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From Plato to NATO in real-world contexts
Here's the thing, right? There are two clear underlying causes to all the major problems on earth. The first is overpopulation. Overpopulation means that there are too many people chasing after too many resources - energy, water, land etc. which inevitably leads to conflict. Enough has been written about that to sink a battleship.
Second, there's subjectivity. What's that? It's a lack of objectivity in our approaches to these problems. It's a natural trait of humanity to form into groups, but every group defines itself by a subjective outlook on the world around it. It's thus these groups that enter into conflicts.
Some examples. No objective discussion of the Middle East is possible due to Israel's emotional outlook: thanks to the Holocaust, any criticism or compromise is decried as 'anti-Semitic'. Likewise, Arab nations and Islamic terrorist groups cannot see past the Palestinian question.
The same is true wherever you look. Such is China's emotional attachment to Taiwan and Tibet that any questioning of the situation is condemned as "interference in our internal affairs". Same goes for Serbia, Russia and Kosovo. The dysfunctional tendencies of the UN and EU are all down to questions of national interest. Even the US defines itself these days with reference to 9/11 and any attempt to rationally tackle the greater issues are met with the same response.
So states and other actors are not rational - they are indeed irrational. International relations theory has it exactly wrong.
The only answer is to find a unifying threat or goal, a way to bring all the conflicting groups together into one. And, ironically, overpopulation provides us with that. We are faced with a significant common problem, that of climate change, for which overpopulation is a major cause. Too many people needing too many products, burning too much fuel and cutting down too many trees... you get the picture.
So work together to solve the population crisis and you have an answer to the irrationality that causes conflict and environmental degradation. It's so simple.
 Next Thursday, 7 February, sees the beginning of the Chinese Year of the Rat, the first in the Chinese Zodiac cycle. No, this isn't some cod astrological analysis: but it does put a little bit of mystical context in. Just look at all the international factors that are just about to converge and you'll see what I mean.
Basically, the next weeks and months could see some rather serious developments in the global political picture.
Kosovo might soon be declaring independence, and despite dissent it looks like most of the international community is going to recognise it. What few realise is that, for Serbia, the secession of Kosovo would be a disaster of monumental proportions. And they're holding an election this weekend in which a hard-right president could be selected.
Already locking horns with the UK, Russia is probably going to stand by Serbia - which means increasing antagonism with the rest of Europe. I can certainly foresee the gas spigot getting turned off for a couple of days, which given the present frigid economic (let alone meteorological) climate could have a severe impact.
Speaking of elections, it's Super Tuesday this week, another moment that's going to define the course of things to come. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Mitt Romney or John McCain: the field of four will probably narrow down to two candidates for the top job in the world.
Not long after that, Monday 18 February is finally going to see elections in Pakistan. Whether rigged or not, there will inevitably be implications for regional stability.
Furthermore, set that against the context of Afghanistan. President Karzai has just shot his nation in the foot by turning away one of Britain's most competent statesmen, Lord Ashdown, as a potential UN envoy.
Moreover, NATO is lumbering towards a crisis with Germany refusing to pull its weight and Canada getting very cold feet in the face of what looks like sheer petulance from its allies. Thus, the NATO conference set for next week could well define the future of the mission, and general stability in Afghanistan. Condi is already jetting in do do her firewoman act.
We don't want to see either Pakistan or Afghanistan go down; both of them falling apart at the same time would be disastrous.
And finally, look at China.
Anyone who's queued for rail tickets at Spring Festival - even in a good year - will tell you what a nightmare it is. This year has seen the worst weather in half a century and chances are that the world's largest internal migration is not going to go ahead as planned. That means some unhappy chappies down Chinatown.
Add to that the very real danger of a food crisis - a failed crop could tip China over the edge - compounded by the general economic malaise and you have a recipe for civil unrest in Olympic year.
And finally, add to that a touch of spice in the form of an upcoming referendum in Taiwan (set for 22 March) and you have a fiery plate of noodles indeed.
In summary, there are various crises impending in Eastern Europe, South Asia and East Asia. The year 2008 could well be going for a bag of rats.
"Yankee go home, but take me with you!" How long is that going to last? This writer seems to believe tha the European and Chinese ways are catching on more now than the American way. I'm slightly sceptical as to the former, but there's certainly an element of truth in it.
On the other hand, the strength of America's style of democracy - I say 'style' since it's not an absolute democracy as one gets from proportional representation methods - does mean that we will have regime change in a year. It's the Bush administration that has sown alienation against the US, not America per se. It can still be turned around, though of course the trend is a general one.
Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.
But Europe lacks a coherent foreign policy, even now, and the Treaty of Lisbon probably won't alleviate that fundamental weakness by 2016. Then again, as pointed out, the Euro is now the real tool of Brussels foreign policy.
As for Beijing: "Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example." That's a Warsaw Pact in-the-making if ever I saw one.
Note also the logical follow-on from my 2012 scenario and big picture theory of simultaneous bipolar-multipolarity, plus the importance of Gwadar.
United States - International Diplomacy - Economic Trends - World Economy - Politics - New York Times
It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.
The author Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow in the American Strategy Program of the New America Foundation (sounds disturbingly like PNAC to me, but will let that one go. The essay is adapted from his book, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, to be published by Random House in March. Gonna add it to my Amazon wish list, I think.
Well, it's that time again - as the year 2007 draws to a close, we look to the future. And one thing is for sure: the primary foci of this weblog, Pakistan and China, were hardly out of the news this year and won't be in 2008 either.
 For China especially, 2008 is the crunch year. The Olympics have acquired a kind of existential significance, and their success or failure have become intertwined with China's contemporary sense of its national identity.
Unfortunately, I can't see the games being the resounding success that the CCP hopes for. Chinese athletes will probably haul in the most medals, but with the enormous pressures upon them there will inevitably be doping scandals. Other athletes will scorn the terrible pollution; tourists will be messed about, pushed, shoved and spat around (most Beijingers will behave admirably, but it'll still be the negatives that get remembered); and journalists will lament the restrictions on free reporting. Few Chinese yet realise how things will be perceived, and it will come as a shock.
Most of all, this most political of sporting events will inevitably be deeply politicised. There will be incidents: medal-winners standing up for Tibet, Taiwanese declarations, perhaps even Uyghur violence. Expect 888 to be a very interesting moment in the definition of the new China.
Turning to Russia, there Putin will remain in control, despite the appointment of a new president in Medvedev - little more than a deputy, really, But I have confidence in Putin: he is not stupid, and will not wish relations with the EU and NATO to deteriorate further. Things were getting silly, what with all this missile defence rubbish, not to mention Litvinenko and Lugovoi, and in 2008 Russia will attempt to repair some of the damage - though not with Britain, who will be the main losers.
Meanwhile, it will be a period of reflection for the EU itself, as the member states attempt to digest the implications of the Lisbon Treaty. Expect at least one ratification to fail.
 There is at least reason to positive about the Middle East. Iraq has calmed in 2007, though of course it's not the end by any stretch of the imagination. We are also thankfully unlikely to see action against Iran either. Bush desperately needs a positive legacy to speak of, so with elections in full swing at home he and his cronies may attempt at least to broker a compromise solution. Does he have what it takes? We shall see.
But there are clearly going to be fireworks in Pakistan. Far too early to tell how things will pan out, but it probably won't be good. This writer is already predicting a Balkanisation of the country: that may be going too far, but with the conflicts in NWFP and Balochistan likely to gain pace as society fractures after the elections then the prospects for stability are low. Great map too - worth examining to see what it suggests about Iran and Iraq and all
It is almost certainly the end of the road for Musharraf, and with Bhutto gone there will be a power vacuum. Power vacuums mean conflict, as we have seen in Iraq. But the West and India have meddled enough in Pakistan - it is up to them.
Recognition of global turmoil as the basic challenge of our time requires confronting complexity. That is the weakness of the issue insofar as the American political scene is concerned. It does not lend itself to sloganeering or rouse the American people as viscerally as terrorism. It is more difficult to personalize without a demonic figure like Osama bin Laden. Nor is it congenial to self-gratifying proclamations of an epic confrontation between good and evil on the model of the titanic struggles with Nazism and Communism. Yet not to focus on global turmoil is to ignore a central reality of our times: the massive worldwide political awakening of mankind and its intensifying awareness of intolerable disparities in the human condition
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership
 When I started this blog two years ago, crude was priced at $60 per barrel. Now it's $96. The dollar was $1.21 to the Euro then: now it's $1.44.
So go the figures. Something is up. There is a big picture to this, and - shock and awe - after spending the best part of the last two years studying International Relations, I have a theory.
The basic idea is this: there are too many people chasing too few resources. Breaking down this simple statement brings us to two key players - the US and China. And the hidden factor is the instability of a multipolar world that is evolving into a bipolar structure: the 'West', led by Washington, and the 'Rest', very loosely led by China, competing for dominance over those resources, particularly energy.
 The thing is that, unlike the Cold War where two political ideologies were in competition, current US hegemony is still based on military and political power projection, whereas China's ace of spades is economic soft power.
The misuse of firepower is adding to rather than reducing the global instability that came to our notice on 9/11 (but had existed well before then). The World Trade Center attacks were as much a protest against US foreign policy than a statement about political Islam, and since then Islamist terrorism has increased exponentially.
The instability caused by terrorism is adding to the energy crisis by contributing to high prices if not yet directly threatening supply. Meanwhile, China's economic leverage means that the only way that US industry can compete is with a weak dollar. However, both things mean that oil producers such as Russia and manufacturers such as China are building enormous reserves of dollars, shifting the centre of the world economy away from the West. Thanks to events such as the subprime crisis, an economic meltdown is probably imminent.
China and Russia themselves are involved in abetting instability. While they do not directly support terrorism, they sponsor states such as Iran, the key outside player in Iraq and probably Afghanistan. Pakistan is also a pivotal state in all this, since if Pakistan goes down Afghanistan goes with it.
If Iran is bombed too, as looks increasingly likely, there will be a black hole of chaos slap bang in the middle of Eurasia - from Iraq through to Pakistan - creating a massive geographical chokepoint that most of the world's energy needs to get past.
The more terrorists that are bred in the black hole, the more the West has to spend on security, thus diminishing economies and general confidence. The US is already spewing vast quantities of blood and treasure on Iraq, a situation that can only be helping China's peaceful rise and Iran and Russia's leverage over the energy market.
Add to this the threat of WMD. After the Cold War ended in 1989, only the US had the capability to launch a decisive military blow. Now anyone, terrorist groups included, with a bomb (probably with uranium sourced from Russia and technology from Pakistan, itself donated by China) and a suitcase can hold any other entity to ransom - just as energy suppliers like OPEC and Russia can cut off dependent economies overnight.
Iran and Pakistan are both the key proxy players and the key potential battlegrounds. China and the US are vying for control of both, since whoever calls the shots in Tehran and Islamabad calls the shots over Gulf oil and the terrorist training grounds in Iraq, Afghanistan and the lawless badlands of Pakistan.
 Russia sits in the middle, ostensibly neutral but leaning towards China and away from the US. It got burnt in Afghanistan in the '80s, but isn't shy of lending a helping hand to Iran. Conversely, India is also on the fence, but looks to Washington rather than Beijing. It needs stability in Pakistan above all else, since the threat of a nuclear standoff could suddenly become very real.
Thus it's all connected. That's what this blog is about - making the connections. It's not a dissimilar situation to the Cold War with its proxy conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but it is a more complex one. Instead of two or three, there are now four horsemen of the apocalypse - the West, meaning America and its rather powerless allies (notably Europe and probably India), versus the Rest's nexus of counter-hegemony - China and its partners-in-crime Russia and Iran.
The prospects for war? Unlikely at the time being, since Beijing and Washington are still playing different games. Should they ever go head-to-head, however, over Taiwan for example, then all hell will break loose.
 On the back of the BBC's excellent analysis of the Bush administration's failure on Iraq, 'No Plan, No Peace' comes a similar analysis from The Economist. The essence of both is that Cold War thinking is useless in the modern era.
It's hard to summarise two hours of BBC documentary, but the essence was this: the US didn't have a plan for the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and while the British had deep misgivings they failed to make an impact. Memorable moments include: the admission that the only intelligence on Iraqi culture came from the Lonely Planet; the discovery that orders for the aftermath had been copied directly from the Marshall Plan ("the only currencies shall be the US Dollar and the Reichsmark"); and the description of Rumsfeld's deputy as "the dumbest m****f***** I've ever met". Timeless comedy, were it not so tragic.
There needs to be a realisation in the corridors of power that the days of pitched battles and supremacy by superior firepower are gone. That was true in Vietnam, and arguably as far back as the Battle of Jutland. What matters is intelligence and boots on the ground - not soldiers brainwashed in bootcamp but educated professionals able to understand and adapt to the alien culture around them. No amount of technology can replace that. After all, the true weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47.
The reluctance of politicians to accept that this is the true 'Revolution in Military Affairs' is saddening. Rumsfeld's assumption was that a light force could take Saddam out in a matter of weeks, which was correct: but this did not dovetail well with his deeply flawed assumption that everything would be fine afterwards. The surge does appear to be working, but it would have been better in 2003 than now, after thousands have died, the country in chaos and Iran is in the ascendency. You need lots of well-worn boots, not a few shiny new hi-tech weapons.
Armies of the future | Brains, not bullets | Economist.com
The “transformation” advocated by Donald Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed forces would be slimmed down and money invested in “smart” weapons, reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its “future warrior” was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an artificial “exoskeleton” (a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his limbs.
The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states. Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians.
The comment below, delivered at a conference on genocide is heretical but true. In the 2005 film Lord of War it is said that "the real weapon of mass destruction is the AK-47". That's entirely correct, but the real engines of genocide are poverty and weakness - accompanied by complacency on the part of the "international community".
Give people the arms to fight evil - it's bloody and nasty and lots of people suffer terribly - but in the long run, less of them will die. Allow them to retaliate back with superior armed force. Horribly Machiavellian, but such is the reality of geopolitics.
BBC NEWS | Americas | Can the world stop genocide?
French author Gerard Prunier, like the proverbial ghost at a wedding, said genocides could not be prevented by the international community.
"When you see a dictatorial regime heating up, everyone starts talking, talking, talking ... and by the time the talking stops, either matters have quietened down or they have happened."
And that is the crux of the matter, according to Mr Prunier - it is difficult for politicians or the military to intervene in a situation that has not yet evolved into a crisis.
So what is Mr Prunier's solution?
"Genocides can only be stopped by the people directly involved - and usually that means people involved in the war that accompanies most mass killings."
And if it is the government committing the genocide, the solution is "arm the rebels", he says.
"It won't be clean - it will be messy," the French author said, "but it is more likely to stop the mass killing than international intervention."
Finally, I've found an IR thinker who isn't wrapped up in misconceived notions of 'science', 'method' and 'theory' and sees the field for what it really is - an infinitely complex and mutable non-systemic entity that warrants close examination in context of itself, not someone's tired old ideas from the last century.
The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct. Naive falsificationism takes it for granted that the laws of nature are manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. Empiricism takes it for -ranted that sense experience is a better mirror of the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that the artifices of Reason give better results than the unchecked play of our emotions. Such assumptions may be perfectly plausible and even true. Still, one should occasionally put them to a test. Putting them to a test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them, start doing science in a different way and see what happens. Case studies such as those reported in the preceding chapters show that such tests occur all the time, and that they speak against the universal validity of any rule. All methodologies have their limitations and the only 'rule' that survives is 'anything goes'.
Paul Feyerabend, Against Method
Will need to check this guy out in more detail...
QUOTES: Paul Feyerabend
It is conceited to assume that one has solutions for people whose lives one does not share and whose problems one does not know. It is foolish to assume that such an exercise in distant humanitarianism will have effects pleasing to the people concerned. From the very beginning of Western Rationalism intellectuals have regarded themselves as teachers, the world as a school and 'people' as obedient pupils. In Plato this is very clear. The same phenomenon occurs among Christians, Rationalists, Fascists, Marxists. Marxists no longer try to learn from those they want to liberate; they attack each other about interpretations, viewpoints, evidence and take it for granted that the resulting intellectual hash will make fine food for the natives.
Against Method, 1975
I would say, for most of the misery in our world, wars, destruction of minds and bodies, endless butcheries are caused not by evil individuals but by people who have objectivised their personal wishes and inclinations and thus have made them inhuman.
Farewell to Reason, 1987
Travel did many things to a person, but the one thing it did most successfully was break a person down. Admittedly, my travel experiences were not very representative. My experience with travel was Central Asia. Central Asia, then, broke a person down. It did so first by exhilaration. Was this place real? Was I really here? It did so next by exhaustion. Nothing was easy, and each hassle and bribe and malfunction and injustice took something of one's spirit, bent it, made it meaner. Then came the most brutal breakdown of all: the knowledge of how easily one could live within that meanness.
Tom Bissell
Chasing the Sea
Rising China, Shining India; the quagmire in the Persian Gulf and America’s Global War on Terror. These are some of the focal points of international politics in 2007, and none of them exist in isolation.
For the giant populations of Asia to continue their slow grind out of poverty requires economic growth; industrialisation and development must be fuelled. Both China and India are increasingly dependent on oil and gas imports, and in order to safeguard their futures energy security is vital. So each needs to command new sources and new ways of bringing in fossil fuels.
There are some vital strategic areas that can serve as transit routes in both China and India’s energy security policies. Thus geopolitics return to the historical heartland of Kipling’s Kim – the territory now known as Pakistan. It is as if the original Great Game has gone back to square one, only with some fresh rules and new players.
This thesis aims to examine the geopolitical implications of developing Pakistan as an ‘energy hub’, and to analyse the impediments to its fruition and the interested parties’ strategies for seeing it through. And, whereas other studies tend to focus on individual factors at work, it aims instead to critically observe them in the context of the situation as a whole.
Bound copies are available at lulu.com for around $10 plus P&P; downloadable PDF files are free of charge. Click here to access the virtual storefront.
This work is made available on the understanding that it will not be copied, plagiarised or otherwise reproduced without the explicit consent of the author.
No man likes to be beaten. But to be beaten by the man who has always stood as the particular example of mediocrity in his eyes, to start by the side of this mediocrity and to watch it shoot up, while he struggles and gets nothing but a boot in his face, to see the mediocrity snatch from him, one after another, the chances he’d give his life for, to see the mediocrity worshipped, to miss the place he wants and to see the mediocrity enshrined upon it, to lose, to be sacrificed, to be ignored, to be beaten, beaten, beaten – not by a greater genius, not by a god, but by a Peter Keating – well, my little amateur, do you think the Spanish Inquisition ever thought of a torture to equal this?
Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead
“I want you to hear. I want you to know what’s in store for you. There will be days when you look at your hands and you’ll want to take something and smash every bone in them, because they’ll be taunting you with what they could do, if you found a chance for them to do it, and you can’t find that chance, and you can’t bear your living body because it has failed those hands somewhere. There will be days when a bus driver will snap at you as you enter a bus, and he’ll only be asking for a dime, but that won’t be what you’ll hear; you’ll hear that you’re nothing, that he’s laughing at you, that it’s written on your forehead, that thing they hate you for. There will be days when you’ll stand in the corner of a hall and listen to creature on a platform talk about buildings, about that work which you love, and the things he’ll say will make you wait for somebody to rise and crack him open between two thumbnails; and then you’ll hear the people applauding him, and you’ll want to scream, because you won’t know whether they’re real or you are, whether you’re in a room full of gored skulls, or whether someone has just emptied your own head, and you’ll say nothing, because the sounds you could make – they’re not a language in that room any longer; but if you’d want to speak, you won’t anyway, because you’ll be brushed aside, you who have nothing to tell them about buildings! Is that what you want?”
Ayn Rand, The Fountainhead
Peter Howard-Comment-Obituaries-TimesOnline
During 2000, Peter Howard was my boss at Jane's Navy International, and I couldn't have asked for a better editor and mentor in my early years. He will be missed.
His family's nominated charities are The British Lung Foundation and The Gurkha Welfare Trust, and donations would be appreciated.
Peter's obituary from The Times reprinted below.
Continue reading "Goodbye, Peter" »
Who said democracies never go to war with each other? If this escalates, and Lebanon is extremely shaky at the moment, it's goodbye and good riddance to Immanuel Kant.
BBC NEWS | Middle East | Clashes on Israel-Lebanese border
Israeli and Lebanese forces have exchanged fire on the border between the two countries, reports say.
The clash broke out after Israeli troops searched a border area for bombs, following the discovery of four explosives on Monday.
Lebanese troops fired on Israeli tanks inside the border zone, prompting retaliatory fire, Israeli reports said.
Israel and Lebanon's Hezbollah militia fought a 34-day war last year sparked by flare-ups on the tense border.
It is becoming more and more obvious by the day that the post-Cold War world is not, after all, multipolar but bipolar. The great powers are the US and China. This is especially obvious when it comes to Middle East affairs, though interests coincide as much as they conflict. Of course, the biggest leveller is energy security - and that's the central objective for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese foreign policy | A quintet, anyone? | Economist.com
Never mind that China, in the more than four years since it appointed a special envoy to the Middle East, has offered no original ideas. To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-exporting countries, China has rapidly emerged since the 1990s as a big customer and investor. Some 45% of China's oil imports from January to November last year were from the Middle East. To countries such as Iran and Syria, eager to check American power in the region, China's veto power at the UN and its shared misgivings about America make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy...
China worries about its dependence on American military might for the security of its oil shipments from the Middle East. It is still a long way from being able to project military power over such a distance itself, though a Chinese official was quoted in the state-owned press this week as saying China had the ability to build an aircraft carrier, but had not decided when to do so. China is trying to diversify its sources of energy, buying more from Russia, Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.
But experts predict that China will long remain heavily dependent on energy from the Middle East. So it has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with America's tactics, but will share the same broad objective. Jeffrey Bader, a former senior American diplomat now at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, DC, says that China's resistance to American initiatives in Sudan and Iran depends on Russian support for its position. If Russia were to switch sides, so too would China, he argues. It is in no mood to take on America alone.
No, not Tiananmen, Tiawan, Tibet and torture (hope that doesn't get this website blocked). Now we're talking about the traingular relationships of China, India, Pakistan and the US. I might add Iran in there as well - see below.
Asia Times Online :: China News - The geometry of Sino-Indian ties
Hu's visit will be the crowning event to mark a decade of steady improvement in bilateral relations and serve as an impetus for further strengthening ties between Asia's two emerging powers. However, the substance and consolidation of the improving bilateral relationship will have to overcome what I term the four Ts - threat perceptions; territorial disputes; and the two triangulars, ie, China-India-US and China-India-Pakistan.
Despite progress in bilateral relations over the past few years, mutual suspicions remain. Partly this is due to the dynamics of security dilemma and structural conflicts between the two Asian giants. India has watched China's phenomenal growth in economic and military areas with both envy and alarm. The very fact that China continues to lead India on many indicators of power poses a greater threat than its military defeat 40 years ago.
Likewise, China is paying close attention to India's growing military power and its nuclear and missile developments. Beijing is wary of New Delhi's eastward strategy of developing greater economic and military ties with Japan and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Just to really complicate matters, let's stick oil and and gas into the equation too. Then you have the Iran-US-China triangle over Iran's nuclear ambitions, and the Iran-Pakistan-India triangle relating to gas pipelines. No-one said this would be simple...
The Asia Times neatly throws structural realist theory straight out of the window. Also known as neo-realism, this Cold War theory rests on the idea of a balance of power between two giants (then the US and USSR); with equal military capabilities, the peace held for 50 years.
However, with information warfare and nuclear proliferation on the rise, and several examples in recent history of how a small, clever enemy can defeat the conventional military forces of a superpower (think Vietnam, Aghanistan I, 9/11, Afghanistan II, Iraq), it seems that asymmetric warfare is well and truly in. Sheer strength is irrelevant, as long as there is a David who knows how to topple the Goliath.
Asia Times Online :: Asian News, Business and Economy.
a conventional confrontation between the US and the comparatively smaller, less powerful Russia-China axis would quickly result in a catastrophe for the East. In fact, the rising East has intentionally kept its relations with the West as friendly as possible in order to avoid the terrible costs of a direct, conventional confrontation. This policy has facilitated, without needless interruption, the ongoing and massive transfer of wealth from the West to the emerging (rising) economies of the East. It is a very smart and pragmatic policy for the East.
Nevertheless, simultaneous with that policy another one is being actively pursued. The rising East is not content to merely assume that the US colossus will treat, or will learn to treat the globe's lesser powers in a fair and equitable manner, taking proper account of their legitimate views and interests.
Unilateralist, overly muscular and mostly self-serving US policies and actions since the 1991 collapse of the roughly balanced bipolar order of the two superpowers demonstrate that nothing can be taken for granted in that regard. Prudently, the rising multifarious East has been learning ever deeper and wider multilateral cooperation within itself in the energy, economic, diplomatic, political and military spheres aimed at developing and putting in place potent asymmetric leverages in all those same spheres.
The bigger they come, the harder they fall.
The last few weeks - which have seen China tighten its grip over Africa and Asia, and the Republicans lose their grip in the Capitol and rethink their whole strategy - has generated a slew of articles over at Asia Times Online.
One author speaks of a new East-West Cold War style conflict developing, though I'm not so sure how stable or even feasible a China-Russia-India alliance would be:
It isn't yet fashionable to speak openly of a world subdividing itself again into two camps - those aligned with the US and those aligned with the Russia-China axis at the core of a new rising, multifarious yet coherent pole of the East - with the dividing line between the two camps consisting of the contest for control over global strategic resources.
Despite all the relevant signs pointing precisely in that direction:
# The deepening accord in all key spheres between Russia, China, India, the other rising powers of the East and the key resource-rich regimes of the world.
# Steadily rising East-West tensions, the ever-more divergent interests between East and West.
# The increasingly incompatible approaches to global issues and problems resulting in an ever-widening chasm between East and West.
Far too long to analyse in full, but worth looking at at a later date.
Another writer re-examines the China-India relationship:
Professor Ma Jiali, a veteran South Asia expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), says India's recent economic performance combined with its growing importance in international affairs has led to a rethink in Beijing of India as zhong he guoli, a Mandarin term that translates roughly as a "comprehensive national power".
For Beijing, relations with India are now considered the highest priority, according to Professor Ma, given that India is what he calls a "four-in-one" country. "India falls into each of the four major categories of countries that China wants to focus its diplomatic energies on," he explained. The four categories are: Developing countries, neighboring countries, rising powers, and influential actors on the international stage.
Another still looks at China and Russia, and finally we have the four horsemen of America, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea.
There's really far too much to read here, but the implication is clear - the world is shaking into what looks like being its new order for quite a while. I personally will suggest that the US will remain one major pole, with China its key rival and Europe, Russia, India and Iran as second-tier powers that either ally with the gig pair or stand their distance. Both a multipolar and a bipolar environment at the same time - twice as nasty, twice as unpredictable.
The Faith and the State lecture series closed with a general debate held at the ISHSS in Amsterdam. Moderated by Maarten Huygen of NRC Handelsblad newspaper, the speakers were chosen to embody as best as possible the different strands of the discussions over the last two months.
In the right corner was atheist philosopher Prof Herman Philipse; ranged against him were the Labour party Mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, and Professor Hakan Yilmaz of Bogazici University, Istanbul. Also present was Cornell historian Professor Laurence Moore, representing the American dimension of the debate. Their main statements are detailed further elsewhere: what follows is a summary of the public forum itself.
Read on below.
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