar project entering its final stages. No coincidence here. Mr. Bugti’s real job was to scare the Chinese away and scuttle Chinese President Hu Jintao’s planned visit to Gwadar a few months later to formally launch the port city.
Gwadar is the pinnacle of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. It’s a modern port city that is supposed to link Central Asia, western China, and Pakistan with markets in Mideast and Africa. It’s supposed to have roads stretching all the way to China. It’s no coincidence either that China has also earmarked millions of dollars to renovate the Karakoram Highway linking northern Pakistan to western China.
This bears out exactly what I said in my thesis. Guess I'm not that stupid after all. Perhaps under pressure from the US, India has already lost out to China with regard to Burmese energy: a pattern is emerging.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Iran, Pakistan dump India on pipeline
Last week, Iran's deputy minister in charge of the pipeline, Hojatollah Ganimifard, was quoted by the Iranian Oil Ministry's news service Shana as saying, "The content of the peace pipeline contract has been finalized and all the points prepared by the two sides' legal experts have been re-read and agreed by the two sides [Iran and Pakistan]." He said the two sides would ink the contract in December "without a third partner".
And this week, Mokhtar Ahmad, advisor to Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, was quoted as saying, "As we expected, the text of the peace pipeline has been made ready for the signing by the two states' heads." Pakistan said that any excess gas that would have been destined for India could be transferred to China.
Exactly as I suggested in my thesis, Indian intransigence over the IPI may well be opening the door to China. Moreover, it's more than likely that the current state of emergency in Pakistan will wipe out the IPI deal once and for all. What the article doesn't make explicit, however, is exactly how Iranian gas would transit from Gwadar to China other than by rail, which is not the most efficient method. Note also that an Abu Dhabi company is investing $5bn in Gwadar.
Press TV
In a major development, Pakistan and Iran have crossed the last stumbling block in the way of a piped gas deal by agreeing on a pricing formula.
Both sides would review the gas pricing mechanism when there is a change in the co-relation between Japan's LNG and crude oil mix.
A high level delegation, headed by Secretary Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources Furrukh Qayyum dashed to Tehran to seal the gas sales purchase agreement (GSPA) with the Iranian authorities.
The technical and legal experts are to hammer out the landmark gas deal and both sides will technically finalize the deal after decisive talks by November 9 (today) in Tehran.
According to the officials, under the new scenario in the wake of India's evasive attitude as Indian experts did not participate in the recently held meeting in Tehran and the ongoing meeting in Islamabad, both Iran and Pakistan have decided to materialize the project.
"We have also asked Iranian authorities that the gas to be imported from Iran can also be exported to China as LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) as the western part of that country has a shortage of energy", said the Pakistani official.
If it happens, then the project's economic viability would be enhanced.
The LNG terminal would be constructed in Gwadar and the piped gas would be converted into LNG for export to China through a proposed rail link from Gwadar to Xianjiang Province, China.
The Pakistan Ministry of Railways is studying the feasibility of laying the railways line from Gwadar to China.
The official concluded that Pakistan had also extended an offer to Iran to establish its own terminal in Pakistan.
Pervez Musharraf really isn't doing himself any favours. Take, for example, this editorial in The Telegraph in which an allusion is made to Roosevelt's (alleged) comment exemplifying the ultimate realpolitik: "He may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."
The response? Three Telegraph journalists are kicked out of Pakistan. This can only go to show that the regime has now become utterly self-indulgent. Even if Musharraf is saying - only saying, mind - elections will be held in January; even if the clampdown on Bhutto has been lifted; it still goes to show the direction the emergency is taking.
Bankrupt relationship - Telegraph
Despite George W Bush's rhetoric about freedom, the struggle against terrorism is provoking a reaction familiar from the Cold War and nowhere is that clearer than over Pakistan.
In the old parlance, General Pervez Musharraf is "our sonofabitch". He has failed to stamp out extremist groups and close the madrassas that inspire them. He has allowed the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to fall into the hands of assorted jihadis. And he has sacked independent-minded judges for fear that the Supreme Court declare illegal his re-election as president last month.
Yet, despite this combination of incompetence and brutality, America and Britain continue to back him as head of what has a strong claim to be the most dangerous country in the world.
 Kindly understand the criticality of the situation in Pakistan and around Pakistan. Pakistan is on the verge of destabilisation. Inaction at this moment is suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this country to commit suicide.
It's kind of sad. In many ways, General Musharraf has been one of the best leaders Pakistan has had for generations. He has more or less turned around the economic incompetence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as ensuring that General Zia's Islamist agenda was superseded by a more secular outlook.
That's why Musharraf's actions are so deeply disappointing. Probably it's a case of second-term delusion. It's commonly the fact that once leaders have been around for seven or eight years, surrounded by cronies and sycophants they begin to believe in their own infallibility and omnipotence. It even happened to Thatcher and Blair. That's why the US two-term limit on presidents is such a good idea.
Whatever the case, Musharraf has revealed himself for what he always really was: a tinpot military dictator of a teetering banana republic.
I'm not one to support democracy for democracy's sake, and of course it's easy to criticize from the safety and comfort of the West. Ali Eteraz at Comment is Free makes a fair point:
There is a segment of Pakistan - which includes the judges, lawyers, and journalists - which wants to take to the streets. They have dominated the news over the past year and they want to make a democratic push, with some people casting the lawyers in the same role as the Burmese monks. However, Musharraf's shrewd move of setting forth a limited PCO - targeting only the judiciary and leaving the assemblies intact - has neutralised this segment of the population. The illusion of popular participation is retained, while Musharraf's most vexing political opponents - the judges - get sidelined. If he had gone further and cancelled elections, it would have ignited a firestorm, but in his talk to Pakistani public (discussed below), he assured that he would do no such thing.
Disengaged western audiences, pumped full of the current pro-democracy intoxicants, will almost universally decry Musharraf's behaviour. I decry it too, precisely because I am a disengaged westerner and I have that luxury. However, the story in Pakistan is not so straightforward.
What I am being told by bazari merchants, some young professionals, and some industrialists in Karachi and Lahore is that they merely care for stability, whether it comes in the form of the military, or in the form of democracy. Incidentally, many of them believe that it is Musharraf who is more likely to assure that stability. A couple of people, with middle class businesses, suggested to me that Musharraf should behave more like a dictator; a secular version of the previous Islamist dictator, Zia ul Haq, in order to assure stability for business and economic growth. However, that is a minority view.
Yet that being said, history will probably see the state of emergency as Musharraf's biggest mistake. He has almost certainly grossly underestimated the ill-will against him within Pakistan itself. He has in fact strengthened the case against him, which can only help Bhutto, the lawyers and the militants.
In the greater geopolitical scale of things, Musharraf has also effectively chosen sides in the New Great Game too. America is incensed that their puppet president is turning away from even the veneer of legitimacy. Musharraf also mentioned in his address today his embarrassment at the kidnapping of Chinese workers prior to the Lal Masjid siege. Today's effective re-coup shows that Pakistan is now more likely than ever to align with China, which will not interfere in its internal affairs.
The worst case scenario is accelerated destabilisation as the US withdraws support, Bhutto's supporters rise up and in the ensuing unrest the militants seize their chance. Musharraf is committing rather than preventing the suicide of the state.
Heartthrob cricketer-cum-politician, Imran Khan, had a good point today during an interview with the BBC. Dictators always say they're acting for the good of the country; but really the outcome of suppressing the democratic process is to invite change by violent means instead.
"When you stop all legal and constitutional ways of people challenging [the president], then the only ones who challenge him are people with a gun.That's what happened to the Shah of Iran," said Khan, ominously.
 Thought he might. This is not yet checkmate in the Pakistan endgame, there's a way to go yet, but this move - while long-expected - is highly significant. Musharraf has waited for Bhutto to leave the country for the weekend, and has reportedly surrounded the supreme court, home of his new enemies the legal fraternity. And - crucially - TV and radio are off the air.
Thus this incident has all the characteristics of a coup, though one held by the military already in charge. Musharraf came to power in what he called a 'counter-coup' against Nawaz Sharif's 'coup', though it's the winners that tend to write history. So I'd call this the beginnings of a coup to the power of three.
Musharraf is clearly using the steeply rising Islamist-inspired violence in the north-west as his inspiration, and indeed there is some traction to the concept of Pakistan really being in a state of emergency. The attack on Bhutto's homecoming convoy proved that. But it's above all a political move. The question is: how will it be used? With Bhutto and the lawyers closed down for the time being, can Musharraf use the opportunity to quash the militants once and for all - or will they bite him back? And in either case, what are the prospects for Pakistan sliding deeper into the morass rather than out of it?
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Musharraf imposes emergency rule
Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf has declared emergency rule, state-run TV has said, amid reports that police have surrounded the Supreme Court.
Judges are believed to be inside the building in Islamabad, reports say.
Troops have been deployed inside state-run TV and radio stations, while independent channels have gone off air.
Gen Musharraf is awaiting a Supreme Court ruling on whether he was eligible to run for re-election last month while remaining army chief.
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
Wide ranging article covering the history of India's relations with its East Asian neighbours along with current concerns such as energy and security threats such as the Taiwan straits.
PINR - India Rediscovering East Asia
China has been increasing its engagement with South Asia to the quiet consternation of India. China's free trade agreement with Pakistan went into effect in July this year and China has also emerged as Bangladesh's leading trade partner and arms supplier. Beijing's support for the regime of Nepal's King Gyanendra following his suspension of democracy from February 2005 until April 2006 has been a source of irritation to India.
China's efforts to develop alternative overland routes to transport oil and gas imports by extending the existing Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan and China and developing port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan's Baluchistan province, as well as through Bangladesh and Myanmar, have been viewed by India as part of a "string of pearls" strategy of economic and military encroachment into South and Central Asia.
India's rapprochement with East Asia is also tied to a number of India's broader strategic interests, including rapprochement with the United States, ensuring stability along India's periphery, meeting its energy security needs, and fueling economic integration in South Asia.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Gwadar Oil City: Pakistan, China to sign agreements in early 2008
During the forthcoming visit of Chinese president in early 2008, Pakistan and China are set to sign agreements on Chinese investments in Gwadar Oil City, incentives for setting-up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Gwadar seaport development programme for expansion of bilateral trade and strengthening of investment relations.
All these initiatives are considered to be essential for the success of Trade Energy, Transport and Industrial Corridor between Pakistan and China, a senior government official told Daily Times on Tuesday.
One to bookmark for later - but interesting how ICG sees connections between Balochistan and the other key elements in the Pakistan story - military versus democracy, Talibanisation and the GWOT.
International Crisis Group - B69 Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochista
Violence continues unabated in Pakistan’s strategically important and resource-rich province of Balochistan, where the military government is fighting Baloch militants demanding political and economic autonomy. President Pervez Musharraf’s government insists the insurgency is an attempt to seize power by a handful of tribal chiefs bent on resisting economic development. Baloch nationalists maintain it is fuelled by the military’s attempts to subdue dissent by force and the alienation caused by the absence of real democracy. Whether or not free and fair national and provincial elections are held later this year or in early 2008 will determine whether the conflict worsens.
Instead of redressing Baloch political and economic grievances, the military is determined to impose state control through force. The killing of the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the army in August 2006 was followed by the incarceration of another, Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, who has been held on terrorism-related charges without due process since December. Law enforcement agencies have detained thousands of Baloch nationalists or those believed to be sympathetic to the cause; many have simply disappeared. With the nationalist parties under siege, many young activists are losing faith in the political process and now see armed resistance as the only viable way to secure their rights.
Relying also on divide-and-rule policies, the military still supports Pashtun Islamist parties such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) in a bid to counter secular Baloch and moderate Pashtun forces. The JUI-F is the dominant member of the six-party Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Musharraf’s coalition partner in the provincial government since October 2002. It is also a key patron of the Afghan Taliban. Using Balochistan as a base of operation and sanctuary and recruiting from JUI-F’s extensive madrasa network, the Taliban and its Pakistani allies are undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S. and other Western support for Musharraf is alienating the Baloch, who otherwise could be natural partners in countering extremism in Pakistan.
 Carnage in Karachi as suicide bombers attack Benazir Bhutto's homecoming parade - Reuters is now putting the death toll at 133. Sad to say, but it's a safe bet that just as many died in the panicked stampede and crush as were killed by the explosions.
It's happened: now attention must turn to the implications. First, let's take a look at the likely culprits and motivations. First among them is the Islamist movement and 'Al Qaeda', the Taliban and 'related groups' such as Jamaat-e-Islami. There's already been heavy fighting in Waziristan this month, and there have apparently been threats to Bhutto from extremist elements in response to her promise to crack down on them. The sensible fingers will be pointing at them first.
On the other hand, many - including Ms. Bhutto's rather indiscreet husband Asif Ali Zardari - will have conspiracy theories of their own. The ISI, once a sponsor of the Taliban, is foremost among the other possible instigators of the bombings. In fact, the ISI would have been in a good position to create a security loophole for the bombers to get through. And also worth noting that the blasts occurred at the right moment for prime-time UK TV and the US evening news, though not for the Pakistani newspapers. It was about international impact as much as anything.
Elements within the ISI - perhaps not under President Musharraf's control - will fear losing their grip on the country should 'democracy' prevail, though it hardly did badly in the '90s last time Bhutto was in charge. But the General himself or his uniformed cronies could also have a hand in things, since a dead Benazir would solve their short-term angst about handing over the reins and declaration of a state of emergency would certainly hold up the 'elections'.
One figure commentators seem to forget about is the current prime minister, Shaukut Aziz. It has to be said that he's done a reasonable job since 2004 and may well resent being demoted back to finance minister. Could he be raising a faction within the government to further his interests?
In effect, it doesn't matter who really perpetrated the outrage, since Pakistani public opinion - volatile at the best of times - is likely to become highly polarized now. What's for sure is that there will be a reaction.
All of the above - Bhutto, Musharraf and Aziz - are seen by many in the country as US puppets. The blasts are therefore not so much about pro-Islam or pro-PML(Q) [ie. pro-Musharraf] but also anti-American. Thus there's a couple of ways the camps could divide.
It's likely that Bhutto's PPP supporters will be enraged and will seek to vent their anger somehow, but whether this will be against the Islamists or the more obvious target of the military regime remains to be seen. Civil society in the shape of the strengthening lawyers' movement may be their key allies in this - but could there be a Devil's deal with the Islamists too in a union against the army? Alternatively, could the army and ISI be in cahoots with the Islamists, as they were in the last elections?
On the other hand, since Bhutto has effectively sold out to Musharraf anyway, it could be that the army sees this another excuse to crack down on militants, as occurred during the siege of the Lal Masjid a couple of months back. For this it will need the PPP's support. Asia Times sees the current fight against militants in Waziristan as "but a precursor of the bloodiest battle that is coming". And that could have wider implications:
A qualified estimate by intelligence officials is that Pakistani military pacification of the Waziristans would slash the capability of the Afghan resistance by 85% as well as deliver a serious setback to the Iraqi resistance.
Back to Karachi. If anything, Bhutto herself is indirectly responsible. Her showmanlike return - complete with a riotous reception on board the flight, swarms of supporters at the airport and rally and all kinds of thetrical gestures like wearing a sloganized baseball hat above her trademark white headscarf and the intended homage to Jinnah's tomb - was engineered to elicit an extreme mass reaction.
Now she's got it. Pakistani politics was galvanised enough as it was, and the bombs will have intensified the situation even further. What will transpire over the next days and weeks remains to be seen.
India's spectacular growth is only matched by its spectacular poverty, runs the trailer for a recent BBC World debate. Very true, and ultimately (as always with India) it's the very policies designed to protect the poor that damage them most.
Shockingly free-market liberal statement coming up: in order to bring people out of poverty, as has occurred in China, India needs to create the right conditions for business. Unfortunately, the very fact that India is a liberal democracy stands in the way of this, with so many interest groups protecting their own interests. The communists may do well in land reforms in West Bengal, but fail miserably when it comes to the next step in Friedrich List's stages of economic development - creating a manufacturing base.
Same goes for caste reservations (also dealt with by The Economist this month). You can't break the cycle by positive discrimination, that just makes things worse: only universal primary education is the answer.
India's economy | A Himalayan challenge | Economist.com
India has by far the most restrictive employment-protection laws for collective dismissals, scoring much worse than China and Brazil as well as all the rich countries. Manufacturing firms need to obtain government permission to lay off a worker from factories with more than 100 staff. This partly explains why most firms are so small: 87% of employment in Indian manufacturing is in firms with less than ten employees, compared with only 5% in China. Small firms cannot reap economies of scale or exploit the latest technology, and so suffer from lower productivity than big firms...
There is compelling evidence that further reforms would boost India’s growth. Industries in which the government has eased regulation and encouraged competition, such as telecommunications and IT services, have grown fast. State-owned firms still account for 38% of output in the formal non-farm business sector, yet the OECD estimates that private firms are on average one-third more productive than public-sector ones. States with looser labour-and product-market regulations enjoy higher labour productivity.
Sadly, further bold reform is currently blocked by the communist parties on which the coalition government depends for its majority. In an economy where income per head used to rise by barely 1% a year, current growth rates feel like a miracle. But to eliminate India’s vast poverty the country must try harder.
I'll never forget a rather unconsidered remark made to me by a Pentagon official shortly after 9/11. I was writing about the sales of Apache gunships to Pakistan, to which the officer replied: "As long as they're helping us against terrorism, they can have whatever they want."
More evidence here of America's continuing military commitment to Pakistan - yet the US is even more unpopular there than India (the second largest third-world buyer of arms behind Pakistan). And in India too, misgiving about the US are high, mainly due to its criticism of New Delhi's energy-based relationship with Tehran.
Meanwhile, China's investment in Pakistani infrastructure is only increasing - and that seems to be buying more love than US weapons ever will. Because roads and railways benefit the people, whereas guns are just used an an instrument of US foreign policy. Indeed, they are often turned on Pakistani people themselves. Reports that 50 civilians were killed in clashes in Waziristan this week are of course to be considered carefully, but the bad blood generated is the real effect of the US arms trade.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Arms sales: How the US is not winning friends
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has given over $10 billion to Pakistan to buy or reward President General Pervez Musharraf’s support for its newest war, the “war on terror”. Pakistan has spent over $1.5 billion of this amount on buying new weapons. To understand the scale of this aid, consider Pakistan’s total military budget in 2006, estimated at about $4.5 billion. The United States is now giving Pakistan aid to pay for the new deal for F-16s, bombs, and missiles. It is likely to win few friends.
There is little doubt today about how unpopular the United States is in Pakistan. A Pew poll released in September 2006 found that in Pakistan, the United States is viewed less favorably even than India (with which Pakistan has fought four wars). Just over 25% were favorable toward the United States, compared to one-third who felt that way toward India.
Not much analysis on the political situation, but interesting to note that talks are ongoing regarding an electricity line from Iran to Gwadar. Though Pakistan has gas resources of its own, its power situation is currently rather bleak and so in the short term it may well need to import electricity direct.
Also worth posing the question: what significance does control over the transmission grid have on Pakistani politics? If the army were to shut down the already-parlous energy sector (much of it run by retired officers), it could hold the other parties to ransom.
United Press International - International Security - Energy - Analysis
The approval of a $60 million electric line between Iran and Pakistan reflects a regional trend toward electrical grid interconnection, but its path through the unstable Baluchistan region of Iran and Pakistan also highlights the troubles facing energy cooperation between the two countries, as well as the difficulty in protecting a proposed $7.5 billion scheme to send natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan.
In late September, Tehran and Islamabad made another step toward building a 220 volt power line between Iran and Gwadar in Pakistan. The estimated $60 million cost of building the transmission line will be borne by both countries and will supply Pakistan with 100 megawatts of electricity from Iran.
More on Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. Despite an apparent cooling of tension in the last few years, the author notes that Hu Jintao's rise to power comes partly on the back of a hardline attitude towards Tibet, always a bone of contention between the two Asian giants.
I disagree slightly with some of the points: for example, the territorial dispute does seem to be under control, mainly due to economic linkages. But the point that India forms part of a nexus of powers on China's borders - Australia, Japan and the US Pacific presence is interesting. Also worth noting that the newly-completed Qinghai-Tibet railway and refurbishments to the Indian road infrastructure near the border would allow both China and India to swiftly step up their military presences. And finally, Chinese plans for Tibetan water resources could also have a devastating effect on the subcontinent.
PINR - India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes
Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."
Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the U.S. saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.
Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about U.S. efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.
As both China and India "rise and shine" economically, so geopolitical questions begin to assume greater importance. Whatever the rhetoric from Beijing, China's neighbours are clearly less comfortable about it than ever. That's good for India, which (aside from Pakistan, of course) is generally viewed as fairly benign.
However, India's growing strategic relationship with the US is opening this to debate. Apparently, talks are in progress regarding a closer partnership with NATO, and the US ambassador to NATO is interestingly quoted as lumping China in with concerns such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. But surely a NATO (read US) - India partnership can only aggravate tensions with China, rather than 'balance' the SCO as noted in the article. Lasting peace in the region needs NATO to engage with the PRC rather than India, in order to pull it into a security structure. Attempting to counteract the SCO via NATO might only lead to an arms race that brings in Russia too.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Any pronounced gravitation toward an "Asian NATO" form of collective security will inevitably affect India's relations with China. (India shares Australia's predicament on this score.) Therefore, India has to perform some very tricky rope acts in the period ahead. In a major speech during a visit to Thailand on September 14, Mukherjee stressed, "The India-China partnership is an important determinant for regional and global peace and development, and for Asia's emergence as the political and economic center of the new international order."
Three days later, addressing the strategic community in Seoul, the minister underlined the importance of a "truly integrated Asian economy that will draw on the economic potential of India and China". Expressing confidence that India's "strategic and cooperative partnership [with China] will mature and steadily develop", he added, "Sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop."
The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to convincingly interpret the implications of its "strategic partnership" with the US. The perception is growing, and is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led security system in Asia. Clearly, the request by the NATO secretary general to call on the Indian foreign minister wouldn't have been made without Washington's nod.
Sanctions. The answer to everything. Impose sanctions on Burma, the international community says, and everything will be fine.
Wrong. One only has to look at the plight of Iraq in the 1990s to confirm that, under some circumstances, economic sanctions actually hurt the people you are trying to help.
Yes, one could say that sanctions had an effect on South Africa, but the regime at the time had links to the global economy that it couldn't afford to lose. That's not the case in Burma, and in fact sanctions would only increase the desire to rebel. After all, the current crisis was triggered by a doubling of fuel prices, which would surely occur again under sanctions.
It's well known that, with their energy interests, China and India are the key players here. But neither would really benefit from the sustained rule of the junta. No successor government, presumably led by Aung San Suu Kyi, is going to back out of the energy deals already made with China and India - indeed, they'll be vital in rebuilding Burma as a nation again. So why support the dictatorship?
Just for a moment, let's think the unthinkable. If China fails to act, then the revolution has little hope. But there is one thing that the West can do - supply arms. The jungles of Burma are filled with guerilla groups itching for a fight, and were the ordinary people be able to contribute too then the military would topple rapidly. Yes, a lot of people will die, but no more than will die anyway under sanctions and repression.
There is a danger of Burma becoming a proxy war between China and India - because India would have to be the major supplier, as it was back in the 1950s when it support the Tibetan independence movement - but with the Beijing Olympics approaching China probably wouldn't want to get too involved.
There would also be potential for Burma to descend into inter-ethnic confrontation too, and thus the supply of weapons may exacerbate tensions. But with a leader of the symbolic strength and legitimacy of Aung San Suu Kyi in place, that prospect would be unlikely and a disciplined UN mission from the very start would hold things together during the reconstruction period.
Most of the revolutions of 1989 were, thankfully, bloodless. Not so in Romania, but the students fought back and Ceausescu fell. In Tiananmen Square, however, there was little the students could do. Moreover, the Bosnian conflict dragged on for ages due to Western reluctance to help the Muslims fight back.
So much for my arch geopolitics. War is a terrible thing, but if it can be over swiftly then it may be the lesser of two evils.
Comment is free: Let's get serious
Beijing wants the killing to stop, not in the name of human rights but for the sake of stability. But China and Russia do not want to see any regime change - either the eventual toppling of the Burmese generals or an implosion of the junta. A triumph of Buddhist-inspired people power might encourage Buddhists in Tibet and Falungong militants in China to defy the communist party control and Beijing's repression.
Still, China is in a bind as Burma conjures up memories of the Tiananmen Square killings just Beijing is preparing to host the Olympics. A repeat of the 1988 massacre in Rangoon when at least 3,000 pro-democracy activists were gunned down in the street, would cast a dark shadow over China's desire to be treated as a responsible global power.
While China will not back any sanctions, it is open to increasing diplomatic pressure to stop the killings, and the junta can ill afford to ignore the anxieties of its number one benefactor.
The US and the EU have many avenues to pressure both China and Asean, even up to the point of threatening a boycott of the Beijing Olympics. A simple threat by Beijing to suspend all arms supplies to Rangoon would deliver the only kind of message that the generals might finally understand.
The time of western countries and Asean paying polite lip-service to human rights and release of national heroine Aung san Suu kyi, still languishing under house arrest, is over. The coming weeks will soon demonstrate how many governments will put human rights and the plight of the Burmese before commercial advantage, trading priorities and comfort zone diplomacy.
 It's not just the moment of truth for Burma. It's a moment of truth for China, and that by implication affects all of us.
The question is: is China now a responsible stakeholder in the international community, or simply a nation concerned only with self-interest at the expense of human rights - both within its own territory and elsewhere?
It is no longer acceptable to trot out that tired old phrase: "We do not interfere in other countries' internal affairs". With the Olympics approaching, if Beijing really wants to be seen as an equal partner then it cannot let its coming-out party be overshadowed by its negligence of well-established international norms.
A former Burmese student leader just appeared on the BBC, insisting that the UN has "failed" his people and that it is no longer time for sanctions. He is right. Sanctions are slow and ultimately will only hurt the Burmese people, not the military elite. So, in a sense, it's a moment of truth for the UN and its ineffectual new chief, Ban Ki-Moon too.
But only China, with its massive investment in Burma's economy via the logging trade and various energy deals can make a real difference. India, I'm afraid to say, is impotent on the matter and is disappointingly reflecting the Chinese sovereignty line.
The CCP is in a difficult position. If it condemns the impending crackdown and acts on Burma, whether in the UNSC or bilaterally, then it opens itself up to a round of internal re-examination of the events of Tiananmen square - which themselves occurred just after a brutally repressed democracy movement in Burma in 1988. Though news of events of Burma is restricted in China, via the Internet, unlike in 1989 people will get to know about them.
In the next 48 hours, there are only two things that can happen. Either the junta relaxes control, frees Aung San Suu Kyi and enters negotiations with the UN. Or the guns begin to fire while the UN, as always, stands by. The world is watching. It's up to China.
International Crisis Group - Myanmar: Time for Urgent Action
Only China, India, and, to a lesser degree, ASEAN have any influence on the military regime. China has very close economic and political links with Myanmar, while India has developed strong military ties. Both would suffer from worsening instability there, as they did after the violent August 1988 military crackdown. In the past, the military junta has fired on peaceful protestors or used vigilante groups to attack them. Demonstrations in recent days have reached a country-wide scale where such action could cause massive loss of life.
China, India and ASEAN should communicate to the military that a repeat of the 1998 violence would be unacceptable and would lead to serious consequences, including action by the UN Security Council. China and Russia should warn Myanmar that they would support full consideration of the situation there by the Security Council, as well as a possible adoption of a Security Council Resolution, if the military use force against protestors.
 Even the US is stepping up support for the current protests in Burma (Myanmar), with a call for added sanctions in the hope of buckling the already-pressured Junta. But like in Sudan, notes Isabel Hilton in The Guardian's Comment is Free, the country that really matters is China:
China has sustained the Burmese military with generous support; Chinese aid has built transport infrastructure and dams; Chinese investment gives Beijing a stake in key sectors of Burma's economy; Chinese immigration has produced large Chinese populations in Burma's cities; and Chinese support has rendered US sanctions against the regime ineffectual. Why, then, is China now being cited as a restraining influence?
China's default diplomatic position is that it does not "interfere" in the domestic politics of other countries - one might add, especially where supplies of energy and natural resources or strategic issues are involved. Beijing is averse to lectures on human rights and democracy at home, so naturally disinclined to deliver them abroad.
But China is now faced with the fact that the high diplomatic profile that goes with greater global power exposes it to new pressures to uphold international standards, and that if the country is to continue to sell her ascent to global superpower status as unthreatening, close partnerships with unsavoury regimes can produce undesirable blowback. China's previous intransigence on Darfur melted when campaigners married the Beijing Olympic games to China's support for the Sudanese regime to produce the slogan "Genocide Olympics". China suddenly found it convenient to send an envoy to Sudan and to play a more constructive role in multilateral efforts to resolve the crisis. A similar pressure is building over Burma.
And inevitably, fears of another Tiananmen square crop uo too. But this author is correct to note that 18 years on from 6/4, the PRC's position is very different. It is now supposed to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and cannot be seen to be supporting the Myanmar regime at this moment.
On the other hand, should Beijing encourage a transition to democracy and the return of Aung San Suu Kyi, what kind of message would they be sending to their own people? There's no doubt that, state censorship aside, the Chinese have more access to outside media than ever and many of them must be watching this closely:
For Beijing, the sight of tens of thousands of citizens in peaceful street protests led by Buddhist monks is little short of a nightmare, since China has its own potentially explosive combinations of religious and civil dissent: Buddhist monks in Tibet, Muslims in Xinjiang, even Falun Gong practitioners at home - all lay claim to the moral authority to challenge a corrupt and self-seeking autocracy. The sight of mass civic demonstrations in pursuit of political reform recalls both 1989's Tiananmen Square and 1979's Democracy Wall.
A bloodbath in Burma, given China's close identification with the dictatorship, would resonate like a Tiananmen Square massacre by proxy, just as Beijing is polishing the silver for next year's Olympics. For China negotiation is infinitely preferable to bloodshed and the instability that could result.
Finally, it's worth considering the implications for India too. Like Pakistan, Burma is a state pivotal to both regional powers' political and economic interests. India must be concerned about potential movements of refugees should things get violent, and along with China it has energy interests vested in the current Myanmar regime.
In fact, The Times of India points out, at times New Delhi's line sounds eerily reminiscent of Beijing's:
India's interests in Myanmar are rooted in energy, security, keeping insurgents in check and countering China's overpowering influence on India's doorstep.
Myanmar is also important to an India seeking to extend its power into southeast Asia, politically and militarily, standing as it does at the mouth of the Malacca Straits. These interests have kept India and China engaged with the unpopular military regime in Yangon. As recently as 10 days ago, foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee was subjected to public questioning by British and American diplomats in Bangkok on India's Myanmar policy. Mukherjee stuck to India's line that it did not interfere in internal developments in any country.
Days later at the APEC summit in Australia, member countries decided Myanmar could only be tackled through India and China. Neither country responded.
So much for democracy's domino effect. But what happens over the next few days will indirectly prove where China and India really do stand in the modern world.
 As if Musharraf didn't have enough problems already, what with Bhutto and Sharif snapping at his heels and the lawyers conspiring against the legality of his rule, now there's this bloke too:
Bin Laden to declare war on Musharraf, al-Qaida says | Special reports | Guardian Unlimited
In what was the third message from Bin Laden this month, he described Gen Musharraf as an infidel, condemning the president's closeness to the US.
He said the decision to send the military into the Red mosque in Islamabad in July had "demonstrated Musharraf's insistence on continuing his loyalty, submissiveness and aid to America against the Muslims ... and makes armed rebellion against him and removing him obligatory".
The message added: "So when the capability is there, it is obligatory to rebel against the apostate ruler, as is the case now."
We learn two facts from this. One, OBL (if indeed it is he) is alive and well and gets the Pakistani papers. Secondly, Al Qaeda recognises the pivotal position of Pakistan in the geopolitical map and wants a piece of the action. Here we go.
Some bland comments from the Indian external affairs minister. But in the long run, can India really balance the tensions in its relationships with the US and the PRC? The problem for New Delhi is that (aside from Russia, perhaps) it's the only major power that has to live under both US global hegemony and Chinese regional hegemony. And India doesn't wield the economic and political power that Moscow can now boast due to its energy resources. Non aligned movement aside, one day it may just have to make the call.
The Hindu : Front Page : Strategic partnership with China will mature: Pranab Mukherjee
Asked about the possible impact of the emerging U.S.-India equation on China’s ties with New Delhi, Mr. Mukherjee said: “There is no question of cooperation between India and the U.S. to act as some sort of containment of any country, including China.”
Trade and investment “are the great drivers of the new relationship” between India and China.
“The leaders of both countries recognise that co-existence and cooperation is the wise course of action; and sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop and to bring benefit not only to us but also for other partners in Asia.”
Differences, including those over the border question, “did not stand in the way of investment and trade.”
So it would appear that General Musharraf will hang up his boots on 15 November and maintain his position as a civilian president. So he says, at least, and today's discovery of 18 dead Pakistani soldiers highlights the dangers ahead.
Whether or not the US is pleased or unnerved is uncertain: the BBC's sources seem to think that Washington would have preferred Musharraf to have remained army head. From Musharraf's own point of view, however, the surrender of his uniform is the last gambit in a bid to hold onto power in the face of rising domestic opposition. There does need to be a very strong structure in place, however, to keep Musharraf and Bhutto from fighting among themselves, while the Isamists look on. If it doesn't work out, what are the chances of a another military coup - perhaps secretly engineered by Musharraf and his cronies - in the mid-term so as to maintain a grip on stability?
BBC NEWS | South Asia | US struggles with Pakistan policy
There's a growing realisation that the US must not only have a partnership with Gen Musharraf and the army but also have a partnership with the people of Pakistan.
The aim now in Washington, many observers believe, is to treat not just Gen Musharraf but also the Pakistani nation as an irreplaceable ally and to bolster the perception that US would prefer to deal with a popular civilian government.
Every now and again, Asia Times Online turns up an absolute tour de force of an analysis: this is one of them. It pulls together every thread in the Afghanistan war, from the significance of events on Pakistan to the options available to the local powers China, India and Russia.
The one major beef I have with it is, as before, whether it is truly possible to negotiate with the Taliban. Sure, you can talk to the heads of major Taliban groups, but what are the guarantees that one agreement is going to quell the whole bunch of them? Isn't it likely that large splinter groups that oppose any settlement will break off and carry on doing their own thing? Still, the author seems to think that talks are on the cards.
Below, I attempt a rough summary of all the points, in an actor-by-actor format.
- The Taliban: As NATO and the US tire, the chances of a settlement grow, especially in the light of potential instability in Pakistan too.
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The UN: Growing acceptance of the idea of talking with the Taliban. -
The US: Should seek intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistan dialogue with the aid of China, Russia and India. -
Iran: The US quagmire in Afghanistan is succour to their ambitions for regional dominance. -
Russia: Fears of 'Talibanization' will draw the Central Asian states closer into seurity frameworks such as the SCO. -
China: Stay out of it, and leave the Taliban to the US. -
India: Stick with the US, and hope that Pakistan doesn't regain influence in Afghanistan.
And here's the key:
Clearly, the continued disintegration of the Pakistani state widens al-Qaeda's support base among the Taliban. If US-Iran tensions escalate, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan become intertwined. That means the Afghan war may take a new form rather than lead to peace.
The whole article is reprinted below: check out also Ahmed Rashid's sobering analysis in The Telegraph in which he describes his own land as "a failing state hovering over the abyss".
Continue reading "'Stan - The Big Picture" »
A week is a long time in politics, and eight years is even longer. At least, however,we now have the date to watch for. Benazir Bhutto is behaving in an eminently sensible manner here; she has mitigated the risk of being instantly deported and making a shambolic and undignified exit as did Nawaz Sharif: she also gives Musharraf a chance to save face and be 're-elected' (the cut-off for that is 15 October).
Most importantly, she buys time for everyone: though on the other had, that also means that opponents will also have four weeks to get their acts together too. Something to be aware of is that Bhutto is still wanted for corruption charges, well detailed in Musharraf's autobiography (he accuses her, among other things, of having a penchant for expensive jewellery and keeping a private menagerie). It'll be important for Musharraf not to let this go - but with the legal fraternity now very much his enemies, I can see them achieving some kind of knockdown on the charges.
It'll be a date to mark in the diary, and will certainly have significant ramifactions for Pakistan's short-term future.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Bhutto announces Pakistan return
 What few commentators have noted is that today's ejection of Nawaz Sharif is thick with symbolic overtones. Not only did Sharif choose the anniversary of 9/11 to stage his attempted comeback, but the debacle at the airport today was strangely reminiscent of the coup and counter-coup that saw Musharraf sweep to power in 1999 and Sharif packed off to exile.
So far so good for the General, since there has been no immediate civil unrest.
Pakistan's political crisis | Shove off Sharif | Economist.com
Mr Sharif’s arrest sparked a few protests in Rawalpindi but was more notable for the failure of his Pakistan Muslim League-N party to organise almost any gathering in Punjab, the country’s most populous province and the party’s stronghold. It did not help that General Musharraf’s agents had arrested most of the party’s leaders and, reportedly, 2,000 of its activists in recent days. Nonetheless, Mr Sharif has not yet raised enough of a clamour to trouble a military dictator.
What will happen once Benazir Bhutto comes in, however, is anyone's guess. And what will the Americans, Indians and Chinese think - after all, they all have major stakes in Pakistan's fragile polity. America and China will probably be secretly happy with a stronger Musharraf who can counter the resurgence of Islamism, while India may feel obliged to back Bhutto. That would set things up for a tense situation.
The last lines of the article are also well worth reprinting:
For his part, if there are no serious protests in next few days, General Musharraf might think he does not need Ms Bhutto. His supporters can muster the simple majority in Parliament that he needs to get himself re-elected president, while also retaining his job as army chief. If he is happy to defy the orders of the Supreme Court—which would probably take exception to this action—he would not need to rewrite the constitution in his favour, a step requiring a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Then he would not need the support that Ms Bhutto has all but promised.
In the short term, this draconian drift might just put a lid on Pakistan’s latest troubles. After all, Pakistanis are accustomed to the bit and bridle of military rule. But a solution that sustains an army dictatorship by smashing faltering institutions and democratic politicians, in a country where supremely undemocratic Islamist forces are seething, does not augur much stability.
Just as with Pakistan, India looks like it will lose out to China in the effort to find secure energy transit routes.
PINR - Pipeline Politics: India and Myanmar
India has clearly lost an important diplomatic initiative in the attempt to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar. Even after the deal was sweetened with US$20 million in "soft credit" and the proposed construction of a power plant in Myanmar, it would appear that Indian influence was quietly denied by the inevitability of China's international support for Myanmar. Beijing's use of its veto to keep Myanmar's human rights record off of the U.N. Security Council agenda turned out to be more important to the Myanmar junta than the economic incentives.
Amid reports that former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, is criticising the Bush regime for its neglect of Asia comes this report. It is difficult to see India and China forming anything more than a perfunctory strategic relationship - their rivalries over the Indian Ocean region remain strong, especially where Tibet, Pakistan and Myanmar are concerned, but the point is that China is the nascent power these days.
India has to recognise this, and perform a careful balancing act with the US. Its longer term interests, however, may be better served by accepting a role as a partner to China's rise. At present India's fear is that it will be little more than a junior partner, but I suspect that Chinese officials would wish to downplay this and concentrate on economics and trade rather than security. The statement is also a clear rebuff to the American nuclear plan, so some planners in Washington must be reeling.
The Hindu News Update Service
Beijing, Sept. 4 (PTI): China will "vigorously" implement a bilateral agreement to upgrade Sino-Indian relations to strategic levels, Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, said while hinting that Beijing is open to civilian nuclear energy cooperation with all countries under the IAEA safeguards, sources said here on Monday.
Yang who met a joint delegation of members of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) here on Friday told them that he had been instructed by the Chinese leadership that Beijing would vigorously implement the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and cooperation agreed upon by the two countries.
Reading the timeline below really joins the dots about what's been going on in Pakistan this year. Today the plot unravelled further, with signs that as well as Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif is also planning a comeback. It's clear that the whole debacle over the sacking of Iftikhar Chaudhry, the chief justice, is linked to this point.
However, for all Musharraf's faults, he has done at least one thing - he has held Pakistan together under immense pressure from the Islamists on one side and the US on the other. The entry of both the 'democrats', not just Bhutto alone, will fracture the political scene even further. Neither Bhutto not Sharif have much to be proud of, other than being civilians, and indeed it was they that oversaw Pakistan's steady slide. Democract alone is not going to solve Pakistan's problems, and if the populace goes to the streets in favour of either Musharraf, Bhutto, Sharif, Chaudhry or Shar'ia, it'll set the scene for some bloody four-way clashes.
What it could mean for Afghanistan is anyone's guess.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Exiled Pakistani PM 'to go home'
9 March: Musharraf suspends chief justice for "abuse of power". Lawyers protest
April: Protests grow, amid clashes with police
12 May: 34 people die as rival political groups clash in Karachi
11 July: 102 people die when army storms radical Red Mosque in Islamabad
July-Aug: Sharp rise in suicide attacks by pro-Taleban militants
20 July: Supreme Court reinstates chief justice
9 Aug: Musharraf rejects emergency rule
23 Aug: Supreme Court says exiled ex-PM Nawaz Sharif can return
A lengthy but useful summary of everything that's important in the world right now pertaining to the linkages between geopolitics and energy. Must look out for this Dilip Hiro guy's book.
We can now probably add to this list of Bush's errors America's disruption of the world financial system via subprime loans, not to mention high oil prices and a feeble dollar but hey.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US in their sights: The rising powers
...with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of US supremacy - Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode US hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The George W Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, overextending itself...
Yet there are other explanations - unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures - for the current transformation in international affairs. These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.
I'm not sure how much I trust Pakistan's APP news agency, so this is to be taken with a pinch of salt. I can also find no reference to a US "International Oil Company" - unless indeed it is an anonymous one for now. I can, however, find the "Indian Oil Corporation Limited" (IOCL) and the "International Oil Company Limited", based in Hong Kong and thus perhaps a Chinese front. I did discover "Interoil", which is stockmarket listed as IOC, but its main drive is Papua New Guinea.
So the plot thickens. Who, if anyone, is pulling the strings here?
Associated Press of Pakistan - IOC to construct Turkmenistan-Pakistan oil, gas pipeline
The US International Oil Company (IOC) would construct 2,200 km long Turkmenistan-Pakistan oil and gas pipeline project in a period of three years. Geo News quoting the details released from IOC liaison office reported that the government has awarded the estimated $10 billion project to the IOC.
Two oil refineries and four thermal powerhouses of 1,000 megawatt each would also be set up under the project.
The pipeline with a capacity of supplying 2 million barrel of oil and 4 billion cubic feet of gas would be constructed up to Gawadar, where one refinery would also be constructed at a cost of $3.5 billion, IOC said.
The project also envisages construction of hydro-cracker for the production of JP 1 and JP 4, for the first time in Pakistan.
IOC said that the matters relating to the security in Afghanistan and insurance guarantee have been finalized and the ceremony of the mega-project agreement inking would soon be held.
In July 2007, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation agreed on the foundation of an 'energy club'. In August it will hold its annual summit, and this author considers whether that means another step towards an Asian NATO.
PINR - S.C.O. Summit Demonstrates its Growing Cohesion
...the last couple of years the S.C.O. has taken steps in intensified cooperation in a wide scope of security dimensions. This has occurred to such an extent that development toward a genuine security organization can no longer be excluded, although this still might take a considerable number of years. Although the West at present does not have anything to fear from the S.C.O., current developments might encourage the West to closely observe further activities of the grouping. In any case, the time has gone that Western security experts could depict the S.C.O. as simply one of many insignificant organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.
As China's commitment in Pakistan, especially through Gwadar increases, so too does their interest in the nation's internal security.
Protection of Chinese national
ISLAMABAD: Secretary Interior Syed Kamal Shah and Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Luo Zhaohi signed an MoU to form a joint task force for the safety and security of Chinese nationals in Pakistan at a ceremony held here on Monday.
The MoU is the first of its kind signed against the backdrop of the rising number of kidnapping incidents and attacks on the Chinese people who are engaged on various development projects in the country. A number of Chinese nationals have also lost their lives in these attacks.
Well, Canada is doing a good job too but the Yanks are basically making things worse for ISAF. Below the BBC's Paul Wood summarises the commons defence committee's report on operations in Afghanistan. They can be summarised even further into one point - lack of resources.
Basically, in an age when deaths overseas have a direct impact on the ballot box, Afghanistan is proving the inefficacy of our NATO allies. Every military death is tragic, but the unwillingness of the other European nations to allow their troops to do the jobs they are supposed to do simply makes life more difficult and dangerous for the Brits and Canucks. There is no point deploying the military if you are not going to put them in harm's way with all the kit they need to support them.
Secondly, the reason ISAF is there is to establish security so as to create the conditions for development - and thus general happiness and well-being in Afghanistan. That's the greatest obstacle to Talibanisation, not armed action. Unfortunately, the prevailing attitude seems to be that development should be left to the NGOs. In fact there are few worse people to do the job. NGOs exist simply to fulfil narrow and often irrelevant single issues eg. introducing women's theatre groups to towns where there's no running water. What Afghanistan really needs is big money and big business with the backing of Western governments.
Do the job properly or not at all. Put the cash in, put the kit in and put the people in. And this is a defining moment for Europe. Does it really have a role in the wider world, or is it content to let the 'Stan slip back into total anarchy? It would probably take Pakistan with it, and now that the GWOT has kicked off, the existence of a revived black hole full of terror training camps would have grave consequences for Europe's own domestic security.
If the battle in Afghanistan is lost, the war will be fought in the streets of Londonistan instead.
BBC NEWS | UK | UK Politics | Afghanistan warning decoded
1. There are too few troops on the ground to win.
If the mission is to succeed, says the committee, it will require a commitment of size and strength greater than the international community is "willing to acknowledge, let alone to make."
2. If we are not exactly losing, we are not winning either.
The committee said: "Violence is increasing and spreading to the relatively peaceful Kabul and the northern provinces."
3. Too many Afghan civilians are being killed.
The committee said: "Civilian casualties undermine support for (the Nato force) Isaf and the Afghan government and fuel the insurgency, further endangering our troops."
4. There are still not enough British helicopters to do the job.
"UK helicopter operations in Afghanistan are not sustainable at the present intensity."
5. Some of our Nato allies are leaving us in the lurch.
"The reluctance of some Nato countries to provide troops for the Isaf mission in Afghanistan is undermining Nato's credibility and also Isaf operations."
6. You can't fight the Taleban and opium at the same time.
The coalition's strategy lacks "clarity and coherence". "Uncertainty among Afghans about Isaf's role in poppy eradication puts UK forces at risk."
7. The Afghan security forces are a disappointment - some useless, some corrupt, some actually working against us.
"Police failure and corruption alienate support for the government of Afghanistan and add to grievances which fuel the insurgency." Even the Afghan army "are some way off operating independently".
8. So the exit strategy has problems, as in Iraq.
"We recommend that the government clarify its planning assumptions for the UK deployment to Afghanistan and state the likely length of the deployment beyond the summer of 2009."
9. The media war isn't going well, either.
"The Taleban is ahead in the information campaign. The government (must)...co-ordinate more effectively the presentation of Isaf's objectives and the way in which developments in Afghanistan are reported."
I think it's a little tenuous to suggest that the sole reason for Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid was the abduction of seven Chinese brothel workers. However, this author takes a close look at China's strategic relationship with Pakistan and considers how much Beijing's influence contributes to the conflict with Islamist extremism.
Foreign Policy In Focus | China, Pakistan, and Terrorism
U.S. pressure on Pakistan to clear the region of the Taliban and al-Qaeda has forced Pakistan into an ever-tighter embrace of China. Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid, a potent symbol of this strategic Sino-Pakistani alignment, also sent a blood-soaked message to religious militants that Chinese interests will remain off-limits. Musharraf is not apologetic about defending Chinese interests in Pakistan and punishing those who dared to harm them.
Authoritative figures such as Lords Inge and Ashdown have reiterated the fact that Britain is in the 'Stan for the long haul. Their foreboding does smack of the 'domino effect', but the danger in Pakistan is more real than it was in Southeast Asia back in the '60s. The battle of Las Masjid is testament to that. And if both Afghanistan and Pakistan succomb to Islamism, then the potential for a stream of trained-up bombers heading for the Piccadilly line multiplies fivefold.
The Lords are also correct to identify a double problem - NATO's lack of coordination with the US forces in country and lack of long-term development. Development can only come with security in place, goes the theory, though I wonder if anyone has ever tried promoting development and waiting for the security situation to calm down as progress is made.
Lastly, Iraq. The Brits look like pulling out of Iraq and leaving it to the Americans: the other side of the deal should be an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. That way, NATO can attempt to deal with Afghanistan - which is certainly not a hopeless case - without American impediments, and America can be left to its deserved fate in Iraq.
Generals' warning on Afghanistan | World | The Observer
Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.
'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'
Update: Things just went from bad to worse. The fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and one could even go so far to say that the Durand Line is no real border - they are one and the same problem.
Events in Islamabad over the last few weeks have now provoked the Taliban sympathisers in Waziristan to relinquish their tenuous truce - an added headache for both Musharraf and NATO. What chance is there of a NATO intervention within Pakistan proper?
A report speculating that the possible delivery of Pakistan's long-owed F-16s is part of a geopolitical strategy on the US's part to undermine the SCO's (and therefore China and Russia's) influence. America also worries about a popular uprising against Musharraf's government - a government that it is increasingly losing the power to manipulate.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan heading for a crackdown
From the proceedings of the meeting of the SCO's Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) held in Bishkek on Monday in preparation of the summit on August 16, trends are available that must definitely be annoying Washington. There is no mistaking that the SCO is slouching toward Afghanistan and Pakistan with an irresistible offer of mutual engagement in terms of shared interests of regional security and stability...
For the first time, the SCO is likely to pose a challenge to the United States' monopoly of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The CFM has taken the view that the existing pattern of involvement by the international community is restricted to specific sectoral problems in Afghanistan. It concluded that such a narrow issue-based approach on the part of the international community will not serve the purpose of stabilizing the country.
The article continues:
Plainly speaking, the SCO is unambiguously proclaiming its intention to work closely with Kabul and Islamabad - a turf that has hitherto been tacitly accepted by the regional powers as more or less the exclusive playpen of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This runs counter to the consistent US approach based on keeping Russia out of Afghanistan, and disrupting any Russian-Chinese coordinated policies in Afghanistan.
 The siege of the Lal Masjid is over, but in what looks like an increasingly critical juncture for General Musharraf, the repercussions will now begin.
In the next few days, weeks and months, the following questions may be answered. How will the 'martyrdom' of the hardliners and madrassa students who chose to remain at the mosque be perceived in Pakistan and the wider region? Will they inspire a larger movement, or only fuel the growing crisis of Talibanisation in the border regions? How will the aftermath of the siege react with existing political issues such as the sacking of the Chief Justice and the forthcoming elections?
It is also interesting to note that part of the Islamist's agenda relates to Chinese influence in Pakistan. The incidents are comparitively minor, but it appears that one of the extremists' grievances in Islamabad was a Chinese-run brothel: meanwhile, three Chinese workers were shot near Peshawar during the weekend. If this continues, Beijing may have to say a few private but stern words.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistani soldiers storm mosque
Security forces began a full-scale siege of the mosque last week, not long after mosque students abducted seven Chinese workers they accused of running a brothel.
The BBC's M Ilyas Khan in Islamabad says the military operation is a gamble for President Pervez Musharraf who risks a backlash from supporters of those inside the mosque.
In recent days the army has redeployed thousands of troops in north-western Pakistan where pro-Taleban militants opposed to President Musharraf have been carrying out a string of attacks said to be linked to the mosque siege.
 Pakistan has enough problems with Taliban and Al-Qaeda-inspired militants in its border areas. Once the fighting spreads to the cities and the urban middle classes, there really will be trouble.
This is not a massive incident, but with several dead it will undoubtedly provoke something else - maybe a protest, maybe a political move, maybe rioting. It is telling that the ceasefire was negotiated by the MMA, not the military government - which is a further indication that the Islamist parties are strengthening their foothold within the country's fragile political structure.
Add to this the controversy over the sacked judge, Iftikhar Chaudhry, and Musharraf may have a recipe for distaster. All eyes in India, the US and the rest of the world need to be on South Asia in the next days in case this blows up out of control.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Clashes erupt at Pakistan mosque
Fighting around the Lal Masjid raged throughout much of Tuesday.
Deputy interior minister Zafar Warriach told a news conference: "The deaths of nine people have been confirmed so far and more than 140 wounded."
Other reports have put the number killed higher.
Speaking to the BBC, Information Minister Muhammad Ali Durrani said the government was still discussing how to handle the situation.
The BBC's Syed Shoaib Hasan who is outside the mosque says the ceasefire was negotiated by a politician from the MMA, a coalition of Islamic parties.
Beyond its place in the GWOT, could Pakistan become a staging post for the anti-Iran campaign? The author calls it a new Cold War, alluding to Iraq and Afghanistan's growing proxy war status - but don't forget who sponsors both Iran and Pakistan... China. So if there is a Cold War, it's the ultimate big daddy in the whole deal.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - All roads leading to Pakistan
The fact is Pakistan is uniquely placed - geographically and politically - to affect the outcome of Anglo-American strategy toward Iran and Central Asia. Zia was extremely prescient about such a geopolitical setting.
In recent months, the US media have reported on the role of Pakistani security agencies in enabling covert US operations aimed at destabilizing Iran. If US Vice President Dick Cheney has his way and a US-Iran military confrontation indeed takes place, Pakistan's role becomes of vital importance to Washington.
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
Bound copies are available at lulu.com for around $10 plus P&P; downloadable PDF files are free of charge. Click here to access the virtual storefront.
This work is made available on the understanding that it will not be copied, plagiarised or otherwise reproduced without the explicit consent of the author.
India will soon be the world’s fifth largest consumer of energy. And there is probably one major reason for this: aircon.
Unless you have visited India in the summer months, you won’t appreciate the significance of aircon, but I certainly do. Despite its responsibility for the enormous energy deficit, aircon is perhaps now the ultimate giver of health and life to the rising middle classes.
The other night the electricity failed again, for around four hours, and the invertor didn’t hold enough charge to get through the night. It was miserable. Such is the power of aircon – once you have it, you can’t live without it. The contrast between my father’s non-aircon house and my cousin’s more expensive and modern dwelling couldn’t be greater.
Much as I hate MacDonalds, aside from the clean toilets and the absurdly smart security guards in their jat-moustaches and white spats, the saviour of Connaught Place is MacDonalds and its aircon. Ironic in a country where beef is not available.
So as the economy continues to boom, so the god of aircon will continue to ascend through the pantheon. Borne on his conveyance, the sacred refrigerated soft drink, his influence will only grow stronger as time passes.
I used to have an unshakeable faith in karma and the laws of the dao. For evey action, I once thought, there must be an equal and opposite reaction. As long as you do the right thing, you’ll be fine; but every moral outrage will come back to haunt you.
I’m not sure I believe in that anymore. Having circumnavigated the Dalai Lama’s residence not once but three times – an act that is supposed to gain one’s soul immeasurable merit – plus spun all the prayer wheels and donated to beggars all around, I still missed the bus tonight, leaving me stranded for another day.
It was an easy mistake to make. I arrived before time at the bus stand where I was dropped off on Sunday, only to discover too late that the bus picks up 200 metres down the road, out of the line of sight. I then compounded this error by trying to catch up with the bus in Dharmasala itself, but missed it again leaving me stuck at the town’s chaos station until nightfall.
Then again, there are worse places to be stuck. McCleod Ganj itself has nothing much to offer beyond the Tibetan temples and curio shops, but the true value of the trip has been to escape the oppressive heat and boredom of Delhi in a landscape far, far removed from the depressingly clinical flatness of Holland. The only thing to do here is to put on your shoes and walk, and that’s what I’ve done.
I’ve missed the hills, and I’m glad to be here.
“How can you govern a country that has 500 types of cheese?” Charles de Gaulle once lamented. But if France is hard to rule, then imagine a subcontinent that has 300 million gods. De Gaulle didn’t have an answer to that one.
I’ve never really believed in what must be an apocryphal figure, but out of that pantheon there must be a divinity for almost everything. For example, there has to be a god of diarrhoea. There must be. I’ve worshipped at his temple often enough on my visits here in the past, and have spoken to him on the porcelain telephone on many an occasion.
It’s a source of some disappointment, therefore, that so far on this trip I have hardly suffered at all. But for a couple of minor bouts of no more than a morning or so there’s been nothing. I’ve been avoiding meat, I must admit, and the shits do seem to be tied up with ‘non-veg’ food.
But in any case it’s so damn hot I’m hardly eating anything at all. I’ve currently resorted to fulfilling my nutritional needs via fizzy drinks, of which I’m now consuming an unpardonable litre to a litre-and-a-half per day. There must be a god of Coke, Thums Up and Limca too, I reckon – they’re certainly earning their keep.
'Travellers' never fail to amuse me. They loaf around in their dreadlocks, tattoos and baggy pants in a desperate effort to be different and just end up blending right into their own little crowd. Nowhere more so than here in India, the hippie capital of the known universe.
But when push comes to shove, say when a bus is a couple of hours late as tend to happen in Asia once in a while, this bunch will kick up a fuss like ther's no tomorrow. "Chill out, man," I feel like saying, "It's all good, don't mean nothin'." There's more of them than me though, so I keep my trap shut in case all that peace and love turns into an angry punch-up.
Anyway, made it in the end. The bus came, the flies went away, and despite more rupturous dissent when a group of Tibetans from a refugee colony outside Delhi boarded and took all the best seats we got here earlyish this morning. I promptly disappeared and found a decent hotel at half-rate, which makes up for having been done over for the price of my bus ticket on Janpath back in ND.
Home of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, McLeod Ganj sits among the hills near Dharamsala at 1,750m above sea-level. Here you'll find a Little-Tibet without-Tibet, somehow more engaging yet altogether false compared to the real thing. I'll stay here a couple of days, though - it'll do me good.
Right. I'm sick of sitting in my father's dusty flat on the outskirts of Delhi, where there aren't even any shops, let alone things to do. No TV, no radio, and I've nearly read my 700-page novel. Interviews went well, but more on that later once the telephone gets reconnected and I have Internet again. Apart from that I am climbing the walls in serious need of therapy.
Off to Dharamsala for a few days it is then. See you later...
In Europe you are so used to the electricity coming on at the flick of a switch and water flowing at the turn of a tap you don’t even think about it. Even in Shanghai I had utilities 24/7. No worries. But here it’s different. Here you have to work.
The day begins at 6.30am, like or not, since the mains water only operates during limited periods of the day. Since it’s been 30 degrees all night and there’s no aircon as promised, (in fact not even an aircon brochure anywhere to be seen, despite my father’s assurances) you haven’t slept anyway, so it’s no big deal.
Turn on the motor via the switch in the bathroom, assuming electricity is functioning. Run downstairs to the bottom water tank, where there are three valves which must all be turned in the correct direction for the tank to fill with water. Once the mains shuts off, you can then pump water up to the top tank on the roof, which provides the majority of day-to-day water use.
This is assuming that you have even half a clue about how the system works. If you don’t, and it hasn’t been demonstrated to you, there is nothing for it but experimentation of the all the different combinations of the valves and motor, none of which work leaving you without water for washing up, showering or flushing the toilet for the rest of the day. Discover at a later date that one of the valves was bust anyway, making all of the above academic.
This is not impoverished rural Bihar; this is a middle-class suburb of New Delhi, the national capital.
At least there is a solution to the three-to-four times daily power cuts: each household possesses an invertor, basically a battery that charges up if the electricity is working and runs the lights and fans if it is not.
However, this invertor is not strong enough to keep the fridge going, so anything within is in a permanent flux of thaw and cool which in 40 degrees of heat can’t be good for sanitation.
I can’t live here. There’s a difference between being a whinging softie and just failing to accept that things need to be this way. I don’t accept that it needs to be this way, not here, not now in 2007. It was like this in the 80s and nothing has changed at all.
The images of India you see on TV are false. The only way to live comfortably here is to be incredibly filthy rich. The rest suffer in uneasy silence – and that’s not even including the billion poor for whom conditions are infinitely worse. If this is shining India, then there is no hope.
6.12 am. Ding Dong!
Me, Phil: (Opening door) Namaste…
Lakshmi, Housemaid: Namaste. (goes about business)
L: Something something something panee something something?
P: Er… panee? (go to turn on water)
L: Something something something kanna hayng?
P: Haa, kuch kanna….
L: Something something something…
P: (shrug pathetically)
L: Something something something something something
P: (shrug)
L: (getting frustrated) Something something something something something something something something something kanna hayng?
P: Haa, kuch kanna…
L: Something something something…
P: I’m terribly sorry, you see I don’t speak any Hindi. Mayng Hindi ne hee balta hoong.
L: Something something something something something something something something something (shrug, goes off to prepare breakfast)
Continue for two days.
 India. How can you romanticise a place do relentlessly romanticised by so many others before oneself? Yet the temptation remains, and even as I write the cries of the muezzin drift in their eerie song over the city as it prepares again for rest. But I am in no mood for romance tonight, because in the midst of a billion people and their loves and lives there is no room for anything but lonely contemplation of what India is and what it will never become.
I arrive minutes before the stroke of the midnight hour, dumped unceremoniously into the night by KLM’s sterile efficiency of in-flight movies and boxed-up dinners. Eight hours of Germany’s geometric order and Uzbekistan’s barren expansiveness before the darkness creeps up; and in between them more clouds than one can see beyond, as viewed from the sky behind the aircraft’s wing. My cousin and father are there to receive me, patiently waiting for the airport to disgorge its new arrivals from its bowels, and we ride in near silence through the still-bustling streets, each quiet for his own reasons of fatigue.
I try to sleep, but in the heat and unfamiliarity sleep does not come because she is not there and because I know now that she cannot be again.
In the morning, I awake to countless instructions. This is how the water works, an obscure contraption that needs careful control of the system of pumps; here is the refrigerator, the bathroom, the cupboards, locks and bolts. My father wears again the army shirt and slacks he wore last night in anticipation of his trip to Calcutta this afternoon; he thinks they are practical, but they don’t suit him.
It had rained the last day, and it offers some respite as the heat begins to build again. The expected rickshaw wallah is not there, and must we persuade another to take us to the office which he does in a half-resentful flood of sweat. At one point the ground is so bumpy I must get out and push. But eventually my father’s business in the office is done and we return for a moment, only for him to turn straight around and head for Calcutta.
So having come all this way to where I belong and am yet so alien, I am alone again. My cousin takes me for lunch, though work delays him by a couple of hours, and we eat quickly outside in a flurry of somnolent flies. A ride around the locality orients me to the neighbourhood’s landscape of idenikit tenement houses and shining new developments, all of which seem only half complete. And then again I am alone in the dusty apartment on the edge of the city, with the Yamuna river curling alongside redolent with the stink of a million other lunches and dinners and loves and lives. This is India; I am back.
‘Baloch passing most critical period after Bugti’s death’
The people of Balochistan are passing through the most critical period after the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti...
He said there is no negative impact of the situation on the ongoing resistance movement, which is getting organised again. It is a clear proof of the reorganisation of the movement that seven to eight helicopters regularly bombard hideouts of resistance activists.
China, Pakistan team up on energy | csmonitor.com
"I think most security experts are looking at this very closely because this is the closest access point China has to the Persian Gulf," says Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security in Washington. "I don't know that this is something the US particularly likes."
The article concentrates mainly on the US perspective:
Given the energy game's high stakes, some wonder if Gwadar will set off alarm bells in Washington. Last April, while hosting the China-Pakistan Energy Forum in Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf was asked as much by a visiting delegate. But to a roar of applause, he quickly deflected the question: "I do not care about pressure from major powers. If Pakistan suffers pressure from certain major powers, I believe China will come forward to help us apply pressure on the other side."
Still, the opening of Gwadar is indicative of how China's largesse in Pakistan is coming into open competition with the US – and how that could alter the region's political landscape.
Apparently, it's all about the money - China has promised $12bn to Pakistan, while the US offers only a paltry $6bn. Who's your daddy, especially in the energy game?
Meetings set for later in April augur well - and China's observer status of the SAARC could be set to make it complement the SCO?
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan - Pak, China to sign 3 accords during PM’s visit: Kasuri
Islamabad and Beijing are set to sign at least three agreements during Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s visit to China, scheduled from April 16 to April 22, said Foreign Minster Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri here on Sunday while talking to reporters after a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the foreign office.
Kasuri said that there was a complete unanimity of views between the two countries on bilateral, regional and international issues. He said the two countries would sign agreements to establish the Joint Investment Company, University of Engineering and Science and Technology, and the Media University in Pakistan when Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz would visit China in the second week of April.
“We welcome China’s entry in SAARC as an observer,” said Kasuri, and it has heightened the importance of the organisation. “We are confident that China will play an important role in the association,” he added.
Nothing new here, but worth a quick look.
China's footprint in Pakistan - Los Angeles Times
Gwadar would provide a more secure corridor for China's fuel and energy supplies in the face of instability in the Persian Gulf and also down in the pirate-infested Strait of Malacca, by Indonesia, through which 80% of China's oil imports now pass. From Gwadar, imports could travel overland up through Pakistan and into China.
Trade out of China's own restive western region of Xinjiang would also be easier and faster. The distance from Kashgar, on the edge of Xinjiang, to Gwadar is 1,250 miles, versus twice that distance to reach Shanghai.
Some analysts see a more strategic interest in Gwadar. They say it could play host to Chinese vessels, listening stations or an outpost from which Beijing could monitor the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, including the U.S. Navy base on the remote island of Diego Garcia, a key launching pad for operations in the Persian Gulf.
But a beefed-up Chinese military presence in Gwadar probably is years away, if it happens at all.
...but in battalions.
A brace of articles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus from Asia Times. Prospects of a 'united front' against Musharraf are particularly disturbing, since if Pakistan falls to a Taliban-style revolution or civil war, then the US, India and China may come to blows over what to do about it. And scary things are happening, such as a plague of child bombers. (Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Suicide attackers with nothing to lose)
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Another stiff test for Musharraf
KARACHI - From the mountains of Pakistan's tribal areas to the capital Islamabad and up to the insurgent coastal belt of Balochistan province bordering Iran and Afghanistan, pan-Islamists are developing a united front ultimately to take on the West and its allies in the region.
The immediate target, though, is the administration of West-leaning President General Pervez Musharraf. Islamists of all hues are coming together. These include those believing in tribal traditions (the Islamic Emirates of the Waziristans and the Taliban of Afghanistan); global jihadis (al-Qaeda), proponents of Islamic democracy (the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan and the newly organized United Islamic Front of Afghanistan), and madrassas (seminaries) led by the Lal Masjid (mosque) in Islamabad).
These groups plan to join hands next Tuesday in a mass sit-in protest in Islamabad against Musharraf.
Here is the author's assessment on Musharraf's options:
Musharraf has few choices. He can continue the impossible fight against Islamists, at the behest of Western forces, all the way from the mountains of the Waziristans to the southern port city of Karachi and the deep seas of Gwadar, or switch sides and make a major compromise that could eventually support the emergence of a green crescent in Southwest Asia.
The wily Musharraf, though, has survived many challenges to his rule since taking power in a coup in 1999.
The final article deals with the newly-joined battle in NWFP. Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan crosses a dangerous boundary
Comprehensive analysis of Gwadar from Pakistani point of view.
The News - International
 Just when I thought I had the most terribly original thesis topic, The Economist goes and hijacks it - even the title. At least it shows I'm onto something.
It's impossible to disconnect the whole India-Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus, partly because Pakistan is a very artificially-constructed nation and Afghanistan has never really been a natural state at all. It's all very complex, with India close to Afghanistan and meddling in Pakistan's internal conflicts, yet needing Pakistan on side for the pipeline projects. And with China and the US thrown into the mix, the geopolitical implications could be immense.
Game on.
India and Afghanistan | The Great Game revisited | Economist.com
India has an obvious interest in a stable Afghanistan. It hopes the country will one day accommodate transmission lines bringing electricity from Central Asia, as well as a pipeline for oil and gas from the region. There are two competing gas-pipeline projects: “TAPI”, running from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan to Pakistan and on to India; and another from Iran through Pakistan to India. Instability in Afghanistan is a big impediment to the first, but America opposes the second. For now, Pakistan refuses to allow Indian goods to cross its territory. But India also hankers after direct trade routes with Central Asia.
A Chinese-Pakistani joint-venture port at Gwadar in Baluchistan, which had its ceremonial opening this week, is matched by an Iranian-Indian venture to develop the “free port” at Chabahar in the Gulf of Oman. Both would require road links across Afghan territory. Indian engineers are currently connecting Afghanistan's ring road to the Iranian border. The Indian press blamed the abduction and killing in 2006 of an Indian engineer working on the project on Pakistani intelligence, after the Taliban denied involvement.
Pakistan would also benefit from Afghanistan's becoming the land bridge between India and Central Asia. But until a final resolution of its dispute with India, its calculations will be more cynical. Afghanistan is no longer, as it was under Taliban rule, a client of Pakistan. But “an unstable Afghanistan is the second-best option to a stable one ruled by your friends,” says Mr Rubin. “Both are certainly preferable to an Afghanistan ruled by your enemies.”
Iran's nuclear shenanigans have wider repercussions for near neighbours such as India, which may find itself in a diplomatic confrontation with the US.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - India grapples with energy issues
A prominent US legislator, Congressman Tom Lantos, who is head of the House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations, has introduced a bill that, if passed, will ensure that India and Pakistan are not able to proceed with their gas pipeline connecting to Iran.
The legislation, the Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007, seeks to target companies investing in Iran's energy sector by ensuring that deals with Iran worth more than $20 million will bring the investors under US sanctions.
According to reports, the US government has been quietly warning foreign energy companies, including Europe's Shell and Repsol and Malaysia's SKS, as well as the governments of China, India, Pakistan and Malaysia, that penalties are possible if they pursue energy deals with Iran.
Also worth noting is the concept of a 'South Asian Energy Ring':
The SAARC, for which energy is a very high priority for cooperation, comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Key SAARC nation Pakistan has welcomed the energy-ring concept. Amanullah Khan Jadoon, minister for petroleum and natural resources, said Pakistan is a strong advocate of energy cooperation in South Asia.
All you need to know.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan port opens new possibilities
Some analysts see an operational Gwadar port as China's first foothold in the oil-rich Middle East, as well as providing road and rail links to the economic powerhouse. Beijing wants Gwadar to be the gateway port for its western region, as its eastern seaboard is 3,500km from Kashgar, the main city in the far west of China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, whereas the distance from Kashgar to Gwadar is only 1,500km. This makes it feasible and cost-effective for China's interior regions to carry out trade through this port. That is why China expressed interest in helping Pakistan to develop Gwadar into a full-fledged deepwater commercial port, capable of handling cargo ships of up to 50,000 tons or more.
Energy-hungry China is eyeing Central Asia's oil and gas reserves and is increasingly looking to Pakistan for oil and gas supplies. Beijing plans to run at least five oil and gas pipelines to Gwadar from the Central Asian republics and wants to turn the facility into a transit terminal for Iranian and African crude-oil imports.
Gwadar is expected to play a key role in China's energy security, as its strategic location gives it greater scope as a free oil port in the region, and it will be the endpoint of all gas pipelines from Central Asian states, Iran and Qatar. Pakistan and China have also held talks on the construction of the strategic pipeline from Gwadar to China's borders, enabling it to import oil from Saudi Arabia.
What to do? Protestors on the streets, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighting it out, not to mention America's Afghanistan war and a possible attack on Iran. Not a happy opening for Gwadar, was it?
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Shaky Musharraf holds only the military card
Musharraf has dismissed the idea of declaring an emergency or deploying the army, despite the fact that all armed-forces intelligence agencies have reported the failure of the civilian administration and the police to handle the protests. The agencies say that probably the only way to contain the protests would be the deployment in sizable numbers of paramilitary forces such as the Pakistan Rangers.
The crisis is being compounded by other developments. According to latest reports, the Pakistani Taliban have seized control of settled areas such as Tank in North West Frontier Province, and the leader of the Awami National Party, Isfandyar Wali, revealed on television that the Taliban now control Frontier Region (FR) Kohat, just 15 kilometers from the provincial capital, Peshawar. "I am constantly saying that Taliban are very rapidly getting powerful in the North West Frontier Province, but nobody is listening to me," said Wali...
The crisis has thus severely eroded the credibility of the Musharraf government, and when the dust settles, both he and the military will find themselves on shaky ground.
Compounding the situation are regional developments. The Taliban are about to launch an offensive in Afghanistan, and a US attack on Iran is not out of the question. These events could propel stronger Iraqi resistance to the US-led occupation there, and set shock waves in motion from Pakistan to Israel. As a major US ally in a region where anti-US forces are calling the shots, any weakening of the Pakistani leadership would have far-reaching ramifications.
It would seem that the military card is the only one Musharraf has left to play. He is truly between the proverbial rock and hard place.
Pervez Musharraf's sincere thanks to the Chinese FM.
Associated Press of Pakistan - Chinese assistance helped realize dream of Gwadar Port: President
General Pervez Musharraf on Tuesday said the dream of the Gwadar Port was realized with China’s assistance and said its continued involvement will help in further improvement of the facilities and infrastructure at the country’s first deep-sea port.Talking to Chinese Minister for Communication Li Shen, the President said the two countries enjoy an all weather and strategic partnership that will continue to grow for the mutual benefit of the two people.
He said there was a need for greater long term involvement between the two countries to make the Port an important Container and Energy hub for the region.
The Chinese Minister said that with the completion of the second phase, the Gwadar Port will be able to handle the world’s biggest ships and more infrastructure can be added to enable it to serve as an energy hub for the region.
Today would be a good day to attack Gwadar, and the authorities know it.
Reuters AlertNet - Pakistan steps up security ahead of port opening
GWADAR, Pakistan, March 19 (Reuters) - Pakistan tightened security around a coastal town in Baluchistan province on Monday, a day before the opening of a port authorities hope will bring prosperity to the remote and troubled region.
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is due to open the Gwadar deep-sea port on the Arabian Sea on Tuesday along with Chinese Minister of Communications Li Shenglin.
China financed 80 percent of the initial development costs of the $248 million project in Baluchistan province, 70 km (45 miles) east of the Iranian border and on the doorstep of Gulf shipping lanes.
Thousands of soldiers and policemen guarded the coast and roads to the port on Monday while fishermen were told to stay well clear.
It could well be a slip of the pen, but note the writer's words here. Pakistan's FM is pushing for the Karakoram pipeline as a "contingency plan". Contingency for what, exactly? And it shows the pipeline is still very much on the table.
Pak bends over backwards for Beijing, offers oil backup-Rest of World-World-NEWS-The Times of India
BEIJING: Pakistan's foreign minister, Khurshid Kasuri, on Monday offered to build oil reservoirs and lay gas pipelines in his country's territory across the Chinese border to help Beijing prepare a contingency plan.
Kasuri, who is here on a four-day trip, is pushing Beijing to set up an energy corridor linking the Chinese-built Gwadar port in Pakistan to western China.
The Gwadar port in Baluchistan, located at the entrance of the Gulf and about 460 km west of Karachi, is due to be opened on Tuesday.
It will be operated by the Port of Singapore Authority, which has obtained a 40-year contract to run it.
"The most important thing is the trust that exists between China and Pakistan. The energy corridor will pass through a friendly country, which will be a big advantage for China,"Kasuri said in an interview to the official media in Beijing.
Probably too early to pass judgment on the current situation, but many commentators are calling the protests about the sacking of a prominent judge the biggest challenge yet to Musharraf's authority. It looks like he has made a serious miscalculation here, which is not a terribly good idea in what is supposed to be an 'election year'.
On the other hand, at least the anti-government protest groups appear to represent elements of civil society, a far more positive sign than bands of Islamists on the streets.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Blood and batons spur Pakistan row
A simple constitutional matter of referring the country's most senior judge to be investigated by the appropriate judicial body is getting bigger, nastier, and potentially more dangerous for the present government by the day. And it would appear that it is a problem of the government's own making.
Essentially, a few hundred lawyers in half a dozen cities was all the opposition amounted to in the beginning.
If they had been allowed to shout slogans and wave their fists in front of courts, that would probably have been the end of the matter.
But local administrations chose to pit their police forces against the protesting lawyers. Bloody scenes in Lahore last Monday unified the lawyers like never before and hardened their stance.
They have taken to the streets again on Saturday. And the police have got their batons out. Result? More blood being spilt, more publicity.
Anyone would think China has a policy of encirclement...
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - China moves into India's back yard
China is all set to drop anchor at India's southern doorstep. An agreement has been finalized between Sri Lanka and China under which the latter will participate in the development of a port project at Hambantota on the island's south coast.
An agreement on the Hambantota project was among eight that were signed during Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse's recent visit to China. Even as the Sri Lankans were finalizing the deal with the Chinese, they clinched an agreement with the Americans. In Colombo, officials reached agreement on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US.
The agreements come at a time when India is already watching with concern the growing Pakistani influence in Sri Lanka.
The Hambantota Development Zone, which the Chinese will help build, will include a container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an airport and other facilities. It is expected to cost about US$1 billion and the Chinese are said to be financing more than 85% of the project.
 Not one but two articles in today's Asia Times highlight the difficult geopolitical position of Pakistan, sandwiched as it is between both Iran and Afghanistan.
In the first, the author notes that the Balochistan issue is a common problem for Iran and Pakistan, while not forgetting that Iran is in truth a more fractured society than it would appear. Morover, the IPI pipeline gets into it too. How the US will deal with this is anyone's guess:
The moot point is to what extent Musharraf is willingly cooperating with US regional policy against Iran. He is skating on thin ice. He may endear himself to Washington as a brave leader in the Muslim world, but Pakistani public opinion is averse to serving the US agenda over Iran. This contradiction is fraught with dangers. It can only further accentuate Musharraf's isolation within Pakistan and add to the country's overall political uncertainties.
Washington could be miscalculating that only the Shi'ites in Sunni-dominated Pakistan will feel alienated by Musharraf's unfriendly attitude toward Tehran. The fact is, in emotive terms, the average Pakistani citizen is bound to view US hostility toward Iran as yet another instance of Washington's "crusade" against the Islamic world.
But Washington, on its part, can draw satisfaction that it is killing two birds with one stone. It may become difficult to advance the Iran-Pakistan-India gas-pipeline project when a thick cloud of distrust threatens to engulf Pakistan-Iran relations.
Musharraf's problems do not end there, with the US and NATO now threatening to extend the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan's NWFP:
"It was not an option for Pakistan to carry out any operations on its own, as Washington has completely shown its mistrust in Pakistan's ability to conduct any credible military operations against militant hideouts," a top security official told Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity. "There was only one demand: that Pakistan allow NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] troops the right of hot pursuit of al-Qaeda in Pakistani territory, or NATO would force its own way in."
Will they really go in 'hot pursuit' of al-Qaeda and the Taliban across the Durand Line? To do so could well further destabilise an already shaky Islamabad. It just goes to show that the GWOT, energy and the nexus of world instability (what I may begin to call the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan or IPA triangle) are intimately connected.
Ironic. To all intents and purposes, the Pakistani government and ISI created and armed the Taliban in the 1990s. Now the beast is biting the hand that fed it.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Taleban spread wings in Pakistan
Some in NWFP say the Pakistani military establishment has deliberately allowed the Taleban to expand their area of influence.
This, they say, provides the government with the argument that the Taleban phenomenon is a spontaneous development which is difficult to control in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan.
NWFP Governor Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai seemed to be arguing this way when he told journalists last month that the Taleban movement was "developing into some sort of a nationalist movement, a sort of liberation war against coalition forces".
But senior administration officials in Peshawar say the government is not colluding with Taleban.
Instead, they say, the government simply lacks the capacity to counter an increasingly aggressive Taleban force both on the border with Afghanistan, and in the provincially-administered Frontier Regions (FRs), those areas that separate the border tribal regions from NWFP.
Could it get any more geopolitical? In the space of two paragraphs, we basically drag in everything that's going on in the region and join the dots. All we need now is some Kiplingesque figure with a peg leg and a name that rhymes...
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban
One-legged Mullah Dadullah will be Pakistan's strongman in a corridor running from the Afghan provinces of Zabul, Urzgan, Kandahar and Helmand across the border into Pakistan's Balochistan province, according to both Taliban and al-Qaeda contacts Asia Times Online spoke to. Using Pakistani territory and with Islamabad's support, the Taliban will be able safely to move men, weapons and supplies into southwestern Afghanistan.
The deal with Mullah Dadullah will serve Pakistan's interests in re- establishing a strong foothold in Afghanistan (the government in Kabul leans much more toward India), and it has resulted in a cooling of the Taliban's relations with al-Qaeda.
Not quite as catchy as the 'Silk Road'
Asia Times Online :: China News, China Business News, Taiwan and Hong Kong News and Business.
China's ever expanding pipeline network has the potential to bring about a significant strategic realignment of Xinjiang and the adjacent region. Central Asia, with its huge reserves of oil, gas and minerals, has already seen some sharp rivalry among the United States, Europe and Japan. All of the major powers, in conjunction with multinational corporations, are seeking to secure alliances, concessions and possible pipeline routes in the area.
Oil and gas pipelines to China from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could easily be extended to link into the pipeline networks of both Russia and Iran. This model has been dubbed the "Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge" - a Eurasian network of pipelines linking energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia through to China's Pacific coast. A major part of the old Silk Route is inexorably turning into the "Black Gold Route" of the new millennium.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news : China-Pakistan rail link on horizon
Beijing's involvement in several rail projects in Pakistan is motivated primarily by commercial considerations, but it also sees distinct advantages for its improved transportation and access to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf states. A reliable network of road and rail links can only ensure China's access to energy-rich central Asia, serving it both commercially and strategically.
Terrorism, as always, has a political motivation and today's attack was obviously intended to derail peace talks between India and Pakistan. Thus the leaders should be applauded for their restraint and unity in condemning it on the one hand without jumping to conclusions on the other.
If the two countries can get an agreement on Kashmir together, it would be a landmark achievement - but there are many vested interests who would rather see them fail. Expect attacks like this to increase over the next months, especially as Pakistan heads towards a watershed election.
Terrorism in India | Murder on the Friendship Express | Economist.com
After three days of talks, they are likely to sign several agreements, including one to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war. They will also continue negotiations to resolve two smaller territorial disputes: Sir Creek, a briny stream that should set the two countries’ maritime border; and the Siachen glacier, on the eastern edge of Kashmir. The peace process, says Commodore Uday Bhaskar, of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi, is “becoming blast-proof”.
Given the rivals’ history of war and slaughter, that is no trifle. Yet it is one thing for the process to survive under fire, and another for it actually to succeed. Dolefully, with every blast, peace looks more distant.
Two incidents last week, both relatively minor, but perhaps evidence that the militants in Greater Balochistan (both Baloch nationalists and Islamic extremists) are on the move.
First in Iran, then in Quetta.
Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma - not to mention Pakistan. Countries can choose their friends―but not, as Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, has noted, their neighbours.
Asia.view | Trouble with the neighbours | Economist.com
In its present buoyant mood, India may think that it can cope readily enough with living in a low-rent, violent district. Fine―until something big goes wrong. India's rising international prestige and economic allure could both be put in jeopardy if the country is sucked into some headline-grabbing regional conflict. The best way to reduce that risk will be to find ways of helping the neighbours with a bit of gentrification here and there whenever the opportunity arises, however grudging they may be in their response.
The author does make a bit of a leap in his logic, but his assessment does sound plausible at least.
Militarising Balochistan : outlookindia.com
The following details of this project have since become available from an article titled Militarisation of Balochistan" written by columnist Mir Mohammad Ali Talpur in the Post of February 1, 2007:
* The Chinese will be building the airport 26 km away to the north-east of the existing airport towards Pasni.
* Disregarding the normal procedure, a sum of Rs.1.05 billion for the acquisition of 6,500 acres of land has been released to the Military Estate Officer in Quetta instead of to the Civil Aviation Authority. The land for the airport has already been acquired by the Military Land and Cantonments Department. The JFK airport in New York, one of the largest in the world, covers an area of only 4,930 acres. The land on which the proposed new Gwadar airport will be located is much more than the land on which the JFK airport is located and twice the size of the land on which London's Heathrow airport is located (2,965 acres). In Heathrow, one plane lands or takes off every 46 seconds. Such heavy commercial traffic is never visualied in any airport of Pakistan even in the medium and long terms. Such a huge airport near Gwadar would, therefore, have other objectives. It will serve as a mammoth airbase.
It's all about supply, demand and transit. At best the IPI is a potential solution to the Kashmir issue. But at worst it's yet another point of friction.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - Gas: Iran turns up the heat
Putin paid special attention to cooperation "in building facilities for gas production and transportation in India and the adjacent region" (emphasis added). This is a reference to the highly politicized US$7 billion project for a 2,100-kilometer Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
Putin's visit to Delhi came closely on the heels of the latest round of negotiations over the price of gas for the Iran pipeline project. According to a new formula proposed by Iran, the cost of gas will translate at the Pakistan-India border as $4.93 per million British thermal units (mBtu), plus $1.5 per mBtu that India would have to pay to Pakistan as a transit fee. Indian officials have since expressed optimism that the signing of India's $145 billion gas mega-deal with Iran might take place by June.
In geopolitical terms, it could be the focal point of a new power-sharing axis, perhaps under the auspices of the SCO:
In other words, we're talking seriously for the first time about the prospect of a gas market uniting Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and China. This is where a breakthrough in the protracted negotiations over the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project could become a defining moment for energy politics in Eurasia.
Russia is not in competition with Iran in tapping the South Asian market for gas. It is expedient for Russia if Iran gets deeply engaged in the Asian market (which includes two energy guzzlers - China and India) and, that, too, with Russian equity participation in the actual construction of Iran's pipeline to South Asia. That could lead to Gazprom's participation in the highly lucrative distribution and retailing of Iranian gas in Pakistan, India and China.
The grand opening swiftly aproaches, and writers are beginning to consider the deeper geostrategic significance of Gwadar. yet we still don't really know that much about it.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
It is expected that with Gwadar port operational, Pakistan will become a key player in the Persian Gulf region and serve as an energy corridor for Central Asia, South Asia and western China. With the exception of Chahbahar port in Iran, Gwadar will be the only free port between Dubai and Colombo providing container storage and warehousing facilities...
Pakistan plans to spend $7 billion in the next eight years to improve the country's road infrastructure, completing a network linking China and South Asia through Gwadar by 2014.
Because of its geo-strategic location, Gwadar has the potential to become a regional maritime hub. The 14.5-meter draft of the port will be able to accommodate up to "fifth-generation" ships, including Panamax and mother vessels.
Islamabad firmly believes that the Gwadar port is a key entry point for energy supplies for Central and South Asia, as well as western China. It will allow the expansion of oil trade in the region, as it provides the shortest possible route to landlocked, oil-rich Central Asian states.
You don't say, India. About time too.
IndianExpress.com :: We don’t envy China, will rather emulate it, says FM
Recognising China’s prowess in attracting and implementing infrastructure projects, finance minister P. Chidambaram today said India needs to “emulate” China in infrastructure development.
Despite having a different political environment, he said India can learn from China about execution of projects on time. This according to the FM includes enforcing a disciplined on those leading project execution, along with a reward-punishment incentive structure.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - India takes a slow road
India's involvement with road-building is bitterly opposed by both the Taliban and its sponsors in Pakistan, as the highway under construction not only will boost Afghanistan's connectivity and trade ties with the outside world, it will also enhance the trade and influence of Iran and India - countries whose relations with Islamabad and the Taliban are hardly friendly. Pakistan fears that with the completion of the highway, India's presence and influence in its neighborhood to the north, ie Central Asia, will increase manifold...
The land route through Pakistan is the simplest way of moving goods between India and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Pakistan is reluctant to allow India access to Afghanistan via its territory, although such a move would earn it considerable revenue in the form of transit fees. This Pakistani stance has made the land route via Iran into Afghanistan all the more crucial for India. India hopes that the road link through Iran and Afghanistan will open up markets for its goods in Afghanistan and beyond in Central Asia. Hence the Indian interest in completing the Delaram-Zaranj highway...
Since 2003, India and Iran have been cooperating in developing the Chabahar port complex. Chabahar is closer to India than the existing port at Bandar Abbas. Iran has extended huge concessions to Afghanistan to attract it to use Chabahar port rather than the port that Pakistan is developing with Chinese help at Gwadar in Balochistan province.
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan has fallen dramatically and that of India's has grown. None of the projects that India is involved with in Afghanistan undermines Pakistan's influence as much as the Zaranj-Delaram road link. This explains why Indians working on this project are particularly vulnerable to Taliban attacks.
Here, the author suggests that the US and NATO are so keen to keep Pakistan and Musharraf on side that they are even considering making the Taliban "part of the solution". Part of the solution to what exactly? It's complicated... but the long-term problem appears to be Iran. Yet appeasing the Taliban would surely contradict the entire purpose of the War on Terror. What a balls-up.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
...will the cozy US-Pakistan condominium that has been at the steering wheel in the "war on terror" in Afghanistan allow regional powers like Russia (or Iran and India) to mess around in the Hindu Kush? The exclusivity of that condominium has been an integral part of the war through the past five years.
The geopolitics of the Afghan war are seldom talked about, but they have figured throughout at the center of the closely guarded US-Pakistan agenda. For the same reason, very little is heard nowadays about the idea mooted by French President Jacques Chirac at NATO's Riga summit in late November regarding the formation if a "contact group" on Afghanistan comprising countries in the region that have an interest in Afghanistan's stability. The proposed group would have made the conduct of the war more transparent and regional powers would have found such a forum useful.
But Washington has all but smothered the French proposal. Both the US and Pakistan would be horrified if any such contact group took shape and then proceeded to demystify the hunt for the elusive Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
But there are other nuances, too. It appears that the US has broached with Pakistan the issue of "help and assistance" in respect of its standoff with Iran.
International Relations is an immensely complex subject, and in order to stay focus everyone has pare away a few factors now and again. The southern hemisphere is completely off my radar, and I am also frequently guilty of ignoring the 'R' in 'BRIC' too - Russia.
But Russia is definately part of the equation even in these post-Cold War days. Historically a partner of India, while China and the US uneasily applied themselves to Pakistan for geostrategic reasons, Russia is now edging back into India's sphere due to its energy wealth.
The article predicts that by 2020 or so, India's energy needs will treble. So it is competing with traditional rival China for Russian hydrocarbons. The US would also like to court India in order to ensure a regional balance, and is doing so in the shape of nuclear technology. Britain's Gordon Brown also just made a visit, though it was overshadowed by the facile Big Brother controversy.
Ironically, therefore, India is now in a great bargaining position, with suitors on all sides. Bizarre as it may sound, India is the new Pakistan.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Russia and India's complex friendship
Before leaving Moscow President Putin was keen to point out "the very specific feature of our interaction has to do with the fact that we have moved from the simple paradigm of seller-buyer relationship to jointly work on products".
Russia is trying to tie in India's lucrative arms and energy contracts.
Moscow has reason to act. India has just begun building a new strategic partnership with the United States.
The spur for this was President Bush's landmark deal offering co-operation in civilian nuclear energy programmes. Washington wants to make common cause with India as the world's biggest democracy and a counterweight to rising China. It wants to sell its own nuclear reactors to India and weapons too.
So India's rise means it is being courted on both sides.
Delhi's ultimate aim is probably to secure what it calls "strategic balance" to avoid becoming too closely tied to either Moscow or Washington.
That will mean some hard-nosed bargaining. But it is India that is buying, whether it is energy or arms, and so it finds itself in an unaccustomed but increasingly powerful role as a major economic player, with both Moscow and Washington vying for its business.
A likely successor to President Niyazov of Turkmenistan has emerged in the shape of a former dentist and health minister, the deliciously unpronouncable Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. By the sounds of it, he is going to be very much a puppet of the security services: we shall see.
However, what is more certain is that the parlous state of Turkmenistan is still a likely spark for tension and instability. Agriculture and the energy industry are in meltdown, and various vultures - not just Russia, but China and India too, are hovering. 'Elections' will be held on 11 February, but whether or not Turkmenistan can be turned around without disintegration and intervention is open to debate.
Turkmenistan's new father | Economist.com
One possible scenario would be for the new president to take Turkmenistan some way along the path followed by Kazakhstan, and make the country more welcoming to foreign investment. Turkmenistan has what are believed to be among the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. BP’s conservative official estimate is 2.9trn cubic metres, but the Turkmen authorities claim gas the true figure is up to 20bn cu metres. Even if reserves are only half this level, Turkmenistan would rank above major gas producers such as Algeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria.
In recent years, Turkmenistan’s gas output has been around 63bn cu metres per year, the majority of which is exported to Russia and Ukraine. The sanctity of long-term deals was always open to question, as Mr Niyazov tended to renege on agreements once a more lucrative offer was on the table. If the gas sector is to be opened up, Russian capital could face serious competition from Western and Chinese companies, as well as Indian. This in turn wo
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