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Bush, the Neo-Cons and the death of the Old Order
Sorry Brazil, in this analysis the 'big four' are the contender states, Eurasian military-economic powers Russia, India and China plus the rival-cum-ally, the US.
Interesting that coinciding with a Condi trip to Beijing comes a possible US military deal with New Delhi that might undermine Russia's virtual monopoly over its defence equipment. Russia continues to supply China, of course, no big.
If India were to become dependent on the US both for nuclear power, Gulf-related energy security and military hardware, that truly would seal it into Washington's orbit as anti-American social forces in Pakistan begin to spin away and thus towards China instead.
Also interesting to note that China's defence budget took another leap last year, as revealed in the annual Pentagon estimate. Part of the 18% hike is probably down to rising oil and food prices, but there can be no doubt that China is building up its capability while hardly making a major contribution to UN peacekeeping (as does India).
All things being considered, it looks like simple geopolitics to me.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Gates' talking points in Delhi related primarily to defense trade. India's procurement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft in a deal estimated at $10 billion - and possibly, as high as $ 16 billion - was number one priority for him and for the American defense contractors accompanying him. The principal bidders include Lockheed Martin's F-16 and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet.
The importance of the deal is not only commercial, but that the new generation aircraft will be in use with the Indian Air Force for the next 40-year period and, therefore, clinching the deal becomes absolutely vital for the US if it is to aim at "inter-operability" with India. Gates knows it is the sort of deal that will ensure US-India military-to-military cooperation becomes irreversible and pin India down as the US's strategic ally in the region...
Gates expressed satisfaction over the entry that the US has made in the Indian market, which is traditionally dominated by Russia. He said, "We have tried for some years now to get a seat at the table, and we're finally there." Washington is determined to throw Russia out of the Indian defense market in the coming years. The assertiveness of the US sales pitch is evident from the remark by a US official in Gates's entourage, "When you go into joint production [and] cooperative development [with the US], you're getting not only the best product in the world, but you have the best support system, the best maintenance package over the life of the product. You also have companies that operate with integrity, which is different than what India has seen with other partners in the world. We're very transparent."
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
If there's one thing that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - and arguably, sad to say, Vietnam - have proved is that in order to bring peace and stability to a country you need a lot of troops, a lot of money and a lot of time. All of them must be spent wisely.
That was the essence of Donald Rumsfeld's disastrous failure of vision, the deeply misguided belief that the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs was the be all and end all. But he eventually found out that once the high-tempo warfighting phase is over, then the force multipliers of US technology count for nothing.
Incredibly, the US Army has only just redrafted its manual to suggest that "stabilising countries and winning over locals required more than just military skills... and knowledge of foreign languages and local cultures are also important." Duh. That says it all.
That's why developments in NATO are alarming. The SecGen attempts to gloss over the problem, but it's certainly the case that many of the old European nations are still cashing in on the post-Cold War peace dividend. Times have changed, however. At least France under Sarkozy is beginning to pull its weight.
What NATO has to do is create a virtuous circle in Pakistan: contain the Taliban long enough for development and prosperity to flourish, which in turn will provide people with an alternative to fighting for scarce resources and political control. For that there need to be boots on the ground, because one thing's for sure - there's plenty more where the Taliban came from.
Nato crisis grows over Afghan troops | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited
In Washington on Wednesday Gates told the House of Representatives' armed services committee that the alliance could split into countries that were "willing to fight and die to protect people's security and those who were not". He added: "My view is you can't have some allies whose sons and daughters die in combat and other allies who are shielded from that kind of a sacrifice."
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato's secretary-general, said more forces were needed to combat Taliban and al-Qaida violence but dismissed Gates' suggestion that Nato could become a "two-tiered alliance" based on a country's willingness to fight. "I do not see a two-tier alliance, there is one alliance," he said as he arrived for the Vilnius meeting.
A disappointingly weak argument for the candidates' foreign policy apathy during the primary cycle. Surely, as commander in chief of the world's most advanced armed forces and helmsman of its largest economy, the president has some choice? Apparently not: policy is 'shaped by events'.
Rubbish. What is the point of all that power projection capability if the US has no role in helping to define global affairs? This is exactly the kind of argument that makes the world a worse place to live in. Sure, unpredictable events occur, but that doesn't mean the president must be hostile to being prepared and having beliefs and opinions.
If anything, the post below is an argument against democracy - if nothing can ever change, then why bother? Shame on you, Friedman.
Foreign Policy and the President's Irrelevance | Stratfor
When you drill down into position papers that are written but not meant to be read — and which certainly are not devised by the candidates — you find some interesting thoughts. But for the most part, the positions are clear. The candidates are concerned about Russia’s growing internal authoritarianism and hope it ends. The candidates are concerned about the impact of China on American jobs but generally are committed to variations on free trade. They are also concerned about growing authoritarianism in China and hope it ends. On the unification of Europe, they have no objections.
This might appear vapid, but we would argue that it really isn’t. In spite of the constitutional power of the U.S. president in foreign policy, in most cases, the president really doesn’t have a choice. Policies have institutionalized themselves over the decades, and shifting those policies has costs that presidents can’t absorb. There is a reason the United States behaves as it does toward Russia, China and Europe, and these reasons usually are powerful. Presidents do not simply make policy. Rather, they align themselves with existing reality. For example, since the American public doesn’t care about European unification, there is no point in debating the subject. There are no decisions to be made on such issues. There is only the illusion of decisions.
There is a deeper reason as well. The United States does not simply decide on policies. It responds to a world that is setting America’s agenda. During the 2000 campaign, the most important issue that would dominate the American presidency regardless of who was elected never was discussed: 9/11. Whatever the presidential candidates thought would or wouldn’t be important, someone else was going to set the agenda.
The issue of policies versus character has been discussed many times. One school of thought holds that the foreign policies advocated by a presidential candidate are the things to look at. In fact, the candidate can advocate whatever he or she wants, but foreign policy is frequently defined by the world and not by the president. In many cases, it is impossible to know what the issue is going to be, meaning the candidates’ positions on various topics are irrelevant. The decisions that are going to matter are going to force the president’s hand, not the other way around.
The pertinent point in the analysis below is perhaps overlooked. The problem with American democracy, from a non-American point of view, is that it is almost wholly concerned with issues of domestic policy. Iraq maybe, but that's because it has a direct and visible effect on the voting population.
However, as the writer points out, the responsibility of the Presidential office more often than not turns to foreign policy, like it or not. Yet it's not something the candidates are judged upon until their baptism of fire - as we saw with Bush and his pet goat.
Super Tuesday neglects Pakistan at America’s peril
Heading towards Super Tuesday, Pakistan has dropped off the radar of the primaries although it is the most likely place for the next civil war between Islamic terrorists and civilians. It might even become a cause of war with India and near total loss of American influence in the entire region.
Terrorism by Islamic fundamentalists supported by the Taliban and Al Qaeda has spread almost all across Pakistan. Terrorists killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and have attacked Air Force and Army personnel near military bases. Nearly half of Pakistani territory from Baluchistan to the North West Frontier is unstable and extremists seem to fear the army less.
Yet, none of the Presidential candidates seem to be aware of the dangers inherent in this situation for America, which is deeply engaged in the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts while trying to win over India as a strategic counterweight to China.
 Next Thursday, 7 February, sees the beginning of the Chinese Year of the Rat, the first in the Chinese Zodiac cycle. No, this isn't some cod astrological analysis: but it does put a little bit of mystical context in. Just look at all the international factors that are just about to converge and you'll see what I mean.
Basically, the next weeks and months could see some rather serious developments in the global political picture.
Kosovo might soon be declaring independence, and despite dissent it looks like most of the international community is going to recognise it. What few realise is that, for Serbia, the secession of Kosovo would be a disaster of monumental proportions. And they're holding an election this weekend in which a hard-right president could be selected.
Already locking horns with the UK, Russia is probably going to stand by Serbia - which means increasing antagonism with the rest of Europe. I can certainly foresee the gas spigot getting turned off for a couple of days, which given the present frigid economic (let alone meteorological) climate could have a severe impact.
Speaking of elections, it's Super Tuesday this week, another moment that's going to define the course of things to come. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney or John McCain: the field of four will probably narrow down to two candidates for the top job in the world.
Not long after that, Monday 18 February is finally going to see elections in Pakistan. Whether rigged or not, there will inevitably be implications for regional stability.
Furthermore, set that against the context of Afghanistan. President Karzai has just shot his nation in the foot by turning away one of Britain's most competent statesmen, Lord Ashdown, as a potential UN envoy.
Moreover, NATO is lumbering towards a crisis with Germany refusing to pull its weight and Canada getting very cold feet in the face of what looks like sheer petulance from its allies. Thus, the NATO conference set for next week could well define the future of the mission, and general stability in Afghanistan. Condi is already jetting in do do her firewoman act.
We don't want to see either Pakistan or Afghanistan go down; both of them falling apart at the same time would be disastrous.
And finally, look at China.
Anyone who's queued for rail tickets at Spring Festival - even in a good year - will tell you what a nightmare it is. This year has seen the worst weather in half a century and chances are that the world's largest internal migration is not going to go ahead as planned. That means some unhappy chappies down Chinatown.
Add to that the very real danger of a food crisis - a failed crop could tip China over the edge - compounded by the general economic malaise and you have a recipe for civil unrest in Olympic year.
And finally, add to that a touch of spice in the form of an upcoming referendum in Taiwan (set for 22 March) and you have a fiery plate of noodles indeed.
In summary, there are various crises impending in Eastern Europe, South Asia and East Asia. The year 2008 could well be going for a bag of rats.
"Yankee go home, but take me with you!" How long is that going to last? This writer seems to believe tha the European and Chinese ways are catching on more now than the American way. I'm slightly sceptical as to the former, but there's certainly an element of truth in it.
On the other hand, the strength of America's style of democracy - I say 'style' since it's not an absolute democracy as one gets from proportional representation methods - does mean that we will have regime change in a year. It's the Bush administration that has sown alienation against the US, not America per se. It can still be turned around, though of course the trend is a general one.
Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
But Europe lacks a coherent foreign policy, even now, and the Treaty of Lisbon probably won't alleviate that fundamental weakness by 2016. Then again, as pointed out, the Euro is now the real tool of Brussels foreign policy.
As for Beijing: "Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example." That's a Warsaw Pact in-the-making if ever I saw one.
Note also the logical follow-on from my 2012 scenario and big picture theory of simultaneous bipolar-multipolarity, plus the importance of Gwadar.
United States - International Diplomacy - Economic Trends - World Economy - Politics - New York Times
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.
The author Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation (sounds disturbingly like PNAC to me, but will let that one go. The essay is adapted from his book, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, to be published by Random House in March. Gonna add it to my Amazon wish list, I think.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
The Guardian picks up and spins a recent pronouncement by Frederick Kagan of AEI. The operative paragraph and conclusion are below, and deserve a bit of picking apart.
A complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum? Highly unlikely. Kagan may say he is not "fear-mongering", but this statement is over the top. Whatever its problems, the moderate mainstream in Pakistan's civil society and the military is more than powerful enough to prevent that eventuality.
There again, it did happen in Iran, but circumstances now are not the same. It is correct, therefore, to make contingency plans, but not to push forward what is not yet an inevitable self-fulfilling prophecy.
A struggle within the Pakistani military? Also not likely. Undoubtedly there remain radicals in the ISI, but if nothing else Musharraf has probably purged the army of the extremist tendencies seen under General Zia, who was himself somewhat discredited by the end of his rule.
However, there is a distinct possibility of Islamabad losing control of the outer regions - some might say it has already done so. This does have implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan and thus must be taken seriously.
The basic point is that Pakistan needs well-planned aid and support if its WMD are not to fall into the wrong hands. It's the kind of thinking that should have been deployed prior to the Iraq invasion, which after all was about the same thing - preventing access of the wrong people to WMD.
Finally, two things Kagan fails to mention are the China and India factors. He treats the subject as if it's entirely a US issue, which it is not. The two Asian powers have deep-set interests too, and must be part of the solution rather than allowed to become part of the problem.
Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem - New York Times
The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism...
The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.
 So it would appear that Musharraf is a General no longer, though undoubtedly his protege General Ashfaq Kiyani will closely follow his demands for the time being. Kyani is a former head of the ISI and this is also significant. Presumably he himself is already a man with great influence.
Amit Pandya reports from Pakistan, and his findings are a little surprising. But it is a good point that by her perceived closeness to Musharraf and the US, Bhutto has put herself in a tricky position in future elections.
Pandya also points out that for democracy to flourish, the opposition needs to unite, Islamists and the political mainstream alike, but at the time being this does not seem to be the case. Musharraf's gamble with the state of emergency may well have fractured any alliance against him but his doffing of his military role today and promise to end emergency rule once he is sworn in a civilian president will go a long way towards appeasing his US sponsors. He is perhaps more wily than we previously imagined.
Stimson - Pakistan’s Brighter Future: The View from the Ground
While not unimportant to Pakistanis, the principal demands of the US government are less important than the longer term political developments in the society. The elections to be held in a little over a month are not considered significant. Whether the General retires as Army Chief and serves as a civilian President has also become entirely unimportant. The key issue is whether he leads the country, and the actual role of the Army in the government.
The army remains indispensable to any future political order because of the tenacious hold that it has now established in the national economy, and because Pakistan, under any government however democratic, will face armed challenges from within or without. However, there has also been a widespread and growing sense that its long and repeated interference in politics has harmed both the political development of Pakistan and the integrity of its principal mission of national defense against the country’s enemies.
The main political parties, those with sufficient support to be political players in their own right, offered a poor alternative. Widely discredited by their tenures in government in the 1990s, both the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (PML(N)), were viewed askance by many Pakistanis of democratic conviction. Indeed, many considered the Musharraf regime’s survival a result of the public’s distrust of the large political parties.
There had to be one, and note how this author neatly ties up all the conflicting elements in the current drama: internal opposition to Musharraf; the Balochistan rebellion; Afghanistan, America and the GWOT; China and Gwadar; India and Kashmir.
The essence of the article is that the current situation is all the result of an American plan to instigate regime change in Pakistan to advance its own interests. Of course much of the report is to be roundly dismissed. I particularly enjoyed this paragraph (I used to work at Jane's):
This was the perfect timing for the launch of Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, a book authored by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, a columnist for a Pakistani English-language paper and a correspondent for ‘Jane’s Defence Weekly’, a private intelligence service founded by experts close to the British intelligence.
But the point is that the Pakistan situation is not clear-cut in that all Pakistanis favour democracy and Benazir Bhutto, as the Western powers would have us believe. There are still deep veins of paranoia at work, and it's these that enable the continuing dominance of the military and security forces.
Ahmed Quraishi.com
“We have indications of Indian involvement with anti-state elements in Pakistan,” declared the spokesman of the Pakistan Foreign Office in a regular briefing in October. The statement was terse and direct and the spokesman, Ms. Tasnim Aslam, quickly moved on to other issues.
This is how a Pakistani official explained Ms. Aslam’s statement: “What she was really saying is this: We know what the Indians are doing. They’ve sold the Americans on the idea that [the Indians] are an authority on Pakistan and can be helpful in Afghanistan. The Americans have bought the idea and are in on the plan, giving the Indians a free hand in Afghanistan. What the Americans don’t know is that we, too, know the Indians very well. Better still, we know Afghanistan very well. You can’t beat us at our own game.”
Mr. Bugti’s armed rebellion coincided with the Gwadar project entering its final stages. No coincidence here. Mr. Bugti’s real job was to scare the Chinese away and scuttle Chinese President Hu Jintao’s planned visit to Gwadar a few months later to formally launch the port city.
Gwadar is the pinnacle of Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation. It’s a modern port city that is supposed to link Central Asia, western China, and Pakistan with markets in Mideast and Africa. It’s supposed to have roads stretching all the way to China. It’s no coincidence either that China has also earmarked millions of dollars to renovate the Karakoram Highway linking northern Pakistan to western China.
One to save and read for later, and not a lot of new int. But this (conservative) report does highlight the increasing threat of Chinese economic intelligence gathering, cyber warfare ("weapons of mass annoyance") and its general commitment to asymmetric capability-building:
China’s search for asymmetric capabilities to leverage against U.S. vulnerabilities represents a serious form of irregular warfare preparation. China is convinced that, financially and technologically, it cannot defeat the United States in a traditional force-on-force match up. However, as Chairman of the Defense Science Board Dr. William Schneider highlighted, if it can acquire niche weapons systems that are relatively inexpensive and that can exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, it stands a chance of deterring or defeating the United States in a limited engagement. This strategy explains China’s emphasis on acquiring sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, mines, and information and electronic warfare capabilities.
Quite an unusual remark on p10 regarding China's growing submarine capability: with lots of Kilo-class coming on line, plus several indigenous Shang-class SSNs due for launch in 2008 and rumours of some AIP subs on the build too, the USN should even look at the PLAN as a partner in regional naval security.
On the other hand, an upgraded DF-21 ballistic missile with re-entry capability could make the littoral too dangerous for US CVBGs to inhabit.
Full PDF report downloadable here.
 Michael Klare, author of Blood and Oil, was in Amsterdam today to talk on his conception of the impending energy crisis. While he was a good speaker, seeing him in person did begin to reveal some of the flaws in his arguments.
The lecture opened with a bold set of statements: "No government is willing to solve the energy problem by seeking alternative energies... and I have zero confidence that any will try to increase production." Having tantalised us with this and promises of an apocalyptic vision of the future, Klare then utterly failed to expand.
Fortunately, the organisers allowed one student in the audience to ask a question (the other debating time was reserved for the usual blathering incoherence of rival academics failing to make their points or even ask questions) and he did ask what I would have done. The question was "why?"; Klare's answer was that "dysfunctional governments" were at fault, "governments that piss away billions on Iraq yet invest little on finding solutions".
That seems far too easy a way to excuse the actions of the Bush regime, though he did have a good point on China's failure to deal with the crisis. Though the CCP itself is aware of the trouble we're in, grass roots-level corruption means that any efficiency measures are swept under the carpet in favour of improving growth figures.
Yet Klare's overall take on the US-China contest over energy was as simplistic as the rest. It was, he said, a situation analogous to the Cold War, in which both powers supply arms to their energy-supplying clients in a competition for influence.
He did later remark that Beijing's Africa policy also involves economic and infrastructural aid - something that Africans were rightly suspicious of - but did not elaborate further. But his aim was to reinforce his point that the recent creation of America's Africa Command (Africom) was the latest stage in a continuing Kennedy doctrine, building on previous policy in the Persian Gulf. The SCO, moreover, was a front for China to extend its military supply network to Central Asia.
All of that may be true, but overlooks the nuances of an evolving bipolar US-China situation that is far more than a simple military confrontation.
To be fair, Klare did have some good ideas about 'the resource curse' whereby the wealth in countries like Nigeria falls into the hands of those who control the state, thus negating democratic urges in the governing classes. (One could say the same for Burma). And his analogy with the Balkans of 1914 was apt - violent internal social forces could intersect with external geopolitical motives to produce an explosive mixture.
Also, an interesting theory from an otherwise egomaniacal second speaker came to light, in that $100 oil punished the PRC as much as anyone else, and could be a ploy in order to bring down the RMB or lessen China's export deficit. She also highlighted that fact that Klare didn't even mention Europe, though that merely proved his point that Europe's influence is next to negligible.
But overall, Klare was a little disappointing. He was right to note that control of chokepoints such as Hormuz give militarily powerful states great leverage, but his frame of reference was still bound by conventional military thinking.
The reality is that inducing energy scarcity, just like terrorism and WMD, is an asymmetric method of power projection that doesn't necessarily involve military firepower. Having a big technologically-advanced navy isn't the be-all and end-all any more. That's what makes the problems so complicated and so intertwined.
 Kindly understand the criticality of the situation in Pakistan and around Pakistan. Pakistan is on the verge of destabilisation. Inaction at this moment is suicide for Pakistan and I cannot allow this country to commit suicide.
It's kind of sad. In many ways, General Musharraf has been one of the best leaders Pakistan has had for generations. He has more or less turned around the economic incompetence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as well as ensuring that General Zia's Islamist agenda was superseded by a more secular outlook.
That's why Musharraf's actions are so deeply disappointing. Probably it's a case of second-term delusion. It's commonly the fact that once leaders have been around for seven or eight years, surrounded by cronies and sycophants they begin to believe in their own infallibility and omnipotence. It even happened to Thatcher and Blair. That's why the US two-term limit on presidents is such a good idea.
Whatever the case, Musharraf has revealed himself for what he always really was: a tinpot military dictator of a teetering banana republic.
I'm not one to support democracy for democracy's sake, and of course it's easy to criticize from the safety and comfort of the West. Ali Eteraz at Comment is Free makes a fair point:
There is a segment of Pakistan - which includes the judges, lawyers, and journalists - which wants to take to the streets. They have dominated the news over the past year and they want to make a democratic push, with some people casting the lawyers in the same role as the Burmese monks. However, Musharraf's shrewd move of setting forth a limited PCO - targeting only the judiciary and leaving the assemblies intact - has neutralised this segment of the population. The illusion of popular participation is retained, while Musharraf's most vexing political opponents - the judges - get sidelined. If he had gone further and cancelled elections, it would have ignited a firestorm, but in his talk to Pakistani public (discussed below), he assured that he would do no such thing.
Disengaged western audiences, pumped full of the current pro-democracy intoxicants, will almost universally decry Musharraf's behaviour. I decry it too, precisely because I am a disengaged westerner and I have that luxury. However, the story in Pakistan is not so straightforward.
What I am being told by bazari merchants, some young professionals, and some industrialists in Karachi and Lahore is that they merely care for stability, whether it comes in the form of the military, or in the form of democracy. Incidentally, many of them believe that it is Musharraf who is more likely to assure that stability. A couple of people, with middle class businesses, suggested to me that Musharraf should behave more like a dictator; a secular version of the previous Islamist dictator, Zia ul Haq, in order to assure stability for business and economic growth. However, that is a minority view.
Yet that being said, history will probably see the state of emergency as Musharraf's biggest mistake. He has almost certainly grossly underestimated the ill-will against him within Pakistan itself. He has in fact strengthened the case against him, which can only help Bhutto, the lawyers and the militants.
In the greater geopolitical scale of things, Musharraf has also effectively chosen sides in the New Great Game too. America is incensed that their puppet president is turning away from even the veneer of legitimacy. Musharraf also mentioned in his address today his embarrassment at the kidnapping of Chinese workers prior to the Lal Masjid siege. Today's effective re-coup shows that Pakistan is now more likely than ever to align with China, which will not interfere in its internal affairs.
The worst case scenario is accelerated destabilisation as the US withdraws support, Bhutto's supporters rise up and in the ensuing unrest the militants seize their chance. Musharraf is committing rather than preventing the suicide of the state.
Heartthrob cricketer-cum-politician, Imran Khan, had a good point today during an interview with the BBC. Dictators always say they're acting for the good of the country; but really the outcome of suppressing the democratic process is to invite change by violent means instead.
"When you stop all legal and constitutional ways of people challenging [the president], then the only ones who challenge him are people with a gun.That's what happened to the Shah of Iran," said Khan, ominously.
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
 On the back of the BBC's excellent analysis of the Bush administration's failure on Iraq, 'No Plan, No Peace' comes a similar analysis from The Economist. The essence of both is that Cold War thinking is useless in the modern era.
It's hard to summarise two hours of BBC documentary, but the essence was this: the US didn't have a plan for the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and while the British had deep misgivings they failed to make an impact. Memorable moments include: the admission that the only intelligence on Iraqi culture came from the Lonely Planet; the discovery that orders for the aftermath had been copied directly from the Marshall Plan ("the only currencies shall be the US Dollar and the Reichsmark"); and the description of Rumsfeld's deputy as "the dumbest m****f***** I've ever met". Timeless comedy, were it not so tragic.
There needs to be a realisation in the corridors of power that the days of pitched battles and supremacy by superior firepower are gone. That was true in Vietnam, and arguably as far back as the Battle of Jutland. What matters is intelligence and boots on the ground - not soldiers brainwashed in bootcamp but educated professionals able to understand and adapt to the alien culture around them. No amount of technology can replace that. After all, the true weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47.
The reluctance of politicians to accept that this is the true 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is saddening. Rumsfeld's assumption was that a light force could take Saddam out in a matter of weeks, which was correct: but this did not dovetail well with his deeply flawed assumption that everything would be fine afterwards. The surge does appear to be working, but it would have been better in 2003 than now, after thousands have died, the country in chaos and Iran is in the ascendency. You need lots of well-worn boots, not a few shiny new hi-tech weapons.
Armies of the future | Brains, not bullets | Economist.com
The “transformation” advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed forces would be slimmed down and money invested in “smart” weapons, reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its “future warrior” was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an artificial “exoskeleton” (a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his limbs.
The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states. Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians.
Finding a resolution to the crisis on the Turkish-Iraqi border has deep implications for many of the parties involved.
Turkey in particular, with its ambitions to be viewed as a leading state in the Islamic world as well as its aspirations to join the European Union, is under scrutiny as never before. Its actions over the next weeks will define whether its neighbors and allies will continue to regard Ankara as a reliable partner or a potentially destabilizing force within the region.
The United States of America must also impose its will but faces a tricky balancing act between its commitment to Turkey and the need to maintain regional stability. And Iraq, already engulfed in violence, cannot afford more conflict and the flows of arms and refugees that will ensue.
Continue reading "Turkey and Iraq: The Implications" »
'Myanmar's "Saffron Revolution", like the Ukraine "Orange Revolution" or the Georgia "Rose Revolution" and the various color revolutions instigated in recent years against strategic states surrounding Russia, is a well-orchestrated exercise in Washington-run regime change, down to the details of "hit-and-run" protests with "swarming" mobs of monks in saffron, Internet blogs, mobile SMS links between protest groups, well-organized protest cells which disperse and re-form. CNN made the blunder during a September broadcast of mentioning the active presence of the NED behind the protests in Myanmar.'
Get out of here! I find this a little hard to believe, though the author makes a good case for Burma's geopolitical relevance - especially to China. It's well-known that the bulk of China's energy passes through the vulnerable Malacca Straits, and that pipelines through Burma would allow both Middle-Eastern and African oil to bypass the chokepoint. It's also well-known that Burma is offering gas of its own, and that it features heavily in China's 'string-of-pearls' plan for naval dominace of the Indian Ocean theatre. Gwadar is another aspect of the strategy.
However, if the US is really meddling in Burma's collapsing revolution, you would have thought that they would have done better. It's not CIA style to sponsor peaceful but ultimately ineffectual protest movements. Where are the guns?
Asia Times Online :: Southeast Asia news - The geopolitical stakes of 'Saffron Revolution'
In fact the US State Department admits to supporting the activities of the NED in Myanmar. The NED is a US government-funded "private" entity whose activities are designed to support US foreign policy objectives, doing today what the CIA did during the Cold War. As well, the NED funds Soros' Open Society Institute in fostering regime change in Myanmar. In an October 30, 2003 press release the State Department admitted, "The United States also supports organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Institute and Internews, working inside and outside the region on a broad range of democracy promotion activities." It all sounds very self-effacing and noble of the State Department. Is it though?
In reality the US State Department has recruited and trained key opposition leaders from numerous anti-government organizations in Myanmar. It has poured the relatively huge sum (for Myanmar) of more than $2.5 million annually into NED activities in promoting regime change in Myanmar since at least 2003. The US regime change effort, its Saffron Revolution, is being largely run, according to informed reports, out of the US Consulate General in bordering Chaing Mai, Thailand. There activists are recruited and trained, in some cases directly in the US, before being sent back to organize inside Myanmar. The US's NED admits to funding key opposition media including the New Era Journal, Irrawaddy and the Democratic Voice of Burma radio.
The concert-master of the tactics of Saffron monk-led non-violence regime change is Gene Sharp, founder of the deceptively-named Albert Einstein Institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a group funded by an arm of the NED to foster US-friendly regime change in key spots around the world. Sharp's institute has been active in Myanmar since 1989, just after the regime massacred some 3,000 protestors to silence the opposition. CIA special operative and former US military attache in Rangoon, Col Robert Helvey, an expert in clandestine operations, introduced Sharp to Myanmar in 1989 to train the opposition there in non-violent strategy. Interestingly, Sharp was also in China two weeks before the dramatic events at Tiananmen Square.
I'll never forget a rather unconsidered remark made to me by a Pentagon official shortly after 9/11. I was writing about the sales of Apache gunships to Pakistan, to which the officer replied: "As long as they're helping us against terrorism, they can have whatever they want."
More evidence here of America's continuing military commitment to Pakistan - yet the US is even more unpopular there than India (the second largest third-world buyer of arms behind Pakistan). And in India too, misgiving about the US are high, mainly due to its criticism of New Delhi's energy-based relationship with Tehran.
Meanwhile, China's investment in Pakistani infrastructure is only increasing - and that seems to be buying more love than US weapons ever will. Because roads and railways benefit the people, whereas guns are just used an an instrument of US foreign policy. Indeed, they are often turned on Pakistani people themselves. Reports that 50 civilians were killed in clashes in Waziristan this week are of course to be considered carefully, but the bad blood generated is the real effect of the US arms trade.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Arms sales: How the US is not winning friends
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has given over $10 billion to Pakistan to buy or reward President General Pervez Musharraf’s support for its newest war, the “war on terror”. Pakistan has spent over $1.5 billion of this amount on buying new weapons. To understand the scale of this aid, consider Pakistan’s total military budget in 2006, estimated at about $4.5 billion. The United States is now giving Pakistan aid to pay for the new deal for F-16s, bombs, and missiles. It is likely to win few friends.
There is little doubt today about how unpopular the United States is in Pakistan. A Pew poll released in September 2006 found that in Pakistan, the United States is viewed less favorably even than India (with which Pakistan has fought four wars). Just over 25% were favorable toward the United States, compared to one-third who felt that way toward India.
Picking away at three apparent setbacks for Al Qaeda, the author highlights some flaws in the arguments. A mildly critical letter from one of Bin Ladin's theological mentors (who recently emerged from prison) doesn't prove much. A rift between Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda bigshot Ayman Al-Zawahiri is also dismissed.
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism analyst who writes for The Washington Post among others, seems to accept the split in Al Qaeda's leadership and asserts that the real man in charge is now Al-Zawahiri. "It has been two years," he writes, "since bin Laden reportedly chaired a meeting of al-Qaeda's Majlis al-Shura—the movement's most senior deliberative body." That's according to "Asian intelligence", presumably from Pakistan's ISI. This in turn opens the following questions:
Al-Qaeda: Beginning of the End, or Grasping at Straws?
Dr. Hoffman's reference to "Asian intelligence" certainly is interesting, but one must, with respect, suggest one of four conclusions about its viability: (A) If it is true, U.S. and NATO forces should have been able to wipe out the Majlis al-Shura and much of al-Qaeda—though not bin Laden—based on Asian information about the timing and deliberations of the Shura's meetings over two years; (B) If it is true, and the Majlis has not been destroyed, one of America's Asian allies apparently did not share highly actionable data with Washington; (C) If it is true, and the Majlis has not been destroyed, Western authorities must have decided not to attack, perhaps because the Shura meets in Pakistan; and, (D) The information is not true.
In any case, it's all irrelevant. Even if Al Qaeda is refocusing its mission under new leadership; even if all the bigwigs got wiped out in an airstrike tomorrow; it's not going to affect the overall global security question. It's wrong to focus on the simplistic idea of Al Qaeda as some kind of overarching command structure (significant as it is) and right to look more deeply into the grassroots, not the tip of the iceberg.
More on Sino-Indian strategic rivalry. Despite an apparent cooling of tension in the last few years, the author notes that Hu Jintao's rise to power comes partly on the back of a hardline attitude towards Tibet, always a bone of contention between the two Asian giants.
I disagree slightly with some of the points: for example, the territorial dispute does seem to be under control, mainly due to economic linkages. But the point that India forms part of a nexus of powers on China's borders - Australia, Japan and the US Pacific presence is interesting. Also worth noting that the newly-completed Qinghai-Tibet railway and refurbishments to the Indian road infrastructure near the border would allow both China and India to swiftly step up their military presences. And finally, Chinese plans for Tibetan water resources could also have a devastating effect on the subcontinent.
PINR - India-China Competition Revealed in Ongoing Border Disputes
Apparently, the strategic consequences of India's economic resurgence coupled with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's offer in March 2005 to "help make India a major world power in the 21st century" have greatly bothered the Chinese. This offer, and the long-term India-U.S. defense cooperation framework and the July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear energy deal that followed soon after, have been compared by Chinese strategic analysts to "the strategic tilt" toward China executed by former U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1971 to contain the common Soviet threat. Claiming that these developments have "destabilizing" and "negative implications" for their country's future, China's India-watchers have started warning their government that Beijing "should not take India lightly any longer."
Chinese leaders were led to believe that China's growing economic and military might would eventually enable Beijing to re-establish the Sino-centric hierarchy of Asia's past as the U.S. saps its energies in fighting small wars in the Islamic world, Japan shrinks economically and demographically while India remains subdued by virtue of Beijing's "special relationships" with its South Asian neighbors. However, a number of "negative developments," from Beijing's perspective, since early 2005 -- the Indian and Japanese bids for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, the formation of the East Asia Summit that includes India, Australia and New Zealand, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, India's ability to sustain a high economic growth rate of eight to nine percent and the strategic implications of India's "Look East" policy -- have apparently upset Chinese calculations.
Therefore, after a hiatus of a few years, Chinese media commentaries have resumed their criticism of Washington's "hegemonic ideas" and for drawing "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern." Some Chinese analysts express serious reservations about U.S. efforts to draw "India in as a tool for its global strategic pattern," arguing that "India's DNA doesn't allow itself to become an ally subordinate to the U.S., like Japan or Britain." Nonetheless, most see India as a "future strategic competitor" that would be an active member of an anti-China grouping due to the structural power shifts in the international system and advocate putting together a comprehensive "contain India" strategy based on both economic tools (aid, trade, infrastructural development) and enhanced military cooperation with "pro-China" countries.
As both China and India "rise and shine" economically, so geopolitical questions begin to assume greater importance. Whatever the rhetoric from Beijing, China's neighbours are clearly less comfortable about it than ever. That's good for India, which (aside from Pakistan, of course) is generally viewed as fairly benign.
However, India's growing strategic relationship with the US is opening this to debate. Apparently, talks are in progress regarding a closer partnership with NATO, and the US ambassador to NATO is interestingly quoted as lumping China in with concerns such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. But surely a NATO (read US) - India partnership can only aggravate tensions with China, rather than 'balance' the SCO as noted in the article. Lasting peace in the region needs NATO to engage with the PRC rather than India, in order to pull it into a security structure. Attempting to counteract the SCO via NATO might only lead to an arms race that brings in Russia too.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
Any pronounced gravitation toward an "Asian NATO" form of collective security will inevitably affect India's relations with China. (India shares Australia's predicament on this score.) Therefore, India has to perform some very tricky rope acts in the period ahead. In a major speech during a visit to Thailand on September 14, Mukherjee stressed, "The India-China partnership is an important determinant for regional and global peace and development, and for Asia's emergence as the political and economic center of the new international order."
Three days later, addressing the strategic community in Seoul, the minister underlined the importance of a "truly integrated Asian economy that will draw on the economic potential of India and China". Expressing confidence that India's "strategic and cooperative partnership [with China] will mature and steadily develop", he added, "Sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop."
The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to convincingly interpret the implications of its "strategic partnership" with the US. The perception is growing, and is incrementally gaining credibility, that India is aligning with a US-led security system in Asia. Clearly, the request by the NATO secretary general to call on the Indian foreign minister wouldn't have been made without Washington's nod.
Some bland comments from the Indian external affairs minister. But in the long run, can India really balance the tensions in its relationships with the US and the PRC? The problem for New Delhi is that (aside from Russia, perhaps) it's the only major power that has to live under both US global hegemony and Chinese regional hegemony. And India doesn't wield the economic and political power that Moscow can now boast due to its energy resources. Non aligned movement aside, one day it may just have to make the call.
The Hindu : Front Page : Strategic partnership with China will mature: Pranab Mukherjee
Asked about the possible impact of the emerging U.S.-India equation on China’s ties with New Delhi, Mr. Mukherjee said: “There is no question of cooperation between India and the U.S. to act as some sort of containment of any country, including China.”
Trade and investment “are the great drivers of the new relationship” between India and China.
“The leaders of both countries recognise that co-existence and cooperation is the wise course of action; and sensitivity to mutual aspirations is the underpinning for building confidence and trust. There is enough space and opportunity for both of us to grow and develop and to bring benefit not only to us but also for other partners in Asia.”
Differences, including those over the border question, “did not stand in the way of investment and trade.”
If the first casualty of war is the truth, then its first omen is also linguistic. The French foreign minister's remarks on Iran and the IAEA's subsequent riposte are eerily reminiscent of the war of words that took place in 2002 between the UN's inspectors led by Hans Blix and the hawks in the Pentagon.
What is very unusual is that it's the French that are the hawks this time. That's quite a major shift in international relations. Up until this year, Blair and his predecessors would have been the swiftest to cosy up to Washington, while Chirac and his forebears would bang the drum of protest. Perhaps, with Gordon Brown visibly shying away from Bush, the French are seizing the opportunity to regain a world voice in the absence of a coherent EU foreign policy.
Whatever the case, with a UNSC meeting scheduled for Friday, the path of no return may already be opening up.
UN nuclear boss warns warmongers over Iran | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war," Bernard Kouchner told French TV and radio.
While talks over Iran's nuclear programme should continue "right to the end", Mr Kouchner said, an Iranian nuclear weapon would pose "a real danger for the whole world". France has taken a much harsher line towards Iran since the election of Nicolas Sarkozy to success Jacques Chirac as president.
So it would appear that General Musharraf will hang up his boots on 15 November and maintain his position as a civilian president. So he says, at least, and today's discovery of 18 dead Pakistani soldiers highlights the dangers ahead.
Whether or not the US is pleased or unnerved is uncertain: the BBC's sources seem to think that Washington would have preferred Musharraf to have remained army head. From Musharraf's own point of view, however, the surrender of his uniform is the last gambit in a bid to hold onto power in the face of rising domestic opposition. There does need to be a very strong structure in place, however, to keep Musharraf and Bhutto from fighting among themselves, while the Isamists look on. If it doesn't work out, what are the chances of a another military coup - perhaps secretly engineered by Musharraf and his cronies - in the mid-term so as to maintain a grip on stability?
BBC NEWS | South Asia | US struggles with Pakistan policy
There's a growing realisation that the US must not only have a partnership with Gen Musharraf and the army but also have a partnership with the people of Pakistan.
The aim now in Washington, many observers believe, is to treat not just Gen Musharraf but also the Pakistani nation as an irreplaceable ally and to bolster the perception that US would prefer to deal with a popular civilian government.
Every now and again, Asia Times Online turns up an absolute tour de force of an analysis: this is one of them. It pulls together every thread in the Afghanistan war, from the significance of events on Pakistan to the options available to the local powers China, India and Russia.
The one major beef I have with it is, as before, whether it is truly possible to negotiate with the Taliban. Sure, you can talk to the heads of major Taliban groups, but what are the guarantees that one agreement is going to quell the whole bunch of them? Isn't it likely that large splinter groups that oppose any settlement will break off and carry on doing their own thing? Still, the author seems to think that talks are on the cards.
Below, I attempt a rough summary of all the points, in an actor-by-actor format.
- The Taliban: As NATO and the US tire, the chances of a settlement grow, especially in the light of potential instability in Pakistan too.
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The UN: Growing acceptance of the idea of talking with the Taliban. -
The US: Should seek intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistan dialogue with the aid of China, Russia and India. -
Iran: The US quagmire in Afghanistan is succour to their ambitions for regional dominance. -
Russia: Fears of 'Talibanization' will draw the Central Asian states closer into seurity frameworks such as the SCO. -
China: Stay out of it, and leave the Taliban to the US. -
India: Stick with the US, and hope that Pakistan doesn't regain influence in Afghanistan.
And here's the key:
Clearly, the continued disintegration of the Pakistani state widens al-Qaeda's support base among the Taliban. If US-Iran tensions escalate, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan become intertwined. That means the Afghan war may take a new form rather than lead to peace.
The whole article is reprinted below: check out also Ahmed Rashid's sobering analysis in The Telegraph in which he describes his own land as "a failing state hovering over the abyss".
Continue reading "'Stan - The Big Picture" »
A lot of this Guardian article on the likelihood of US-Israeli strikes on Iran is purely speculative, and thus must be taken with a large pinch of sand. Neither the commentator quoted below, Patrick Cronin, and an ex-CIA source can offer any hard evidence, though both believe that an attack is imminent.
However, one prescient remark from Cronin is that, with elections coming up in November 2008, any action taken in the six months prior to the poll would be seen as 'political'. That would mean that if it's going to happen, it'll happen this winter. Just as with Iraq, it's highly probable that there are already plans drawn up to effect the mission, so all Bush needs is another plausible 'smoking gun'.
Proxy war could soon turn to direct conflict, analysts warn | Iran | Guardian Unlimited
"The proxy war that has been going on in Iraq may now cross the border. This is a very dangerous period," Patrick Cronin, the director of studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said.
Iran's leaders have so far shown every sign of relishing the confrontation. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared yesterday that American policies had failed in the Middle East and warned: "I am certain that one day Bush and senior American officials will be tried in an international court for the tragedies they have created in Iraq."
In such circumstances, last week's Israeli air strike against a mystery site in northern Syria has triggered speculation over its motives. Israel has been silent about the attack. Syria complained to the UN security council but gave few details. Some say the target was Iranian weapons on their way to Hizbullah in Lebanon, or that the sortie was a dry run for a US-Israeli attack on Syria and Iran. There is even speculation that the Israelis took out a nuclear facility funded by Iran and supplied by North Korea.
The situation is particularly volatile because the struggle for influence threatens to exacerbate a confrontation over Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
This one's going straight on my blogroll. PostGlobal is a collaboration between The Washington Post and Newsweek that analyses global trends - the fall of America, the rise of China, energy, Islam etc..
In short, it's basically just like my blog, but with flash graphics, real cash backing, plus gurus like Fareed Zakaria on board. The only thing they lack is a decent subeditor, which does let it down a little.
What really caught my eye today was this introduction to 'midrange' trends over the next 36 months. Summary below:
A dramatic global realignment appears to be in progress (and quickening) as the result of several factors:
- The loss of US influence as a result of the Iraq war
- A view across the globe resulting from Abu Ghraib and range of missteps that the US has lost the moral high ground it had enjoyed for decades
- A feeling among global leaders that the US is without a coherent foreign policy strategy...a belief that has started feeding on itself and has emboldened US adversaries
- China's rise, its smooth diplomatic technique, its re-alignment with Russia and its aggressive, clever drive to form new alliances with nations extending from Asia and Africa to South America
- Russia's recent rise combined with Russian President Putin's domestic popularity and his reputation for effectively standing up to the West
- The rise of non-aligned nations emboldened by the inability of the US to effectively use the extraordinary power it possesses
- A view among key global leaders that the US will be bogged down in Iraq for many years (a view heightened by significantly by President Bush's September 13 Iraq speech), thus distracted and unable to respond effectively to key political moves by the range of international players
- A recognition by the international community that the Bush Administration not only hasn't been able to deal effectively with non-state actors (e.g. terror groups like Al Qaeda) but they are holding their own or starting to win
More excellent points culled from the article below.
Continue reading "PostGlobal" »
A balanced perspective from The Economist, which does look closely at the reasons for leaving: America no longer influences Iraqi politics; disaster has already befallen the nation. But the reasons for staying are even more compelling.
The Iraq war | Why they should stay | Economist.com
If the case for staying depended on extrapolating from the modest gains the general claims for his surge, it would be a weak one. The strong case is that if America leaves, things will get even worse. This can only be a guess, but it is more plausible than the alternative guess that America's going will nudge Iraq in the right direction. In the past two years, violence has tended to decline where American troops are present and to rise in the places they leave. There is no doubt that some Shia militias want to rid Baghdad of its Sunnis and that American troops are for now the only thing stopping them. Contrary to what foreigners think, most Iraqis say they oppose partition: in the BBC/ABC poll, 62% said Iraq should have a unified government and 98% said it would be a bad thing for the country to separate on sectarian lines...
If America could choose again, it would not step into a civil war in Mesopotamia. But there are worse reasons than preventing a bloodbath for a superpower to put its soldiers at risk. Having invaded Iraq in its own interest—to remove mass-killing weapons that turned out not to exist—America owes something to Iraq's people, a slim majority of whom want it to stay. It is hard to know how Iraq can be mended. At some point it may become clear the country has sunk so low it is simply beyond saving. But it is not possible to be sure of that yet.
Amid reports that former Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, is criticising the Bush regime for its neglect of Asia comes this report. It is difficult to see India and China forming anything more than a perfunctory strategic relationship - their rivalries over the Indian Ocean region remain strong, especially where Tibet, Pakistan and Myanmar are concerned, but the point is that China is the nascent power these days.
India has to recognise this, and perform a careful balancing act with the US. Its longer term interests, however, may be better served by accepting a role as a partner to China's rise. At present India's fear is that it will be little more than a junior partner, but I suspect that Chinese officials would wish to downplay this and concentrate on economics and trade rather than security. The statement is also a clear rebuff to the American nuclear plan, so some planners in Washington must be reeling.
The Hindu News Update Service
Beijing, Sept. 4 (PTI): China will "vigorously" implement a bilateral agreement to upgrade Sino-Indian relations to strategic levels, Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, said while hinting that Beijing is open to civilian nuclear energy cooperation with all countries under the IAEA safeguards, sources said here on Monday.
Yang who met a joint delegation of members of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) here on Friday told them that he had been instructed by the Chinese leadership that Beijing would vigorously implement the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and cooperation agreed upon by the two countries.
A lengthy but useful summary of everything that's important in the world right now pertaining to the linkages between geopolitics and energy. Must look out for this Dilip Hiro guy's book.
We can now probably add to this list of Bush's errors America's disruption of the world financial system via subprime loans, not to mention high oil prices and a feeble dollar but hey.
Asia Times Online :: Middle East News - US in their sights: The rising powers
...with not even a decade of this century behind us, we are already witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which new powers are challenging different aspects of US supremacy - Russia and China in the forefront, with regional powers Venezuela and Iran forming the second rank. These emergent powers are primed to erode US hegemony, not confront it, singly or jointly.
How and why has the world evolved in this way so soon? The George W Bush administration's debacle in Iraq is certainly a major factor in this transformation, a classic example of an imperialist power, brimming with hubris, overextending itself...
Yet there are other explanations - unrelated to Washington's glaring misadventures - for the current transformation in international affairs. These include, above all, the tightening market in oil and natural gas, which has enhanced the power of hydrocarbon-rich nations as never before; the rapid economic expansion of the mega-nations China and India; the transformation of China into the globe's leading manufacturing base; and the end of the Anglo-American duopoly in international television news.
I think it's a little tenuous to suggest that the sole reason for Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid was the abduction of seven Chinese brothel workers. However, this author takes a close look at China's strategic relationship with Pakistan and considers how much Beijing's influence contributes to the conflict with Islamist extremism.
Foreign Policy In Focus | China, Pakistan, and Terrorism
U.S. pressure on Pakistan to clear the region of the Taliban and al-Qaeda has forced Pakistan into an ever-tighter embrace of China. Musharraf's crackdown on the Lal Masjid, a potent symbol of this strategic Sino-Pakistani alignment, also sent a blood-soaked message to religious militants that Chinese interests will remain off-limits. Musharraf is not apologetic about defending Chinese interests in Pakistan and punishing those who dared to harm them.
Authoritative figures such as Lords Inge and Ashdown have reiterated the fact that Britain is in the 'Stan for the long haul. Their foreboding does smack of the 'domino effect', but the danger in Pakistan is more real than it was in Southeast Asia back in the '60s. The battle of Las Masjid is testament to that. And if both Afghanistan and Pakistan succomb to Islamism, then the potential for a stream of trained-up bombers heading for the Piccadilly line multiplies fivefold.
The Lords are also correct to identify a double problem - NATO's lack of coordination with the US forces in country and lack of long-term development. Development can only come with security in place, goes the theory, though I wonder if anyone has ever tried promoting development and waiting for the security situation to calm down as progress is made.
Lastly, Iraq. The Brits look like pulling out of Iraq and leaving it to the Americans: the other side of the deal should be an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. That way, NATO can attempt to deal with Afghanistan - which is certainly not a hopeless case - without American impediments, and America can be left to its deserved fate in Iraq.
Generals' warning on Afghanistan | World | The Observer
Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq.
'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan are far greater than in Iraq,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not then stop a widening regional war that would start off in warlordism but it would become essentially a war in the end between Sunni and Shia right across the Middle East.'
Update: Things just went from bad to worse. The fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and one could even go so far to say that the Durand Line is no real border - they are one and the same problem.
Events in Islamabad over the last few weeks have now provoked the Taliban sympathisers in Waziristan to relinquish their tenuous truce - an added headache for both Musharraf and NATO. What chance is there of a NATO intervention within Pakistan proper?
A report speculating that the possible delivery of Pakistan's long-owed F-16s is part of a geopolitical strategy on the US's part to undermine the SCO's (and therefore China and Russia's) influence. America also worries about a popular uprising against Musharraf's government - a government that it is increasingly losing the power to manipulate.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - Pakistan heading for a crackdown
From the proceedings of the meeting of the SCO's Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) held in Bishkek on Monday in preparation of the summit on August 16, trends are available that must definitely be annoying Washington. There is no mistaking that the SCO is slouching toward Afghanistan and Pakistan with an irresistible offer of mutual engagement in terms of shared interests of regional security and stability...
For the first time, the SCO is likely to pose a challenge to the United States' monopoly of conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The CFM has taken the view that the existing pattern of involvement by the international community is restricted to specific sectoral problems in Afghanistan. It concluded that such a narrow issue-based approach on the part of the international community will not serve the purpose of stabilizing the country.
The article continues:
Plainly speaking, the SCO is unambiguously proclaiming its intention to work closely with Kabul and Islamabad - a turf that has hitherto been tacitly accepted by the regional powers as more or less the exclusive playpen of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This runs counter to the consistent US approach based on keeping Russia out of Afghanistan, and disrupting any Russian-Chinese coordinated policies in Afghanistan.
I've been thinking this for quite a while, and looks like Gordon has been too. The essential problem with the Global War on Terror (GWOT) is that it is not actually a war. 'War' implies some kind of competition for territory and resources; even the Cold War was stretching the point, being as it was an economic and ideological conflict fought for real only by proxy.
The thing is that, once you have got into the 'war' mindset, your approach to the situation is defined by it. Military commanders throughout the world are obsessed with retaining a warfighting capability - MBTs, carrier groups and suchlike that project power over national borders. But the situation we are facing now is not about national borders. Terrorists simply cannot be fought with conventional military forces. Even guerilla armies can't be beaten this way - look at Vietnam.
What the US needs to do is acknowledge that there are two ways to defeat terrorism - through both hard power and soft power. The hard power part is about eliminating those terrorists who are an immediate threat, either through small tactically-inserted special forces teams working overseas or via intelligence and policing within home territory. Wading in with tanks and Apache helicopter gunships will simply create alienation and more terrorists, something the Israelis too have yet to cotton on to. The soft power part is about tackling the warped ideologies that fuel terrorism, which in turn are inspired by disenfranchisment and economic or social deprivation.
It's the classic speak-softly-big-stick argument, but I see little evidence that force structures and governmental foreign policy apparatus are being adapted to meet the moderm world. With the military brass - not to mention the defence industry and the trade union lobbies - eager to obtain and supply hugely-expensive power projection platforms, the real need is overlooked. Yes, of course retain a warfighting capability - but realise that a small nation such as the UK is unable to fight a real war larger than a Falklands/Sierra Leone scale without US assistance. Hold on to what we need to stay militarily viable, but spend the rest on restructuring the surveillance, intelligence and development side of the equation - all of which the military could still turn its hand to and prove its usefulness.
Language and terrorism | Don't mention the GWOT | Economist.com
To speak of a “global war on terror” is over-simple. Shortened to the acronym GWOT, it conflated the military campaign against al-Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan in 2001 with the war two years later to overthrow Saddam Hussein, an old foe who almost certainly had nothing to do with September 11th. That Iraq is a magnet for al-Qaeda is the result of the invasion of Iraq, not its cause. GWOT also implies, wrongly, that there exists a military solution to a problem that for a few countries (eg, Afghanistan) requires a co-ordinated nation-building effort but for most demands patient police and intelligence work. “War” should be the exception, not the focus of the effort against terrorists.
Beyond its place in the GWOT, could Pakistan become a staging post for the anti-Iran campaign? The author calls it a new Cold War, alluding to Iraq and Afghanistan's growing proxy war status - but don't forget who sponsors both Iran and Pakistan... China. So if there is a Cold War, it's the ultimate big daddy in the whole deal.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - All roads leading to Pakistan
The fact is Pakistan is uniquely placed - geographically and politically - to affect the outcome of Anglo-American strategy toward Iran and Central Asia. Zia was extremely prescient about such a geopolitical setting.
In recent months, the US media have reported on the role of Pakistani security agencies in enabling covert US operations aimed at destabilizing Iran. If US Vice President Dick Cheney has his way and a US-Iran military confrontation indeed takes place, Pakistan's role becomes of vital importance to Washington.
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
Bound copies are available at lulu.com for around $10 plus P&P; downloadable PDF files are free of charge. Click here to access the virtual storefront.
This work is made available on the understanding that it will not be copied, plagiarised or otherwise reproduced without the explicit consent of the author.
Bob Hope and no hope, and I believe that Bob Hope is no longer available for USO performances in any case. But seriously, the idea of a 'military hotline' from Washington to Beijing is reminiscent of Cold War thinking. Could the US be implicitly acknowledging a bipolar structure and China's counter-hegemonic status?
BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | US urges China military openness
"You don't have to agree or disagree with any particular country's objective," he continued, "but it's very helpful to understand what those objectives are and why they're going in that direction."
He said he urged Beijing to be more open about its military budget.
Here, the author suggests that the US and NATO are so keen to keep Pakistan and Musharraf on side that they are even considering making the Taliban "part of the solution". Part of the solution to what exactly? It's complicated... but the long-term problem appears to be Iran. Yet appeasing the Taliban would surely contradict the entire purpose of the War on Terror. What a balls-up.
Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan
...will the cozy US-Pakistan condominium that has been at the steering wheel in the "war on terror" in Afghanistan allow regional powers like Russia (or Iran and India) to mess around in the Hindu Kush? The exclusivity of that condominium has been an integral part of the war through the past five years.
The geopolitics of the Afghan war are seldom talked about, but they have figured throughout at the center of the closely guarded US-Pakistan agenda. For the same reason, very little is heard nowadays about the idea mooted by French President Jacques Chirac at NATO's Riga summit in late November regarding the formation if a "contact group" on Afghanistan comprising countries in the region that have an interest in Afghanistan's stability. The proposed group would have made the conduct of the war more transparent and regional powers would have found such a forum useful.
But Washington has all but smothered the French proposal. Both the US and Pakistan would be horrified if any such contact group took shape and then proceeded to demystify the hunt for the elusive Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
But there are other nuances, too. It appears that the US has broached with Pakistan the issue of "help and assistance" in respect of its standoff with Iran.
 All eyes were on George W. Bush last night, as he delivered his seventh state of the union address:
"For too long our nation has been dependent on foreign oil. And this dependence leaves us more vulnerable to hostile regimes, and to terrorists -- who could cause huge disruptions of oil shipments, and raise the price of oil, and do great harm to our economy.
It's in our vital interest to diversify America's energy supply -- the way forward is through technology."
Duh. A school child could have told you that 20 years ago - I know that because I was that child. So why has nothing been done?
"This war is more than a clash of arms -- it is a decisive ideological struggle, and the security of our nation is in the balance. To prevail, we must remove the conditions that inspire blind hatred, and drove 19 men to get onto airplanes and to come and kill us...
So we advance our own security interests by helping moderates and reformers and brave voices for democracy."
So why do you keep supporting undemocratic regimes while destroying those societies that do want to progress?
"If American forces step back before Baghdad is secure, the Iraqi government would be overrun by extremists on all sides. We could expect an epic battle between Shia extremists backed by Iran, and Sunni extremists aided by al Qaeda and supporters of the old regime. A contagion of violence could spill out across the country -- and in time, the entire region could be drawn into the conflict."
Of course, this is a situation that Bush himself created, but he is right in that failure is no longer an option. The troop surge may well be too little too late, and it's been tried before, but it's better than just walking away.
Full text of the 2007 State of the Union Address here.
I don't believe in Al Qaeda: that is I don't think there is some kind of unified Islamic terrorist group that can be stopped by any means at the West's disposal. But I do believe that there is such a thing as terrorism inspired by Islamic as well as political objectives, and I do believe that current foreign policy is doing them more favours than anything else.
The problem is that the West is now fighting on two fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which are bordered by Iran (which can supply oil and weapons). Pakistan is also a grand source of personnel.
Sooner or later, if the West is to 'win', it will have to join these dots - but of course that will only create more of them.
Global terrorism | On the march | Economist.com
Western security officials say the revitalisation of al-Qaeda is partly due to the fact that “the pressure is off” in North Waziristan, a Pakistani tribal region where the army agreed a ceasefire with militants last September. Afghan and NATO commanders complain that the truce has also provided cross-border safe havens for the Taliban. Mr Negroponte called Pakistan an important ally, but also “a major source of Islamic extremism”.
Western officials also worry about what they call “blowback” from Iraq: instead of sucking in would-be suicide bombers on one-way tickets, it could pump out battle-hardened fighters to wage violent campaigns elsewhere. Mr Negroponte said an American pull-out would allow Iraq to replace Afghanistan as an al-Qaeda sanctuary.
Read between the lines here. It is not altogether becoming of a departing intelligence chief to launch a political storm, but the signs are that the US is growing increasingly discontent with the Musharraf regime. Yes, it wants a scapegoat, but the signs are that it is deliberately drawing back from the Pakistan regime with it was once so close.
BBC NEWS | South Asia | Al-Qaeda 'rebuilding' in Pakistan
The BBC's James Westhead in Washington says that until now the US has not been so specific about where it believes al-Qaeda's leaders are hiding.
Such a claim will be embarrassing for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who Mr Negroponte described as a key partner in America's war on terror, our correspondent says.
Afghanistan has welcomed the comments. President Hamid Karzai's chief-of-staff, Jawed Ludin, told the BBC that Afghanistan had long maintained that the Islamic militants operated from within Pakistan, and that Mr Negroponte's statement was refreshing in its honesty.
It is becoming more and more obvious by the day that the post-Cold War world is not, after all, multipolar but bipolar. The great powers are the US and China. This is especially obvious when it comes to Middle East affairs, though interests coincide as much as they conflict. Of course, the biggest leveller is energy security - and that's the central objective for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese foreign policy | A quintet, anyone? | Economist.com
Never mind that China, in the more than four years since it appointed a special envoy to the Middle East, has offered no original ideas. To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-exporting countries, China has rapidly emerged since the 1990s as a big customer and investor. Some 45% of China's oil imports from January to November last year were from the Middle East. To countries such as Iran and Syria, eager to check American power in the region, China's veto power at the UN and its shared misgivings about America make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy...
China worries about its dependence on American military might for the security of its oil shipments from the Middle East. It is still a long way from being able to project military power over such a distance itself, though a Chinese official was quoted in the state-owned press this week as saying China had the ability to build an aircraft carrier, but had not decided when to do so. China is trying to diversify its sources of energy, buying more from Russia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.
But experts predict that China will long remain heavily dependent on energy from the Middle East. So it has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with America's tactics, but will share the same broad objective. Jeffrey Bader, a former senior American diplomat now at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, DC, says that China's resistance to American initiatives in Sudan and Iran depends on Russian support for its position. If Russia were to switch sides, so too would China, he argues. It is in no mood to take on America alone.
You don't need a degree in development economics to see who the winners and losers will be. Despite China's economy relying on manufactured exports to the West, it still invests nearly twice as much in R&D as India; I dread to think what levels it spends on infrastructure.
In fact, according to the OECD, China will soon be the world's second-biggest R&D spender in dollar terms - $136bn this year as opposed to Japan's $130bn and America's impressive $330bn. You have to hand it to the PRC though - they are full of good sense on a lot of things (shame about the environment).
Europe, on the other hand, would do well to up its spending and encourage the things that it is good at - technology and services - rather than buckling to domestic pressures from trade unions and farmers. I know who the smart money is on.
India’s R&D spend lower than China’s
India’s expenditure on research and development is 0.7% of its gross domestic product (GDP) as compared with China’s 1.2%.
Minister of state for HRD D Purandeswari told the Upper House in a reply that North America spends 2.7%, Japan 3.1% and the European Union 1.8% of their GDP in R&D.
Well, it would suit Saudi fine. No unwelcome criticism of its human rights record; no irritating demands from Indian and Pakistani workers; just a customer willing to pay high prices for the product. Win-win, apart from the loss of the US security umbrella - but that in itself is a provocation to the Islamist element and arguably makes the Middle East more unsafe.
New Saudi alignment with China could challenge U.S|In Depth|Reuters.com
Chietigj Bajpaee, research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., said China risks being seen as trying to "lock up" Saudi oil at the expense of Washington, or India, another Asian tiger economy with a billion-plus population and a voracious appetite for oil.
"(China and the United States) have an increasingly symbiotic relationship," Bajpaee said. "This has led to fears in the United States that China is encroaching into its 'sphere of influence' and undermining relations with its traditional allies."
Almost everything you needed to know about Balochistan, but were afraid to ask, neatly summed up here. The only aspect which is not dealt with is the presence of the US in Afghanistan and its uneasy influence over Pakistan, and also India. One couldn't ask for a situation where so many rival powers were so interdependent and intermeshed.
Note also that India is building a rival port in Iran at Chabahar - that I did not know, and it only makes the situation more volatile.
The Geostrategic Implications of the Baloch Insurgency
Balochistan's strategic significance and natural endowment makes it a critical province for Pakistan. Strategically, Balochistan bridges Central, South, Southeast and East Asia on one end, and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East on the other. Regional states, especially India, cannot reach the energy and trade markets of the Caspian Sea region without transit through Balochistan, which Pakistan denies to India despite repeated pleas on New Delhi's behalf by Washington. India absorbs punitive freight costs by routing its trade goods through the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, even for shipments to Afghanistan. Since 2001, New Delhi has made great strides in reaching out to Baloch leaders, whose National Jirga has now made it a party to the arbitration of their "Accession to Pakistan Pact" in the ICJ (The Nation, November 13).
India is also wary of the Sino-Pakistan naval port on the Arabian Sea, which has raised Beijing's profile in the Indian Ocean. India is even more concerned over Taliban-inspired "militant groups" who operate in Indian-administered Kashmir. As the Taliban are widely believed to have their operational bases in Balochistan, they equally worry India's allies in the region, especially Afghanistan and Iran. Afghanistan resents Pakistan's patronage of the Taliban, which have become the largest threat to its stability since their regrouping in 2003. Iran is also unhappy with Islamabad's policy toward the Taliban due to the group's anti-Shiite theology and the subversive operations of the Taliban's allies, such as Jandallah, in Iran's Sunni-dominated province of Sistan-Balochistan.
No, not Tiananmen, Tiawan, Tibet and torture (hope that doesn't get this website blocked). Now we're talking about the traingular relationships of China, India, Pakistan and the US. I might add Iran in there as well - see below.
Asia Times Online :: China News - The geometry of Sino-Indian ties
Hu's visit will be the crowning event to mark a decade of steady improvement in bilateral relations and serve as an impetus for further strengthening ties between Asia's two emerging powers. However, the substance and consolidation of the improving bilateral relationship will have to overcome what I term the four Ts - threat perceptions; territorial disputes; and the two triangulars, ie, China-India-US and China-India-Pakistan.
Despite progress in bilateral relations over the past few years, mutual suspicions remain. Partly this is due to the dynamics of security dilemma and structural conflicts between the two Asian giants. India has watched China's phenomenal growth in economic and military areas with both envy and alarm. The very fact that China continues to lead India on many indicators of power poses a greater threat than its military defeat 40 years ago.
Likewise, China is paying close attention to India's growing military power and its nuclear and missile developments. Beijing is wary of New Delhi's eastward strategy of developing greater economic and military ties with Japan and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Just to really complicate matters, let's stick oil and and gas into the equation too. Then you have the Iran-US-China triangle over Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the Iran-Pakistan-India triangle relating to gas pipelines. No-one said this would be simple...
The Asia Times neatly throws structural realist theory straight out of the window. Also known as neo-realism, this Cold War theory rests on the idea of a balance of power between two giants (then the US and USSR); with equal military capabilities, the peace held for 50 years.
However, with information warfare and nuclear proliferation on the rise, and several examples in recent history of how a small, clever enemy can defeat the conventional military forces of a superpower (think Vietnam, Aghanistan I, 9/11, Afghanistan II, Iraq), it seems that asymmetric warfare is well and truly in. Sheer strength is irrelevant, as long as there is a David who knows how to topple the Goliath.
Asia Times Online :: Asian News, Business and Economy.
a conventional confrontation between the US and the comparatively smaller, less powerful Russia-China axis would quickly result in a catastrophe for the East. In fact, the rising East has intentionally kept its relations with the West as friendly as possible in order to avoid the terrible costs of a direct, conventional confrontation. This policy has facilitated, without needless interruption, the ongoing and massive transfer of wealth from the West to the emerging (rising) economies of the East. It is a very smart and pragmatic policy for the East.
Nevertheless, simultaneous with that policy another one is being actively pursued. The rising East is not content to merely assume that the US colossus will treat, or will learn to treat the globe's lesser powers in a fair and equitable manner, taking proper account of their legitimate views and interests.
Unilateralist, overly muscular and mostly self-serving US policies and actions since the 1991 collapse of the roughly balanced bipolar order of the two superpowers demonstrate that nothing can be taken for granted in that regard. Prudently, the rising multifarious East has been learning ever deeper and wider multilateral cooperation within itself in the energy, economic, diplomatic, political and military spheres aimed at developing and putting in place potent asymmetric leverages in all those same spheres.
The bigger they come, the harder they fall.
The last few weeks - which have seen China tighten its grip over Africa and Asia, and the Republicans lose their grip in the Capitol and rethink their whole strategy - has generated a slew of articles over at Asia Times Online.
One author speaks of a new East-West Cold War style conflict developing, though I'm not so sure how stable or even feasible a China-Russia-India alliance would be:
It isn't yet fashionable to speak openly of a world subdividing itself again into two camps - those aligned with the US and those aligned with the Russia-China axis at the core of a new rising, multifarious yet coherent pole of the East - with the dividing line between the two camps consisting of the contest for control over global strategic resources.
Despite all the relevant signs pointing precisely in that direction:
# The deepening accord in all key spheres between Russia, China, India, the other rising powers of the East and the key resource-rich regimes of the world.
# Steadily rising East-West tensions, the ever-more divergent interests between East and West.
# The increasingly incompatible approaches to global issues and problems resulting in an ever-widening chasm between East and West.
Far too long to analyse in full, but worth looking at at a later date.
Another writer re-examines the China-India relationship:
Professor Ma Jiali, a veteran South Asia expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), says India's recent economic performance combined with its growing importance in international affairs has led to a rethink in Beijing of India as zhong he guoli, a Mandarin term that translates roughly as a "comprehensive national power".
For Beijing, relations with India are now considered the highest priority, according to Professor Ma, given that India is what he calls a "four-in-one" country. "India falls into each of the four major categories of countries that China wants to focus its diplomatic energies on," he explained. The four categories are: Developing countries, neighboring countries, rising powers, and influential actors on the international stage.
Another still looks at China and Russia, and finally we have the four horsemen of America, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.
There's really far too much to read here, but the implication is clear - the world is shaking into what looks like being its new order for quite a while. I personally will suggest that the US will remain one major pole, with China its key rival and Europe, Russia, India and Iran as second-tier powers that either ally with the gig pair or stand their distance. Both a multipolar and a bipolar environment at the same time - twice as nasty, twice as unpredictable.
  Oh, irony of ironies. It's not been a good week for warmongering dictators. Heads had to roll for Iraq. First, almost literally, was Saddam's. It was kind of his fault in the first place. Now Rummie's out too: someone had to take the fall for the biggest foreign policy disaster since Vietnam.
But getting rid of either them isn't going to make the slightest bit of difference.
It's not often that you hear the murmur of an apology in Confucian cultures, much less at the highest of political levels. If Kim Jong-Il really has said he is sorry to Beijing, then that indiscates not only a loss of face but some serious leverage on China's part.
Once again, this whole episode appears to be working out in China's favour while the US and others (Japan and Europe too) stand on the sidelines. Yes, of course it's a regional affair, but one suspects that in the CCP there is some considerable glee at the imroved standing of China in the 'international community'. Solving the DPRK problem truly would make China seem a 'responsible partner' to an increasingly overstretched and irrelevant US.
Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | North Korea backs down after Chinese pressure
As well as tighter cargo checks at the main border crossing of Dandong, China has ordered at least four banks to freeze money transfers to North Korea. According to the New York Times, it is also threatening to cut low-cost oil supplies in a cross-border pipeline that is thought to provide more than 80% of North Korea's needs.
This leverage appeared to have paid off today when China's special envoy to Pyongyang, Tang Jiaxuan, put a "strong message" to Mr Kim. According to South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper, the North Korean leader expressed remorse for putting China in a difficult situation and demonstrated a willingness to compromise.
 It's amazing how at home I feel in New York. It's not that things are exactly the same - they are not - but yet somehow the 'melting pot' seems to take in every aspect of the other cities I've lived in and blends them into one.
In New York you have it all: the bustle and imperial grandeur of London; the brownstone architecture and flashy skyscrapers of Shanghai's east and west riverbanks of the Bund and Pudong; even some of the old world charm of Amsterdam, at least in the Village.
The subway took all of an hour to get to grips with, and navigating the grid system was a piece of cake. The ethnic mix reminded me of London too, though elements of Chinatown were, of course, pure Puxi.
Perhaps most of all, New York had that easy familiarity of an old friend I had grown up with - over 30 years of TV. Every inch of the city has been immortalised on celluloid, and it was as if I had never been anywhere else. Such is the impact of popular culture.
Lastly, the media. This place is self-obsessed. On any one of four or five rolling news channels today, the airwaves were jammed with non-news of Cory Lidl's unfortunate light aircraft crash into an upper East Side tenement block. North Korea? Fuggedabahdit.
On the other hand, strolling past Ground Zero on Wednesday did give me an uneasy sense of unreality. How must it have looked to those who witnessed the attacks? I imagined myself watching in slow motion as the planes made impact and realised just how much that day affected the national psyche of this place.
There are few Republicans to be found in New York, but they are not the only Americans.
Well here I am. Flags flying everywhere, and no white people on the metro. Those are the two things that have struck me most of all so far, but I haven't had time to fully get to grips with the place yet. A light plane hit a building on the upper east side today too, but I was nowhere near. More later.
Flying out this morning for the Faith and the State debate with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Frits Bolkestein, Bas Heijne and Tony Judt. Will report back as soon as possible...
 Well, we all woke up to a slightly different world. With even Pakistan condemning the tests (there's an element of hypocrisy there, but still, it's the thought that counts) we are perhaps seeing a sudden wave of unity against Kim Jong-Il. All eyes are now on Northeast Asia.
There's also about to be a significant management handover, and for Ban Ki-Moon (who now looks almost certain to take over the reins at the UN) this is going to be a baptism of fire if ever there was one.
The question is, of course, what happens next? There's three main possibilities I can see.
Firstly, should North Korea pull another similar stunt in the near future, things are going to escalate further. The military solution is of course the nightmare scenario, but there is the chance that the US Army and the PLA would actually join forces and attack North Korea from both north and south. Under such a rapid attack, it's likely that the regime will fold within hours, but this will of course leave the PRC and ROK with an immense headache that they won't have immediate solutions for.
More likely is the turning of the economic screws. But this would also be calling Kim's bluff, since he has previously stated that sanctions will be seen as an act of war. Beijing will also be reluctant to implement this option, since once the DPRK begins to buckle then hordes of refugees will swarm across the Chinese border and create huge social problems in its northern provinces.
The last option is to do nothing - perhaps keep the intelligence work going but little more - and hope that the regime collapses by itself. This could take a long time. And Japan and South Korea will be tempted to develop their own nuclear defences in response, which will ratchet up regional tensions even further. China especially will find it hard to accept a nuclear-armed Tokyo, and Japan itself will convulse with disputes about its pacificist constitution, its role in world affairs and the legacy of Hiroshima.
Ban Ki-Moon, though ostensibly an international figure, is going to be inextricably bound up with the fate of what is after all his home country. Shinzo Abe too is faced with a huge crisis in his first weeks in office. Now is not a good time to be changing the staff; Kim probably knew that all along.
 With late-night TV-movie plots unfolding in the Amish school massacre and the Miss World hijacking, it's easy to overlook todays two more sobering stories, but the BBC's Paul Reynolds does make the effort to join the dots.
Both the North Korean announcement of a potential test and Iran's statement of refusal to suspend uranium enrichment are further blows to the authority of the UN and US interests. To resolve both situations, we have to look to China.
North Korea's activities may have a more long-term strategic effect, especially if South Korea and Japan feel obliged to go nuclear in order to enhance their self defence. This is the first big foreign policy test for new Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, who was quick to condemn North Korea's missile tests earlier in the year, and Beijing will no doubt be looking closely at what he has to say, or not say. But it certainly won't please China if an arms race emerges in East Asia, particularly one involving Japan. That would certainly complicate matters.
If China takes the lead over quelling Kim Jong-Il's unpredictable ambitions, it is more likely to sit back and watch the Iran situation, or even veto snactions in the UNSC.
In many ways, as a major trading partner of Iran, it is in China's interests to allow it to develop its capability and reinforce it as a friendly power in the Middle East in opposition to the US and Israel. Lack of censure from Beijing is sure to ease the flow of oil to China too.
In a sense, it's also fair to say that the Iran crisis is one of America's own making. Through its aggressive Middle East policy and pursuit of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, an Islamic nuclear conundrum was in a sense an inevitable consequence. On the other hand, China's support for North Korea in the 1950s have let it with an uncomfortable responsibility on its own doorstep.
While the US and Europe stand relegated the sidelines of both issues, China's role becomes ever the greater. But with nuclear weapons, the wait-and-see tactic is a risky one indeed. If things go wrong, can we expect China to be a responsible stakeholder in preventing a drama from becoming a crisis?
BBC story below. See also Asia Times Online, which examines in more detail US and Chinese relations with the extended 'Axis of Evil'. In short, while American political opinion is against the four, China's economic ties with them are on the increase:
The Bush administration's efforts to isolate Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela economically are implicitly designed to promote "regime change" from unfriendly to friendly government in each of these countries. Beijing has explicitly worked against Washington's isolation and regime-change endeavors by deepening its relations with Tehran, Pyongyang, Damascus and Caracas...
Continue reading "Two Balls in Beijing's Court" »
Economics isn't my strong point, but I think that the upshot of the article is: "The US trade deficit is going to decrease its long-term politico-economic strength".
Guardian Unlimited Business | | America is living beyond its means
The US has struck a Faustian bargain with its trading partners, particularly China, responsible for about one third of the $700bn-plus trade total last year. As the American economist Tom Palley puts it: "US consumers get lots of cheap goods in return for which they give over paper IOUs that cost less to print. Meanwhile, China creates millions of jobs and builds modern factories that are transforming it into an industrial superpower, and it also accumulates billions of dollars in financial claims against the US. From this perspective, trade deficits don't matter because there are no limits to either government or private borrowing, and because manufacturing doesn't matter either." The logic of this, Palley notes drily, is that the US would benefit even further if China devalued its exchange rate and ran a larger trade surplus...
What would happen if, as a result of global developments over the coming decades, the dollar ceased to be the reserve currency of choice. This was a point raised by Avinash Persaud, one of the financial sector's more original thinkers, in a recent lecture in New York. Persaud's argument is as follows.
Throughout history, there has always tended to be one dominant reserve currency along with a host of lesser rivals. In the 19th century Britain was the pre-eminent economy and sterling was the main reserve currency. Yet currencies don't retain their dominance forever... The US is living beyond its means, hoping that nobody cashes the cheques it has been merrily writing as the current account has gone deeper into the red. That's the advantage of being a reserve currency, even though, as Persaud notes, there is no rule which says that you have to run current account deficits simply because you are a reserve currency.
Britain didn't a century ago. In the decade or so up to the first world war it had a trade surplus of 5% of GDP. "That is a mirror image of the US today. The UK was in surplus by as much as the US is in deficit." That deficit has enabled the Chinese to build up their industrial strength at a rapid rate, so much so that it is probable that China - and perhaps India - will have overtaken the US as the world's largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis, at least) by 2050. Persaud thinks that the upshot of this will be that in the next few decades the dollar will start to lose its reserve status just as sterling did in the last century.
But would the CCP be able to implement the solutions named below quickly enough to stem internal revolt?
Asia Times Online :: Asian news and current affairs - When the US falls, China stumbles
A sharp slowdown or contraction of real personal consumption expenditure growth in the US in 2007 will lead to much slower economic growth in China. China's export growth could be flat or even negative while investment growth could be cut in half. In addition, rationalization in China's export sector could lead to much higher urban unemployment, especially among China's migrant workforce. This could heighten already increasing social instability, further undermining private consumption growth and economic growth in China.
A US economic downturn next year will undoubtedly have a strong negative impact on China's economy. However, this impact could be mitigated by the government's marshaling of China's considerable resources, including the country's nearly US$1 trillion of foreign exchange reserves. In addition to these reserves, China has enormous fiscal resources that it can employ to boost the economy either directly or indirectly through the country's massive state-owned banking system - not exactly music to the ears of foreign investors who have poured money into China's banks.
Though dependent on consumer demand in the United States, China's economy could easily withstand a US economic recession because of its vast resources and its ability to extend these resources through the still-dominant state-owned economic structures. As a result, slowing US economic growth does not imply a significant reversal in global commodity prices, especially oil prices. Even if economic growth in China slows to 5% in 2007, demand for energy and crude oil in China will remain quite strong.
Comment is free: Fighting the wrong war
It is ironic that an administration fixated on the risks of Middle East oil has chosen to spend hundreds of billions - potentially trillions - of dollars to pursue unsuccessful military approaches to problems that can and should be solved at vastly lower cost, through R&D, regulation, and market incentives. The biggest energy crisis of all, it seems, involves the misdirected energy of a US foreign policy built on war rather than scientific discovery and technological progress.
 The latest no-brainer from US intelligence - fighting Muslims makes them hate us:
The intelligence estimate, completed in April, is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism by United States intelligence agencies since the Iraq war began, and represents a consensus view of the 16 disparate spy services inside government. Titled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,’’ it asserts that Islamic radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread across the globe.
An opening section of the report, “Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement,” cites the Iraq war as a reason for the diffusion of jihad ideology.
The report “says that the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse,” said one American intelligence official.
Duh. Even better, a public document also cited in the New York Times article reminds us again that the war has not actually made us safer but put us in more danger than ever:
“The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry,” it states.
The report mentions the possibility that Islamic militants who fought in Iraq could return to their home countries, “exacerbating domestic conflicts or fomenting radical ideologies.”
Fantastic. We can look forward sooner or later to lots of radicalised and combat-experienced Muslims coming back to set Europe alight, though with its tiny Muslim population America itself won't have that problem. With Iraq now the terrorist academy of choice, whether Osama bin Ladin is alive or dead is of less relevance than ever.
At least the intelligence assessment on Iraq is uniform: everyone knows what the score is:
“New jihadist networks and cells, sometimes united by little more than their anti-Western agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge,” said Gen. Michael V. Hayden, during a speech in San Antonio in April, the month that the new estimate was completed. “If this trend continues, threats to the U.S. at home and abroad will become more diverse and that could lead to increasing attacks worldwide,” said the general...
Original article below.
Continue reading "Iraq Worsens Terrorism" »
 "We are used to thinking in terms of conventional warfare between nations, but energy is becoming a weapon of choice for those who possess it." Such is the assesment of Senator Richard Lugar, and it is not a bad one at all.
There's a long piece about energy security in Asia Times, coming from an unusual angle. Should the US ally with the big four Asian economies - China, Japan, South Korea and India - rather than Europe?
Here's the most interesting paragraphs, paraphrased from an expert from China's Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Su Jingxiang:
...if only Washington were savvy enough to "revalue the tremendous market potential" in China and "abate unnecessary doubts toward China", closer cooperation between Beijing and Washington on international energy issues could be realized...
He pointed out that gunboat diplomacy was no longer workable either in the Middle East or Latin America as it produced only terrorism and resistance. At the same time, Su acknowledged that growing dependence of energy imports "weakened the competitiveness and injured the economic security of the US"...
Su advised that the US should "steer away to more cooperation" with other major oil consumers (such as China and India). "The new type of strategic partnership will consolidate the negotiating capacity of oil consumers in their talks with the oil producers, thus helping boost the economic boom and national security of the US," he wrote.
It's not a bad idea, but it does overlook that essential strategic reality - China and the US are competing for the same limited supply. That, after all, is why Russia and the the Middle East have them over a barrel.
But the author does note that the recent visit to China by US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has resulted in some concessions by either side (another minor Yuan devaluation, and increased voting power for the PRC in the IMF) that must improve the relationship.
In a sense, then, China has jumped at the chance to manoeuvre the US, weakened as it is by Iraq, into a bargaining position.
Meanwhile, Putin is taking the opportunity to buy back some control over the former Eastern Bloc via gas pipelines. You need to read the article to get the full details, but basically Russia is playing a clever political hand in its negotiations over routes for Kazakh oil. Unencumbered with concerns about democracy and human rights, it's also sorted out its difficulties with Turkmenistan too.
The wheeler-dealings have implications for both Asia and Europe:
Curiously, Gazprom struck the deal with Turkmenistan soon after the US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, Steven Mann, visited Ashgabat to lobby for progress on the moribund Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAP) gas-pipeline project, which was supposed to be an integral part of the new grand US strategy of creating a "Greater Central Asia" with a unified energy structure for the countries of Central and South Asia. It was hoped to draw Central Asia into the US sphere of influence and pit Indian interests against Russian influence in the region.
But the TAP and the United States' "Greater Central Asia" strategy are not the only casualties of Gazprom's Turkmen deal. The ramifications of the deal run in far-flung directions deep into the European continent. The deal arguably frustrates the US attempt to reduce the European Union's dependence on Russian energy supplies.
Since Russia looks like it has clinched the stranglehold over Europe's gas supply, a remaining factor is Iran. Europe has to get access to Iranian gas somehow, in order to give itself an alternative to Russian gas:
And this is undoubtedly a critical factor of divergence in the respective approaches of Russia, the EU and the US toward the Iran nuclear issue. Though Russia is certainly interested in a solution to the Iran crisis, Moscow will have reason to worry about an EU-Iran agreement that may lead to an improved energy dialogue between the two protagonists, as that would make Iran a rival to Russia on the European gas market. As for Tehran, it, too, perfectly well understands that its preference should be to settle with Western Europe rather than with Russia. That is why Tehran has opted for independence in its gas policy and has scrupulously kept Gazprom out of its Southern Pars gas fields.
Yet there is another chance - China. China is a key competitor for Central Asian gas and has bought up large holdings of it.
In summary:
Russia is in control of Central Asian gas routes to the EU
The EU's only alternative is Iran
The US is constraining Iran over the nuclear issue, so that's off the agenda for the time being, which suits Russia fine
Only China can compete with Russia for control of Central Asian energy
Can the US really broker a deal with China and India, or will national interests win through?
Fascinating stuff. Full article below.
Continue reading "Axis of Oil" »
 What did Richard Armitage mean by "bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age?" Surely no-one would notice the difference?
Joking aside, the recently-published remarks reveal a lot about both regimes.
First, let's examine Musharraf's motivation in letting them spill. He may well be trying to attract sales for his forthcoming autobiography, which I wouldn't put past him (and doesn't the publication of memoirs signal impending retirement too?) But more likely, he's using them as a bargaining chip in a relationship that's looking increasingly strained over Pakistan's wishy-washiness over Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Fact is that most of the populace in Pakistan are pro-militants and anti-West, and that's scary for both Musharraf and his erstwhile ally Bush. The Pakistani President may well be trying to win back a little popular support.
The remarks also speak volumes about the naivety of the Bush administration. The original "back to the Stone Age" bombing campaign over North Vietnam merely strengthened resolve there, leading to America's ultimate defeat. And to think that high-altitude strikes alone can change a regime or even a policy is also wrong - look at the various post-1991 operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq before the 2003 invasion.
Finally, for a senior member of the US administration to even entertain such thoughts is clearly a sign of how dangerous it had become. You have to feel a little for Musharraf being put under that kind of threat.
Not to say Armitage's was the only view. There must have been some real infighting over Pakistan at the time. I personally remember speaking to a Pentagon spokesperson who told me that, as far as the DoD was concerned, as long as Pakistan helped in the War on Terror it could buy as many weapons as it liked. That in itself is an equally perilous attitude.
Either destroy a nation or arm it to the teeth. Such seem to be the limitations of US foreign policy. Facilitating development and offering economic, industrial and technological assistance in order to promote a transition to legitimacy? Not even part of the equation.
Guardian story below.
Continue reading "Rolling Thunder Phase II" »
 Today's what, in the business, they call "a fast news day". Stuff happened. Lots of it.
We awoke to images of anti-government protests in Hungary, sparked by the Prime Minister's admission of misconduct. Though rain stopped play today, the storming of the TV station (always the fist thing to go down in a revolution) was eerily reminiscent of the end of the Cold War back in 1989.
Then, though perhaps we should have seen it coming, a military coup in Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra had been on shaky ground ever since calling a snap election to prove his credibility, and tacitly admitting defeat and withdrawal from politics yet never really letting go of the reins (Tony Blair - something to ponder there. But the sight of tanks in Bangkok is still quite a shocker.
All this distracted attention from the backdrop of UN headquarters in New York, where world leaders are gathering for Kofi Annan's final session in charge. It's not been a day of minced words, with prominent personalities calling for moves to end the Israel-Palestine conflict and even the sight of Bush - commendably - demanding action on Darfur:
Mr Bush said that if the Khartoum authorities did not do so quickly, the UN had to act. "Your lives and the United Nation's credibility are at stake," he added, addressing the people of Darfur.
The US president also announced the appointment of a special US envoy to the region.
Fine words then, but not much action for now. But Bush was also struggling to justify his increasingly isolated position on the Middle East, the bigger fish being fried at the expense of Sudan.
All this and also a shake-up in Saddam's trial: continued protests in Taiwan; and bombs in Somalia. Anchors across the rolling news channels were looking somewhat out of breath.
What does all this mean? Well, for now it is of course too early to tell. But I think that today has dealt quite a blow to the institutionalising agenda of neo-liberalism. Hungary's problems stem from economic failure that has, if anything, been exacerbated rather than assuaged by EU membership:
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, one of the biggest problems facing governments in former Eastern Bloc countries has been how to marry the expectations of the electorate with the harsh realities of running free-market economies that aspire to join the single European currency.
 Even worse in Thailand, one of the leading lights of ASEAN but also the source of the 1997 financial crisis. I expect that investors will be watching events with dismay: the image of Asia as a stable region for trade has been shattered once again.
China, on the other hand, will probably be laughing all the way to the bank as foreign companies get the jitters and pull out.
And finally, the UN as an institution is once again under the microscope. It came out of the Lebanon fiasco somewhat bruised, and the mainly European contingent of peacekeepers have yet to prove their worth under any major test. Now there is a growing onus for it to engage with the fractious Israel-Palestine conflict, an issue at the very root of much of the tension in the world today.
What happens with Sudan and Darfur is an even graver immediate issue: can this embattled institution stand back yet again and allow genocide in our own time? We shall see.
 Even now, five years on, the events of 11 September 2001 possess a certain surreality, a lack of context in the state of things then and the state of things now.
It's certainly one of those 'Kennedy moments', which we will all look back upon decades from now. For me it was doubly unreal, since I was at that time on a military exercise up in the wilds of Scotland, at Garelochhead, an army base near Faslane submarine station. Our SOPs were to remain isolated from external influences, even other units, and when the news broke all we has was a tiny transistor radio that could only pick up the crackly local Scottish station.
The fumbling attempts of those underfunded reporters to take stock of the situation were typical of all media outlets, in a way: CNN didn't do much better. It was weeks before I got to see the footage, by which time its impact had faded; it felt like it hadn't really happened, it was just another late-night disaster movie on repeat showing.
But it was real, and the world we live in now is as much a consequence of 9/11 as 9/11 was a consequence of the world we lived in then. But no-one saw it - it was impossible - even if we had effectively (in the words of IR professor Steve Smith) "sung that world into existence".
The world we are singing into existence now is certainly a bleaker one than we thought we had in 1989, the year of revolutions. It's telling that despite the failure of China's 1989 pro-democracy revolution and the success of those in Europe, it's China that is leading now while Europe is swiftly falling behind.
But that's by the by. The new world disorder is one where terrorist attacks are more, not less, likely. Afghanistan seemed to be a success for a while, but that image is fading fast. Post-Iraq the suicide bombers there and elsewhere have added motive and impetus. This year's 'spectacular' failed, but there'll be another.
North Korea and Iran are both enjoying their spell in the limelight due to the nuclear issue, and post-Lebanon, Israel and Palestine are further than ever from reconciliation while Britain and Blair are now looking like the lame ducks of international affairs.
Ultimately, it looks as if the bigger picture is one where the enemies of the US are winning. In the past five years it has lost so much of the legitimacy it built up since World War II, and squandered the sympathy, solidarity and support of 12 September. It's almost as if 9/11 didn't happen: Bush started it, didn't he?
Perhaps the world didn't change on 9/11; perhaps we just perceived it to have done. If anything, it's a massive distraction from the real underlying and interlinked problems of the planet: overpopulation, poverty, pollution.
But what is happening now and what happens next is and will be the result of the changes that we have wrought. Let's hope that we can turn the tide before that cycle spins out of control.
Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | US interventions have boosted Iran, says report
A report published by Chatham House said the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had removed Iran's main rival regimes in the region.
Israel's conflict with the Palestinians and its invasion of Lebanon had also put Iran "in a position of considerable strength" in the Middle East, said the thinktank.
Unless stability could be restored to the region, Iran's power will continue to grow, according to the report published by Chatham House.
China's rise leaves West wondering
The Bush administration came to power convinced that China was America's strategic competitor. But then came 9/11. To Beijing's enormous relief, Washington's focus shifted to terrorism, and there was less attention on China's discreet military build-up.
Nevertheless, Pentagon planners are concerned about developments, and US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said much of China's arms spending is being concealed.
Ambassador Sha responded strongly to the allegations. "It's better for the US to shut up," he said. "Keep quiet. It's much, much better."
This is a crucial question for China's future. Will it be just an economic superpower content to sell the world shoes and washing machines? Or will it have the military muscle to protect its new interests around the world?
Marking an anxious birthday in Cuba | Economist.com
The United States hopes that the only bastion of communism in the Americas might be toppled by people power, as in the revolutions in central Europe in 1989. But the Cuban authorities may hope for a different transition model: China's. The People's Republic survived the death of its towering founder, Mao Zedong, and then eventually flourished by liberalising its economy while keeping strict one-party control over the state.
Cuba may attempt to do the same. Raúl Castro, Fidelâs brother, has 'temporarily' taken over the most important jobs of party leader, president and commander-in-chief of the army. Previously he was the world's longest-serving defence minister. As in China, the army is not only the 'defender' of the revolution, but an active player both in politics and business. The slightly younger Castro is said by some to be more intolerant of opposition than his brother, but he is also thought to have been responsible for the limited liberalisation of Cuba's economy in the 1990s.
 Nice graphics, scary economics.
Fears of a slowdown | Economist.com
Unfortunately, the Chinese government has few tools at its disposal to manage the pace of growth. Its attempts to tighten monetary policy have been feeble, hampered by its policy of keeping the yuan artificially cheap. Though the government has tried to “sterilise” its foreign currency operations by issuing more government securities to mop up the resulting excess yuan, its efforts are constrained by the shaky banking system.
China has tried to bolster its weak macroeconomic controls with microeconomic interventions, placing administrative restrictions on investment in specific industries it considers to be growing too fast. China’s economy may now be too big for such policies to do much good but the government is fearful of choking off export-led growth when so many Chinese are desperate for jobs. And the relatively primitive state of China’s financial system makes it hard to fine-tune either micro or macroeconomic policies—particularly since so much investment is driven by political considerations at all levels of government.
 Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | Pakistan launches huge nuclear arms drive
An interesting exchange:
Commodore Uday Bhaskar of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis in Delhi suggested the timing of the report could be intended to influence the US Congress's debate on the Indian deal:
"My initial reaction is that one of the report's authors [David Albright] is a critic of the India-US nuclear deal and therefore this report has to be seen in the light of its passage through Congress. It may be true but there's a reason why the report appears now."
Mr Albright, a former UN weapons inspector who now runs Isis, denied there was any link between the timing of the report and the congressional debate. "It is a strange twist to the debate to see a potential Pakistani threat to India as an attempt to derail the India agreement in Congress," he said, adding that the publication was dictated more by the need to get the report out before the summer holidays began.
There is speculation in Delhi that the new plant may be a fresh sign of China's commitment to a "strategic partnership" with Pakistan. The pair already have extensive military and diplomatic ties.
"China has supported Pakistan since the 80s and it remains the wild card here," Commodore Bhaskar said. "At the time of the Indo-US deal, there were clear indications that Beijing thought if Washington can assist India, China can aid Pakistan."
Mr Albright said Chinese assistance was a possibility.
"You always worry that some of this is coming from China. Can Pakistan really do all this on its own? You wonder," he said. "That would be very serious."
Original Isis report here. Note the conclusion:
South Asia may be heading for a nuclear arms race that could lead to arsenals growing into the hundreds of nuclear weapons, or at a minimum vastly expanded stockpiles of military fissile material. A negotiated agreement that results in a halt to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons should be a priority for the international community. Not only are such arsenals a waste of precious resources, they increase instability in the region and could needlessly provoke China to respond by increasing the size and lethality of its own nuclear capabilities.
 The Spanish Civil War was really just a prelude to World War II. Could a similar pattern of events alreay be unfolding?
Perhaps somewhat fanciful, premature and over-the-top, but at least someone is thinking about it. Asia Times' Chan Akya considers, in a two part series, how China and India might get involved should the tide of conflict in the Middle East expand further.
After a somewhat overenthusiastic reference to Huntingdon's Clash of Civilizations and a long historical passage, the author then hits a nail more-or-less on the head:
There are today not enough Christians or Muslims in China to push the country in the direction of supporting either the West or Islam in any global conflagration. However, a resurgent West poses more of a threat to China's patriarchal culture, which is not very different from the centralized authority-driven culture of Islam. Given that, it is more likely that China would tilt toward supporting Islam, as its weapons-proliferation efforts over the past few years have shown.
Yep. The Uyghurs are hardly a threat to China, while if India were to side with the West then its Muslim population might just explode. And China has been sponsoring Iran (not to mention Iraq, too) for decades. If the price is right, they'll sell to anyone - and they get the oil rights in return.
As to whether I agree with the concluding paragraphs, I'm not sure:
This leads me to conclude that an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East would eventually necessitate the West to demand adequate support from China, failing which the country itself could become a target. The waxworks of Beijing are likely to grant enough concessions to the West to avoid being attacked, and then lie in wait for their revenge.
The Indian situation is more precarious. While much of the country's right-wing intelligentsia would push it to war against Islam, there is enough of a fifth column in place to thwart the country's historic quest for vengeance. India's Muslims number more than any other country's in the world with the exception of Indonesia. Add to these the populations of both Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Indian military might is in essence boxed in.
The West demand support from China? Like it is already trying to do over sanctions for Sudan, North Korea and Iran? Give me a break. The West knows it won't get a smidgin of help from Beijing, and will thus be more likely to expect direct (or indirect) conflict. China will probably see its opportunity to firm up its energy security, not to mention nationalist ambitions such as Taiwan when the West's back is turned.
India, on the other hand, I do expect to be somehow squeezed in the middle, unable to act in its own interests, effectively encircled by China via Sino-friendly states such as Pakistan and Burma, a weak and politically fractured Nepal and the conquered territory of Tibet.
Read on below.
Continue reading "China, India and WW3" »
Good men, the last wave by, crying how bright
Their frail deeds might have danced in a green bay,
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.
The Economist's choice of title (from a poem by Dylan Thomas) for its analysis of the collapse of the WTO talks is apposite indeed. Think of what you might, for better or for worse the WTO is now the light that failed.
The historic chance to truly liberalize the world economy looks like it has eluded us, and at the end of the day those who will suffer most will be the poor and the deprived. Europe's ludicrous and insane Common Agricultural Policy will continue to screw people in Africa and elsewhere:
This is a tragedy, especially for the developing world. Last year, the World Bank estimated that global gains from trade liberalisation would equal roughly $287 billion, of which $86 billion would accrue to developing nations, lifting at least 66m people out of poverty. Activist groups including Greenpeace and Oxfam were quick to condemn both Washington and Brussels for intransigence over agricultural subsidies, saying that rich-world self interest is leaving the poor to suffer.
For the benefit of a few French farmers, cheap subsidised grain will continue to flood the world market putting local producers out of business and ultimately creating the conditions for famine. As Amartya Sen correctly says, it's not just drought that triggers starvation - it's economics.
It's not often that I spring to Bush's defence, and this is not one of those times, but The Economist has a point:
The collapse will probably be blamed on America, which has been pushing for bold action on agricultural tariffs, and resisting a modest compromise deal that includes caps on its own agricultural subsidies. This is ironic, because America has been one of the grave men pushing hard to revive Doha after the round’s first collapse at Cancún in 2003. Despite high-profile deviations, such as slapping tariffs on imported steel, Mr Bush has largely been a committed free trader.
The truth is that while there have been grave men and wise men, the good men have had no real voice. And I too think that the blame lies squarely with our very own beloved EU.
What has not been said, so far, is who else will gain from this. I think there's going to be one big beneficiary... it's coming... China. Without demands to relax trade tariffs on manufactured imports etc. China may well continue to resist becoming the 'world's largest market', as so many expect it to be.
On the other hand, if the West begin slapping tariffs and quotas on imports from China, the whole edifice of the PRC could swiftly begin to crumble. I don't think it'll come to that, but it could be one of a cocktail of factors that lead us further down that dark road, burning and raving at the close of day.
Continue reading "Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night..." »
 With Israeli reserves being called up, expect to see a ground offensive launched in the next couple of days. This war is escalating rapidly, and as all students of military history know, it's now easier to keep on going than to change direction and pull back. Just like the great powers mobilised at the opening of World War I, Israel is gaining momentum, and it can't just apply the brakes.
The Economist, nevertheless, calls for exactly that. And so it should, even though it's unlikely. It also argues that this conflict may in fact be a gross miscalculation by both Hizbollah - who didn't expect such a robust response - and by Ehud Olmert, keen to show the electorate and the international community that he's no softie. He's a man conspicuously living in the shadow of Ariel Sharon and other hard-man warrior politicians, and he's got a point to prove.
But the whole premise of the crisis rests on a Hobson's choice. Neither side actually can back down anyway:
If Hizbullah is beaten, it risks losing its position as the strongest power in the fractious Lebanese state, with damaging consequences in the region for its Iranian sponsor and Syrian ally. If Israel falters, many of its people think, the iron wall of military power that has enabled it to win grudging acceptance in the Middle East will have been seriously breached.
That being said, neither are involved in a conflict that it's possible to 'win' an any conventional sense:
However much punishment Mr Olmert inflicts on Hizbullah, he cannot force it to submit in a way that its leaders and followers will perceive as a humiliation. Israel's first invasion of Lebanon turned into its Vietnam. It is plainly unwilling to occupy the place again. But airpower alone will never destroy every last rocket and prevent Hizbullah's fighters from continuing to send them off. No other outside force looks capable of doing the job on Israel's behalf. At present, the only way to disarm Hizbullah is therefore in the context of an agreement Hizbullah itself can be made to accept.
It's amazing that even after decades of terrorism, Israel still assumes that conventional military power can flush out the Islamists. It can't. Even in the unlikely event that Hizbollah was 'wiped out', a new group would simply rise in its place. And hopes that it can be 'beaten' are also misguided:
Hizbullah cannot be uprooted. It is not going formally to surrender. Its past struggle against Israel has won it the fierce loyalty of many Lebanese Shias, and its present one will add to their number even if it comes off worse. Israel's security will not be enhanced by destroying the rest of Lebanon. By weakening the Lebanese state, and its fragile but well-intentioned government, Israel just weakens the already feeble constraints Lebanon tries to impose on Hizbullah's actions.
The only answer The Economist has is for America to promptly broker a settlement. But it doesn't even look like Condi's packed her handbag yet, and Bush is quite happy to let 'this shit' go on for an undetermined period.
Meanwhile, the chances of the rest of the region being sucked in when the invasion begins grow stronger. We don't hear very much from Iran and Syria in the Western media, but you can be sure they'll have something to say when the time is right.
Full article below.
Continue reading "The Accidental War" »
 Oxford Professor and all-round commentator Timothy Garton-Ash takes a timely look at the state of the world in mid-2006.
His analysis is bleak. Of course, no writer on current affairs has the benefit of hindsight and it'll be a long time before we know how history will view this little episode. But Garton-Ash takes the essentially neo-realist view that a multipolar order is a recipe for disaster.
The neo-liberalist argument that the US will create stability through institutions and 'enlightened self-interest' no longer washes, and the hegemon is clearly on the decline as other powers rise. The kernel of the argument is quite succinct:
This new multipolarity is the result of at least three trends. The first, and most familiar, is the rise or revival of other states - China, India, Brazil, Russia as comeback kid - whose power resources compete with those of the established powers of the west. The second is the growing power of non-state actors. These are of widely differing kinds. They range from movements like Hamas, Hizbullah and al-Qaida, to non-governmental organisations like Greenpeace, from big energy corporations and drug companies to regions and religions.
A third trend involves changes in the very currency of power. Developments in technologies with violent potential mean that very small groups of people can challenge powerful established states, whether by piloting an aeroplane into the World Trade Centre in New York, targeting a missile at Haifa, taking on the US military in Iraq, bombing the London underground, or squirting sarin gas into the Tokyo subway.
Not to mention the US's loss of EH Carr's third kind of power, 'power over opinion' (the others being military and economic power). Since the war America has been much better at provoking than winning hearts and minds. It just can't let go of those balls, and unfortunately Israel tends to follow suit.
Most of all, Garton-Ash displays his disillusionment with the tenets of liberalism (which encompasses a convenient jibe at the commander-in-chief of misplaced liberal values, the French President):
When Jacques Chirac spoke fondly of multipolarity, back in 2003, he conflated two claims: the world is multipolar, and that's a good thing. Claim 1 is being proved right. Claim 2 has yet to be confirmed. For a start, it matters a lot whether this is multipolar order or multipolar disorder. Order is a high value in international relations. It stops a lot of people being killed. At the moment, we have multipolar disorder, and it's not clear what the shape of a new multipolar order might be. Historically, the emergence of new powers, elbowing for position, has increased the chances of violence. So has contested authority within the frontiers of states.
I disagree with the author's fears that nuclear conflict is impending; no state (apart from North Korea, perhaps) would be willing to act in such self-disinterest, and I can't see any terrorist organisations gaining the capability or the will to use the bomb.
But the essence of his fears is spot-on:
We liberal internationalists dream of a world of democratic, peace-loving, human-rights-respecting states... Some of the growing powers fit that vision... to a large extent, India and Brazil. China and Russia definitely do not, nor do many of the non-state actors that are currently making the running in world politics. Henry Kissinger has suggested that the geopolitics of Asia in the 21st century could resemble those of Europe in the 19th century, with great powers jockeying for position, using war as the continuation of politics by other means. But it could be worse. It could be that kind of great-power rivalry on a world scale, plus terrorists. And corporations. And transnational religious communities. And international NGOs. No moral equivalence is suggested between these very different kinds of actor, but what they all have in common is that they don't fit neatly into a world order of states.
By other means, indeed.
Continue reading "New World Disorder 2.0" »
 Diplomacy at work again. Probably it'll provoke Hizbollah to continue doing their shit.
So, in the spirit of the academic study of international relations, if this is the language of political discourse then there are some things I too would like to add:
Hamas - you can stop doing this shit to boot. And Israel, for that matter. Get your shit together and just be friends.
North Korea and Iran, stop doing this nuclear weapons shit. It's really bad for regional stability, OK?
Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, just turn this shit in and live in peace for God's sake.
That goes for you too, Taliban. Get your shit out of here.
Meanwhile, America, lose that shit-for-soul Guantanamo Bay shit.
India and Pakistan - enough Kashmir shit already. Don't want to see any more of this blowing up trains shit. You Pakistani boys from Yorkshire had better give over this shit and all.
Burma - stop this shit and release Aung Saan Suu Kyi
You Islamic terrorist groups in Indonesia and the Phillipines can cease shitting with us as well.
Get over yourselves and stop this Taiwan shit, China. And forget about that Japanese shit too. It's just shit.
Orangemen, stop doing this shit in Northern Ireland. It just pisses everyone off and makes matters worse. Hurry up and die, Rev Paisley.
Russia, Chechnya, you know what's coming. I shit you not. And Uzbekistan, you'd better sort your shit out too over that massacre at Andijan.
Somalia, Sudan. Just stop this shit.
You and all, Columbia.
In fact, all of you, just stop this shit. Now.
Original Bush-Blair conversation below.
Continue reading "Stop Doing This Shit" »
 A complex and highly-involved essay on an alternative model to the OPEC system features in Asia Times Online. Far too detailed to get into the nuts and bolts of it - reprinted below - but just imagine for a moment what the planet would look like if we were able to rid ourselves of the political weight of the OPEC cartel.
For a start, the energy security issue could be removed from the Middle East conflict, radical Islam and terrorism. I'm not saying that Russia is a safe and stable country, far from it, but the balance of economic power would shift significantly once the Kremlin became the overlord of our energy supplies rather than the failing states and dictatorships that are lackeys to the US military-industrial complex.
With the Levant disintegrating as I write, war in Iran looming, Iraq a centre of instability and Somalia looking like a new challenge to oil security - commanding as it does the sea lanes to the south of Saudi Arabia - it's an impossible dream that's worth at least considering.
It is quite tough to understand exactly how this would all work:
The OPEC model has been limited to crude oil; the Russian model aims at covering supply of both crude oil and natural gas. The OPEC model has been limited to regulating supply and price, according to the swing-producer mechanism. Until now, this role has been played by Saudi Arabia, with its global lead in crude-oil reserves, and in its flexible capacity to lift, pump to port, and ship.
The Russian model aims to supplant the Saudis, emphasizing Russia's global lead in gas reserves and in barrel of oil equivalent (boe). Already, Russia exceeds Saudi Arabia as the largest producer in boe terms (13.3 million boe per day, compared with 10 million boe/d for Saudi Arabia); the largest exporter in boe terms (18.7% of global hydrocarbon exports); and the largest reserve base (16.3% of world hydrocarbon reserves boe).
From the Russian perspective, the Saudi role and OPEC model have benefited the United States, which can pressure Saudi Arabia into opening the spigot to deal with supply emergencies; the US also pressures other oil producers, such as Libya, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Indonesia, by military methods, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. In the Russian alternative, the US will be far less influential, and have fewer levers, commercial or military, to effect pressure on the energy suppliers. Russian arms and defense-industry partnerships are on offer to relatively weak, intervention-prone energy producers in Africa and Latin America to offset US pressure.
In short, it's a direct affront to US hegemony, and so it ain't gonna happen - at least at this summit. It is also a threat to the lynchpins of globalization - transnational private companies - since the Russian model is based on mega-firms like Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft, all of which are at least partly state-controlled.
But there may be benefits:
The security of Russian energy supply is thus to be contrasted with the unreliability of US behavior. In the short term, this Russian strategy also enables Russian companies to secure the capital and technology they need for high-cost, high-risk projects in difficult terrain. Reciprocally, the strategy offers access to stable supply and pricing of oil and gas to consumer countries, including diversion of energy transportation away from military pressure at chokepoints - for example, the Strait of Hormuz, through which most oil tankers sail en route to Asia and South Africa. In America's wars with Iraq, and its threatened attack on Iran, oil consumers are dependent on the US Navy to keep the Hormuz waterway open. They are obliged to pay for this protection through the premium US oil companies charge for delivery risk.
And guess who leapt onto the bandwagon straight away:
India was the first to buy into the new Russian model, purchasing a minority shareholding in the first of the Sakhalin Island offshore oilfields to come onstream. This does not supply crude oil directly from Russia - a short-term Indian priority that the government in New Delhi is also pursuing. China followed India with different tactics, first by funding the proposed East Siberian Oil Pipeline, which will assure direct oil deliveries to Daqing; and most recently, by buying into Rosneft's public share flotation.
Immediate success for this model is unlikely. But with energy security such a fundamental issue these days - more important at a globalized economic level than simple political ideology or cultural identity - then we are perhaps seeing the seeds being sown for a new non-aligned movement.
It's no coincidence that these three guys had a meeting today. No coincidence at all.
Continue reading "A Different Model for a Different World" »
 An opportunity may already have been lost. With Bush and Putin 'failing to agree' on Russia's entry to the WTO, inevitably there will be comebacks. After all, the G8 summit is being hosted in St Petersburg, and the onus is on Russia to assert its rising status.
And the issue is that old chesnut, energy security. With the WTO membership carpet pulled from beneath its feet, Russia today refused to sign the energy charter which would guarantee the reliable supply of energy to Europe. As the Ukraine discovered, Russia knows that it has a powerful economic and political weapon in its grasp, and there's no reason for it to let go.
Anyone who still thinks - or says - that oil is not a major issue on the global political agenda will, however, be corrected by this year's G8, notable for its straight talking:
"Energy is essential to improving the quality of life and opportunities in developed and developing nations," the leaders' statement said.
"Ensuring sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy at prices reflecting market fundamentals is a challenge for our countries and for mankind as a whole," it added.
The statement comes after months of rising oil prices - including a new spike following the Israeli action in Lebanon.
That's the sharp end of it - you can't have energy security without political security, and last week it just got a whole lot worse. Thus the G8 summit is inextricably intertwined with events in the Middle East, from Israel and Lebanon to Iraq and Iran. It's not just an additional point of discussion, as is being reported - it's the main item on the menu.
Continue reading "Tit for Tat" »
 A delightfully acerbic and tongue in cheek analysis of the North Korea missile launch by the BBC's Matt Frei.
In a nutshell, Frei reckons that the launch is little more than a PR stunt from a Kim Jong-Il disappointed at the recent lack of media attention:
...you can imagine the Dear Leader's dismay as he flicks from one channel to the next and finds the world stage obsessed with football, Rooney's red card, Brangelina or the nascent nuclear programme of Iran.
But not him. Not a squeak. Nada.
I can just picture him hurling his kimchi at the plasma screen, shouting: "Why all the fuss about Tehran? Why are they getting all the attention when they have barely started enriching the uranium and the rhetoric. We're beyond enriching. We are fully enriched! We have already manufactured six nuclear warheads and we can't even make it onto late night TV? Hello! Whatever happened to the axis of evil?"
But Brangelina might well hold the key to the situation. Frei's theory is that movie buff Kim takes his cues from spectacular blockbusters like Independence Day - films that harness the paranoia at the heart of US culture.
But more worryingly, there's also a geopolitical element of empathy with - you've guessed it - China:
There he was. Japan's foppish prime minister crooning away incomprehensibly in the Holy of Holies, permitted to don the King's shades, allowed to discuss global affairs with Priscilla Presley.
W had arranged a personal tour of Graceland with bells and whistles and the Chinese president wasn't even allowed to call his recent meal at the White House a state visit.
Oh, the shame of it! So President Hu Jintao may have called up Kim Jong-il and said: "Go girl! The skies are yours, just aim those missiles away from us."
Kim Jong-il relies on China for everything from food to power to rental videos. He is unlikely to have launched several missiles without its consent.
But Frei's got a brilliant solution to the affair:
So here's my idea. Invite him over for face-to-face talks about the stuff that matters and sweeten the diplomacy with a guided tour of Universal Studios, lunch with Stephen Spielberg and a life-long subscription to Netflix and Blockbusters.
The missile crisis will be over and North Korea will be become a fabulous location for Mission Impossible 4.
Fantastic stuff - it's what you pay the licence fee for. Check it out below, and see also this Asia Times brief on the missile suite.
Continue reading "A Hissy Fit from the Hermit State" »
 Of course it is impossible to predict what course the future will take with regard to potential conflict with China. What follows is thus quite speculative. But there are a few factors pertaining to the period around 2012, the next Year of the Dragon, that stand out:
Economic superpower status. Over the next five or six years, China's economic ascendancy will be complete. Publications such as Newsweek are already writing on what they call 'China's Century'. What happens in the Chinese economy sends shockwaves around the world. Not to mention the US budget deficit, much of which is already down to China. With this kind of authority, China is going to be far less shy to act, perhaps radically, in its own interests.
Games over. The Chinese are greatly looking forward to the 2008 Olympic Games and the 2010 Shanghai Expo and are unlikely to do anything to scupper them before they are over. But by 2012 they will have neither of these to lose.
Impending implosion? Over the next decade China's resources will be stretched to a crippling limit while, despite the one-child policy, the population will have continued to rise. Rampant environmental pollution is not going to help put food in the mouths of 1.4 billion hungry citizens. Peasant protests and nationalism are both on the increase and by this time the CCP may no longer be able to keep them under control.
Resources on the wane. And oil: never forget oil. By 2012, unless it has taken serious measures to secure resources for itself, it's going to break down like an old banger - and the incredible economic growth that legitimates the Party's grip on power will break down down with it. Many theorists predict this year as a critical point - see for example the Olduvai Gorge theory, itself based on Hubbert's Peak.
Election year. The year 2012 will see elections in not only the US but possibly also in Taiwan. Elections are also due in Hong Kong; whether or not the authorities will allow them is another matter. It may even be time for the current leadership of the CCP to stand down after eight years in power. The year is thus extremely volatile politically with world leaders distracted and potential flashpoints waiting to happen within 'One China' itself.
 Military superpower status. Finally, if speculations are correct, by 2012 China's military build-up will be complete. It will have its motive, it will have its carrier group, it will have its opportunity. If the PRC moves to retake the ROC, will the US act to defend it or not? If things continue as they have done since 9/11, by 2012 the US military itself will be embroiled in conflicts across the Middle East, from Syria, via Iraq and Iran, as far as Afghanistan. Weakened and overstretched it won't be in a position to fight upon a second front. In a Presidential election year as 2012 will be, the prospect of even more American body bags will not be a vote-winner. And if Taiwan falls undefended, what would happen next?
I hope that it does not come to this. The only outcome that is in all our interests is peace. But as if all the above are not enough, there are enough mystical predictions out there to indicate that something is up: we just don't yet know what.
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Update - since this hypothesis was first written in Autumn 2005, I've found a couple more articles which seem to justify it. Of course they must be taken with a large pinch of salt, but this Epoch Times report confirms similar thinking on the 2012 date - see also the analysis by the Association for Asian Research.
Read on below for more detailed explanations.
Continue reading "Flashpoint 2012" »
 Worth noting for future reference, an article delineating some of the geopolitical implications of the Gwadar naval port.
Though events may well overtake me, at the moment it is looking like the most likely future flashpoint between China and the US - Taiwan excepted - is going to be here. All of the pieces are in place. China is building up Gwadar in order to protect its Gulf oil supplies, and perhaps export energy via potential pipelines through Pakistan (see map). The US also has a major presence in Pakistan due to the War on Terror, and is actively engaging the Taliban along the border.
Meanwhile, Baloch nationalists are conducting a campaign for independence - which inevitably will bring them into conflict with both powers. India appears to be supporting this, and finally Pakistan and Iran seem to be caught in the middle between their alliances and enmities with the US, China and India.
A more complex and volatile situation could not be asked for. According to the Government of Balochistan website:
The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port by Pakistan is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Balochistan by the Baloch freedom fighters. Pakistani response to secessionism is aggressive military action in Balochistan. Pakistani fighter jets, gunship helicopters, heavy artillery, and over 60,000 troops have launched a military operation inside Balochistan to target the ethnic Baloch population, mainly the non-combatant, innocent men, women and children. To date the Pakistani forces have conducted extrajudicial arrests of more than 4,000 Baloch activists, killed over 700 Baloch nationals in direct military action, and planted landmines in Baloch areas to close all escape routes resulting in the deaths of over 10,000 Baloch civilians due of starvation and lack of medical assistance.
Jerusalem, Israel based Government of Balochistan in Exile is in contact with officials of countries that have a vested interest in containing Chinese ambitions in the region. Negotiations are being conducted to explore ways and means to close the Chinese naval outpost in Gwadar. Both the Indian and U.S. policy makers are keen to resolve the grievances of the Baloch people through peaceful means. But, neither Iran, Pakistan nor China agree to retract from their plans and settle the issue of sovereignty of Balochistan with the Baloch leadership. Hence, the Baloch nationalists were compelled to fight for their self-determination, and they have already waged the Baloch War of Independence on both the Iranian and Pakistani government forces.
Full article reproduced below.
Continue reading "Three Great Powers and One Nascent Nation" »
 On Thusday I attended a lecture by IR's leading light, Robert Keohane, in which he discussed aspects of anti-Americanism. (Some extracts from the new book are available here.)
Not having the wit to take notes, I can't remember all of the four types of anti-Americanism he described, but the gist of the talk was that despite the prevalence of anti-American discourse it has little real effect. "Yankee go home - but take me with you!" was one memorable remark.
The Economist is also thinking about this, but its explanations are a lot less vague:
Inside the clever head of Donald (stuff happens) Rumsfeld, America's defence secretary, for example, wags a tongue that may on its own be responsible for having needlessly alienated more former friends of the United States than any other instrument since the invention of the B-52 bomber.
The authors go on to furnish us with numerous examples. And here's the crux of the article:
The point, though, is that if much of the war against terrorism is a contest between valuesin short, a PR warAmerica should be winning hands down. A brand that stands for life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is an easier sell than a brand that stands for beheading unbelievers and reviving the Middle Ages.
Absolutely. But then again, America is not the only government that is losing the PR battle. Apparently China is too. Well, not so sure about that one, but still. Much of the article relates to the crucial story of 'Super Voice Girl, but a former journalism professor has a wry comment to make at the end:
Jiao Guobiao, who last year was dismissed from his post as a journalism lecturer at Peking University after issuing a lengthy diatribe against the Propaganda Department (comparing it to the Roman Catholic church in medieval Europe), sees a glimmer of hope that things might be changing. He has not (yet) been arrested. The department has become like a blunt knife, says Mr Jiao. In the past it could slice meat apart in a stroke, but now it's not so fast.
By the way, if you're reading Prof. Keohane - I still reckon that China is quite capable of behaving utterly irrationally in a pure realist sense, even if in itself it believes in the rationality of its actions.
First Economist article below.
Continue reading "Tin Ears and Sharp Tongues" »
 The G8 finance ministers got together today for a preliminary meeting ahead of July's summit. At the top of the agenda, naturally, is energy security.
But that's boring. And something far more important got going on Friday. It's even bringing colour to the usually grey cheeks of The Economist.
...the comparison with the Olympics is striking. Think of all those robotic East German sprinters, Romanian gymnasts and Chinese swimmers churned out by state-backed programmes. By contrast, a winning football team needs not just athleticism but also a spark of creativity and style that cannot be manufactured by sport's central planners. Even taking drugs does not appear to be much help for footballers.
The World Cup is apolitical. The USA will probably be crap again. China and Russia aren't even in it. The superpowers are Brazil and a clutch of developing and declining countries.
Who will be this year's heroes? We shall see...
Continue reading "The Beautiful Games Begin!" »
Cold War Standoff, Lukewarm Co-operation or Something Else Altogether?
In Iran is embodied all of the issues of our time: nuclear ‘rogue states’; Islamic fundamentalism; energy security. And both the US and its rising rival, China, have vital interests in its future.
America’s policy is heavily discussed, and the newspapers are filled with fact, hearsay and rumour about its next move. But what will China do? Given that it has more significant stakes in Iran than in the other ‘Axis’ members, can the Chinese ruling classes just look the other way as they did with Iraq? Will they push for a settlement as they are doing with North Korea? Or will they confront the US in the United Nations and even on the ground?
At this crucial junction for the world order, neither neo-realism and neo-liberalism – both written and practised by ‘Occidental’ thinkers, not ‘Oriental’ – may be fully adequate to explain what happens next. Indeed, are our understandings of Chinese interests correct at all?
Download Word file here or read the main text below. (File contains additional footnotes and bibliography).
Continue reading "Theorising China's Iran Crisis Policy" »
 Or 14 "observations" on counter-insurgency, in this case.
Quite a few years ago, a British Army TV recruiting campaign veered away from the glamorisation of military life and served up something else altogether. In one ad, the viewer was confronted with an angry African refusing to give soldiers access to his well. The officer removed his sunglasses and calmed the man with eye contact.
It was an example of the way we do things in Britain, and I remember my own officer once telling me to take off my shades one day at the range. "Only Americans wear those," he told me. The implication was: "And the American soldier doesn't understand how to get on with the civilian."
In retrospect it comes as no surprise that the US military did not have any knowledge about how to conduct an operation of the type it finds itself embroiled in today. How this is still possible after Vietnam, however, beggars belief. According to the BBC's Paul Reynolds:
...there was no such counter-insurgency doctrine in the US military as a whole when the invasion of Iraq was launched in early 2003. There was no expectation that one would be needed. The hope was for a quick war and a quick peace.
In the aftermath of Haditha, the US have belatedly turned to their UK allies for a bit of advice - and even to TE Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom, from which the title quote comes.
The author is careful to point out that the British are not perfect, but I'd still say that we are a lot better than the US when it comes to judicious use of "underwhelming force". Part of this is down to experience, but the rest of it is down to a different mindset.
With notable exceptions, on the whole the British soldier is disciplined and aware of the environment he is operating in. That means knowing a bit about the local culture and being able to communicate with the local people.
It's softly, softly catchee monkey out there. The Cold War is over - that's what force transformation was meant to be all about. No good charging around in your APCs all day, dressed in full kit, Ray-Bans on and rock music blaring. That's not how to win hearts and minds.
But if America is not a "learning culture", what's the point in telling them that?
Continue reading "Wearing Shades and Eating Soup With a Knife" »
 It's exactly 17 years since Tiananmen: and 38 or so since My Lai. Nothing has changed.
The headlines today are all about the alleged massacre at Haditha. One would have thought that by now the US forces would have learned that this is not what wins hearts and minds, yet still it goes on. Like the CCP, it is caught in a political timewarp, where by divine right it may conduct itself as it wishes to achieve whatever it thinks necessary.
John Gittings makes the comparison between Haditha and Tiananmen in The Guardian's Comment is Free. His point is a little tenuous, but the final paragraphs hit home:
Are not the Chinese people - or at least the majority of them - much better off than before 1989? Is it not time to move on from Tiananmen Square?
There are simpler, more moral, arguments than these. It is wrong to kill civilians whether in the streets of Beijing or Baghdad. The mother of an Iraqi boy shot by US troops is as entitled to protest, as are the Tiananmen mothers. If regimes lie to their people, then those lies must be exposed. This is what brave Chinese protestors mean when they call on their government to "settle accounts with history". It should be a good rule for us all.
But the way I see it, 'incidents' like Haditha, not to mention Abu Ghraib, not only reduce the image of the US to its allies but gives succour to the CCP. If America can get away with it, why shouldn't we, you can almost hear them saying.
If the US truly does wish to be a responsible stakeholder in global affairs, it must be whiter than white. It can't afford to expose itself to criticism in this way. Because for every My Lai or Haditha there will follow an Andijan or a Tiananmen. It's all a question of relativity.
Continue reading "Six Four Oh Six" »
 Despite its dry and austere reputation, The Economist sticks to the mandate of true journalism: of late, for example, it has been instrumental in keeping Darfur in the international spotlight.
Tonight is the deadline for a deal to be struck between the government and rebels, and likely as not it won't happen.
However, on a positive note, the US is getting involved. This week has thus been a good one for the US, in my eyes: the correct judgement on Zacarias Moussaui and now at least the right moves towards Sudan. Iran, of course, is another matter, but at least the US is trying to push it through the UN Security Council.
Does this herald a new era for US diplomacy? I don't think so at all. There's always interests involved somewhere along the line:
George Bush is now said to be passionate about getting both NATO and United Nations forces on the ground in Darfur, an idea that the Islamist Sudanese government detests. The reality, however, is more nuanced. Sudans military intelligence has been supportive of both the CIA (spilling a few beans on al-Qaeda) and the janjaweed militias who have done most of the killing in Darfur. So the question for the Bush administration is not just how to stop the slaughter, which it has called a genocide, but how to stop it at the same time as keeping Sudan more or less on side in the war on terrorism.
Nevertheless, it's the right move, especially in the face of UN inadequacy over the food programme. However, it's very doubtful whether a NATO or UN force could be effective, and inevitably it'll end up as another quagmire.
Continue reading "An Eye on Darfur" »
It's the right decision, both legally, politically and morally.
Evil as the man is, he did not actually kill anyone himself: he only plotted to do so. The other 19 hijackers gained for themselves martyrdom, if not in the eyes of God, certainly in the eyes of legions of angry young Muslims looking for heroes.
Were Moussaoui to be executed, he would become another such beacon for Islamic extremism. Osama Bin Laden would have a field day: imagine the speech he would make on al-Jazeeera.
The US needs to regain the international legitimacy for its human rights policy that was lost at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. This is a step towards achieving that aim, and placing the US back on the legal and moral pedestal that it needs to assert its primacy.
Most people wish it could be Christmas every day. Zacarias Moussaoui wishes it could be 9/11 every day. I'm sure he'll do well in a US jail, just like Jeffrey Dahmer.
BBC report here and reprinted below.
Continue reading "Moussaoui to Live" »
A few select cuttings from this year's Internet report by media freedom organisation Reporters sans Frontiers.
I've actually exercised some self-censorship in cutting the name of a dissident currently under arrest in China from the copy. This is not because I am trying to conceal his identity - it's easy to find out, if you have access to the RSF website - but because search engines, spiders, robots and censorship technology within the Chinese mainland may well find his name and add me to the blocked list. Yes, a little overcautious perhaps, but remember that RSF itself is very very blocked in the PRC.
Read on below - don't say I'm not even-handed.
Continue reading "Annual Internet Report" »
 So, if we already know that a UN resolution is going to be vetoed, why bother even drafting it?
The basic point of today's news is that a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is being prepared to try to manage the Iran nuclear crisis. This follows the IAEA's report to the UN Security Council that Iran is breaking its obligations on the enrichment of uranium - confirmed by Iran itself.
The relevant part of the chapter is Article 41:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
However, as we read in The Guardian (also below), China and Russia will both veto any decision on actual sanctions. So what's the point?
There basically is none, other than as a face-saving measure for the US (and most likely its special friend, the UK). As long as the appearance of going the UN is kept up, then the US can later say "well, the UN was ineffective, so we had to go it alone".
There is zero chance that military action will be authorised under Article 42, but we all know it's going to happen eventually. This is the beginning of the diplomatic process of preparing the ground for the recriminations that will come later.
Continue reading "So the Point Is, Exactly?" »
 It's 1 May, and that means rioting! Well, maybe not today. Oh, and it's this blog's six-month anniversary too.
The hijack of Labour Day by globalisation (whether pro- or anti-) is continuing, however, in the shape of a strike by immigrant workers in the US, as pointed out in The Economist's Global Agenda.
Immigration is the subject of this week's study, and I concede that it's something I haven't thought an awful lot about before. But I myself am the product of immigration in many ways:
My father is an immigrant, who came to the UK in the 1960s and stayed on, though now he lives between both New Delhi and London.
I emigrated from Canada to the UK, and still hold a Canadian passport. I am now naturalised as a British citizen, and thus as an EU citizen.
I spent two years in Shanghai, as a 'foreign expert' transferring my skills to Asia.
I now live in the Netherlands: I'm waiting on my resident's permit.
In the west, it is something that affects us all - it's a further breakdown of the boundaries of the nation state.
Full article below.
Continue reading "The True Labour Day" »
 Another Bin Laden tape surfaced today, and the BBC offers a translation. Yes, OK, I'm guilty of it myself, but it's amazing how much interest the old duffer can still provoke, even three-and-a-half years after 9/11.
Osama Bin Laden is no longer a relevant figure. Whatever 'al-Qaeda' actually is, and whether or not he is still the nominal head of it, international Islamic terrorism has transcended his influence. Terrorists act more or less alone these days. They attack independently and with minimal supervision from the FBI's most-wanted. But for the need for finance and supplies, they would be outside the jurisdiction of all but the most local of groups.
And there have been few significant attacks since Madrid. Of course I wouldn't be saying this were I in Baghdad, but killing other Muslims isn't part of the strategy, I reckon.
Parts of Bin Laden's speech itself are notable for their twisting of logic, but that's propaganda for you. On Sudan:
One of the areas of gravest strife was western Sudan, where some differences among the tribesmen were used to trigger a ferocious war among them that consumes everything in its way, in preparation for sending Crusader forces to occupy the region and steal its oil under the cover of maintaining security there. It is a continuous Zionist-Crusader war against the Muslims.
Wrong. In fact Chinese and Malaysian companies hold the majority of the equity in Sudan's oil production.
The next paragraph also makes me wonder:
...you smile in our faces, saying: We are not hostile to Islam; we are hostile to terrorists, and we advocate peaceful coexistence and dialogue rather than a clash of civilizations. The reality belies their pronouncements, for the Western diplomats only seek dialogue for the sake of dialogue. They aim to deceive and anaesthetise us in order to buy time. They only want us to observe a truce.
Well done Osama for flicking through Huntingdon's book (I wonder if The Clash of Civilizations is available in Arabic?), but despite appearances the West is not really bent on destroying Islam. It would be more than happy to co-exist with Muslims, so long as it can buy their oil under favourable terms. That's the real point.
Go back to your cave, Osama (though I suspect that you're actually hiding in Pervez Musharraf's spare room) and leave us in peace. Leave the jihad to those who are actually out there fighting.
Update: Even Hamas and the Sudanese government don't want to know about this.
There again, there's always going to be someone who buys this stuff and goes out and acts upon it...
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